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Commentary on the epistle to the Hebrews

by

Franz Delitzsch

tr. by

Thomas L Kingsbury

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SECOND SECTION.

THE HIGH-PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST GREATER THAN, AND ANTITYPICAL OF, THAT OF AARON.

CHAP. VII. 26–IX. 12. *Such an high priest (after the order of Melchizedek) it was meet that we should have; One, namely, who, having offered up Himself in sinless purity once for all, is royally enthroned at God's right hand, and who, being raised as Mediator of the new covenant infinitely above the Aaronic priesthood and their ministries in the earthly tabernacle, is working now for us in the archetypal sanctuary, into which He has once entered with His own blood, accomplishing thereby an eternal redemption.*

WITH one glance backwards [in τοιοῦτος γάρ] at the Melchizedekean nature of our Lord's priesthood expounded in the former section (vii. 1–25), and more especially at what was there said (in ver. 25) of Him as "ever-living," and so able perfectly to save and perpetually to mediate for us, the sacred writer thus continues:

Ver. 26. *For such an high priest was also meet for us, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens.*

The particle γάρ marks here a connection not loose and

accidental, as Tholuck assumes, but as close and intimate as possible. The whole following paragraph (vers. 26–28) is an expansion of the opening words: "for *such* an High Priest was meet also for us." This is evident from the circumstance that the series of five attributes in ver. 26 closes with "*made higher than the heavens*," and that this is again taken up at viii. 1, and made the starting-point of a fresh development. Τοιοῦτος refers back to the Melchizedek character of our Lord's priesthood just set forth (vii. 1–25), with which the sacred writer now combines its super-Aarónical and *high-priestly* character, as already intimated in a previous section (ch. v. 1–10), and (in a preparatory way) still earlier (ii. 17, 18, and iii. 1). Ἔπρεπεν, used before (ii. 10) to designate that which was meet or fitting for God to do on our behalf, is here repeated to designate what was meet and fitting for us to have in Him who should carry out the divine purpose,—a purpose which nothing less could satisfy than our transcendent inward and heavenly perfection. Καί (rightly inserted in the texts of Griesbach, Lachmann, and Tischendorf, before ἔπρεπεν[1]) is intensive, and not to be rendered by a mere "even," as by Winer ("for such an high priest was *even* the fitting one for us:" *Gr.* § 53, p. 389 Germ., p. 458 Eng. tr.). Much more is contained in it than that; the thought being: "We have such an high priest provided for us; and further, just such an one we stood in need of."

The five attributes which follow are not a mere expansion of the τοιοῦτος (Schlichting); nor, on the other hand, are they indefinite additions to its meaning (Lünemann, Bleek, De Wette, etc.); but are selected to characterize Him who is both a priest "after the order of Melchizedek," and (beyond the type of Melchizedek) a "*high* priest," the antitype of Aaron.

And (1.) He is styled, in reference to His relation to God the Father, ὅσιος (*sanctus*), godly-minded, saintly, so as on the one hand to be well-pleasing to God, and on the other to inspire reverence in us. In the citation [twice made from

[1] [The Codex Sinaiticus omits it.—Tr.]

the sixteenth Psalm at] Acts ii. 27 and xiii. 35, *τὸν ὅσιόν σου* is regarded as an appellation of Christ. It is there the rendering of the Hebrew חסידך [*thy pious*, or *favoured one*]. The Septuagint renders קדוש uniformly by *ἅγιος*, never by *ὅσιος*, and חסיד and the like adjectives always by *ὅσιος*, never by *ἅγιος*. The distinction between the two words is made by Hofmann to consist in *ἅγιος* denoting the antithesis of that which is out of or does not pertain to God, *ὅσιος* of that which is ungodlike and contrary to the divine will; while Ebrard regards *ὅσιος* as antithetical to "sinful," *ἅγιος* to "profane." The two distinctions are easily reconciled, and both are accurate. *Ἅγιος* and *ὅσιος* are related to each other much as our adjectives "holy" and "religious." *Ἅγιος*, when applied to a *person*, denotes a sacred, divinely dedicated, and guarded being; *ὅσιος* a godlike, divinely guided, and enlightened disposition.[1]

(2.) The second attribute of our High Priest is *ἄκακος*: this He is in relation to men, being without guile, malice, or unkindness of any sort, unreservedly good and gracious to all. *Ἄκακος* is here equivalent to the Hebrew תָּם; whereas at Rom. xvi. 18, *τῶν ἀκάκων* (*the simple ones*) would have to be rendered by פתאים.[2]

(3.) With reference to His perfect and perpetual fitness for the discharge of His priestly office, our Lord is styled *ἀμίαντος* (*immaculate*), as being both undefiled in fact and incapable of defilement. The first condition of lawful entrance into the Levitical sanctuary, and of service there, was corporeal purity (Lev. xv. 31). Priests, before performing divine service, and especially the high priest on the day of atonement (Lev. xvi. 4), were obliged to wash or bathe. But of Christ it is said, not only that He is actually free from every kind of uncleanness, but also incapable of contracting such: *ἀμίαντος*, from *μιαίνεσθαι*, the Septuagint rendering of הִטַּמֵּא (to make unclean). He is like the element of fire, which purifies other things, without itself contracting any impurity. Nor can aught unclean approach Him even outwardly now,

[1] See Note A at the end of this volume.

[2] See Note A.

to disturb the pure serenity of His heavenly mode of being. Therefore,

(4.) With reference to His present dwelling-place, He is spoken of as κεχωρισμένος ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν, that is, so separated from evil men (חטאים or רשעים) as to be henceforth unassailable by them (St. John vii. 32–36),—"*taken away*" (as Isaiah[1] expresses it) "*from the vexation*" or "*oppression*" (of their presence), and from their ungodly "*judgment*," whereby He was once condemned to a malefactor's death. The meaning of κεχωρισμένος ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν is not (as Ebrard assumes) that our Lord, in all His dealings with sinners, remains free from any inward sympathy with their sinfulness, nor (as Hofmann[2] and others put it) that He has nothing in common with sinners, whereby He could ever become like-minded with them; but simply, that in virtue of His exaltation He is now for evermore withdrawn from all perturbing contact with evil men. [The "contradiction of sinners" vexes Him no more] (Bengel, Tholuck, Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann). And even that is not all. He is also,

(5.) In respect to His present mode of existence, "*become higher than the heavens*" (ὑψηλότερος τῶν οὐρανῶν γενόμενος); *i.e.* He is now uplifted above all created heavens into the eternal realm of true life, or (as might be scripturally said) into the uncreated heaven itself of the divine nature, so that He is now become, strictly speaking, as to His mode of being, supra-mundane. Hofmann observes, quite correctly (*Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, 388): "*Whenever it is only meant to say*

[1] Isa. liii. 8. [Comp. Apoc. xii. 5, ἡρπάσθη τὸ τέκνον αὐτῆς πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Isaac Watts expresses the same thought finely in a communion hymn:

"With joy we tell the scoffing age,
He that was dead has left His tomb;
He lives above their utmost rage,
And we are waiting till He come."

Book iii. Hymn 19.]

[2] *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, 404. The correct interpretation of κεχωρισμένος is, however, assumed at pp. 32 and 286 of the same volume,—that, namely, which makes it express not so much a moral as a quasi-local separation.

of the glorified Jesus that He has departed from the world of humanity and is returned to the Father, the term εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν is quite sufficient. But it is not so when the purpose is to deny His inclusion within any sensible limitations that might avail to separate Him from the supra-mundane Godhead. In such case we have the expression ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν οὐρανῶν ('far above all the heavens'), Eph. iv. 10, and the like." [Comp. Heb. iv. 14.] Moreover, we certainly do not misrepresent the sacred writer's thought when we say, that while the first three of these attributes [ὅσιος, ἄκακος, ἀμίαντος] describe our Lord, in His high-priestly character, as the antitype of Aaron, and in His venerable, gracious, and immaculate humanity, the two last [κεχωρ. ἀπ. τ. ἁμαρτ. and ὑψηλοτ. τ. οὐρ. γενομ.] express the super-celestial exaltation of His royal priesthood, in which He is the antitype of Melchizedek, and has not only all enemies, but the heavenly world itself, nay, "all the heavens," beneath His feet. In this exaltation He is also raised above the typical high priests of the Old Testament in yet another particular: His great atoning sacrifice has been once offered in the past, and once for all.[1]

Ver. 27. *Who hath not daily need, like the high priests, to offer up sacrifices, first for his own sins, and then for those of the people, for this he did once for all, when he offered up himself.*

Ἀνάγκειν ἔχειν with following infinitive is a phrase familiar to St. Luke (xiv. 18, xxiii. 17); but in the Gospel and the Acts he uses προσφέρειν, not ἀναφέρειν, in this sense of offering sacrifice. Προσφέρειν, which is likewise of ordinary occurrence in our epistle, is the usual Septuagint rendering of הקריב (הביא); while ἀναφέρειν stands for העלה, and in the Pentateuch still more frequently for הקטיר in combination with המזבחה, the complete phrase being ἀναφέρειν ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον (comp. Jas. ii. 21). Ἀναφέρειν, which is used in the Septuagint in connection with the sin-offering (Lev. iv. 10, 31) as well as with the burnt-offering (עֹלָה), is pur-

[1] See Note B at the end of this volume.

posely chosen by the sacred writer here to express that lifting up of Christ upon the altar of the cross (*ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον*) which he seems to have mainly in view.[1] The expression *ἀναφέρειν θυσίας ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν* leads us to think specially of the sin-offerings under the law (חטאות); and the more so, because the additional phrases, *πρότερον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτιῶν, ἔπειτα τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ*, contain an evident reference to the ritual of the day of atonement, as was the case with the similar passage in ch. v. 3.[2] That presentation, however, first of a sin-offering for himself and his house, and then of another sin-offering for the whole congregation, was performed by the Levitical high priest only once a year (*κατ' ἐνιαυτόν*, ix. 25); whereas here the sacred writer appears to affirm this of the high priests, as being a part of their daily service (*καθ' ἡμέραν*),—a difficulty which has from the first severely exercised the ingenuity of interpreters. Various solutions have been proposed: 1. Some take *καθ' ἡμέραν* to signify, "on some one definite day in the course of the twelvemonth,"[3] or more generally, "on recurring days," "again and again;"[4] so Ebrard, with Bengel, would render *καθ' ἡμέραν* by "one day after another." He supposes the sacred writer looking back through the centuries to fix his eye merely on the series of successive days of atonement, on which the high priests of the law had again and again presented the same sacrifices. But this insertion of supposed yearly intervals would completely invert the proper meaning of *καθ' ἡμέραν*, which would likewise be the worst possible equivalent for *διαπαντός* that

[1] Compare 1 Pet. ii. 24 with Heb. ix. 28 [and Heb. xiii. 10 with the note there]. In the Hebrew sacrificial word הַעֲלָה (to make go up or ascend), the notions of sending up the sacrifice to heaven by fire, and of bringing it up to the altar (על־המזבח or במזבח), appear to be combined, nor is it easy to say which of the two should be regarded as the more prominent.

[2] *καθὼς περὶ τοῦ λαοῦ οὕτως καὶ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ προσφέρειν περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*, where the *περὶ ἁμ.* refers to the sin-offerings still more evidently than the *ὑπὲρ ἁμ.* here.

[3] So Schlichting, and others after him.

[4] Grotius, Böhme, De Wette.

an author so rich and so accurate in his phraseology could have chosen; whereas the proper expression for "every year on some fixed day" would be *τακτῇ ἡμέρᾳ*,[1] or *καθ' ἡμέραν μετὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτόν*, or *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ*, or something similar. We must therefore approve the attempt made by most modern interpreters[2] to find other ways of maintaining the accuracy of this assertion, that the high priests had need daily to offer, first for their own sins, and then for those of the people. To accomplish this, it is assumed —2. That the sacred writer is here consciously combining or confusing the special service of the high priest once a year on the day of atonement, with the part which he took in the daily sacrifices. We are consequently referred (*a*) to the daily morning and evening sacrifice, the *Thamid*, consisting of one lamb (and on the Sabbath of two lambs) on each occasion. But the high priest did not necessarily take part in this offering: he officiated only when it pleased himself to do so;[3] or, as Josephus says,[4] on Sabbaths, new moons, and other solemn occasions. The *ἀνάγκην ἔχει*, therefore, of our passage, would not be a suitable expression. Moreover, the *πρότερον* and *ἔπειτα*, the "first for himself" and the "then for the people," would have no proper significance in reference to the daily offering of the Thamid, which was intended to be mainly symbolical of the perpetual adoration due from Israel to his God, and was consequently presented at the beginning and close of each succeeding day, in the name not first of the high priest and then of the people, but of the whole congregation as an indivisible unity, while they in their turn were said to pray "before the Thamidim" (נגד תמידין), *i.e.* in the presence of these their daily or perpetual sacrifices. Reference has indeed been made to a passage in

[1] Dr. Biesenthal ingeniously suggests that *καθ' ἡμέραν* is here an erroneous rendering of what he assumes to have been the reading of the Hebrew original text of the epistle—יומא יומא—*i.e.* "every day of atonement." [The Jews call the day of atonement יומא, "the day," *i.e.* the day *κατ' ἐξοχήν*.—Tr.]

[2] With exception of Ebrard, as above, and of De Wette.

[3] So *Thamid* vii. 3, בזמן שרוצה, "at such time as pleases him."

[4] Jos. *Bell.* v. 5, 7.

Philo (i. 497, 26), according to which there were two kinds of Thamidim,[1]—one a daily offering made by the priests for themselves, and the other that made by them on behalf of the people. This is true; but by the Thamid offered for the people Philo understands, as he says himself expressly, the offering of the two lambs; and by the other or priestly Thamid—which he carefully distinguishes from this as (*διὰ*) *τῆς σεμιδάλεως*—he simply means the daily sacerdotal Minchah, which had nothing to do with the Thamid proper, and must be carefully distinguished likewise from the people's Minchah, which formed a part or appendage of their Thamid, as of every other burnt-offering. This sacerdotal Minchah, about which most interpreters of our epistle seem much in the dark,[2] may be supposed to have been in the author's mind when using the expression *καθ' ἡμέραν*, and so lead us (*b*) to another and more satisfactory interpretation of it. The facts of the case are these. We read at Lev. vi. 13–16[3] of a מנחה תמיד ("a meat-offering perpetual") which the high priest, from the day of his anointing onwards, had to offer daily, half in the morning and half at even. This Minchah, like every meat-offering for the priest, was to be "wholly burnt." It was therefore a daily vegetable holocaust (quite independent of any other sacrifice) which the high priest had to offer for himself, not for the people, as a daily renewed consecration to his office. We have nothing here to do with the question whether this precept bound the ordinary priests as well as the high priest; it is enough for our purpose to know that the latter had to present this Minchah on the day of his consecration, and was bound by the letter of the law to repeat it daily ever afterwards. As a sacrifice of initiation it was called מִנְחַת חִנּוּךְ (the Mincha of dedication), and in its daily repetition מִנְחַת חֲבִתִּין (the Minchah of pan-baked flour-cakes). There is a brief but express allusion to it in Ecclus. xlv. 14: *His*[4] (the high priest's) *sacrifices shall be*

[1] Philo calls them *αἱ ἐνδελεχεῖς θυσίαι.*

[2] See Note C at the end of this volume.

[3] In the English version, vers. 20–23.

[4] *θυσίαι αὐτοῦ.* [So also the Vulgate, *Sacrificia* IPSIUS *consumpta sunt*

wholly consumed, every day (*καθ' ἡμέραν*) *twice, perpetually* (*ἐνδελεχῶς*). Josephus also describes it, *Ant.* iii. 10, 7. After mentioning the loaves of shew-bread provided at the public expense, and placed on the holy table every Sabbath-day as an offering for the people, he proceeds: "The (high) priest also, at his own expense, offers a sacrifice (*θύει*), and that twice every day, consisting of flour mingled with oil, and gently baked, in quantity a tenth deal of flour. Half of this offering he brings to the fire in the morning, the other half at even." This daily sacerdotal Minchah, though offered under the second temple by a priest-vicar on behalf of the high priest, and not by the pontiff himself, was still provided, as Josephus correctly observes, at his expense: the high priest therefore remained the proper *ἀναφέρων*. Origen refers to this offering when he says (*Hom.* iv. *in Levit.*): "*In cæteris quidem præceptis pontifex in offerendis sacrificiis populo præbet officium, in hoc vero mandato quæ propria sunt curat et quod ad se spectat exequitur.*" Philo must also be alluding to the same sacrifice (*θυσία*),[1] when he says (ii. 321, 38) of the high priest, that as the kinsman of the whole nation he is "daily engaged in making for them prayers and sacrifices,[2] and imploring the best blessings on their behalf, as for those who are his brethren, his parents, and his children, that so the whole people of all ages and degrees may be joined together in one body, and the pursuit of unity and peace." We have in this probably the substance of the high priest's prayer pronounced over his daily Minchah (מנחת חביתין)—his *ἐνδελεχὴς θυσία*, as Philo elsewhere calls it[3]—whenever the office was borne by one rightly sensible of its great and central significance. It would seem therefore most natural to suppose, with the venerable Lundius (*Jüdische*

igne quotidie. Our English version reads, THEIR *sacrifices shall be wholly consumed,* as if our translators had read *αὐτῶν*, or thought that ought to be the reading.

[1] So called, as we have seen, by the son of Sirach (Ecclus. xlv. 14), with which also the *θύει* of Josephus, cited above, corresponds.

[2] *εὐχὰς καὶ θυσίας τελῶν καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν.*

[3] See Note D.

Heiligthümer, iii. 9, ss. 19) and (among moderns) with Thalhofer (*Unblutiges Opfer*, p. 119), that the *καθ' ἡμέραν* of our text must be referred to the then well-known and oft-mentioned pontifical Minchah of Lev. vi. But, nevertheless, I cannot convince myself that this could have been our author's real meaning. For (1) although, as we have seen, the high priest's Minchah might not incorrectly be called a sacrifice (*θυσία*), and although our author (as is plain from v. 1) designates all sacrificial offering (even that of the meat-offerings, מנחות or *δῶρα*, properly so called) as having the removal of sin for its ultimate object, and therefore made *ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν*, yet I cannot think it probable that he would have spoken of the high priest's Minchah simply by itself as a *θυσία ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν*; and the less so, inasmuch as the yet more definite expression *περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν* in ch. v. 3 leads us to think of a sin-offering proper, a חַטָּאת which the high priest had to make (*περὶ ἑαυτοῦ*) on his own behalf. And again, (2) the natural inference from the text in accordance with this interpretation—namely, that the high priests were wont to make daily offerings first for their own sins, and then for those of the people—would have nothing really corresponding to it in the actual liturgy of the temple services. For (*α*) even though the daily offering of the "flour-cakes" (חבתין) was vicariously made on the high priest's behalf, and might therefore be correctly designated even under the second temple as *his* sacrifice, this could not in any way be maintained in respect to the Thamid, consisting of the two lambs, which were also offered by ordinary priests as representatives and on behalf of the people, and not in any respect by them as representatives or on behalf of the high priest. The high priest therefore could not be correctly said, in any sense, to offer the daily Thamid. And, further, (*β*) there is no precept in the Thorah which would justify the application of the term *πρότερον* to the presentation of the high priest's Minchah, and then of *ἔπειτα* to that of the people's Thamid. The order of presentation of these sacrifices in our author's time appears to have been as follows: First the people's Thamid was offered, *i.e.* the lamb; then its

appendage the daily Thamid-Minchah; then the high priest's Minchah (of which so much has been said, and which is also called in Lev. vi. a מנחה תמיד); and finally, the drink-offering, which was an additional appendage to the Lamb-Thamid.[1] On all these considerations, therefore, the interpretation offered by Lundius and Thalhofer must be abandoned.

But if we reject this interpretation, what other is there that we can propose in its stead? Not, surely, that very ingenious and peculiar one offered by von Gerlach, who would evade the difficulty by assuming that all the daily sacrifices might be ascribed to the high priest, as being one whose official dignity concentrated all the functions of the priesthood in his own individual person. This solution would have seemed more admissible if the reading in the text had been ὁ Ἀαρών, and not ὁ ἀρχιερεύς. The real solution, however, must have a less artificial character. Taking, then, for granted that "the offering first for his own sins, and then for those of the people," refers to the Mosaic ritual of the day of atonement, and to transactions which occurred (as the author himself remarks elsewhere) only once a year (κατ' ἐνιαυτόν), the meaning of this sentence must be, that Christ has no need to do that *daily* which the high priest does *annually*, and which, if needing to be repeated at all, must be repeated continually every day, in order to effect a complete atonement for continually emergent cases of sin. The correctness of this solution is supported by the delicately chosen position of the καθ' ἡμέραν before ἀνάγκην, and by the plural ὥσπερ οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς. Christ does not need (the writer would say) to offer sacrifices every day first for His own sins, and then for those of His church, in order to accomplish in His own person, and in the virtue of His own exclusive and eternal priesthood, that which all other high priests of all former ages had been endeavouring to do. [His own intrinsic perfection renders any repetition of His atoning acts unnecessary. Once done, they have eternal validity.] This solution agrees with that of Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 1, 287): "*The comparison here is not between what Christ might have*

[1] More on this point will be found in Lundius, v. 1, 2.

had to do and what the high priests actually have to do daily, but between what the high priests have to do [at certain fixed times] *and what Christ might have had to do daily:* [if it had been necessary for Him to repeat His atoning acts at all,] *it would then have been necessary for Him to do that again and again, and day by day, which He has now done once and for ever.*" This is perfectly true, but with what follows I cannot at all agree.

Hofmann proceeds to maintain that our Lord's atoning action (*τοῦτο ἐποίησεν*) is here represented as analogous not only to what the high priests did for the people, but also to what they first did for themselves in offering up sacrifices on their own behalf. This view—according to which our Lord's supplication in Gethsemane to be delivered from death, had in it, as an expression of human, albeit sinless infirmity, something analogous to the Levitical high priest's sin-offering for himself (*περὶ ἑαυτοῦ*)—has been already combated by us (see notes on ch. v. 7, 8). It may be said here to pass judgment on itself. For if we refer the *τοῦτο ἐποίησεν* to both the kinds of sacrifice mentioned in the clause preceding, we shall make the sacred writer say, and that more than indirectly, that Christ's self-offering once for all was *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτιῶν* as well as *ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ*. But such an interpretation would be (1) a blasphemy. (2.) It would make the sacred writer contradict himself, and his own denial that there was any *ἁμαρτία* in Christ, iv. 15. (3.) It would also contradict the fundamental idea of the sin-offering, according to which the only possible atonement for the sinful is that made by the Sinless: an *ἀναφέρειν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτιῶν* is, according to all the scriptural notions of sacrifice, a self-contradiction. The reader must not indeed infer from all this, that Hofmann's view has anything in common with that doctrine of Menken[1] and Irving, according to which there was in the Lord's flesh, though held in absolute restraint by the power of the Spirit, a certain latent *prava concupiscentia*. This view is rejected by Hofmann with the utmost decision; but we feel bound also to maintain against

[1] See Note D at the end of this volume.

him, that the sacred writer's mode of expressing himself here does not even admit of the question being raised, whether in the once-made self-oblation of our Lord there is so much as a distant analogy to the offering of the high priest *περὶ ἑαυτοῦ*. The very attributes *ὅσιος*, *ἄκακος*, and *ἀμίαντος* in the preceding verse are enough to show that our Lord needed not any offering in the slightest degree similar to that of the high priest *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων ἁμαρτιῶν*; for those attributes, though employed to characterize Him in the state of glory, are inseparably inherent in Him both in nature and person. *Τοῦτο*, therefore, must be referred back (with Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann, and many others) to the high priest *θυσίας ἀναφέρειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τοῦ λαοῦ*, and not merely (with Bengel and Ebrard) to the *θυσίας ἀναφέρειν* in general: for it is the whole relation in which Christ stands to the Aaronical high priest which is here under discussion; and we have seen that it belonged to the prerogatives of the latter, after qualifying himself by a sin-offering on his own behalf, to present sacrifices not only for single acts of sin, but also for all the sins of the whole congregation when gathered together on the day of atonement. Such an atonement for the whole congregation our High Priest has also accomplished *ἐφάπαξ*,[1] at one time, "once for all," and by the offering up of Himself.[2]

Ἑαυτὸν ἀνενέγκας. This is the first place in which the thought that Christ is not only our High Priest, but also the sacrifice for our sins, is quite clearly expressed (comp. *ἀνενέγκας* here with *προσενέγκας* at v. 7); but the note once struck is continually sounded again. It is at the same time evident that the sacred writer regards the self-sacrifice of Christ as a great high-priestly action, in which His high-priesthood is manifested as the antitype and antithesis of that

[1] Ἐφάπαξ is stronger and fuller than ἅπαξ. Comp. Rom. vi. 10.

[2] Luther, before 1527, rendered the last clause of ver. 27 thus: *Gethan, da er einmal sich selbst opfert* [this He did when He once offered Himself]; but in later revisions of his version he followed the correct interpunctuation of the printed Greek texts which lay before him.

of Aaron. This great act of sacrifice performed here below is the basis of His heavenly priesthood, or, as we are now warranted in saying, His heavenly high-priesthood after the order of Melchizedek. *For* (so he continues, ver. 28, setting forth the contrast between the type and the antitype)—

Ver. 28. *For the law setteth up as high priests men having infirmity; but the word of the oath-taking, which is after the law,* [doth this with] *the Son having been perfected for evermore.*

But (such is the question which here presents itself) has not Christ then entered into fellowship with all human infirmity, sin only excepted (iv. 5)? Has not this apostolic writer been already careful to show that the *καὶ αὐτὸς περίκειται ἀσθένειαν*, as being one of the main requisites for the high-priesthood, is applicable to Christ as well as to Aaron, and that without it He would have been wanting in perfect sympathy with us (ch. v. 1–10)? The answer is: So far is this from being overlooked here, that it is even implied and assumed in the *τετελειωμένον* (with which compare the *τελειωθείς* of v. 9); and the difficulty vanishes if we remark that the contrast here drawn between our Lord and the high priests of the law is not between Him and them as He was in the days of His flesh, but as He is now in the state of glory. To "*the law*" (*νόμος*) is here opposed "*the word of the oath-taking*" (in Ps. cx.)—*ὁ λόγος τῆς ὁρκωμοσίας*—"*which is after the law*" (*τῆς μετὰ τὸν νόμον*), not only as being subsequent to it in time, but as rendering it obsolete. The sacred author lays stress on the *oath-taking* (*τῆς ὁρκωμοσίας*), not simply on *the word* (*ὁ λόγος*), and therefore writes, not *ὁ μετὰ τὸν νόμον*, but *τῆς μετὰ τὸν νόμον*. The divine oath in Ps. cx. outweighs the חֻקַּת עוֹלָם of the law (Thorah) concerning Aaron's priesthood. Now the subject of that oath is the Melchizedekean priest of the future, who cannot act as priest without at the same time being enthroned as king: it is therefore Christ Himself, and only Christ in the state of exaltation, to whom that oath refers. The doctrine of the whole passage is briefly this: Our Lord

having made Himself like to the high priests of the law, by partaking as they did of human infirmity, not indeed like them to offer animal sacrifices (a bullock as sin-offering for Himself, and a goat as sin-offering for the people), but in order to be able to yield up His life in *dying* for us, is now for evermore exalted above them all. That final offering up of Himself at the end of His life of suffering here, formed His transition to a life of glory and of heavenly perfectness. The servant-form of human infirmity is now exchanged for that of kingly exaltation.

Observe in this verse the strong antithesis between *ἀνθρώπους* as applied to the high priests of the law, and *υἱός* (without the article, as at i. 1) as designation of our Lord. It is another argument against the validity of Hofmann's position, that the name *υἱός* designates our Lord only in His human and historical manifestation, and not in His divine and eternal (or, so to speak, metaphysical) relation to the Father. As at ch. v. 8 it was said that *καίπερ ὢν υἱός* (*i.e.* although standing as a Son in such an intimate relation to God as might seem to exclude the possibility of learning obedience and of suffering), Christ had nevertheless vouchsafed to enter the same school with us creatures; so here He is contrasted with *mere* men having infirmity as the all-perfected *υἱός*, the one and only Son. Perfect in Himself, He became for our sakes weak and mortal as we are, in order, as a man sharing our infirmity, to reach the goal of ultimate perfection, as the reward of obedience and the result of sufferings undergone for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Father's redeeming love.[1]

The subject started in ver. 26 (*Such an high priest . . . made higher than the heavens*) is a theme far from being yet exhausted. The following chapter therefore opens with the highest and most important of the things which can be said concerning this at once Melchizedekean and antitypical or super-Aaronical priesthood of our Lord.

Ch. viii. 1, 2. *Now the main point in regard to the things*

[1] See Note E.

here spoken of (is this): *Such an high priest we have, who is set down on the right hand of the throne of Majesty in the heavens,* (being) *a minister of the holies, and of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not a man.*

Κεφάλαιον has two meanings: (1.) It signifies the chief or main point or particular beside or among others; *e.g.* Thucyd. iv. 50, ἐν αἷς (ἐπιστόλαις) πολλῶν ἄλλων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον ἦν: in a similar sense κεφαλή is used; *e.g.* κεφαλὴ τοῦ πράγματος. (2.) It denotes the sum or result of numbers added together and set down at the head of the column, the addition being made from below upwards; comp. Arist. *Metaph.* vii. 1, ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων συλλογίσασθαι δεῖ καὶ συναγαγόντας τὸ κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι. In this sense the word is taken here by Erasmus, Calvin, Luther [and others, including the English version]: "Now this is the sum, the net result, of what we are saying." But the meaning thus assigned to *κεφάλαιον* is not quite suitable to the present context. It might indeed be so, if we referred *κεφάλαιον δέ* exclusively to what follows in ver. 1: "Such an high priest we have at God's right hand." This proposition, if it stood by itself, might be regarded as the summary or main result of both the preceding lines of teaching: first concerning Christ our High Priest, as perfected through suffering, the antitype of Aaron; and then, as royally enthroned, the antitype of Melchizedek.[1] But in ver. 2 an important addition is made to what has been previously taught,—namely, that Christ, thus exalted and enthroned, is working as a priest for us in the archetypal sanctuary; and it seems most natural to refer *κεφάλαιον δέ* to the whole paragraph, with this additional point included. Moreover, if *κεφ.* were meant to be taken here in the sense of "*result*" or "*sum*," we should expect the genitive *τῶν εἰρημένων* or (at any rate) *τῶν λεγομένων*, and not, as we have it, *ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις*, which in any case must be closely connected with *κεφάλαιον*.[2] We agree, therefore, with almost all

[1] So Hofmann.

[2] Hofmann proposes another mode of construing the sentence, which can only be regarded as too venturesome an exegetical novelty for

moderns (Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann, etc.) in rendering κεφάλαιον here by "Hauptsache," *main* or *principal matter*. The whole thought which follows is virtually the subject, and κεφάλαιον the predicate, or κεφάλαιον may be regarded as simply in apposition to that to which it is prefixed. (For this view of the construction, consult, among others, Kühner, § 500, Anm. 2; Madvig, § 197; and Rost, p. 482 of 7th ed.) A third view is also possible,—that, namely, which regards κεφάλαιον as an adverbial accusative (*Now as to the main point—such an high priest we have*): comp. Æschines, *de falsa legatione*, p. 278, 8, πέρας δὲ τοῦ πράγματος; and *contra Ctesiph.* p. 515, 17, τέλος δὲ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου.[1] In all these views of the nature of the construction, the logical relation of the thoughts remains much the same.[2]

Instead of τῶν λεγομένων, our author says, with more particularity, ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις, *i.e.* "beside," or "in addition," or "in reference to what is being said,"[3] where λεγομένοις should be followed by a *colon* rather than by a *comma*. The following τοιοῦτον leads us to expect a somewhat full description of its subject, such as, in fact, we have at vii. 26; and consequently ver. 2 must be regarded as constituting part of the description here. The "main point" (κεφάλαιον) is indeed, that Christ, being thus royally exalted to the throne of God, has an equally exalted sphere for His

serious consideration. He would take κεφάλαιον δέ by itself, and attach ἐπὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις (with ἀρχιερεῦσιν understood) to what follows, rendering the whole thus: Now to sum up what has been said: *We have, in addition to those high priests* (of the law), *such an high priest* (as this), *holy, harmless*, etc.

[1] *Vid.* Wannowski, *Syntaxis anom. Græcorum*, p. 200.

[2] Lünemann, however, is quite mistaken in supposing, that because κεφάλαιον is without the definite article, it must be therefore understood here of some one main point among others. In expressions of this kind, κεφάλαιον δέ (τῶν εἰρημένων), τεκμήριον δέ, σημεῖον δέ, μαρτύριον δέ (Madvig, § 196, Anm.), the substantive is always to be regarded as logically defined, as when we say (in German), "*Summa summarum*" [or in English, Sum-total of all this is so and so], or the like.

[3] Ἐπί seems to be here used with that quasi-local or temporal signification which properly belongs to this preposition with a dative, and might be best rendered by the German "*bei*."

high-priestly operation. To give yet stronger emphasis to this His transcendent royalty, the phrase of i. 3, *ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μεγαλωσύνης*,[1] is expanded into *ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θρόνου τῆς μεγαλωσύνης*, reminding us of the term in Jewish theology, כסא הכבוד (the throne of the divine glory). *Ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* must, with all modern interpreters (except Hofmann[2]), be referred (like *ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς* in i. 3) to *ἐκάθισεν* (Christ is seated in heaven, on the right hand of the throne).

Τῶν ἁγίων in ver. 2 refers, of course, to the eternal sanctuary in the heavens, as distinguished from the earthly holy of holies. Some would understand *τῶν ἀληθινῶν* after it, as suggested by the following *τῆς ἀληθινῆς* (*σκηνῆς*). So Böhme, Bleek, Ebrard, and Lünemann. But the relative position of the words is not favourable to this view. It would be better, therefore, to render the clause thus: "Minister or warder of the sanctuary there (*i.e.* in heaven), and of the true tabernacle." *Λειτουργός* is the standing designation of the priest as minister of Jehovah (משרת ה׳: comp. Isa. lxi. 6; Jer. xxxiii. 21; Neh. x. 40); *λειτουργεῖν* being the regular Septuagint word for the discharge of priestly and Levitical functions (שָׁרַת) in the public service (עבודה[3]) of God. *Λειτουργὸς τῶν ἁγίων* is here combined, as frequently in the Septuagint—*λειτουργία τῆς σκηνῆς*, or *οἴκου τοῦ Θεοῦ*. *Τὰ ἅγια* is also here clearly distinguished from *ἡ σκηνή*; while it is evident from ix. 11, 12, that they stand in very close connection with one another. We cannot therefore render *τῶν ἁγίων λειτουργός* (with Luther[4] and others) "a minister of holy things," or "of heavenly blessings." Both terms designate different parts (the inner and the outer) of the same place or building. *Τὰ ἅγια* is the קדש קדשים ("holy of holies"), which in the earthly tabernacle was the *adytum*

[1] See note there.

[2] Comp. *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, 287, with *Weissagung u. Erfüll.* ii. 190.

[3] See Note F.

[4] [Luther's rendering is, *ein Pfleger der heiligen Güter.*] In Philo, when he speaks of the priest as *ὁ θεραπευτὴς καὶ λειτουργὸς τῶν ἁγίων* (i. 114, 4), and says of the Levites, that for them *ἡ τῶν ἁγίων ἀνάκειται λειτουργία* (i. 560, 2), the word (*τῶν ἁγίων*) certainly seems to be used in a wider than the merely local sense.

behind the second veil: it is once called by our author *ἅγια ἁγίων* (ch. ix. 3), but elsewhere simply *τὰ ἅγια* (ix. 25, xiii. 11, etc.), "the sanctuary." *Ἡ σκηνή* is the קדש, or אולם, the outer tabernacle, or "holy place," which at ix. 2 is called by our author *σκηνὴ ἡ πρώτη*, "the first tabernacle." This, the obvious interpretation of ver. 2, is the only correct one; yet that, at the same time, we are not to transfer with literal exactness to the heavenly world the local boundaries and partitions of the earthly type, is both evident from the nature of the heavenly in itself, and is expressly guarded by the use of the epithet *ἀληθινῆς* here. Great realities, indeed, are the subjects of discourse, but those of an ideal and archetypal character. The use of the adjective *ἀληθινός* is common to our epistle with Luke xvi. 11, and the Gospel, Apocalypse, and Epistles of St. John. Elsewhere it does not occur in the New Testament, except only 1 Thess. i. 9. It is applied to that which answers to its name and notion in the fullest, deepest, and most unlimited manner,—to that which is not merely relatively, but absolutely, such as it is called,—to that which is not merely outward and material, but inward and spiritual—not temporal and typical merely, but antitypical, archetypical, and eternal. The distinction in meaning between *ἀληθινός* and *ἀληθής* can hardly be more accurately expressed than in the words of Kahnis (*Abendmahl*, p. 119): "The measure of *ἀληθής* is the reality, that of *ἀληθινός* is the idea. The idea corresponds to the reality with *ἀληθής*; the reality corresponds to the idea with *ἀληθινός*." So it is here. The "true" tabernacle, in which our High Priest now ministers, is the original, essential, and archetypal one; not a work of human hands; not constructed of perishable materials, but a supra-mundane work of God Himself, the product of an immediate divine operation. The earthly tabernacle had been "pitched" by Moses (*ἔπηξεν*, Ex. xxxiii. 7), the heavenly by the Lord, *ἐπ. ὁ Κύριος καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος*: so the *textus receptus*; but the *καί*, which is wanting in B.D.* E.* 17 [and the Cod. Sin.], has been rightly excluded from their texts by Lachmann and Tischendorf.

The question here arises, and demands an answer, what the sacred writer himself understood by the heavenly "sanctuary" (*τὰ ἅγια*) and the "true tabernacle," of which he thus speaks. The older commentators frequently interpret the "true tabernacle" to be the Lord's body; so, for instance, Jo. Philoponus, Jo. Brentius, jun. (1571), Jo. Jac. Grynæus (1586).[1] They appeal on behalf of this interpretation of *σκηνή* to St. John i. 14 (*σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν*), without inquiring into or developing the consequences, and without making any distinction between the *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός* and the *σῶμα τῆς δόξης*. The following considerations may be urged in favour of their view: Our Lord's incarnation is expressly described (St. John i. 14) as a *σκήνωσις*; His human corporeity, therefore, may be regarded as a *σκηνή* (comp. 2 Pet. i. 14); He Himself speaks of His body as a "temple" (St. John ii. 21), which He contrasts with the wood and stone erection of Herod; Christ and His church together form one "holy temple" (Eph. ii. 19–22); the crucified flesh (*σάρξ*) of Christ is in this very epistle (x. 20) compared to the veil of the temple, which had been rent in twain; and from this the inference drawn, that our "new and living way" of approach to the eternal sanctuary is His glorified humanity. All this being taken into account, the supposition appears a natural one, that by *σκηνή* here we are to understand also the Lord's humanity, and that in the same sense in which Jacob Böhme says (iv. 173), "*We are all in Christ one body; for He is our body in God, as Adam is our body in the world.*"[2] No one in later times has revived and developed this interpretation with so much intelligence and completeness, nor defended it with such soundness of argument and wealth of illustration, as Hofmann (*Weissagung*, ii. 189–192, and *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 1, 405, and elsewhere).

Hofmann, in developing his view, proceeds from the per-

[1] See Note G.

[2] [St. Bernard (I think) says somewhere, speaking of the dead in Christ, in their present disembodied condition, *sub humanitate Christi requiescunt.*—Tr.]

fectly correct assumption, that the sacred writer means here to distinguish the sanctuary (*τὰ ἅγια*) of the immediate Divine Presence, God's own "place," from His place of meeting with mankind, the tabernacle (*σκηνή*) wherein He is pleased to dwell among them. On the basis of this assumption, he maintains that the true *σκηνή* is in the first instance the glorified humanity of Christ, and then, in the next place, the church, as being the extension of the incarnation, and having such for its members as have "put on Christ," *i.e.* to whom Christ is, as it were, the raiment they are clothed with, or (according to 2 Cor. v. 1)[1] the *οἰκία ἀχειροποίητος* of their redeemed personality. As, then, the Levitical high priest is styled *τῶν ἁγίων λειτουργός* (in so far as he is admitted to the most holy place of the Divine Presence), and *τῆς σκηνῆς λειτουργός* (inasmuch as he ministers to God in the chosen place of His manifestation among men), appearing in the one on men's behalf before God, and so working in the other, that God vouchsafes to dwell among men; so again, in both particulars, is this true (in transcendent and antitypical reality) of Christ: *First*, He is the true *τῶν ἁγίων λειτουργός*, inasmuch as through the sacrifice of His death He has passed away from the world and entered into God; and *secondly*, He is *τῆς ἀληθινῆς σκηνῆς λειτουργός*, inasmuch as He is now in His glorified humanity with God, and God with us through Him. In the one respect He mediates for us in the holy of holies of the divine nature; in the other He embraces and overshadows with His glorified humanity the whole company of Christian souls, spreading over them all, as it were, the curtains of that sacred tabernacle, and so putting Himself at their service in their approaches and communion with the heavenly Father.

I have endeavoured faithfully to represent Hofmann's view, though using only partially his own words. It is obviously difficult to explain, in consistency with this interpretation, the meaning of *λειτουργός* as an appellative of our Lord, or to assign an intelligible meaning to the different parts of

[1] Such, at any rate, is Hofmann's interpretation of this difficult expression.

the earthly tabernacle, if this must be regarded as its typical meaning. But a closer examination exhibits the necessity of abandoning this interpretation altogether. It is, for instance, quite irreconcilable with ix. 11, where the most natural construction is, and remains, that which connects *διὰ τῆς μείζονος καὶ τελειοτέρας σκηνῆς* with *εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὰ ἅγια*. To interpret this as meaning that our Lord had passed through His own glorified humanity into the sphere of the divine nature, constitutes an impossible figure, or suggests an inadmissible thought. It is further inconsistent with ver. 5 of the present chapter, according to which the earthly Mosaic tabernacle was a copy of a heavenly archetype, exhibited to Moses on Mount Sinai. Now surely it is infinitely more probable that the image there presented to the eye of the lawgiver was that of the companies of worshipping angels, with the divine throne in the background, than any ideal representation of the future humanity of the incarnate Saviour. And, finally, it is a view not only current in the later synagogue,[1] that there was an intimate and mysterious connection between the Jerusalem below and her sanctuary (ירושלם של מטה), and the Jerusalem above with hers (ירושלם של מעלה); but the same idea is constantly suggested by the language of both the Old and New Testaments. Scripture speaks repeatedly of a holy or heavenly temple (היכל קדש, *e.g.* Ps. xi. 4, xviii. 7; Mic. i. 2; Hab. ii. 20), which (from what is said of it) can be meant to adumbrate neither God Himself, nor Christ incarnate, nor the church, but rather the place of adoration of blessed spirits (Ps. xxix. 9), or of men admitted to their fellowship (Isa. vi.). This temple (*ναὸς τῆς σκηνῆς τοῦ μαρτυρίου*) is presented to the mental vision of the seer of the Apocalypse (Rev. xv. 5), and by him described under earthly figures in its various details. Nor should we be justified by Rev. xxi. 22 in spiritualizing away these representations of heavenly realities; for there the new Jerusalem, descending on the transfigured earth, is simply opposed, as a place altogether filled with the divine presence, to the ancient type, in which temple and city were

[1] See Note H.

distinct localities. With these and the like arguments I have already combated Hofmann's view,[1] and must continue to do so. The fact then is, that the sanctuary which here presents itself to the thought of our author, is the place of the divine presence and throne, and the tabernacle that of the angels and the blessed. The divine sanctuary (*τὰ ἅγια*) is "the place of God," which in itself is elevated above all space and time, and filling all things, is not comprehended by any; it is, in brief, the uncreated heaven of the divine glory. But God, the absolute eternal One, has assigned place and time to all His creatures, as conditions of their existence. He makes use of those conditions in manifesting Himself to them; and the very highest creaturely existences, though having their roots of being in the eternal blessedness, are not independent of these creaturely forms. In accordance with this observation, it must be held, that there is always somewhere a glorious creaturely heaven, not forming indeed a definite part of the created universe, and yet having, from the very nature of those who belong to it, a certain definite localization; that it is always and only *there* wherever God vouchsafes to exhibit Himself to angels and to men, in glorious manifestations of His divine love. This heaven of glory is the *ἀληθινὴ σκηνή* here spoken of, "the greater and more perfect tabernacle" (of ix. 11) through which Christ passed in order to enter that divine sanctuary of the immediate Presence, which as the holy of holies (*sanctum sanctorum*) forms the *adytum* or innermost recess of the heavenly tabernacle, its infinite and eternal basis and background, and which now, in virtue of the atonement once accomplished by our Lord, is no longer (like its earthly type) hidden behind a veil, withdrawn from sight and unapproachable, but thrown open and made accessible to the blessed worshippers in the *σκηνή*, by Him who is enshrined within it as its High Priest. He bears, therefore, the twofold title: *first*, He is *τῶν ἁγίων λειτουργός*, a minister of the eternal sanctuary, having been received as God-man into the innermost sphere of Godhead,

[1] In my *Biblische Psychologie*, vi. 6, in reference to his interpretation of 2 Cor. v. 1.

and invested there with divine glory while mediating for us; and *secondly*, He is τῆς σκηνῆς λειτουργός, a minister of the heavenly tabernacle, into which we ourselves, if we persevere to the end, shall one day be gathered, and in which He acts as Mediator now, on the one hand manifesting to the blessed inhabitants the self-revelations of divine glory, and on the other presenting to the Father their sacrifice of adoration and praise.

It seems probable that the ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς of viii. 1 refers both to τὰ ἅγια and to the σκηνή of ver. 2, regarded as distinct portions of one heavenly whole. Our author appears to use the word οὐρανός in the following significations: (1.) In the lower sense, ὁ οὐρανός signifies the starry firmament (xi. 12, xii. 26), and οἱ οὐρανοί the created heavens, through which the ascending Redeemer passed (iv. 14), and above which He is now exalted (vii. 26). (2.) In the higher sense, ὁ οὐρανός signifies God's own eternal heaven, or sphere of divine glory, into which the ascended Lord has been assumed (ix. 24; Acts iii. 21), and which is not essentially different from God Himself (comp. Luke xv. 18, 21, where οὐρανός, שָׁמַיִם, is = Θεός); while οἱ οὐρανοί combines in one term this eternal heaven of God Himself, and the blessed spheres in which His glory is manifested to the angels and the redeemed (comp. Luke xv. 10, 7), — those "heavens" in which the antitypes of earthly sanctities are enshrined (ix. 23), in which our names are written (xii. 23; St. Luke x. 20), and where our inheritance is to be (x. 34; St. Luke xii. 33). (3.) There are passages (not, however, it would seem, in this epistle) where ὁ οὐρανός and οἱ οὐρανοί are used yet more comprehensively, still so as to include in one perspective, as it were, the natural heaven, the angelical and the divine (comp. especially St. Luke's twice related history of the ascension, St. Luke xxiv. 51, Acts i. 11 and ii. 34); but here (viii. 1), where the throne of divine majesty is spoken of as ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, we need only think of the divine and angelical heavens, — the one the antitype of the earthly sanctuary, the other of its vestibule, the earthly tabernacle. In this double sphere our High Priest is sacerdotally me-

diating for us. That it is so, and cannot be otherwise, the sacred writer goes on to prove.

Vers. 3–6. *For every high priest is appointed for the offering of both gifts and sacrifices; whence a necessity that this one should also have something which he might offer. For if he were on earth he would not even be a priest, inasmuch as the priests are here already who offer the gifts according to the law; as being such who serve the type and shadow of the heavenly things, even as Moses is admonished when about to construct the tabernacle: for, "See," saith he, "thou make all things according to the pattern shown thee in the mount." But now so much the more excellent a priestly office hath he obtained, by how much he is mediator of a better covenant, founded as it is upon better promises.*

Michaelis observes in his Paraphrase, that ver. 3 might be omitted here without our missing it. Bleek is inclined to agree with him, though it does not escape him that ver. 3 is but the commencement of an argument, to show that the high priest after the order of Melchizedek requires for the discharge of his functions a heavenly sanctuary. De Wette, rejecting this better view, maintains that ver. 3 disturbs the order of thought. Tholuck even regards it as a link of thought, which is immediately dropped in favour of others; while Lünemann considers it to be an observation made, as it were *en passant*, to justify the use of the term λειτουργός. Ebrard, on the other hand, maintains that all is here clear, conclusive reasoning, and seems to have thought the meaning of προσενέγκῃ to be so self-evident that he has left us in uncertainty what meaning he himself attaches to it. The chain of the argument appears to be as follows: Christ is Priest in the heavenly archetypal sanctuary (vers. 1, 2); for there is no priest without some sacrificial function (ver. 3); and if here on earth, He would not be a priest at all (ver. 4), where there are priests already who serve in the typical and shadowy sanctuary (ver. 5). The priestly functions of Christ, therefore, must be discharged in a higher sphere; and so it is. His sacerdotal ministration is as far exalted above that of the law as the

new covenant, of which He is Mediator, is superior to the old covenant, to which the earthly sanctuary belongs (ver. 6). This connection of thought is clear and consistent, if we bear in mind that vers. 3–6 are the proof of the thesis in vers. 1, 2, and that λειτουργεῖν and προσφέρειν (δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίας) express for our author identical, or at least nigh-related and inseparable notions.[1] Accordingly the λειτουργίας in ver. 6 answers to the προσενέγκῃ of ver. 3 (the one at any rate including the other); and the whole paragraph (vers. 3–6) consists of two syllogisms: (*a*) A priest's office is to offer sacrifice; Christ is a priest (λειτουργός); therefore Christ must have something to offer. (*b*) The sphere in which Christ's priestly office is discharged must be either an earthly one or not; an earthly one it cannot be, inasmuch as on earth (in the material tabernacle) there are other priests officiating according to the law; therefore Christ's sphere of priestly operation must be an unearthly, *i.e.* a heavenly one.

To this conception, however, of the sacred author's process of argument a serious objection has been made. The argument thus understood would rest, as Bleek correctly observes, on the assumption of a continuous heavenly προσφέρειν on the part of our Lord. And does not this involve a contradiction to what is elsewhere insisted on—the one offering of Himself, made once for all, by which Christ is distinguished from all the priests of the line of Aaron, "who offer oftentimes the same sacrifices" (x. 11), and especially from the high priest re-entering year by year the most holy place with the offering perpetually renewed of atoning blood (ix. 7, 25)?

This is the difficulty ignored by Ebrard. Let us examine more closely the words involving it—ὅθεν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τι καὶ τοῦτον ὁ προσενέγκῃ. Lünemann renders them (supplying ἦν), "Wherefore it *was* of necessity that this man also should have something which He might offer;" referring the ἔχειν to the Lord's condition while here in the flesh—it was necessary that He should have a body which He might offer

[1] This is not only evident from ver. 3, in its connection with ver. 2, but derives also fresh confirmation from x. 11, compared with Phil. ii. 17.

once for all. If this interpretation be correct, the sentence contained in ver. 3 must certainly be regarded as a merely casual observation, having no immediate connection with the main argument. We must, however, understand ἔχειν τι as spoken of our Lord in His heavenly state of existence, even as He Himself is here spoken of as the heavenly λειτουργός, and therefore reject Lünemann's interpretation. Hofmann renders the sentence thus: "Wherefore it *is* of necessity (supplying ἐστί) that this man also should have something which He hath (once) offered,"—referring ἔχειν τι to our Lord in His present exaltation at God's right hand, and προσενέγκῃ to His self-offering once made here below, which He possesses as a fact accomplished, now that He is enthroned in heaven. "He must have a sacrifice" (says Hofmann) "with which He ministers, otherwise He would not be high priest; but *His* sacrifice is one offered already, not one that has yet to be made,—*His* ministry (λειτουργία) being as superior to that of the Old Testament, as the new covenant itself is to the old" (*Schriftbew.* ii. 1, 288). This interpretation of the ὃ προσενέγκῃ is to me more than doubtful. That the aorist imperatively demands such a rendering, no one with an intimate knowledge of Greek syntax will maintain. The sentence, *necesse est eum habere aliquid quod offerat*, may be rendered in Greek equally well by ὃ προσενέγκῃ as by ὃ προσφέρῃ: the conception, indeed, is somewhat different, when the *aorist* is used, from that attaching to the *present* (Madvig, § 128); but the reference (*forwards*, not backwards) may yet remain the same (compare, for example, Matt. viii. 20 with Luke xxii. 2).[1] At the same time, it must be allowed that ὃ προσενέγκῃ might have the meaning of "*quod offerret*" or "*quod obtulerit.*" The question is one which subject and context must decide. And who, in the present instance, would maintain that the natural conclusion from the premiss, that a high priest as such is called to offer sacrifice, would be, that Christ as High Priest must have something which He has already offered, and not rather that He must have something to offer? Hofmann

[1] See Note I.

himself, feeling the impropriety of such a conclusion, formulates it thus: "Christ is High Priest, and therefore must have a sacrifice wherewith to minister." Exactly so; and it is this very ministering (λειτουργεῖν) with a sacrifice (which in fact has been already offered once for all) that the sacred writer calls here a προσφέρειν, using the word with that peculiar latitude of application which meets us elsewhere in this epistle. So, for instance, at v. 7, the prayers and supplications of our Lord in the days of His flesh are spoken of as a προσφορά; and so His heavenly intercession on our behalf now might be regarded in the same light. As ἐντυγχάνων ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, He is still προσφέρων τι. But that is not the meaning here. Christ's προσφέρειν in the heavenly sanctuary being opposed to the προσφέρειν δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίας of the Jewish high priest in the earthly one, the τι here must denote something more concrete than the ministry of intercession. The mean or instrument of that perpetual ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ attributed to the High Priest in heaven (at ii. 17), on the basis of His atoning death, is something more than mere intercession. Our author uses προσφέρειν to denote not only the immolation (slaying) of the victim, and its sacrificial oblation on the altar, but also a special transaction with the blood, which in the typical rite formed the mid-act between two others. The high priest on the day of atonement, after first slaying the bullock and the goat for a sin-offering, carried the blood of either sacrifice into the holy of holies, and sprinkled it there before the mercy-seat: this act is designated at ix. 7 as a προσφέρειν; and not till after this had been done was the fat of the sin-offerings offered on the altar, and the bodies of the victims burned without the camp, or holy city. Now these three successive actions, the slaying of the victim in the outer court, the oblation of the fat upon the altar, and the cremation of the body ἔξω τῆς παρεμβολῆς (Heb. xiii. 11), found their one and only antitype in the Lord's sacrificial death on Calvary; while that other distinct action of the Jewish high priest on the same occasion, the carrying the sacrificial blood into the holy of holies, found equally its one

and only antitype in the entrance of Jesus Christ once for all, not ἐν αἵματι ἀλλοτρίῳ (ix. 25), but διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος, into the eternal sanctuary. This blood of Jesus, then, once shed for us and our sins upon the altar of the cross, and thus brought once for all before God in heaven, is the τί[1] of which our author here speaks, as indeed the whole apostolic Scripture proceeds on the assumption of the eternal presence before God, and the perpetual application of that "precious blood." We are not, however, yet come to the place where this question must be discussed in detail;[2] the point with which our author is here immediately concerned being simply this,[3] that our high priest, in order to be high priest at all, and as such Aaron's antitype, must have something to offer, and that the place of such offering cannot be an earthly, and therefore must be a heavenly one.

The following εἰ μὲν in ver. 4 corresponds to the νυνὶ δέ of ver. 6. It is, however, a question whether we should read εἰ μὲν γάρ, with the *text. rec.*, Tischendorf, and the majority of MSS.; or εἰ μὲν οὖν, with Scholz and Lachmann, and the weighty authorities, A.B.D.[1] 17, 73, 80, 137, together with the Latin and other ancient versions, including probably the Peshito. The latter reading, which is also that preferred by Bleek and Lünemann, gives the completest and most logical expression to the thought, making vers. 3–6 to constitute but one syllogism. As High Priest, Christ must have a priestly function (ver. 3); such a function could not be discharged by Him on earth (vers. 4, 5); therefore it must have a heavenly (supra-legal) character. But the very fact that this reading is the easier one, throws suspicion on its genuineness; whereas there is this further probability in favour of εἰ μὲν γάρ, that the author elsewhere in this epistle accumulates the use of the particle γάρ (compare vii. 12–14). Adopting then the reading εἰ μὲν γάρ,[4] we may conceive the

[1] See Note K. [2] See commentary on ix. 12.

[3] This remark is already made by Justinianus, Estius, and others of the older commentators.

[4] Hofmann's conception of the apostolic writer's meaning allows of the retention of εἰ μὲν γάρ without any lacuna in the process of argu-

sacred writer's process of reasoning thus: (*α*) Our High Priest is a λειτουργός (priest-minister) in the eternal sanctuary of heaven; (*β*) for if an high priest at all, He must have some λειτουργία to discharge: and (*γ*) that λειτουργία (priestly function) must be a heavenly, supra-mundane one; for (*δ*) if on earth, He could not be a priest at all. Or if this insertion of the unexpressed thought (*γ*) be regarded as unwarrantable, we may take vers. 3 and 4, *i.e.* (*β*) and (*δ*), as separate proofs of the two parts of the previous proposition (*α*): "Our High Priest is a λειτουργός of the heavenly sanctuary:" thus (*α*) He is λειτουργός, because (ver. 3) every high priest has some λειτουργία; and (*b*) "of the heavenly sanctuary," because (ver. 4) in His case that λειτουργία could not be discharged on earth.

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν is rendered, even by Böhme (incorrectly), *quodsi enim fuisset*[1] ("for even if He had been"). But this rendering misses the sacred writer's thought, whose point of view is strictly the *heavenly* one. Our High Priest is in heaven, and it could not (he argues) be otherwise; for beside the existing Jewish, there cannot be a second earthly priesthood. Were Christ still living on the earth, as in the days of His flesh He once lived here, He would not be a priest at all, neither ἱερεύς nor (*à fortiori*) ἀρχιερεύς.[2] And the reason for this is given in the following clause: ὄντων τῶν ἱερέων τῶν προσφερόντων κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὰ δῶρα. (This is the reading of the *textus receptus*; τῶν ἱερέων is, however, to be rejected as a gloss (*with* Lachmann and Tischendorf); while κατὰ τὸν νόμον is (with Bleek) to be retained, *against* Lachmann and Tischendorf, who (following A. B. and some

ment, and indeed makes it more suitable than εἰ μὲν οὖν (He must have an already accomplished sacrifice, and not one still going on; for if He were on earth, etc.). But this is overstraining the force of the aorist, and against the context.

[1] In another connection this translation would doubtless be admissible (comp. Matt. xxiii. 30).

[2] It is to be observed, however, that οὐδέ here does not belong (as Bleek, Bisping, and Hofmann seem to think) to ἱερεύς, but to ἦν ἄν, *ne esset quidem*. The construction is similar to that in ver. 7, in Luke vii. 39, xvii. 6, John ix. 41, Gal. i. 10, and elsewhere.

cursives) read *κατὰ νόμον*. The variations are for the sense indifferent.) After *ὄντων* we are to supply in thought the *ἐπὶ γῆς* of the previous clause, as in ver. 2 *ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς* is to be understood after *τῶν ἁγίων*. *Δῶρα* here includes *all* offerings whatsoever, being an abridgment of the phrase *δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι*. *Ὄντων* precedes, for the sake of the emphasis. There *are* already priests on earth who offer sacrificial gifts according to the law, *i.e.* who are legitimate priests. This their legitimacy is further proved by the relative clause, commencing with *οἵτινες* (*quippe qui*), which at the same time exhibits the possibility and necessity of a higher priesthood.

Οἵτινες . . . λατρεύουσιν. The verb *λατρεύειν*, which is of special frequency in the writings of St. Luke, and is elsewhere used of divine service in general, with the dative *τῷ Θεῷ* (*e.g.* ch. ix. 14, xii. 28; Luke ii. 37; Acts xxvi. 7, etc.), is here used of priestly sacrificial service in particular, with the dative *ὑποδείγματι καὶ σκιᾷ*, expressing the official sphere or terrain to which this service is confined (compare the *ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ λατρεύοντες* of ch. xiii. 10, and a similar construction of *λειτουργεῖν* with *οἴκῳ* at Ezek. xlv. 5, and with *θυσιαστηρίῳ* in Clem. Rom. c. xxxii.).[1] The whole phrase, *οἵτινες ὑποδείγματι καὶ σκιᾷ λατρεύουσι τῶν ἐπουρανίων*, has evidently an air of depreciation about it, which is still more apparent at ch. xiii. 10: not as though the sacred writer would dispute the divinely established validity of the Levitical priesthood, which, on the contrary, he expressly maintains; but forasmuch now that the true High Priest is come, the dignity of the legal priesthood fades away, so the tabernacle with its sacred furniture no longer partakes of the dignity of its heavenly original, but sinks to the position of a mere pattern and shadow. "The heavenly things" (*τὰ ἐπουράνια*) are the archetypes of all that was comprised in the tabernacle and its furniture (ch. ix. 23). *Ὑπόδειγμα*

[1] It cannot be maintained that *λατρεύειν*, as compared with *λειτουργεῖν*, is, in the usage of the Greek Scriptures, the nobler word. Rather we should say it is the more general term, *λειτουργεῖν* being the proper word for special priestly service, like the Hebrew שָׁרַת.

(from *ὑποδεικνύναι, oculis subjicere*) is a visible image or pattern, whether as a foretype which is followed (iv. 11), or an after-copy (as here and ix. 23) from an original.[1] In the latter sense it is sometimes used to denote a mere sketch or outline. *Σκιά* corresponds to both *umbra* and *adumbratio*, the natural shadow, as well as a product of art. In contrast to *σῶμα* (Col. ii. 17: comp. Philo, i. 434, 6; Joseph. *Bell.* ii. 2, 5), it signifies the shadow cast by a solid body; and in contrast to *εἰκών*, the bodily form of a thing (as our author himself uses *εἰκών* at x. 1), it denotes the mere outline (= *σκιαγράφημα*). It is in this latter sense that it is here attached to *ὑπόδειγμα*.

The earthly tabernacle, in all its arrangements, is a mere copy of or sketch drawn from a heavenly original; and this is proved from Ex. xxv. 40 (comp. xxv. 9 and xxvi. 30). Moses is there bidden, when about to proceed at God's command to the formation[2] of the tabernacle, to follow accurately the pattern exhibited to him on Mount Sinai. The Septuagint word for the deliverance of a divine oracle or injunction is *χρηματίζειν* (*τοὺς λόγους*) *τινί* or *πρός τινα*; in the New Testament it is also used *passively*, as well *χρηματίζεται τινί τι* (Luke ii. 26) as *χρηματίζομαί τι* (Acts x. 22, and twice in St. Matthew). Accordingly *καθὼς κεχρημάτισται Μωυσῆς* will mean: as then Moses has received (in our Scriptures) the divine injunction (which we still read there). The citation, as it stands in the Septuagint, is: *ὅρα ποιήσεις κατὰ τὸν τύπον τὸν δεδειγμένον σοι ἐν τῷ ὄρει.* For *ποιήσεις*, the *text. rec.* in our passage has the grammatically possible but not well supported reading *ποιήσῃς*, *i.e.* the *aor. conj.*, in the same sense as the *fut.*: "*See that thou make*" [Tischendorf, Lachmann, etc., read here *ποιήσεις*, on overwhelming MS. authority]. *Πάντα* is an insertion of our author's, required or justified by the sense. So Philo, i. 108, 5: *ὡς* (*ὅς*) *φησὶ·*

[1] See Note L.

[2] Compare Philo's use of *ἐπιτελεῖν* in the like sense of the *realizing* of an ideal, and in a similar connection: *Moses beheld with his soul the incorporeal ideas* (or images) of *corporeal things* which were thereupon to be constructed (*τῶν μελλόντων ἀνατολεῖσθαι*).

κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ δεδειγμένον σοι ἐν τῷ ὄρει πάντα ποιήσεις. Finally, though it seems hardly worth observing, δεδειγμένον is here substituted for the Septuagint δειχθέντα.[1] On the other hand, it *is* important to observe that the γάρ does not belong to the citation at all, but is part of the formula of introduction:[2] *for*, "*See*," *saith He*, *i.e.* ὁ Θεός, or taking φησί impersonally (that is, without a definite subject), "*it is said*" (*i.e.* in Scripture) (Bernhardy, *Synt.* 419).

St. Stephen refers to the same Old Testament scripture at Acts vii. 44,[3] where he says, ἡ σκηνὴ τοῦ μαρτυρίου ἦν τοῖς πατράσιν ἡμῶν ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ, καθὼς διετάξατο ὁ λαλῶν τῷ Μωυσῇ, ποιῆσαι αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸν τύπον ὃν ἑωράκει. We have here again the same τύπος (for the Hebrew תבנית) which is found only at Ex. xxv. 40 (in the Septuagint), whereas תבנית is elsewhere rendered by παράδειγμα (as at Ex. xxv. 9) or by ὁμοίωμα. The rendering of כתבנית by "after the copy" or "adumbration," to which Bleek appears inclined, would not be quite correct; both words (תבנית and τύπος) with כְּ and κατά have the signification of *norma normans*, a *pattern* or original (not a copy); but it still remains a question whether the original thus exhibited to Moses was the actual heavenly archetype, or only mediately that archetype in a sensuous representation. The latter is the view of Faber Stapulensis, Rivet, Schlichting, Limborch, Storr, von Gerlach, and Ebrard, who says expressly that Moses saw in vision an architectural plan which, apart from the vision, had no real existence. The actual wording of the text does not enable us to decide the question. For as תבנית, starting with the signification building or construction

[1] See Note M.

[2] In what sense special emphasis is thereby laid on the ὅρα, is manifest from Philo's *quæst. in Exod.*, preserved in an Armenian version (*Opp.* vii. 369, ed. Tanchuitz): "*Inspice*," *dicit monens quomodo animæ speculationem sine somno servare oportet et vigilem esse ad videndas species incorporeas.*

[3] Another parallel between the diction of this epistle and that of St. Luke.

(Isa. xxii. 28), comes to stand for any kind of figure or likeness (Deut. iv. 17), plan or pattern[1] (1 Chron. xxviii. 11–19), so τύπος, starting from the meaning "stamp" or "impression" (comp. John xx. 25, τὸν τύπον τῶν ἥλων), takes those of "figure" or "image" (Acts vii. 43), "sketch" or "draft" (as of a letter, Acts xxiii. 25), "exemplar" (for imitation, 1 Thess. i. 7) or "ensample" (for warning, 1 Cor. x. 6, like δεῖγμα πυρὸς αἰωνίου, Jude 7), "pattern," "architectural plan," or "model" (for a building or work of art). Now Moses, it is said, received the injunction to construct the tabernacle after a *heavenly* pattern exhibited to him. And here we are told that the tabernacle was itself an ὑπόδειγμα καὶ σκιὰ τῶν ἐπουρανίων. The "pattern" after which it was constructed must therefore be sought in the "heavenly things" themselves: our author knows of nothing between them and their earthly ἀντίτυπα (ix. 24); the tabernacle is for him the shadow of a heavenly substance, but not the shadow of another shadow. Had he so regarded it, he would certainly not have omitted so important an element in his argument. And yet we cannot suppose either that Moses was left to translate his vision of the heavenly world into the architectural and other visible forms of the earthly sanctuary; nor that that vision, when accorded him, consisted of an actual insight into the very essences of the things themselves. Such insight has never yet been vouchsafed to mortal man; and in the case of Moses as mediator of the legal dispensation, we are the more compelled to assume that the super-sensual, if exhibited to him, must have taken sensuous and visible forms of manifestation. The law itself in all its parts is not an immediate revelation of God, but is mediated throughout by angelic and human agencies (Heb. ii. 2; Acts vii. 53; Gal. iii. 19), like the pure sunlight refracted through a prism. If, therefore, it must be assumed on the one hand, that the vision vouchsafed to Moses was not a mere plan of the earthly tabernacle, but a real mani-

[1] Compare Ps. cxliv. 12, *Our sons like plants that have shot up in their youth, our daughters like corner-stones hewn after the pattern for a palace;* and 2 Kings xvi. 10, "*a likeness of the altar, and a plan of it.*"

festation of the heavenly world, of which that tabernacle was to be a type; so, on the other hand, we must suppose the manifestation to have been made, by a divine operation, in such a form as to have fitted it to serve as a model for the earthly building. And that building, thus constructed in accordance with the vision, flashed upon the inward eye of the great legislator, was ministered in by the Levitical priesthood. Another such priesthood ministering in that which is the shadow of heavenly things would be unimaginable. The high-priesthood of Christ, therefore, must belong to the heavenly world itself, and be of a supra-mundane and heavenly nature.

Carrying out this process of argument, the author proceeds: *νυνὶ δὲ διαφορωτέρας τέτευχε λειτουργίας*—But now being thus disqualified for being a priest on earth, He hath obtained a so much more excellent priesthood. *Νυνὶ δέ* has *logical* (comp. ix. 26 and xi. 16), not *temporal* significance (as *νῦν δέ* at ii. 8 and xii. 26). For the Ionic form[1] *τέτευχε* of the *text. rec.* Lachmann and Tischendorf read (with A.D.[1] I. K. *al.*) *τέτυχεν*,—a form not mentioned by the grammarians, but found also in Plutarch and Diodorus (*vid.* Lobeck, *Phryn.* 395).[2] The verb *τυγχάνειν* takes here, as elsewhere, when used in the sense of *nancisci aliquid*, a genitive of the object (comp. xi. 35). To regard *διαφορωτέρας λειτουργίας* as an accusative plural is an offence against grammar. For the comparative form, *διαφορώτερος*, see note on i. 4.

The priesthood of Christ being no earthly one, is so much the more excellent, and in such degree *ὅσῳ καὶ κρείττονός ἐστιν διαθήκης μεσίτης, ἥτις ἐπὶ κρείττοσιν ἐπαγγελίαις νενομοθέτηται*. The superior dignity of Christ's priesthood to that of Aaron is here measured by the superiority of the new covenant to the old, being the reverse of the argument at vii. 22, where from the greatness of the priest after the

[1] Found also in Attic writers. In the *κοινὴ διάλεκτος* it is the usual form. It is without sufficient proof that Fischer and Sturz (p. 198) regard it as a Macedonico-Alexandrine form.

[2] The Attic form *τετύχηκε* is found only in some cursive MSS. (Complut. Plaut. Genev.).

order of Melchizedek is inferred the superiority of the covenant of which He is Mediator. The term there used to express His relation to the covenant was ἔγγυος, here we have the more general term μεσίτης; both notions are united in the Attic word μεσέγγυος, which, according to Möris and Thomas Magister, must be employed instead of the Hellenistic term μεσίτης. Both appellations ἔγγυος and μεσίτης point to a sphere beyond that of the operations of the Levitical priesthood. The "mediator" of the Old Testament was not Aaron, but Moses. The Levitical priesthood was itself a mere product of that covenant, not its basis, serving to maintain the covenant relation, and helping to remove disturbances thereof, but no more; whereas Jesus Christ is both founder and finisher as well as conservator of the New Testament, as the ἔγγυος and μεσίτης of which He stands in an antitypical relation not to Aaron only, but also and specially to Moses.

The superiority of the new covenant to the old is further exhibited by the relative clause commencing with ἥτις; its establishment is characterized by *νενομοθέτηται*, as a law-based constitution. Compare vii. 11, where the same term is applied to *persons* whose duties and privileges are determined by law. At vii. 11, *νενομοθ.* is followed by *ἐπί seq. gen.* (the people of Israel have a legal constitution made with reference to, or resting upon, the Levitical priesthood), here by *ἐπί seq. dat.*, expressing the conditions on which the whole new covenant is established (compare Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2, 20 (the Lacedæmonians concluded peace ἐφ' ᾧ, *on condition that . . .*), and Thucyd. iii. 114, ἐπὶ τοῖσδε). The use of the word *νομοθετεῖσθαι* in reference to the new testament presents no difficulty. Not only St. James speaks of it as *the perfect law of liberty* (*νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας*, i. 25), but St. Paul likewise, contrasting it as the *νόμος πίστεως* to that of works (*τῶν ἔργων*), Rom. iii. 27 (comp. viii. 2 and ix. 31). *Νόμος* in Scripture designates any and every revelation of the divine will, by which the relations of the church and its members to God are determined.[1]

[1] See Note N.

The sacred writer proceeds to another proof of the superiority of the new covenant—its being already looked forward to under the old.

Ver. 7. *For if that first were irreproachable, a place would not be sought for a second.*

We might also translate, *If that first had been irreproachable, a place would not have been sought*, etc.; but in Greek neither *protasis* nor *apodosis* is so conceived (otherwise the latter would have been a pluperfect): comp. viii. 4. The form of the argument is similar to that of vii. 11. Ἄμεμπτος (as at Luke i. 6, and throughout the New Testament) is used *passively* = that which admits not of blame, irreproachable, μὴ μέμψιν δεχόμενος.[1] Ebrard and Lünemann needlessly imagine that two thoughts are confounded in the *apodosis*—"there would be no place for a second, and no second would be sought for," or *vice versa*. The phrase ζητεῖν τόπον is like τόπον εὑρίσκειν (xii. 17), τόπον λαμβάνειν (Acts xxv. 16), τόπον διδόναι (Rom. xii. 19). The διαθήκη δευτέρα exists already under the first (πρώτη, not προτέρα; see Winer, p. 218), *i.e.* in the divine counsels. A place is sought for it not in the hearts of men (Bleek), but in the historical manifestation of the divine purposes. That is, it is "sought" by the prophetic word, which gives expression to the divine purpose pressing on to its accomplishment. And so the writer proceeds:—

Vers. 8–12. *For, finding fault, he saith unto them, Behold, days are coming, saith the Lord, when I will conclude towards the house of Israel and towards the house of Judah a new covenant: not according to the covenant which I made for their fathers, in the day of my taking hold of their hand to lead them forth out of the land of Egypt; for they themselves abided not in my covenant, and I disregarded them, saith the Lord. For this is the covenant which I will frame for the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; putting my*

[1] Attic writers also use ἄμεμπτος in the sense of "one who has no fault to find." See Thomas Magister.

laws into their mind, I will also inscribe them on their hearts, and will be unto them for a God, and they shall be unto me for a people. And they shall not teach every one his fellow-citizen, and every one his brother, saying, Know the Lord; because all shall know me, from their least unto their greatest. For I will be merciful to their unrighteousnesses, and their sins [*and breaches of law*] *will I remember no more.*

After μεμφόμενος (ver. 8) we must either supply αὐτοῖς (comp. Ex. ii. 7), and render it *vituperans enim eos dicit* (Itala, Vulg., Peshito, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Bengel, and Böhme), or read with Lachmann (following A.D.*K. *al.*), αὐτούς, which grammatically is the better reading, and as to sense more suitable than the αὐτήν (*i.e.* τὴν πρώτην διαθήκην) of Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann, Ebrard, and others; seeing that the following prophetic passage contains no *direct* fault-finding with the Old Testament. Αὐτοῖς evidently refers to the people themselves, as at xi. 3;[1] and "the sacred writer uses the expression *He findeth fault with them* of set purpose, to mark the fact that God does not blame His own institution, but the unfaithfulness of men under it." So Rieger, quite correctly. The covenant was in itself, and in reference to the divine plan and purposes of mercy, free from all blame; yet inasmuch as not individuals only, but the whole people, fell away under it, it could not escape the charge of being unable to establish an abiding communion between God and man.

The great prophetic passage here cited is from Jer. xxxi. (Sept. xxxviii.) 31–34, to which Ezek. xxxvi. 25–27 forms a counterpart. It occurs in the third section of the third great trilogy of the Jeremianic collection of prophecies.[2] This trilogy commences with ch. xxi. Its first book, that "against the Shepherds," occupies ch. xxi.–xxv.; its second book, that "of Jeremiah's Conflict with the false Pro-

[1] And so in the Gospels frequently; *e.g.* Matt. iv. 23, xi. 1, xii. 9, Luke ii. 22.

[2] I hope to show elsewhere, that the whole collection of Jeremiah's prophecies consists of three great trilogies. Neumann (i. 89) is rightly dissatisfied with all previous arrangements.

phets," occupies ch. xxvi.–xxix.; and the third, "the Book of the Restoration," ch. xxx. and xxxi. The prophecies contained in these two chapters were given to Jeremiah when, after the conquest of Jerusalem, he had been carried in fetters, among other captives, to the standing quarters of Nebuzaradan at Rama. Committed at the same time to writing by express command of God, these prophecies speak of the ultimate restoration of the whole people of Israel, of the second David, of Rachel's lamentation at Rama over her children carried away into captivity, and their future return;[1] and lastly, of the new covenant which Jehovah will one day make with His people, based on a final and absolute remission of sins. The passage here selected from this chain of prophetic utterances, whose Messianic meaning no evasion can get rid of, begins with the stereotype phrase in Jeremiah, *ἰδοὺ ἡμέραι ἔρχονται* (the thrice inserted *λέγει Κύριος* is in the Vatican text of the Sept. throughout *φησὶ Κύριος*[2]). Jehovah holds out the prospect of a new covenant to be made with the houses both of Israel and Judah, that is, with the whole covenant people: the *καί* before *συντελέσω* corresponds to the *Vav* of the *apodosis* in the Hebrew text, and therefore must be rendered by "when," or a similar particle. For *καὶ συντελέσω ἐπὶ τὸν, κ.τ.λ.*, the text of the Sept. has *καὶ διαθήσομαι τῷ, κ.τ.λ.* Elsewhere the Sept. uses the expression *συντελεῖν διαθήκην* twice, to represent כרת ברית, viz. ch. xxxiv. (xli.) 8 and 15. Our author seems here to have purposely selected the term *συντελέσω* to express more clearly the conclusive perfecting power of the new covenant of the gospel. It is characterized, in the first place negatively, by its non-resemblance to the old covenant made at Sinai, and renewed in the plains of Moab: *οὐ κατὰ τὴν διαθήκην ἣν ἐποίησα* (LXX. *διεθέμην*)[3] *τοῖς πατράσιν αὐτῶν*

[1] See xxxi. 16, *They shall come again from the land of the enemy*; and 17, *Thy children shall come again to their own border.*

[2] Codd. A. and FA. (Friderico-Augusteus) have the first time *λέγει* K., but both times afterwards *φησί*.

[3] *Ποιεῖν διαθήκην* may here also be a reminiscence of another Septuagint rendering at xxxiv. (xli.) 18.

ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπιλαβομένου μου τῆς χειρὸς αὐτῶν ἐξαγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκ γῆς Αἰγύπτου. The construction ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπιλαβομένου μου for ἐν ᾗ ἐπελαβόμην (Justin, *dial. c. Tryph.* c. xi.) is an imitation of the Hebrew. It was God, the Deliverer from the land of Egypt, who offered that first covenant of Sinai to His people. That covenant was therefore also not altogether wanting in grace and glory; nevertheless God here declares that He will conclude a new one, which shall be different from it, and adds the reason: ὅτι αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἐνέμειναν ἐν τῇ διαθήκῃ μου κἀγὼ (so FA., while both *Vat.* and *Al.* have καὶ ἐγώ) ἠμέλησα αὐτῶν, λέγει (Codd. LXX. φησὶ) Κύριος. The expression in the Hebrew is both times positive, "*because they brake my covenant, and I conceived displeasure against them.*" Yet the rendering οὐκ ἐνέμειναν is excellent; they remained not in the covenant which was intended to include and unite them with God, and so made of it an empty formal framework.[1] Such a covenant-breaking people could no longer be the subject of covenant mercy on God's part; the Holy One must withdraw from them the providential preference and protection which He had purposed to vouchsafe: κἀγὼ ἠμέλησα αὐτῶν. The objection which might here present itself—Could, then, Israel's unfaithfulness to the covenant annul the faithfulness of God?—is easily answered. God's faithfulness to that first covenant was indeed gloriously vindicated in the very fact that

[1] "*The law*" (said Schelling) "*appears to have been the mere ideal of a religious constitution, such as never existed in reality. The Jews were actually and practically almost mere polytheists. The substance of their practical religious belief was paganism; revealed religion was but as an accident. They seem to have passed through all stages of corruption, from the queen of heaven to the abominations of the Phœnicians, and even those of Cybele*" (*Offenbarung's Philosophie*, published by Paulus, p. 668). If indeed we except the times of David, and the early part of Solomon's reign, during which the salutary influence of Samuel continued to be felt, there was no period in the history of Israel before the captivity, wherein the worship of Jehovah was not more or less confronted with that of idols. And even afterwards, among those who returned from Babylon, wearied and disgusted as they seemed with their former idolatries, a scarcely less pernicious and idolatrous formalism and worship of the letter soon gained ascendency.

when it had failed to accomplish His gracious purpose in its institution, He forthwith devised a second covenant which could not fail; and so grace was outbidden by yet larger grace.

The difference between the two covenants is next stated *positively*: ὅτι αὕτη ἡ διαθήκη[1] ἣν διαθήσομαι τῷ οἴκῳ Ἰσραὴλ μετὰ τὰς ἡμέρας ἐκείνας, λέγει[2] Κύριος. The days here meant are the "days that are coming" of ver. 8. When these days shall be fulfilled, and the sought-for place be found in them, then will the new covenant be concluded with the once more united house of all Israel. The *first* "more excellent promise" (κρείττων ἐπαγγελία), on which this new covenant will be established, is this: that in the place of the external obligation and opposition exciting bondage of the letter, will henceforth stand the inward power of the divinely implanted knowledge of the will of God, forming a new bond of communion between the Lord and His people: διδοὺς[3] νόμους μου εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν[4] αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ καρδίας αὐτῶν ἐπιγράψω αὐτούς·[5] καὶ ἔσομαι[6] αὐτοῖς εἰς Θεὸν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔσονταί μοι εἰς λαόν. The διδούς (which seems to imply a נָתַן in the original[7]) is remarkable: after it, as it now stands, the διαθήσομαι αὐτήν must be understood, and so the parallelism of the first clause with the second (καὶ ἐπὶ καρδ. αὐτῶν ἐπιγράψω αὐτούς) made complete. The ἐπὶ καρδίας of our text answers to the Hebrew עַל־לֵבָב; and (as

[1] Lachmann reads ἡ διαθήκη [μου], following A.D.E. and the *Vat.* of LXX.; the *Al.*, on the other hand, and FA., omit μου.

[2] LXX. φησί.

[3] So the LXX. in *Al.* and FA.; but the *Vat.* reads διδοὺς δώσω. For νόμους, FA.* reads, in accordance with the original Hebrew text, νόμον.

[4] FA.* reads καρδίαν.

[5] The *Vat.* reads γράψω, *Al.* and FA. καὶ ἐπιγράψω αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς καρδίας (FA. ἐπὶ καρδίαν) αὐτῶν.

[6] *Al.* and FA. read, καὶ ὄψομαι αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔσομαι, κ.τ.λ., reminding one of John xvi. 22, πάλιν δὲ ὄψομαι ὑμᾶς: it answers to some such Hebrew phrase as ופקדתים.

[7] The complete phrase is διδοὺς δώσω (*Vat.*) = נתן אתן. Compare Deut. xv. 10, LXX., and Thiersch, *de Pent. Versione Alex.* iii. 12.

Prov. vii. 3, LXX., proves) *καρδίας* is to be regarded as the genitive singular. The *second* "more excellent promise" of the new covenant is: that, as the result of manifold inward divine revelations, a true knowledge of God will become universal, a common possession of all His people: *καὶ οὐ μὴ διδάξωσιν ἕκαστος τὸν πολίτην αὐτοῦ,*[1] *καὶ ἕκαστος τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ,*[2] *λέγων· Γνῶθι τὸν Κύριον· ὅτι πάντες εἰδήσουσί(ν) με, ἀπὸ μικροῦ αὐτῶν ἕως*[3] *μεγάλου αὐτῶν.* The rendering of רֵעַ by *πολίτης* is much less usual in the Sept. than by *ὁ πλησίον*; it is found only occasionally in Jeremiah and the Proverbs. The first of the two *αὐτῶν*'s (which is omitted by Lachmann) is not wanted; the second is absolutely necessary,—making, according to the Hebrew idiom, the positives into superlatives: "from their least to their greatest" (*Ges.* § 119, 2). All will know[4] the Lord, *i.e.* will be inwardly *διδακτοὶ Θεοῦ* (John vi. 45), and need no outward teaching (1 John ii. 20, 27).[5] The *third* "more excellent promise," which constitutes the basis of the new covenant, is: that all sins will be done away by the prevenient grace of a free pardon: *ὅτι ἵλεως ἔσομαι ταῖς ἀδικίαις αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτῶν οὐ μὴ μνησθῶ ἔτι.* This promise is the foundation and, as it were, the corner-stone of all others. The *ὅτι* with which it commences is not co-ordinate with the *ὅτι* in the preceding clause, but the proof of it. The words *καὶ τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτῶν* are wanting both in the original Hebrew and the Septuagint; and I agree with Bleek[6] in thinking it more than probable that they are an interpolation from ch. x. 17, where *καὶ τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτῶν* stands in the place of *καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν*. At the same time, the authority of B., 17, 23, *Vulg.*, *Syr.*, *Copt.*,

[1] LXX. *Al.*, *τὸν ἀδελφόν*. The reading, *τὸν πλησίον αὐτοῦ* is not well attested.

[2] LXX., *Al.*, *πλησίον*.

[3] LXX., *Al.*, *μικροῦ ἕως*; and so Lachmann, here following A.B.D.*K., *al.*

[4] *εἰδήσουσιν*, Ionic fut., used also by Attic writers for *εἴσονται*. *Vid.* Lobeck, *Phryn.* p. 743.

[5] Note O, at the end of this volume.

[6] i. 362.

is not sufficient to warrant their exclusion from the text. They must be suffered to remain, though subject to some suspicion; for it is still possible, as Joh. Gerhard suggests, that the sacred writer may have introduced the words ἐξηγήσεως et ἐμφάσεως, *causa ut significaretur cujusvis generis peccatorum remissionem vere credentibus esse promissam.* That in Christ Jesus all our sins are once for all forgiven; that we have nothing to do but to receive this forgiveness in humble faith; and that when we fall into sin the covenant foundation still remains, and needs not the repetition of legal sacrifices to give it fresh validity;—this indeed is the principal and fundamental prerogative of the new covenant: for "where forgiveness of sins is, there is also life and salvation."[1] How deeply sensible our author (and that in a truly Pauline way) was of this truth, is evident from the close of this, the central portion of the epistle: at ch. x. 17 he returns to it, and solemnly repeats the sentence, that where remission of sins is, there is no more offering for sin.

We find ourselves here in the middle of the second section of this central treatise (vii. 26–ix. 12). As in v. 1–10 the sacred writer proved the resemblance between the type Aaron and Christ the antitype, so here he exhibits their dissimilarity. Christ is greater than the Levitical high priest: (α) through His high-priestly sacrifice, offered once for all; (β) through His consequent exaltation to the right hand of the Divine Majesty; (γ) through the divine supra-mundane sphere of His high-priestly work; and (δ) finally, through the absolute and unconditional forgiveness of sins vouchsafed through the covenant of which He is Founder. The conditions and characteristics of this new covenant have been described in the words of the prophet Jeremiah. The sacred writer proceeds by an *antithetical parallelism* to show (ix. 1–12) how, on the one hand, the Old Testament had its visible sanctuary with sacred mystic furniture, and in this sanctuary a holy place accessible to the priests, and a holy of holies entered by the high priest alone once every year with the blood of a twofold sacrifice; and how, on the other

[1] Luther's Catechism.

hand, these shadows have all been brought to an end through the entrance of the High Priest of the New Testament into the eternal sanctuary with the blood of His own once-offered sacrifice, accomplishing an eternal redemption. This antithetical parallelism is introduced by the concluding verse of this eighth chapter.

Ver. 13. *In that he saith "A new" [covenant], he hath made the first old. But that which decayeth and waxeth old is ready to vanish away.*

Ἐν τῷ λέγειν here is like ἐν τῷ ὑποτάξαι at ii. 8, and ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι at iii. 15. *In* saying, or *by* saying, "A new (covenant)," he has antiquated the former one. The perfect πεπαλαίωκε expresses the completion of the act of παλαιοῦν, as coinciding with the utterance of the divine prophetic word, and effected by it. Every word of God is an expression of His will; and the divine will is at the same time a divine act, even before its historical manifestation. The πεπαλαίωκε is therefore more than declarative. God cannot *declare* a person or thing to be so and so, without its being or becoming essentially that which God declares it to be. Παλαιοῦν,[1] moreover (except when used intransitively, as at Isa. lxv. 22), always signifies to make old (Lam. iii. 4; Job ix. 5, xxxii. 15), or set aside as obsolete (Dan. vii. 25). The rendering of the Vulgate is: *dicendo autem novum veteravit prius: quod autem antiquatur* (Itala, *veteratur*), *et senescit prope interitum est.* Erasmus, Beza, and many others, also render πεπαλ. by *antiquavit*, in accordance, if not with the old Roman,[2] at any rate with the later juristic use of the word. Παλαιός answers pretty closely to the Latin *antiquus*, as ἀρχαῖος to *priscus*, and γεραιός (γηραιός) to *vetus* (*vetustus*): καινός, as the antithesis of παλαιός and its synonymes, is equivalent to *novus;* while, on the other hand, νέος (syn. πρόσφατος) answers to *recens:* καινόν is that which has

[1] In extra-biblical literature, the middle or passive παλαιοῦσθαι is the only form used, in the sense of becoming or being made old.

[2] *Antiquare* being the technical term for the rejection of a proposed law.

not hitherto existed or lived; *νεόν* that which has just come into existence, and is full of fresh life. The meaning, therefore, of our verse will be, that God, in promising a "new" covenant, has marked that mediated by Moses with the character of obsolescence: it is henceforth a *παλαιούμενον*, that which is daily becoming more and more antiquated, and *γηράσκον*, daily growing older and feebler, losing more and more its former life and energy; but that which is thus becoming antiquated and lifeless is *ἐγγὺς ἀφανισμοῦ* (comp. *κατάρας ἐγγύς*, vi. 8), *i.e.* drawing ever nearer to that final point where its very existence and right to exist will have come to an end. That final point has, according to the sacred writer, been reached already. It is no longer for him, as Tholuck[1] appears to imagine, in any way a thing of the future; for he is not speaking of Judaism and Christianity, as merely historical phenomena, but of the two *διαθῆκαι* in their divine force and reality. Ever since the new covenant was established in the blood of Jesus Christ, the old covenant has had only a seeming existence and validity in the mind of Israel: it belongs henceforth to a dead and buried past. Already in the times of psalmists and prophets, it was becoming a *παλαιούμενον καὶ γηράσκον*;[2] and that is the best explanation of their position in regard to it. Otherwise it would be impossible to understand the opposition to sacrificial worship which meets us in all parts of later and prophetical Scripture: *e.g.* 1 Sam. xv. 22 sq.; Ps. xl. 7 sq.; Ps. l.; Ps. li. 18 sq.; Prov. xxi. 3; Hos. vi. 6; Jer. vii. 21–23. It is not there said that external sacrifices are good, if only performed in a right spirit; but all such sacrifices

[1] Comment. *in loc.*

[2] This is the boast of modern Judaism against their own rabbinical traditions as well as against Christianity. "The rabbinical position is so far," says Holdheim, "the same as that of Christianity, that both regard sacrifice and atonement as ideas of perpetual validity. Christianity teaches that atonement has been once for all accomplished by the one sacrifice of the cross; rabbinical Judaism looks forward to a restoration of the sacrificial system of the Thorah" (*Ceremonialgesetz im Messiasreich*, 1845). But modern Judaism rejects the idea of sacrifice altogether.

appear to be utterly discarded in favour of those which are wholly spiritual. True, indeed, they merely appear to be so. But nevertheless this aversion in the greatest minds of the Old Testament from the outward and ceremonial, was in their times a prophetic anticipation of that worship of God in spirit and truth which is the main characteristic of the New Testament. That a religion of outward works, without that inward life of the heart which the law assumes and requires, but is unable to give, is utterly worthless, was proved, even in the fairest times of Israel's history, by the prevalent immorality, notwithstanding the strictness of legal observances. And as the whole people, so each individual experienced the same in his own case. The more spiritually-minded any one might be, the more indifferent must he have become towards those legal observances which ofttimes served as a mask to the profoundest ungodliness. This explains our finding in the prophets, while they never impugn the divine authority of the ceremonial law, and at times sternly rebuke and punish high-handed violations of its ordinances, yet so many more exhortations to spiritual worship in antithesis to that of the letter and outward observance. The new covenant is already in their times striving with the old, and threatening with ruin the aged structure. In that of our author the unequal conflict had already come to an end. The old covenant is virtually dead, and the new occupies its place. The temple service, though to continue it may be a few years longer in outward splendour, is only a bed of state, on which a lifeless corpse is lying; the humble forms of worship of the New Testament church enshrine a vigorous, heaven-aspiring life.

All this notwithstanding, the first readers of the Epistle to the Hebrews were sorely tempted to suffer themselves to be dazzled by the pomp of the Levitical forms of worship, and to take offence at the humilities of the religion of the cross. To guard them from such temptation, the sacred writer proceeds to show, in the ninth chapter, how the glory of the Old Testament sanctuary, with its sacred furniture and priestly ministries, pales before the infinitely more gracious

and majestic glories of the High Priest of the New Testament, and of the eternal sanctuary in which He vouchsafes to mediate for us.

Ch. ix. 1. *Now indeed accordingly the first* [covenant] *had also ordinances of divine service, and the worldly sanctuary.*

The first covenant was indeed well appointed in reference to divine service; but— This "but" is further expanded in ver. 6 and the following verses. Having laid down that, in fulfilment of the prophetic word, a new covenant is to succeed the old, the sacred writer proceeds with a *μέν quidem*, and an *οὖν igitur*, to concede the points of excellence of which the latter could boast, and with the following *δέ vero* to indicate its deficiencies, and the superiority of that which supersedes it. All are now agreed that the right reading is *εἶχεν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ πρώτη*, not *ἡ πρώτη σκηνή*, which has all the uncials against it, and got into the *textus receptus* (Rob. Stephens, 1550) from the Complutensian of 1520. The text of Erasmus, from which Luther rendered, had only *ἡ πρώτη*. Calvin and Beza with good right declared *σκηνή* to be an awkward gloss. Sebastian Schmidt endeavoured to vindicate it without success: the sentence *habeat prius tabernaculum sanctuarium mundanum* remains, after all explanations, an illogical proposition, the *tabernaculum* being itself *sanctuarium*.[1] The reading *σκηνή* must therefore be rejected, and *ἡ πρώτη* be interpreted, according to viii. 13, as referring to *διαθήκη*. The antithesis is not between an earthly tabernacle and that in heaven, but between the first covenant with its ministries of mediation, and the new covenant with its divine Mediator. The antithetical comparison commences with the imperfect *εἶχεν*. The sacred writer looks back from the platform of

[1] *Σκηνὴ ἡ πρώτη*, in ver. 2 and in vers. 6, 8, is the holy place of the tabernacle in contradistinction from the holy of holies, not the Mosaic tabernacle itself in contradistinction from any later structure. *Πρώτη* has therefore a different meaning in vers. 2, 6, 8, from what would be assigned it in ver. 1. In the *ἡ πρώτη σκηνή* of Jos. *c. Ap.* ii. 3, *πρώτη* has that *temporal* meaning.

the new covenant towards that which preceded it, and has now become for him not merely a *παλαιούμενον*, but a *παλαιωθέν*.

The objects of the verb (*εἶχεν*) are two, *not* three—*δικαιώματα λατρείας* (*gen. sing.*), and *ἅγιον κοσμικόν*. The rendering adopted by Luther and others, "*Now the first had also its ordinances and services*" (*λατρείας*, *acc. plur.*), though grammatically possible,[1] is against the context: the sacred writer is not thinking of the Mosaic ordinances generally, but simply of those relating to public worship. *Λατρείας* must therefore be a genitive dependent on *δικαιώματα*. The Vulgate rendering is *justificationes culturæ*. But *δικαίωμα* has always a passive signification, denoting the product either of righteous legislation, righteous judgment, or righteous action: *e.g.* Luke i. 6, it denotes a righteous ordinance or precept; Rom. v. 16, an exculpatory or justifying sentence; Rev. xv. 4, a just judgment; Rom. v. 18, just action; and here, as at ver. 10, it is undoubtedly to be taken in the first of these senses—being derived from *δικαιοῦν*, to ordain, constitute, or give legal validity (cf. Philo, i. 653, 5, 16). *Δικαίωμα* is accordingly the LXX. rendering of the Hebrew משפט or חק and their synonymes. The old covenant had also its constitutions or ordinances in reference to the service of God, which were themselves *juris divini*, being based on a revelation of the divine will. Then follows the second object of *εἶχεν*, connected with the first by the enclitic particle *τε*, —*τό τε ἅγιον κοσμικόν*. The meaning in any case must be, that the old testament had also a sanctuary. To take *ἅγιον* (as, for instance, Luther, "an outward sanctity") in any other than a local sense is a mistake. The various parts and ornaments of the Levitical sanctuary are described, and at ver. 11 the heavenly *σκηνή* is directly contrasted with it. Instead, however, of simply saying *ἅγιόν τε*, the sacred writer expresses himself thus: *τό τε ἅγιον κοσμικόν*. The use of the article, and its non-repetition before the adjective *κοσμικόν*, is remarkable. As the adjective *κοσμικόν* cannot be understood in the sense of "beautiful," which would require *κόσ-*

[1] In ver. 6 our author uses *λατρείας* as a plural.

μιον, nor in that of "universal," "belonging to the whole κόσμος,"[1] which would assign to the Levitical sanctuary a position of wider significance than that given it in the Thorah, we must regard it here as denoting a difference between the Levitical sanctuary and that of the new testament. The proper meaning of the adjective κοσμικός is "worldly," "belonging to this world," having relation to it (Tit. ii. 12). The heavenly tabernacle of the new testament is said in contradistinction to be οὐ χειροποίητος τοῦτ' ἔστιν οὐ ταύτης τῆς κτίσεως; and so the *earthly* sanctuary of the Old Testament is here called κοσμικόν, as being by place, material, construction, and usage related to the present transitory world. So Egid. Hunnius: *Sanctum mundanum quia manufactum erat, constans ex materia pretiosa quidem sed tamen dissolubili.* This restriction, however, of the cosmic character to the *materia ex qua* is so far a mistaken one.

A question remains as to the construction of the sentence. Three methods are possible:—

We may render it, (1) "*The first* (covenant) *had also ordinances for the conduct of divine service, and the worldly sanctuary.*" So Bleek, Tholuck, Lünemann, Winer,[2] justifying the phrase τὸ ἅγιον κοσμικόν either from the later usage of the language, or as being like the ὁ αἰὼν πονηρός of Gal. i. 4, where αἰών and πονηρός form together one compound notion. This justification is not needed here. Instead of στενὴ ἡ ὁδος, we might say equally well ἡ ὁδος στενή, whereby a special stress would be laid on the adjective, which is lost in the rendering "the narrow way;"[3] as also the full force of κοσμικόν here is lost in the rendering "the worldly

[1] Compare Jos. *Bell.* iv. 5, 2, τῆς κοσμικῆς θρησκείας κατάρχοντες, speaking of the Jewish high priests. Chrysostom, Haymo, and others, are also wrong in interpreting ἅγιον κοσμικόν of the *atrium gentium* in the temple: *Sanctum sæculare in quo sæculi homines, hoc est, gentiles ad Judaismum transeuntes recipiebat.* The author of this epistle speaks throughout of the Mosaic tabernacle, not of the temple.

[2] P. 121.

[3] See Kühner, § 493, 1; Buttmann, § 125, Obs. 4.

sanctuary." It is indeed completely wrong to imagine that τὸ ἅγιον κ. could be equivalent to ἁγιόν τι τὸ κοσμικόν, whereas it must rather be resolved into τὸ ἅγιον κοσμικόν τι or κοσμικὸν ὄν. A better rendering, therefore, would be, (2) "*The sanctuary*" (*i.e.* the well-known Mosaic tabernacle) "*being a thing of this world*," where κοσμικόν is regarded as a sort of apposition more nearly defining the object, τὸ ἅγιον. But inasmuch as the usage of ἔχειν with determined object and undetermined adjectival predicate is common (*e.g.* Isocrat. *Phil.* § 134, τὸ σῶμα θνητὸν ἅπαντες ἔχομεν; *vid.* Madvig, § 12), and familiar to our author (*vid.* v. 14, vii. 24), it would be still better to render it, (3) "*The first covenant had also liturgical ordinances, and the sanctuary as a thing of this world*," *i.e.* a sanctuary of a simply cosmical character.[1] In this way only can the otherwise difficult article be explained in accordance with Greek modes of thought. Logically, the sense is the same in all three renderings. The sacred writer proceeds to develope the cosmical character of the sanctuary of the old testament.

Ver. 2. *For a tabernacle was prepared, the first one wherein were the lamp, and the table, and the setting forth of the loaves, which* (part of the tabernacle) *was called* "*Holies.*"

The structure of thought is this: The old covenant had a sanctuary of its own, and that of a cosmic nature; for a tabernacle was constructed—first, the outer part, which was called the holies or holy place, and then another part called the holy of holies. It is scarcely necessary to observe that the aor. κατεσκευάσθη (used in the same connection by Philo, ii. 149, 3) refers to the construction of the Mosaic tabernacle, and not of any later building. (For σκηνή placed at the beginning of the sentence without the article, and followed by appositional epithets with the article, both here and in the following verse, compare vi. 7, Acts x. 41, xix. 11, xxvi. 22; and Winer, § 20, 4.) The two divisions of the

[1] Like, for example, ἔχει τὸ χρῶμα μελάντερον, *i.e.* has a complexion of a specially dark hue.

tabernacle are not here regarded as separate buildings, but as the outer and inner parts of the same building. Valckenaer compares the *ἐν πρώτῃσι θύρῃσι* in Homer, and the *est mihi conclave retro in ultimis credibus* of Terence.

Three ornaments are enumerated as belonging to the outer tabernacle (the holy place): (1) *ἡ λυχνία*, Heb. המנורה, the golden candelabrum, with its upright shaft and six branches (three on each side) crowned with seven lamps, and adorned with almond blossoms, pomegranates, and lilies;[1] (2) *ἡ τραπέζα*, השלחן, the holy table, made of acacia (shittim) wood, and overlaid with pure gold, on which account it was called sometimes הש׳ הטהור, the pure table;[2] (3) *ἡ πρόθεσις τῶν ἄρτων*, מערכת הלחם, the arrangement of the loaves called "shew-bread" (2 Chron. xiii. 11), *i.e.* the double row made of such loaves. Bleek, Winer, and Lünemann, insist on understanding *πρόθεσις* here of the action of arranging the twelve loaves, but the connection shows that the sacred writer must have had the loaves themselves as arranged in view. Tholuck's, therefore, is the correcter rendering, *strues panum*, and *πρόθεσις* answers exactly to מערכת.[3] The loaves of shew-bread were placed on the holy table in two מערכות, six in each row. Into the ritual use or symbolical meaning of these sacred ornaments of the tabernacle the commentator is not called to inquire, as he has only to do with what his author says, not with what he omits, except occasionally when such omission appears significant. So here it is noticeable that he omits to mention as belonging to the holy place the golden altar of incense, which also stood there. When Philo (i. 504, 33) speaks of the *τριῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις σκευῶν*, he means, as he proceeds to enumerate, the candlestick, table,

[1] The tabernacle of Moses had only one such candelabrum, the temple of Solomon ten, that of Herod again only one.

[2] In the tabernacle and in Herod's temple there was only one such table, in Solomon's temple ten, which were probably used in succession, one at one time. See 2 Chron. iv. 8, and comp. 1 Chron. xxvi. 16 and 2 Chron. iv. 19.

[3] Neither an hypallage *propositio panum = panes propositi*, nor still less, an hendiadys = *mensa propositionis panum*, is admissible here (Baumgarten, Valckenaer).

and incense-altar.[1] Our author keeps this threefold enumeration in view; but wishing to omit the incense-altar, separates the table from its loaves of shew-bread, and attaches the incense-altar to the inner sanctuary. His object in so doing is obvious. Its investigation, however, must be deferred till we come to the comment on ver. 4.

The outer division of the tabernacle thus furnished is called the holy place, *ἥτις λέγεται ἅγια*. The texts of Erasmus, Stephens, and Mill, accentuate falsely *ἁγία*. Among the ancients, Theodoret correctly remarked that *αγια* was to be read *προπαροξυτόνως*, proving it by reference to the following *ἅγια ἁγίων*. The קֹדֶשׁ, or הֵיכָל (the holy place), is commonly designated in Hellenistic Greek as *τὰ ἅγια* (*e.g.* 1 Kings viii. 8, LXX.). The article is omitted here before the predicate. The sacred writer proceeds to describe the inner division of the tabernacle.

Ver. 3. *But behind the second veil a tabernacle which is called holy of holies.*

The preposition *μετά*, which has often the sense of *post* ("after," in order of succession or time), has here (as Her. iv. 49[2]) the rarer sense of *pone*. The *δεύτερον καταπέτασμα*[3] is the veil made of blue, purple, and scarlet wool, and fine twined linen (byssus), adorned with figures of cherubim, and hung on four gilded pillars of acacia wood resting on silver sockets, which concealed the holy of holies, and had to be drawn aside for a moment by the high priest when he entered the inner sanctuary on the day of atonement. The genitive construction *ἅγια ἁγίων* marks the special holiness of this adytum of the sanctuary, called also דביר [the oracle]. The author proceeds to describe this most sacred locality in detail.

Ver. 4. *Having a golden incense-altar, and the ark of the covenant, overlaid on all sides with gold, in which was a golden*

[1] *λυχνία, τράπεζα, θυμιατήριον.*

[2] *μετὰ Κύνητας*, beyond the Cynetæ.

[3] Comp. Philo, ii. 246, 49; 253, 47.

pot, containing the manna, and the rod of Aaron which had budded, and the tables of the covenant.

Whether we render *θυμιατήριον* (which in itself would simply denote any incense-vessel) by "censer" (with Peshito, Vulgate, Luther) or by "altar" (with the Itala, which in Sabatier's text reads *aureum habens altare*), the statement *χρυσοῦν ἔχουσα θυμιατήριον* still remains a difficulty, which is not to be so lightly disposed of as it is by Ebrard. As to the rendering of *θυμιατήριον*, many interpreters (*e.g.* Grotius, Limborch, Bengel, Böhme, Menken, Stuart, Klee, von Gerlach, Stier), and among them some great biblical archæologists (Villalpandus, de Dieu, Reland, Lundius Deyling, Jo. Ge. Michaelis), and several ancients (Theophylact, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Lyranus), adhere to "censer," following the Vulgate, which reads *aureum thuribulum*, and understand by it the golden censer with which the high priest entered the holy of holies on the day of atonement. In his right hand he carried the golden coal-vessel filled with burning coals from the altar of burnt-offering, in his left the golden censer with a handful of incense. After entering the inner sanctuary, he set down the vessel filled with the live coals before the mercy-seat, and shook out the incense over them from the golden censer. But even so the censer could not be said to be IN the sanctuary, as, according to the tradition, it was immediately carried out and placed in the temple aumbry (לשכת הכלים), but (at the utmost) only to belong to it; besides which—and this is a decisive argument against the interpretation proposed—this "censer" is nowhere mentioned in the Thorah, but only in the ritual of the second temple, under the name of כף. The Thorah (Lev. xvi. 12) speaks only of the vessel מחתה[1] in which the high priest carried the coals from the altar of burnt-offering. This מחתה is in the LXX. called *πυρεῖον*, not *θυμιατήριον* (though Photius does explain one word by the other), and, what is again decisive, it is not said to be of gold. Now nothing is more certain than that the writer of this epistle confines himself strictly to the literal expressions of the Thorah in his enumeration

[1] Rendered "censer" in our auth. version.—TR.

of the sacred furniture of the holy and most holy places; and the same is the case with Philo in his mystical interpretations. When, for instance, he enumerates (ii. 149, 40) the *σκεύη ἱερά* (such as *κιβωτός*, *λυχνία*, *τράπεζα*, *θυμιατήριον*, *βωμός*), he always means by *θυμιατήριον* the altar of incense, in contradistinction to the altar of burnt-offering, which stood in the open air (*ὁ ὕπαιθρος βωμός*), and which he also calls *θυσιαστήριον*. Hellenistic usage differs here from that of the LXX. The LXX. calls the altar of incense *θυσιαστήριον θυμιάματος*, or *θυσιαστήριον χρυσοῦν*, in contradistinction to the *θυσιαστήριον ὁλοκαυτώματος*, or *θυσ. χαλκοῦν*, the brazen altar of burnt-offering. *Θυμιατήριον* is used, on the other hand, by the LXX. only at Ezek. viii. 11 and 2 Chron. xxvi. 19 as translation of מקטרת, "censer," and is not employed by the other Greek translators as designation of the incense-altar, simply because their zeal for literality did not permit of their rendering the term מזבח הקטרה by a single Greek word. But in extra-biblical Greek, where such considerations had no place, the shorter name was preferred; and while the altar of burnt-offering was called simply *τὸ θυσιαστήριον* (from *θύειν*, זבח), the altar of incense was called *θυμιατήριον* (from *θυμιᾶν*, קטר). So we find it used by Philo, Josephus, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Origen. The plural *θυμιατήρια* is sometimes used for incense-vessels generally (*e.g.* Jos. *Bell.* i. 7, 6), but *θυμιατήριον* invariably for the incense-altar. Such being the Hellenistic usage, and in particular that of Josephus and Philo, whose phraseology has so many points of resemblance to that of our author, it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that *θυμιατήριον* means here the incense-altar, and nothing else. It would be, moreover, a quite inexplicable omission in this connection, had he said nothing about it.

But if *θυμιατήριον* here is the altar of incense, the sacred writer appears to be involved in the gross error of supposing that this golden altar, of which Philo says correctly that it stood between the golden candlestick and the holy table (ii. 150, 34), *ἔσω τοῦ προτέρου καταπετάσματος* (ii. 253, 46), had

actually its place *μετὰ τὸ δεύτερον καταπέτασμα*, in the holy of holies. Bleek, De Wette, and Lünemann assume that this was really our author's meaning; and Bleek draws thence the conclusion that he could not have been a Jew of Palestine: but even supposing him to have been an Alexandrine Jew, he must have been a monster of ignorance and forgetfulness to be capable of such a mistake. We cannot believe this, and must therefore endeavour to find another interpretation of his words—*χρυσοῦν ἔχουσα θυμιατήριον*.

We ask, first; May we discern a motive which might have influenced the writer of this epistle, though well acquainted with the local position of the incense-altar in the outer sanctuary, to assign it nevertheless to the holy of holies? Such a motive may certainly be discovered, and is indeed recognised by Bleek himself. "*The sacred writer*," so says Bleek, and after him Tholuck, "*regards the holy of holies without its veil as a symbol of the heavenly sanctuary, and had therefore a direct interest in regarding the altar whose incense-oblation symbolized the prayers of saints* (Rev. viii. 3 sq.) *as pertaining to this inner sanctuary*." This is the exact truth. The Scriptures of the Old Testament, as well as those of the New, speak of a heavenly altar (Isa. vi. 6), the counterpart of the earthly מזבח הזהב. And inasmuch as this antitypical altar actually did belong to the heavenly sanctuary, it was obviously natural for our author to assign the typical altar likewise to the earthly holy of holies. We inquire, in the second place, whether the sacred writer was justified by such considerations in thus speaking of the altar of incense? The answer should be: Certainly he was, and yet not on the principle laid down by Ebrard, *that the incense and its fragrance being destined to enter the holy of holies as the symbol of worship and prayer, the altar from which it came might be said to belong to the same inner sanctuary*. This reason is as good as none at all; for, on the same principle, it might be said that the loaves of shew-bread belonged to the holy of holies, inasmuch as they were placed as a twelvefold thankoffering for all Israel on the holy table, to attract the regards of Him who sits between the cherubim in the most holy place. Nor

can appeal be made to the circumstance that at Ex. xxvi. 35 there is no mention of the altar of incense among the furniture of the holy place "without the veil," for this simple reason, that the construction of this altar had not at that time been commanded; nor, again, to the fact that at Ex. xxx. 10 it is called קדש קדשים, even the altar of burnt-offering which stood outside, both parts of the sanctuary being at Ex. xl. 10 honoured by the same name. On the other hand, it is not without significance in reference to this question, (*a*) that the altar of incense is said (at Ex. xxx. 6 and xl. 5) to be placed before the ark of the covenant, or the Cappôreth, and so brought in direct connection with it; (*b*) that, like the Cappôreth, it was on the day of atonement sprinkled with the atoning blood; and (*c*) that it is spoken of at 1 Kings vi. 22 (precisely as here) as belonging to the inner sanctuary, המזבח אשר לדביר.[1] Our author, like that of the book of Kings, regards the altar of incense as belonging to the holy of holies, although placed within the outer sanctuary in order to be daily served by the ordinary priests. Had he said *ἐν ᾗ χρυσ. θυμ.*, the statement would have been directly erroneous, and it must be allowed that *ἔχουσα* is an ambiguous expression. I cannot, however, believe that the sacred writer would have expressed himself so ambiguously, unless he had felt quite sure that he would not be misunderstood.

The adjective *χρυσοῦν* is not prefixed for the sake of emphatically distinguishing this altar from that of burnt-offering, which was of brass, but as an *epitheton ornans*, which, as descriptive of the material and construction, is without the article. The incense-altar being made of gold, is characteristic of the external magnificence of the Levitical cultus, to which the sacred writer has called attention. For the same reason, he describes the ark of the covenant, the second vessel belonging to the holy of holies, not without reference to its costliness and magnificence, as *τὴν κιβωτὸν τῆς διαθήκης περικεκαλυμμένην πάντοθεν χρυσίῳ*; where, however, *περικεκ.* is not a mere epitheton, like *χρυσοῦν*

[1] Rendered in our version inexactly, "the altar that was by the oracle."—Tr.

above, but, like *κοσμικόν* in ver. 1, a determinative predicate, and therefore without the article.

The ark of the covenant[1] was, he says, overlaid round about (*πάντοθεν*), on all surfaces, *ἔσωθεν καὶ ἔξωθεν* (Ex. xxv. 11; Philo, *πολυτελῶς ἔνδοθεν καὶ ἔξωθεν*), with gold (*χρυσίῳ* is a more suitable term than *χρυσῷ* to designate wrought gold); whereas the incense-altar, which was simply externally covered with gold, is designated as *χρυσοῦν*. The reference is, of course, to the sanctuary in the time of Moses. The temple of Solomon also possessed the ark. Its fate during the Chaldean catastrophe is involved in obscurity. See Grimm on 2 Macc. ii. 1–8. In the second temple its place was occupied by the so-called *lapis fundationis*, a stone slab three fingers high.[2]

With the ark were likewise wanting in the second temple the other articles of sacred furniture enumerated here as its contents or adjuncts:—(1) *Στάμνος χρυσῆ ἔχουσα τὸ μάννα* (Ex. xvi. 32–34, in LXX., *λάβε στάμνον, χρυσοῦν*, where *σταμν.* is masc.),—a golden pot in which an omer of manna was preserved in remembrance of the miraculous feeding of the people in the wilderness. The Hebrew word is צנצנת, probably from צנן, to enclose, contain; and if so, there is nothing to object to in the rendering *στάμνος*. The epithet *χρυσ.*, on the other hand, is an addition to the original text, in which our author follows, with Philo,[3] the Septuagint tradition. That this pot of manna was laid up inside the ark, is a natural conclusion from the words of the Thorah, לפני ה׳ and לפני העדת, against which no argument can properly be drawn from 1 Kings viii. 9 (2 Chron. v. 10), where it is said that *there was nothing in the ark* (of Solomon's time) *save the two tables of stone which Moses put there at Horeb.* The very terms of this statement may almost seem to imply that other things had been there formerly. The sacred writer here follows the same tradition as that of the Gemara *Talm. babli, Joma* 52*b*, "*Since the ark became invisible, have likewise disappeared the*

[1] ארון הברית, Josh. iii. 6, and frequently.

[2] Heb. אבן שתיה; *vid.* Gesenius, *Thes. s.v.* שׁתה, iii.

[3] i. 533, 41, *ἐν στάμνῳ χρυσῷ.*

pot of manna, and the cruse of anointing oil, and Aaron's rod with its almonds and blossoms, and the coffer which the Philistines sent as a present to the God of Israel."[1] Further, (2) ἡ ῥάβδος Ἀαρὼν (=τοῦ Ἀαρ.) ἡ βλαστήσασα. This miraculous witness to Aaron's exclusive right to the priesthood was, according to the traditional interpretation of Num. xvii. 10, laid up like the pot of manna within the ark, along with the tables of the law. (3) Αἱ πλάκες τῆς διαθήκης: the tables of the covenant are mentioned last, simply because the sacred writer, having called attention to the cosmic character of the ancient sanctuary, naturally mentions first those contents of the ark which were most costly or most beautiful. He proceeds with a further description of its adjuncts:—

Ver. 5. *And over it cherubim of glory overshadowing the mercy-seat, concerning which things one cannot now speak in detail.*

Ὑπεράνω αὐτῆς is equivalent to ממעל לו, Ezek. i. 26; αὐτῆς referring, of course, to τὴν κιβωτὸν τῆς διαθήκης. The ark was covered above by a massive gold plate of equal length and breadth, at either end of which were two massive golden cherubs, investing themselves with their outspread wings,[2] and with downward-looking countenances. This golden plate was called כפרת (Cappôreth), "the cover." Ewald's conjecture,[3] that the ark had its own cover distinct from this Cappôreth which rested on it, has been already refuted by Lundius.[4] It finds no support in Scripture, which never speaks of more than one Cappôreth (or cover) "over the ark" (על־הארון) or "over the testimony" (על־העדות), *i.e.* the tables of the law laid up within the ark. Nor would it be correct to say that כפרת in the sense of "cover" must be

[1] Levi Ben Gerson and Abarbanel, with other Jewish commentators on 1 Kings viii. 9, maintain the tradition that the pot of manna and Aaron's rod were laid up in the ark. Bleek supposes that Abarbanel appeals for this to the Cabbala, but that is a mistake. קבלה in the passage referred to simply means "tradition," as it is rightly rendered by Tholuck.

[2] סככים, LXX. συσκιάζοντες.

[3] *Alterthümer*, 140.

[4] Cap. ix. 21, 22.

punctuated כְּפֹרֶת (Chephoreth), since כַּפֹּרֶת (Cappôreth) is a *Piel* form like פָּרוֹכֶת (Pârôcheth)[1] from כפר. We cannot therefore agree with Bähr (*Symb.* i. 381; *Salom. Tempel*, 165), Philippi (on Rom. iii. 25), and others, that the original meaning of the term *Cappôreth* was *Propitiatorium* (*ἱλαστήριον*), an instrument of propitiation; and yet are ready to grant that it is more than probable that in later biblical literature (as at 1 Chron. xxviii. 11[2]) it acquired the additional meaning of a covering or atonement for sin. Hofmann unites both meanings in a facile manner, by conjecturing that the mercy-seat was called Cappôreth, as forming a cover to, and so hiding, the fire of wrath in the divine mind against the violation of the ten commandments laid up in the ark. (For this interpretation, see *Weissag.* i. 141, and Baumgarten, *Pentat.* ii. 53.) It is also the interpretation of Hengstenberg, but is examined and rejected by Bähr (*Salom. Tempel*, pp. 173–177) on the following grounds: First, that it rests on a very weak foundation, in the single phrase הכפרת אשר על־העדות, where the law is called "the testimony," as God's witness to Himself, not as His witness against Israel; secondly, that it does not get beyond the meaning *operculum*, which it takes at once symbolically and literally;[3] and thirdly, that if the idea of propitiation had been originally associated with that of the Cappôreth, it must have appeared in the language of the ritual for the day of atonement. The Septuagint renders Cappôreth on the first time of its occurrence (Ex. xxv. 17) by *ἱλαστήριον ἐπίθεμα*, and afterwards simply by *ἱλαστήριον*, the key to which rendering may be found in

[1] That nouns of this *Piel* formation retain (with that intensification which is characteristic of the *Piel*) the meaning of the *Kal*, is evident from such instances as אַדֶּרֶת, דַּבֶּשֶׁת, דַּלֶּקֶת, and לַהֶבֶת. They do so occasionally, even when the *Piel* verb *differs* in meaning from the *Kal*; *e.g.* בַּצֹּרֶת = *interclusis imbrium* is derived from the *Kal* בצר, *arcere*, *cohibere*, and not from the *Piel* בִּצֵּר, *in accessum reddere*, *munire*.

[2] The holy of holies is there called בית הכפרת, *the House* (Eng. ver. *Place*) *of the Cappôreth* (*mercy-seat*). Comp. Winer, R.W. i. 202.

[3] "The *mercy-cover* that hides the handwriting of ordinances which was against us."—EBRARD.

Lev. xvi. 15, *ῥανεῖ τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ἱλαστήριον κατὰ πρόσωπον τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου καὶ ἐξιλάσεται, κ.τ.λ.*

From a comparison of the various places in which the word is used in Scripture, we may gather that the first immediate meaning and purpose of the Cappôreth was to be the cover of the ark, in which was enshrined Jehovah's testimony to Himself in His relation to Israel (*i.e.* the tables of the law), and that as such it made of the ark a throne or footstool for God (1 Chron. xxviii. 2: comp. Ps. cxxxii. 7, xcix. 5; Lam. ii. 1; Isa. lxvi. 1). It was, so to speak, the middle thing (medium) between the shrine of the covenant Acts and the God of the covenant (Ps. cxxxii. 8). The besprinkling (on the day of atonement) of the Cappôreth with the blood of atonement, cleansed this medium from the impurities of the earthly locality in which it was placed, and aimed at such atonement or reconciliation as might unite Israel and Jehovah in the same way as the Cappôreth united Him with the Ark of the covenant. The Cappôreth was accordingly the same thing as the *Raqîa'* (the outstretched firmament) in Ezekiel's vision of the *mercabah* (Jehovah's chariot-throne). The ark was, in fact, itself a *mercabah* (1 Chron. xxviii. 18),—the difference between it and Ezekiel's "chariot" being simply that the one moved, the other was ordinarily still. Consequently in Ezekiel's vision the cherubim are *under* the *Raqîa'* prepared to carry it whithersoever the Lord will, while in the case of the ark they are placed above the Cappôreth at either end, with the glory of the Lord between them, and engaged in perpetual adoration.[1]

The Cappôreth, then, with the ark, is the throne or footstool of God, as the sanctuary in which it is placed is called מכון לשבתי, "*the place of my session*" (Ex. xv. 17; 1 Kings viii. 13); and "righteousness and judgment" as revealed in the Thorah are said to be "the pillars" of Jehovah's "throne" (Ps. lxxxix. 15, xcvii. 2), even as the Cappôreth is spoken of as being "over the testimony." The cherubim, elsewhere regarded as the bearers of the throne, are here its attendant

[1] *That*, and not motion, is the meaning of their uplifted wings. Comp. Isa. vi. 2.

guards. The Lord Himself promises to be present upon it, and to speak with Moses "*from above the Cappôreth, from between the two cherubim*" (Ex. xxv. 22). The cherubim have therefore the glory of Jehovah between them, and hence are called χερουβὶμ δόξης.[1] The name cherubim (undoubtedly allied to γρύψ γρυπές) signifies, as I have shown elsewhere, beings who grasp or hold fast, and so make that which is held fast unapproachable. They are the living chariot and barrier created for itself by the Divine Majesty, and in a similar sense they are spoken of as the guards of paradise. This observation will enable us to decide between the two possible interpretations of the genitive δόξης given by Cyril and Œcumenius: ἢ τὰ ἔνδοξα ἢ τὰ ὄντα τῆς δόξης τουτέστι τοῦ Θεοῦ. The latter is to be preferred; for δόξα is here, as elsewhere, the divine glory: the cherubim are regarded as accompaniments of that glory.[2] The

[1] The reading χερουβείμ is only a different mode of spelling the same word, or of representing the same pronunciation, and an instance of the frequent interchange of the ει and ι which is found in the oldest classical MSS., and proves how very ancient the corrupt pronunciation called Itacism is (*vid.* Mullach, *Gramm. der griech. Vulgärsprache*, p. 116 sqq.). The reading χερουβείν (χερουβίν) is, on the other hand, more noteworthy, as representing the Aramaic form כרובין, belonging to a dialect which at the date of our epistle still existed as a living tongue. Philo adheres throughout to the old Hebrew χερουβίμ, speaking of it as the form of the word in the Χαλδαίων γλώττῃ, by which he means the ancient language of his people. Josephus employs the Hellenized equivalent χερουβεῖς (*vid.* Grossmann, *Philonis Judæi Anecdoton Græcum de Cherubinis* (1856), pp. 7, 11).

[2] Compare Ecclus. xlix. 8, where it is said of Ezekiel: εἶδεν ὅρασιν δόξης . . . ἐπὶ ἅρματος χερουβίμ. It was a question learnedly discussed in the last century, whether God manifested His presence in a cloud upon the mercy-seat, or whether the ענן of Lev. xvi. 2 was only a cloud of incense (*vid.* Thalemann, *de nube super arca fœderis commento judaico*, 1771). St. Jerome says: *Super propitiatorium et cherubim nihil erat positum quod videbatur sed sola fide credebatur ibi sedere Deus.* Theodoret, on the other hand, that God manifested His presence ἐν νεφέλῃ φωτοειδεῖ. Vitringa, with some inconsistency in parts of his dissertation, endeavoured to maintain the correctness of St. Jerome's statement. In fact, it would seem that Lev. xvi. 2 cannot well be understood of the cloud of incense, but only of a divine manifestation (comp. Ex. xix. 9;

neuter[1] (χερουβὶμ—κατασκιάζοντα) is both suitable to the mysterious nature of the beings designated, and to the application of the name here to images of them literally overshadowing the Cappôreth.

Having thus briefly sketched the ancient sanctuary and its furniture, the writer of the epistle breaks off abruptly with the remark: περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν νῦν λέγειν κατὰ μέρος (κατὰ μέρος opp. ἐν κεφαλαίῳ). If he had been able to enter into particulars, how much he might have said of the symbolical meaning of each article, from the golden candlestick to the golden Cappôreth! But this he cannot now do (οὐκ ἔστιν), as being beyond his present object. He therefore proceeds at once from the ἅγιον to the δικαιώματα λατρείας connected with it. The outer division of the sanctuary is accessible only to the priests, the inner to the high priest alone, and to him only once in the year:—

Vers. 6, 7. *Now these things being thus arranged, into the first tabernacle enter the priests continually, accomplishing* [there] *the services* [of their order]; *but into the second, the high priest alone once every year, not without blood, which he offereth for himself, and for the ignorances of the people.*

The present εἰσίασιν is not here the so-called historical present. The sacred writer regards indeed the old covenant as passed away and superseded, but its ritual worship has still a dying life and present existence. But if εἰσίασιν be a genuine present, it would seem to follow that he regards the details of arrangement in the sanctuary already enumerated as likewise still existing. And so in fact he does, without however justly exposing himself to the imputation of such gross ignorance as that attributed to him by Bleek and

1 Kings viii. 12). At any rate, the divine glory was above the mercy-seat, whether visible or not.

[1] The Septuagint only occasionally uses the word as a masculine. Josephus says sometimes οἱ, and even αἱ χερουβεῖς; Philo only τὰ χερουβίμ. They are for the latter symbols of the highest powers of the divine nature, the creative and the kingly. At ii. 218, 36, he says, in an invocation, δόξαν δὲ σὴν εἶναι νομίζω τὰς σε δορυφορούσας δυνάμεις. This agrees with our interpretation of the χερουβὶμ δόξης.

Lünemann, of not being aware that the Mosaic ark of the covenant had at that time long since disappeared. The primary reference of *τούτων οὕτως κατεσκευασμένων* is undoubtedly to the *κατεσκευάσθη* of ver. 2, which carries us back to the Mosaic era, and to the original construction of the tabernacle with its twofold courts; and the perfect participle certainly implies that this arrangement is contemplated as still continuing, but not necessarily that it does so in every particular. Otherwise one must attribute a quite impossible ignorance to a man evidently so learned in the Scriptures as our author—that of the Scripture record of the superseding of the tabernacles of Moses and David by the erection of the temple in the time of Solomon. He was undoubtedly fully aware likewise, that certain things were wanting in the second temple which were present in the first, and among them the ark of the covenant, with its Cappôreth. The legend of the ark's disappearance after the destruction of the city by the Chaldees, recorded in 2 Macc. iv., could not have been unknown to our author, who indeed refers to other passages in the same book (2 Macc. vi. 18 sq.)[1] in the *ἐτυμπανίσθησαν* of ch. xi. 35. Nevertheless he expressly mentions the ark here, because it is the original divinely-ordered arrangement, not any subsequent alterations of the Levitical sanctuary, which he has now in view, and because, in order to exhibit the full pre-eminence of the new covenant over the old, he must compare it with the latter in its highest completeness and perfection. However gloriously, then, the holy of holies of the old covenant may have been furnished, there was still something wanting there.

Into the foremost part of the tabernacle (the היכל) the ordinary priests might at any rate enter *διαπαντός*, without intermission, on any and every day in the year, for the purpose of performing their daily ministrations [*ἐπιτελεῖν λατρείας* is like the *ἐπιτελεῖν θρησκείας* of Herod. ii. 37, and the *ἐπιτ. εὐχάς, θυσίας, λειτουργίας* of Philo i. 653, 15, 27]. The ministrations (*λατρείαι*) here meant are the dressing of the lamps and the offering of incense, which took place every

[1] Compare also 2 Macc. vii. 20–41 with Heb. xi. 35.

morning and evening; and the removal and setting forth (*πρόθεσις*) of the twelve loaves of shew-bread, which was done every Sabbath-day. But into the inner part of the tabernacle [the *Debîr* (דביר), or "Oracle," as it was called, in Solomon's temple] only the high priest was suffered to enter, and that only once a year (*ἅπαξ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ*, אַחַת בַּשָּׁנָה, Ex. xxx. 10, Lev. xvi. 34, LXX.), that is, on one day only, the day of atonement (יום הכפורים). Any one determined to misunderstand this, might say that the sacred writer's meaning is that the high priest entered the holy of holies only once on that one day. But this would be incorrect. The Thorah itself expressly speaks of *two* such enterings (Lev. xvi.); in reference to which, Herod Agrippa, in his letter to the Emperor Caius (Caligula), says that the high priest forfeits his life if he presumes in that one day to enter (*τρὶς ἢ καὶ τετράκις*) as many as three or four times (Philo, ii. 591, 15). This again, however, contradicts the Jewish tradition, as preserved to us in the talmudic tract Joma; according to which the high priest did actually enter the holy of holies *four* times on the day of atonement: first, with the pan of live coals and the censer filled with incense; secondly, with the blood of the bullock; thirdly, with that of the goat; and fourthly, after the evening sacrifice, to fetch away the coal-pan and the censer. A little further consideration would, however, show that these four enterings were for purposes of atonement only two, and that the first was separated from the second, and the fourth from the third, only by necessity or convenience. Our author here has evidently the *two* principal enterings (the second and third) in view when he adds, *οὐ χωρὶς αἵματος, ὃ προσφέρει ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ ἀγνοημάτων*,—the reference being to the blood of the bullock which the high priest offered *περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἑαυτοῦ*, and to that of the goat which he subsequently offered *περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ λαοῦ*.

The *ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ*, said of the Levitical high priest, is equivalent to *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγνοημάτων*; and *ἀγνοήματα*[1] is a general term for all such offences as are not committed

[1] The word is of rare occurrence in the LXX.

with a high hand, in open defiance of the divine law, but through human infirmity, or with a half consciousness only of their moral turpitude, and for such as, when recognised as sins, are truly repented of.[1]

The transaction with the blood of atonement consisted in sprinkling (הזאה, הזוי), anointing or smearing (נתינה), and outpouring (שפיכה). First, the blood of either sacrifice was "sprinkled," once upwards, and seven times backwards, before the Cappôreth; after this the horns of the altar of incense were "anointed" with the mingled blood of both sacrifices, and the same "sprinkled" seven times before it; lastly, the remainder of the blood was "poured out" at the foot of the altar of burnt-offering. The first of these three actions, that of "sprinkling" in the holy of holies, is here called προσφέρειν, a term quite in accordance with the sacrificial language of the Thorah, הקריב את־הדם = προσφέρειν τὸ αἷμα, Lev. i. 5, vii. 33, Ezek. xliv. 7, 15. Luther renders here: "not without blood which he offered." The one-sided inference of the Socinians, *apparet hinc oblationem illam pontificis non fuisse positam in ipsa mactatione pecudum, proinde nec oblationem Christi illi respondentem* (Schlichting), has been already refuted at ch. viii. 3. But not less one-sided in the opposite direction is the assertion of Seb. Schmid: *sanguis oblati sacrificii inferebatur in sanctum sanctorum idemque spargebatur, non autem demum offerebatur, nisi offerre significet ferre ante aliquem et illi proponere de sacrificio ad placandum et exorandum.* It is even contradictory to the letter of the text of Lev. xvi., which enjoins first the slaying of the victim (שחיטה), then the application of the blood, and finally the consumption of the fat on the altar (הקטרה) of burnt-offering. The application and offering of the blood is therefore an integral part of the sacrificial action, for which the slaying of the victim and the accompanying סמיכה (laying on of hands) is preparatory; while the application of the blood, which is the atonement proper, (כפרה) prepares the offerer (בעל הקכן) for the presentation on the altar of his gift. It would, however, be a mistake to

[1] See note on ch. v. 2 above.

suppose that the antitype must in every respect correspond to this succession of actions in the typical sacrifice; but of this more hereafter. The sacred writer's present purpose is to show how the highest act of the Levitical worship, the entrance of the high priest into the holy of holies, itself exhibited the imperfection of the covenant to which that worship belonged.

Ver. 8. *The Holy Ghost this signifying, that the way into the holies hath not yet been made manifest so long as the first tabernacle remains standing.*

The writer's meaning is, that the Holy Spirit, as He inspires the word of prophecy, so also interprets the otherwise voiceless types of the Old Testament worship and history; His work being, both by the word of prophecy (xii. 27; 1 Pet. i. 11) and by the disclosure of typical significances, to make δῆλον, *i.e.* δηλοῦν, to signify or illustrate divine verities. The point which this divine Interpreter would illustrate by that arrangement of the Mosaic sanctuary to which reference is here being made was this (τοῦτο), that so long as the first tabernacle should remain standing, the way of approach to the true sanctuary would not be disclosed. It is hardly probable that the sacred writer should use ἡ πρώτη σκηνή here in a different sense from that of vers. 2 and 6. It does not therefore mean the old Levitical sanctuary, in contradistinction from that of the New Testament (like ἡ πρώτη διαθήκη, viii. 7, 13, ix. 1), but the holy place of priestly service, in contradistinction from the holy of holies (ἡ δευτέρα σκηνή). From which it is evident that "the holies" (τῶν ἁγίων) of our present verse must be the inner sanctuary, the most holy place; and we find, accordingly, ἅγια, τὰ ἅγια, τῶν ἁγίων, used in the same sense in subsequent passages of the epistle (comp. ix. 12, 24, 25, x. 19, xiii. 11). In the Old Testament, likewise, הַקֹּדֶשׁ, τὸ ἅγιον, is not infrequently the abbreviated term for קדשׁ הקדשׁים (Lev. xvi. 16, 17, 20, 23, 27), as being the holy place κατ' ἐξοχ.; and so in Ezekiel the inner sanctuary is distinguished as קדשׁ from the outer, which is called היכל (ch. xli. 21, 23). It

is the place of the Divine Revealed Presence, or of the Divine Glory; and ἡ τῶν ἁγίων ὁδός is (like ἡ εἴσοδος τῶν ἁγίων of x. 19, and ἡ ὁδὸς τοῦ ξύλου τῆς ζωῆς of Gen. iii. 24) the way of approach to this glorious sanctuary. So long as the first (the outer) sanctuary remained standing, the veil which hung between it and "the holies" hid the way of approach, which therefore was οὔπω φανερά. Bleek and Lünemann regard the πρώτη σκηνή as symbolical of the Levitical priestly service, which had to be done away in order to open the approach to the holy of holies; Ebrard, as symbolical of the relative sanctity and outward righteousness of the old law, under which the inner sanctuary served to symbolize free and absolute divine communion. These interpretations seem to miss the exact meaning of our author here, with whom the point is not the contrast between the two *parts* of the sanctuary, but the *division* between them, and the *hiding* of the one from those engaged in worship in the other. It is indeed clear from vers. 11, 12, that he regarded the πρώτη σκηνή as having its antitype in the heavenly world no less than τὰ ἅγια. That which had to be removed was, on the one hand, the separation and concealment (which actually existed in the spiritual world till the times of the gospel, and was symbolized by the partition in the earthly sanctuary); and on the other, the *cosmic* terrene character of the sanctuary itself. We must accordingly refer the ἥτις which follows (ver. 9) to τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς, not as being *merely* the outer sanctuary, but chiefly as being connected with, and the way of approach, through a veil, to the holy of holies.

Ver. 9. *The which* (tabernacle) *is a parable for the time now present; according to which are offered both gifts and sacrifices, having no power to perfect in conscience him that serveth.*

De Wette's rendering, "which parable is for this present time," cannot be accepted, as it is not in accordance with the usage of the language to combine the pronoun ὅστις with a substantive in this way. The *usus loquendi*, so far as I am

aware, is, that the following substantive, in concord with ὅστις, is uniformly the predicate: compare ἅτινα and ἥτις in the parallel passage, Gal. iv. 24, 26. Neither is the feminine ἥτις here to be explained on the principle of attraction, as if for ὅ,τι ἐστὶ παραβολή (Vulg. *adhuc priore tabernaculo habente statum quæ parabola est;* thus interpreted by Primasius, "quæ" subandi "res"). This explanation is, if otherwise admissible, quite unnecessary here, as ἥτις may be referred either to the πρώτης σκηνῆς or the στάσιν of the preceding clause. To refer it to στάσιν would, however, seem to lay too much stress on that comparatively unimportant word,—ἔχειν στάσιν being simply equivalent to היות קים = "to exist:" the reference to πρώτης σκηνῆς must therefore be maintained as the only right one.

But to proceed. Ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ἐνεστηκώς cannot mean anything else but "this present time;" even the rendering of the Vulgate, *parabola temporis instantis* ("the time just at hand"), being inexact: ἐνιστάναι is indeed properly rendered by *instare*, "to be imminent;" but ἐνεστηκός, ἐνεστός (Rom. viii. 38; 1 Cor. vii. 26), is always that which *has* already supervened or come into existence, and therefore is actually present. Chrysostom and others,[1] giving the words this interpretation, regard this "present" here spoken of as attached to the existence of the ancient tabernacle, and therefore as a present which was in fact past after the appearance of our Lord. But this is inadmissible. The following προσφέρονται is against it, as the inexact rendering of the Peshito and Luther[2]—"*in which were offered*"—shows. Most moderns therefore render thus, "which is a parable in reference to the present time:" either reading καθ' ὅν (instead of καθ' ἥν) in the following clause, and regarding that as a description of the "present time," which the writer has in view; or taking the phrase ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ἐνεστηκώς (with comparison of ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος and ὁ ἐνεστὼς αἰών of Gal. i. 4) as a standing term for the Jewish times, or those of the Old

[1] *e.g.* Theophylact and Œcumenius, Schlichting, Seb. Schmidt, Baumgarten, Bengel, Stein.

[2] Which is also that of our auth. version.—Tr.

Testament, of the character of which the πρώτη σκηνή was a parabolic representation (so Bleek, Tholuck, and Lünemann). But neither of these views is free from objection. As to the former, it seems impossible that a writer who has just been speaking of the tabernacle and its services as things of the past (ix. 1), should be content to regard the separation and veiling of the holy of holies as symbolical of the existing present (as if even since the preaching of the gospel the worship of God in spirit and in truth had not yet begun). And as to the latter view, it is a mere imagination that the phrase העולם הזה was used to designate the ante-Messianic time as such. It simply means the present earthly period of time, in contradistinction from the future eternity. By τὸν καιρὸν τὸν ἐνεστηκότα, therefore, we must here understand the present time of the new dispensation, in which the types and shadows of the old are being fulfilled. So St. John Damascene explains it, in his *Eclogæ* from St. Chrysostom (in this particular departing from his authority); and so Primasius, commenting on the *temporis instantis* ("*hoc est præsentis*") of the Vulgate: *quod enim agebatur in templo tunc temporis, figura erat et similitudo istius veritatis quæ jam in ecclesia completur;* and so likewise the *Glossa interlinearis.*[1] The sacred writer purposely does not say παραβολὴ τοῦ καιροῦ τοῦ ἐνεστηκότος (as if the Levitical cultus and its instruments were a symbolic representation of the existing present, whereas the good things revealed in the gospel are still invisible, and objects of faith);[2] but παραβολὴ εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τὸν ἐνεστ., *i.e.* a parable lasting till the present time, in which the substance being revealed, the shadows pass away. So Carpzov, Heumann, and others render it, *usque ad præsens tempus* (compare the εἰς τέλος of John xiii. 1); and Castellio, *in præsens tempus*, as expressing more definitely the *terminus ad quem* (comp. Acts iv. 3; 2 Tim. i. 12),

[1] This interpretation no doubt gave rise to the glossematical reading found in several editions (Complut., Genev., Plautin., Montan.), εἰς τοῦτον τὸν καιρόν, or εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον.

[2] So at ch. xi. 19, the object of the παραβολή is the invisible and still future resurrection, revealed and promised in the gospel.

"a parable designed to last till the present time, and no longer." That the verb to be understood should be ἦν, not ἐστί, no Greek scholar will consider a difficulty; in fact, nothing needs to be understood.

The next question is, Which of two readings is to be preferred, the καθ' ὅν of the *textus receptus* (D*** E.I.K., Itala, Peshito, and other versions), or the καθ' ἣν of Lachmann[1] (A.B.D.*; Vulg. *juxta quam*)? Bleek, Tholuck, and Lünemann prefer καθ' ἣν, though according to their interpretation it would be the more difficult reading. We, on the other hand, must regard καθ' ὅν, on internal grounds, as inadmissible. For though the present tense, προσφέρονται, certainly implies the continuance of the Levitical sacrifices in the writer's own time, it is certain that he regarded them as no longer having any validity. The Levitical priesthood was now virtually abolished, and its symbolical office was no more. The reading καθ' ὅν would therefore, according to our view, be unsuitable, whether taken in the sense of "*during*" (like καθ' ἑορτήν in Matt. xxvii. 15), or in that of "*according to*" *which time* (καιρόν). We adhere then to the reading καθ' ἣν, and refer it, with Bleek and Bisping, to παραβολή, rather than with Lünemann to τῆς πρώτης σκηνῆς (though in either case the meaning would be much the same): *in accordance with* (or *corresponding to*) *which parable* (*i.e.* the holy place, with the veiled sanctuary beyond it, declaring in a figure its own imperfection), *gifts and sacrifices* (δῶρα τε καὶ θυσίαι, *i.e.* unbloody and bloody offerings[2]) *are offered*, μὴ δυνάμεναι κατὰ συνείδησιν τελειῶσαι τὸν λατρεύοντα.

The attributive participle δυνάμεναι (which might also have been δυνάμενα) agrees here (as is often the case) with the latter substantive (θυσίαι); perhaps also because the bloody sacrifice is regarded as the basis of all others, and therefore takes the first place in the writer's mind. Instead, moreover, of οὐ δυνάμεναι = *invalida*, he writes (giving a subjective turn to the negative) μὴ δυνάμεναι = *quæ non*

[1] Confirmed now further by the Cod. Sinait.—Tr.

[2] See note on ch. v. 1, and compare viii. 3, 4.

valeant (comp. *μὴ δυνάμενον, qui non valeat*, of iv. 15). "*Him that serveth*" (*τὸν λατρεύοντα*) is not to be understood as referring merely to the ministering priest as such, but as including every worshipping Israelite engaged in offering sacrifice, whether by himself, or through the mediation of others,—all the *προσερχόμενοι*, in fact, of x. 1. The Israelite who offers a legal sacrifice maintains thereby his corporate membership in the Old Testament covenant; and if he offers with a right disposition of mind, he experiences an answering operation of grace, but still the holy of holies remains closed for him: the sacrifices which he offers cannot *perfect him κατὰ συνείδησιν*, cannot give him an inward consciousness of perfect reconciliation with God, perfectly satisfied desires after salvation, or a perfected and inward peace. The material offerings of the law are but parables intended to last only till the time when the reality shall be made manifest. Regarded in themselves, they are incapable of any operation on the inward part of man.

Ver. 10. *Consisting only in* (or only connected with) *meats and drinks, and divers washings, ordinances of the flesh, imposed on them till the time of reformation.*

We have in this verse the following various readings which deserve attention:—(1) That of D*** E.I.K., followed by the *textus receptus*, and re-adopted by Tischendorf in 1849, *καὶ δικαιώμασι (σιν) σαρκός*. The Vulgate renders, in accordance with this reading, *et justitiis carnis ad tempus correctionis impositis*, as if it also read *ἐπικειμένοις*, which probably is not to be found in any Greek MS. authority. (2) Griesbach reads *δικαιώμασι σαρκός* without the *καί*, after Cyril of Alexandria,[1] but with very slight MS. authority. Possibly the Peshito version may have been made from this reading; but that such was the case cannot with

[1] Cyr. *Al. Opp.* i. 347, iii. 829; comp. *Nova Patrum Bibl.* iii. 119. *Κἂν γὰρ νεκροῦ τις ἅψατο, κἂν λεπροῦ, κἂν γονορρυὴς ἐγένετο, ἐβαπτίζετο καὶ οὕτως ἐδόκει καθαρίζεσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ δικαιώματα ἦσαν σαρκὸς, τουτέστιν ἐντολαὶ σάρκιναι, σαρκικῶς δικαιοῦσαι τοὺς κατὰ σάρκα δοκοῦντας ἀκαθάρτους.*

certainty be inferred.[1] (3) The reading of A, adopted by Scholz, Knapp, and Lachmann, is δικαιώματα σαρκός. This reading is also witnessed to by B, which reads καὶ δικαιώματα σαρκός (the καί being simply an error of the transcriber), and by the δικαίωμα of D*, which is represented by the Itala: *justitia carnis usque ad tempus restitutionis imposita.*

Most of the older commentators refer μόνον ἐπὶ . . . either to τελειῶσαι as an antithesis to κατὰ συνείδησιν, or to τὸν λατρευόντα as expressing the nature and forms of his worship. The latter view is against grammar; the former (which has recently been espoused by Ebrard) against the facts of the case. The Levitical sacrifices were not offered simply in atonement for ceremonial transgressions, in matters of eating, drinking, washing, and the like, as is specially evident in the quite general references to sin of all kinds on the day of atonement. The preposition ἐπί cannot therefore be taken here in the sense of "*referring to*," but either in the *cumulative* sense of Luke iii. 20 (the sacrifices being regarded as simple additions to other corporeal rites and purifications), or in that of ix. 15, 17, etc., as denoting the system *during* which the sacrifices had validity. These two senses can hardly be discriminated or separated in translation.

The next question is, whether we are to read καὶ δικαιώματα σαρκός, or δικαιώματα σαρκός omitting the καί. These are the only two readings which rest on adequate authority.[2] To the former, with καί, there are two objections:—(1) Though καί does occur in the sense of "and in general" (Matt. xxvi. 59) as well as in that of "and in particular" (vi. 10), we cannot here help feeling convinced that the sacred writer in using καί would have added ἄλλοις δικαιώμασιν σαρκός, and not changed the dative case for an accusative. And (2) the neuter ἐπικείμενα, referring to δῶρα τε καὶ θυσίαι, after the feminine δυνάμεναι, is another serious difficulty. If Erasmus Schmid said well, *Sicut antea* δυνάμεναι *referebatur ad propinquius* ζευγματικῶς, *ita* ἐπικεί-

[1] The rendering of the Peshito is, *quæ sunt* (דאיתיהן) *statuta carnis.*

[2] The Cod. Sin. reads δικαιώματα σαρκός without καί.

μενα ad utrumque δῶρα τε καὶ θυσίαι συλληπτικῶς; one must also recognise the correctness of Sebastian Schmid's criticism: *Quod licet qualitercunque, ut Erasmus Schmid facit, constructio defendi possit, duritiem tamen videatur habere non exiguam.* We therefore elect to read, with Bengel, Bleek, Tholuck, Ebrard, Lünemann, and against De Wette, Böhme, and others, δικαιώματα σαρκός. As being such, the sacred writer reckons the Levitical sacrifices in one category with βρώμασι καὶ πόμασι[1] καὶ διαφόροις βαπτισμοῖς, contemporary ordinances of the same Levitical cultus. He uses the terms βρώματα, etc., as general titles for all the Levitical ordinances concerning such matters, much in the same way as various tracts in the Talmud are entitled: *e.g.* Beîzah (ביצה), collection of precepts and traditions concerning the egg laid on a holy day, whether it may be eaten on the holy day; משקין, similar collection concerning fluids which render eatables unclean; עוקצין, concerning stalks of various fruits which by touching eatables render them unclean, etc. etc. It would be incorrect to infer (as some have done) from Heb. xiii. 9, that the sacred writer is thinking here (under βρώματα) specially of meats partaken of at sacrificial meals or the paschal supper (Bleek, De Wette). The parallel passages in Col. ii. 16–23, Rom. xiv., and 1 Cor. viii., render it far more probable that he is referring to the laws, written and traditional, concerning clean and unclean meats, which were so widely discussed and controverted in the apostolic age, and were closely connected with the precepts concerning sacrifices. In the reference to πόματα he may have had such precepts as Lev. xi. 34, Hagg. ii. 13, or such as the traditional prohibition of wine sold by a Samaritan in view. By διάφοροι βαπτισμοί we are to understand not so much the priestly washings before sacrifice, as the various baths and purifications prescribed in the Thorah after ceremonial defilement, and infinitely multiplied in the unwritten law, the "washings of pots and pans" (Mark vii. 4), and of hands before meals, etc.

[1] On the forms πόμα and πῶμα, compare G. Hermann, *Bion et Moschus*, p. 76.

All these various prescriptions and prohibitions the sacred writer classes together as δικαιώματα σαρκός, not as though outward purity and the sanctification of the natural life was in itself a matter of indifference, but because offering material sacrifices, eating and not eating, drinking and not drinking, bathing and washing, are in themselves simply bodily acts or abstinences, with no direct significance for the inward man. They may indeed, if performed in a right spirit, be accompanied by some inward blessing; but they could never really satisfy the demands of an awakened conscience, or restore to that communion with the Holy One which sin destroys. The attributive genitive σαρκός (=σαρκικά or σάρκινα, comp. vii. 16) is applied to such acts and ordinances, not as in themselves evil or sinful, but simply as inadequate. They were of a material, not a spiritual nature: they could not satisfy the needs of the inward man for unclouded divine communion, and therefore were merely μέχρι καιροῦ διορθώσεως ἐπικείμενα. It is evident from a comparison of Acts xv. 10 (ἐπιθεῖναι ζυγόν) and 28 (ἐπιτίθεσθαι βάρος), that ἐπικείμενα here includes the notion of the painful and burdensome. These ceremonial precepts were imposed on men preparing for better things till the time of reformation,—a time when the inadequate and imperfect should be succeeded by a better and more satisfactory order of things, and when the endeavours of men after true communion with God should be brought into the right track.[1]

Such is the character of the earthly sanctuary and its δικαιώματα. The picture is now completely drawn, and we are fully prepared for the contrast which is to be presented in the following verses (11, 12) of the present New Testament time, the καιρὸς διορθώσεως. The antithesis is in the

[1] Compare Acts xxiv. 3, where the text wavers between διορθωμάτων and κατορθωμάτων. The close of the prophecies of Ezekiel and Zechariah must be brought into agreement with the μέχρι here. All that can be gathered from the Acts of the Apostles (see Baumgarten, ii. 2, 154) is, that the swaddling-clothes of the law were not forthwith burnt at the appearance of the gospel, but to resume them when once thrown aside was perfectly out of the question.

first instance to vers. 9, 10, but, properly speaking, must be extended to the whole preceding paragraph: it involves the δέ correlative to the μέν of ver. 1.

Vers. 11, 12. *But Christ having appeared an high priest of the good things to come, through the greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this creation, and not through blood of goats and calves, but through His own blood, hath entered once for all into the holies, obtaining an eternal redemption for us.*

The appearance of Christ as the promised Mediator of the new covenant constitutes the turning-point in the history of divine revelation, and marks the boundary between its two great periods of prophetic preparation and evangelical fulfilment. Παραγενόμενος is therefore, for the sake of emphasis, placed after Χριστός at the head of the sentence. Παραγενέσθαι is the usual word for appearance or manifestation on the stage of history (comp. Luke xii. 51; Matt. iii. 1; 1 Macc. iv. 46); and Bleek and De Wette err in referring it here to our Lord's entrance into the heavenly world, as if He then for the first time became high priest. Had such been the sacred writer's meaning, he would have used the word γενόμενος, not παραγενόμενος. (Comp. i. 4, vi. 20, vii. 26.) We have already shown this Socinianizing conception of our Lord's priesthood to be a false one: Christ *became*, indeed, *high priest after the order of Melchizedek* by His entrance into the heavenly places, but not simply *high priest*, for that He was already. It is therefore unnecessary to put a comma (with Bengel and Griesbach) after παραγενόμενος: still less must we think of supplying an εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀρχιερέα, as if our Lord's assumption of the priesthood were subsequent to His manifestation in the created universe. From the first moment of the incarnation He was high priest by vocation and potentially: all that followed, till He passed into the highest heavens, was but progressive developments of that original calling.

It is next a question whether we should read, with the *textus receptus* and the Vulgate, τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν, or

with the Itala, Peshito, Philoxenian (and with Chrysostom[1] and Œcumenius), *τῶν γενομένων ἀγαθῶν*.[2] Tischendorf, who once followed Lachmann in adopting the latter reading, has rightly abandoned it, and so likewise Hofmann.[3] It is probably simply an error in transcription, occasioned by *παραγενόμενος*. The interpretation attached by some to the reading *γενομένων*, that the writer of the epistle is contrasting the symbols and figures of the Levitical worship with the good things of the New Testament already realized, was probably an afterthought. If, however, *μελλόντων* be the right reading, there are, as Schlichting observes, still two interpretations possible: *Per futura bona intelligi possunt tum ea bona quæ respectu legis erant futura, tum quæ respectu hujus sæculi sunt futura.* It is, however, highly improbable that by "the good things to come" should be intended merely good things which were indeed future blessings under the law, but present now with us under the gospel. Against such a view is the *ἡ οἰκουμένη ἡ μέλλουσα* of ii. 5, the *μέλλων αἰών* of vi. 5, the *ἡ μέλλουσα πόλις* of xiii. 14, the importance attached to hope throughout the epistle, and the constant references to the world beyond the grave as the proper sphere of the high-priestly action of our Lord. The designation, moreover, of the Levitical sanctuary as *ἅγιον κοσμικόν*, and of its *δικαιώματα λατρείας* as *δικαιώματα σαρκός*, seems to indicate that this *μελλόντων* is not to be understood of some actual historical future, but rather of that heavenly and hidden sphere whose invisible presence in this our earthly one is an object of faith. Bleek, De Wette, Tholuck, Hofmann, and Lünemann, are therefore correct in

[1] Chrysostom's words are: *οὐκ εἶπε· παραγενόμενος ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν θυομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν γενομένων ἀγαθῶν, ὡς οὐκ ἰσχύοντος τοῦ λόγου παραστῆσαι τὸ πᾶν, utpote quod non posset universum explicare oratio.* A contemporary of Cassiodorus, *Mutianus Scholasticus*, thus renders the text of Chrysostom: *Et non dixit: Adveniens Pontifex hostiarum, sed bonorum quæ facta sunt, veluti non valente sermone universum exprimere* (*Cod. Erlang.* 223 of the year 1310). The text presented by St. John Damascene in his *Eclogæ* has, on the other hand, *τῶν μελλόντων*.

[2] This is the reading of B.D* (but not of *Cod. Sin.*—Tr.).

[3] Comp. *Weissagung*, ii. 191, with *Schriftbew.* ii. 1, 291.

interpreting it of those future blessings of the heavenly world which we believe in and hope for now, and of which, as believers, we have already a prospective possession and an actual foretaste. I cannot, however, agree with Hofmann, that the emphasis is here to be laid on *ἀγαθῶν* rather than on *μελλόντων*, as if only the High Priest of the new covenant was an *ἀρχιερεὺς ἀγαθῶν*. The sacred writer's meaning would rather seem to be, that if the Levitical high priest might be in his degree an *ἀρχιερεὺς ἀγαθῶν*, he was not an *ἀρχ. τῶν μελλόντων ἀγ.*, that honour being reserved for the High Priest of the New Testament. Not indeed that this is the antithesis which he has here specially in view; for *τῶν μελλ. ἀγαθ.* is here contrasted as a whole with the preceding *δικαιώματα σαρκός*, *i.e.* the tabernacle and sacrifices of the Old Testament. The high priest of the earthly tabernacle and of the still veiled inner sanctuary was unable by those material and animal sacrifices, and by the animal blood which he then offered, to procure, either for the congregation as a whole or for individuals, any truly satisfying hold of the good things of the future. But Christ is now manifested as *ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν*, *i.e.* as High Priest to obtain, and as High Priest to dispense them.

The final step of the process by which He so obtained these good things as to have them now in hand ready to be bestowed on us, is expressed in the following sentence: *διὰ τῆς μείζονος . . . σκηνῆς . . . διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια.* Hofmann still insists on connecting the two *διά*'s (*διὰ τῆς μείζονος σκηνῆς* and *διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵμ.*) with the subject (*Χρ. παραγεν. ἀρχ.*), as expressing the way in which Christ became high priest; and this view of the construction, at any rate, of the first *διά* follows of necessity from Hofmann's interpretation of the "greater and more perfect tabernacle" as denoting the sinless humanity of our Lord. So also (in respect to the first *διά*) the ancient interpreters for a like reason; *e.g.* Ambrosius, *in Ps.* cxviii.: *Tabernaculum testimonii corpus hoc nostrum est, in quo Christus advenit, per amplius et perfectius tabernaculum*

ut per sanguinem suum intraret in sancta et conscientiam nostram ab omni opere mortuorum et labe mundaret; and Chrysostom: *τὴν σάρκα ἐν ταὐθα λέγει, καλῶς δὲ καὶ μείζονα καὶ τελειοτέραν εἶπεν, εἴγε καὶ Θεὸς λόγος καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνέργεια ἐνοικεῖ ἐν αὐτῇ.* The only difference between Hofmann and the ancients in this interpretation is, that while by the greater and more perfect tabernacle *they* understood the humanity of Christ simply as such, and as taken from the Virgin (*e.g.* Primasius: *corpus intra uterum virginis sine semine viri totius Trinitatis opere effigiatum*), Hofmann understands by it the Lord's *glorified* humanity as the true *σκηνή* or habitation of God, in which the fulness of the divine nature dwelleth bodily (Col. ii. 9),—rightly regarding the designation *οὐ ταύτης τῆς κτίσεως* as not applicable to the *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός* which, in order therein to suffer, our Lord vouchsafed to carry about Him here (*Weiss.* ii. 189; *Schriftb.* ii. 1, 290). This interpretation of the *σκηνή* we have already examined at ch. viii. 2, and found there to be untenable. We will now consider Hofmann's reasons for maintaining it in the present passage.

And first he argues, that if we connect *διὰ τῆς μείζονος σκηνῆς* and *διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος* with *εἰσῆλθεν*, we obscure the relation between vers. 13, 14, and ver. 11; that the emphasis is evidently meant to be laid on the entrance of Christ "once for all" into the heavenly sanctuary, and that this emphasis is weakened by the introduction of the two antithetical clauses *διὰ τῆς μείζονος* . . . and *οὐδὲ δι' αἵματος* . . . before *εἰσῆλθεν*. To this we reply, that the emphasis on *ἐφάπαξ* is by no means impaired by the introduction of the two clauses, which simply define two characteristic circumstances of the Lord's entrance which contribute to render it such as in the nature of things is incapable of repetition. Hofmann's second argument is, that the connection of the two clauses with *εἰσῆλθεν* has this further inconvenience, that it compels us to take the first *διά* in a local, the second in an instrumental sense; and against this latter sense he argues that the blood of atonement was not the mean *by* or *through* which, but the thing *with* which

the high priest, both in type and antitype, entered the inner sanctuary; comparing ix. 25, where it is said of the high priest, εἰσέρχεται ἐν αἵματι (not δι' αἵματος), = Ps. lxvi. 13, בּוֹא ב׳. To this again we answer, first, that the difficulty made out of the two senses of διά is only one for a German translator, and hardly one even for him; that διά *may* be rendered in both instances by "through," denoting in the first instance the way or place *through* which, and in the next the means or qualification *through* which, the high priest obtained an entrance to the holy of holies. Secondly, when at Lev. xvi. 2 sq. it is said that Aaron is not to come at all times, according to his own pleasure, into the sanctuary, but only ἐν μόσχῳ ἐκ βοῶν περὶ ἁμαρτίας, κ.τ.λ., the inference is certainly an obvious one, that the blood of the victims is regarded as an enabling *means* of such approach; and the same is likewise true of the antitype (comp. the ἀνάγκη of ix. 23). Christ, as high priest taken from among men to act on our behalf, could not in that character enter the heavenly sanctuary and make it approachable by us without atonement made for us; His own blood, therefore, was for Him the qualifying means of His entrance there. Thirdly, Hofmann urges that, if "the greater and more perfect tabernacle not made with hands" be heaven itself, there can be no proper distinction established between τὰ ἅγια and ἡ σκηνή. So, with the same notion, Beza remarks, *per absurde diceretur per cœlum ingressus esse in cœlum.* But this supposed tautology is based on a misunderstanding. This is evident from the fact that the sacred writer speaks elsewhere of Christ as διεληλυθότα τοὺς οὐρανούς (iv. 14, "*having passed through the heavens*"), and again says of Him (ix. 24), εἰσῆλθεν εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανόν (that "*He has entered into the very heaven*"). Putting these two passages together, it cannot involve any absurdity to interpret his meaning: *per cœlos in cœlum ingressus est.* Only by "the heavens" here we are not simply to understand the star-worlds of astronomy, which, though they be in contrast to any human constructions οὐ χειροποίητα, are not, in respect of God Himself, οὐ ταύτης τῆς κτίσεως. Against such an interpretation may also be urged the lan-

guage of viii. 2, where Christ is called the λειτουργός of the true σκηνή.

Τὰ ἅγια is therefore here (as we have proved at viii. 2) the *illocal* place of the infinite, self-contained, self-centred Godhead, and ἡ σκηνή the *supra-local* place of divine manifestations to the angels and the blessed, the heaven of love in which God manifestly dwells, and in which He vouchsafes the beatific vision to certain of His creatures, the ναὸς τῆς σκηνῆς τοῦ μαρτυρίου of Rev. xv. 5, which the apocalyptic seer beheld filled with incense-smoke from the δόξα and δύναμις of the divine presence. The former (τὰ ἅγια) is that eternal heaven of God Himself (αὐτὸς ὁ οὐρανός), which is His own self-manifested eternal glory (John xvii. 5), and existed before all worlds; the latter (ἡ σκηνή) is the heaven of the blessed, in which He shines upon His creatures in the light of love. This created heaven has for its background the eternal dwelling-place of the Holy One, and on account of its immeasurable vastness and "many mansions" is called also οὐρανοί (*heavens;* comp. viii. 1, ix. 23, x. 34, and xii. 23, 25).[1] Hofmann remarks, indeed (*Weiss.* ii. 189), that there is nothing said in our present passage of a difference or contrast between the πρώτη and the δευτέρα σκηνή, inasmuch as this distinction was destined (according to ver. 8) to last only μέχρι καιροῦ διορθώσεως. The remark in no way disturbs our position, since in the heavenly world there is no longer any veil (καταπέτασμα) between the place of God's own immediate presence and that of His manifestation to blessed spirits, and consequently no thought of separation, much less of difference or contrast between them, as of a πρώτη and δευτέρα σκηνή. The sacred writer, however, in

[1] *Est altare in cœlis* (says Irenæus, iv. 18, 6) (*illuc enim preces nostræ et oblationes diriguntur*), *et templum, quemadmodum Joannes in Apocalypsi ait cet.* And again Origen, *in Lev.* Hom. ix. 5: *Necessarium fuit, dominum et salvatorem meum non solum inter homines hominem nasci, sed etiam ad inferna descendere ut sortem apopompæi* (לעזאזל) *tanquam homo paratus in eremum inferni deduceret atque inde regressus opere consummato adscenderet ad patrem ibique plenius apud altare illud cœleste purificaretur, ut carnis nostræ pignus, quod secum evexerat, perpetua puritate donaret.*

saying διὰ τῆς μείζονος καὶ τελειοτέρας σκηνῆς, points upwards, as it were, to the heavenly places whose blessed inhabitants are rejoicing now in the unveiled light of the divine glory—the διὰ τῆς being almost equivalent to δι' ἐκείνης τῆς; and first he calls it μείζων, in contradistinction to the narrowness and littleness of its earthly type, and then τελειοτέρα, in contrast with the imperfect, undeveloped, unsatisfactory character of the cosmic tabernacle, with the veiled and unapproachable sanctuary behind it. The epithet οὐ χειροποιήτου[1] after τῆς . . . σκηνῆς (but without the article) is added as a kind of apposition, and is immediately explained by the writer himself as equivalent to οὐ ταύτης τῆς κτίσεως. That heavenly tabernacle, which his upward glance is now surveying, is no work of men's hands, but one "pitched" by the Lord Himself (viii. 2), *i.e.* His own immediate work and institution; it forms no part of the present material cosmos in which we are now placed, but appertains to the future age,[2] and to the world of glory that is yet to come.

The next clause commences with οὐδέ (not καὶ οὐ), as if the preceding one had run thus: *Christ, in entering the eternal sanctuary, passed not through a tabernacle made with hands, but through that greater and more perfect heavenly tabernacle;* (and so proceeds) *nor yet* (οὐδέ) *through blood of goats and calves, but through His own blood entered He in once for all.* The blood through (*i.e.* by means of) which the Levitical high priest obtained his yearly admission to the holy of holies, was the blood of the two great sin-offerings (the bullock and the goat) of the day of atonement; "bullock" (פר) being in the Septuagint rendered by μόσχος, "goat" (שׂעיר) by τράγος. The plurals τράγων καὶ μόσχων are here used generically, the goat-sacrifice being first named, as the one most characteristic of the day of atonement. Christ, on the other hand, as High Priest of the new testament, obtained an entrance to the eternal sanctuary by giving up His own life in sacrifice, and so by a blood as far excelling

[1] The term is used by St. Luke in two places, and in a similar connection: Acts vii. 48 and xvii. 24.

[2] Comp. the title of Messiah (Isa. ix. 6, Vulg.), *Pater futuri sæculi.*

in preciousness that of the animal sacrifices in the hands of the Levitical high priest, as the true "place" of the divine presence excels in sanctity the earthly holy of holies; for that blood was His own, *τὸ ἴδιον αἷμα*, xiii. 12, Acts xx. 28. With this, or rather by means of this blood, as the true key to heaven, He has made His entrance "once for all," not at repeated times, or year by year, into the sanctuary above. The emphasis of the whole sentence commencing with *Χριστὸς δέ* lies on *ἐφάπαξ* and the following *αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος*, the one only entrance, because made "once for all," and (what is intimately connected with it) the eternal validity of the redemption thus obtained. So also Hofmann, rightly observing that here the aorist participle and the aorist verb (*εὑράμενος* and *εἰσῆλθεν*) denote contemporary actions (see on ii. 10). Lünemann's rendering, "*after He had obtained*," is, though not ungrammatical, yet not in accordance with the sense; Ebrard's, on the other hand, in equal accordance both with sense and grammar: "*accomplishing thereby an eternal redemption.*" Eternal redemption had not indeed been fully obtained before our Lord's entrance to the Father, that entrance being itself the conclusion of the great redeeming act. Nor is any injury hereby done to the supreme and fundamental significance of the Lord's sacrificial death upon the cross, without which this entrance *ἐν αἵματι* into the eternal sanctuary would have been impossible. As the resurrection from the dead was the divine obsignation of the work of atonement, so the entrance of the Risen One into the Father's presence imparted to that work its eternal validity for us.

The Hebrew version, made under the auspices of the London Society for Missions to the Jews, rightly renders *εὑράμενος* here by a fut. consec., וַיִּמְצָא פְּדוּת עוֹלָם. Like מצא, *εὑρίσκειν* signifies both to find and to obtain, and in the middle voice to find or obtain for oneself, and then to accomplish or bring about what one has been labouring for or striving after (comp. the *ποιησάμενος* of i. 3); *εὑράμην* being the Alexandrine, or at any rate non-Attic form of the aorist, instead of *εὑρόμην*. *Λύτρωσις* is a Luke word (Luke i. 68,

ii. 38: comp. *ἀπολύτρωσις*, xxi. 28; *λυτροῦσθαι*, xxiv. 21; *λυτρωτής*, Acts vii. 35), St. Paul using exclusively the word *ἀπολύτρωσις*. The Septuagint renders by *λύτρωσις* both גְּאֻלָּה (redemption), its exact equivalent, and פְּדוּת (release); Theodotion employs it once as the rendering of כִּפֻּר (atonement). In the ordinary Scripture usage of *λύτρωσις* (*ἀπολύτρωσις*), the notion of a *λύτρον* (redemption-price) is almost lost sight of, as when the word is used of the redemption of Israel, or that of the elect in the last day; but this is by no means the case (as is evident from the two *loci classici*, Matt. xx. 28 = Mark x. 45, and 1 Tim. ii. 5 sq.) when it is applied to the redemption of mankind by Christ. The *λύτρον* paid by Him for us is His death (ix. 15; Tit. ii. 14; 1 Tim. ii. 5 sq.), as the offering up of Himself; or His blood (Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14), as the giving up of His *ψύχη* (Matt. xx. 28),—His "precious blood," as that of a lamb without blemish and without spot (1 Pet. i. 19). In our present passage, likewise, it is the Lord's blood which is regarded as the *λύτρον*. And since it is by means of this, His own blood, that Christ enters into the holy of holies (even as the Levitical high priest made his entrance by means of the blood of goats and calves), so it is clear (contrary to the interpretation given by many among the ancients) that to God Himself, and not Satan, the *λύτρον* is paid. This is involved in the very fact of the close relationship between the notions of כִּפֻּר and כִּפֻּרִים: the blood which Christ as כִּפֻּר paid for us is דַּם הַכִּפֻּרִים,—the דַּם הַכִּפֻּרִים in virtue of which He, as antitype of the high priest, on the day of atonement entered (after His passion) the eternal sanctuary, and appeared in the presence of God for us. Now the blood of atonement was offered to God, and to Him only: to Him, therefore, this *λύτρωσις* was also made, to Him our redemption-price paid down. And this *λύτρωσις* is an eternal one (*αἰωνία* for *αἰώνιος* here only and at 2 Thess. ii. 16 in the N. T., but sometimes in the LXX.); that is, it is of absolute, never-failing validity. The same truth had been already expressed in the word *ἐφάπαξ*. As Hofmann truly says, redemption is the object which the high priest has in view in appearing

before God: when that appearance has once been made, the object has been gained, and gained for ever.[1]

It remains to inquire how the sacred writer thought, or how he would have interpreted in his own mind this entrance of Christ into heaven, *διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος*. In pursuing which inquiry we will start from the following delicate observations of Schlichting, which have been more or less entirely made their own by Bleek, Lünemann, De Wette, and even Tholuck, and well deserve a careful examination:— *Notandum est, autorem, ut elegantiæ comparationis consuleret, usum esse in priore membro voce "per," licet pontifex legalis non tantum per sanguinem hircorum et vitulorum, h. e. fuso prius sanguine istorum animalium seu interveniente sanguinis eorum fusione, sed etiam cum ipsorum sanguine (οὐ χωρὶς αἵματος h. e. ἐν αἵματι) in sancta fuerit ingressus. Verum quia in Christi sacrificio similitudo eo usque extendi non potuit, cum Christus non alienum sed suum sanguinem fuderit, nec sanguinem suum post mortem, sed se ipsum et quidem jam immortalem, depositis carnis et sanguinis exuviis, quippe quæ regnum Dei possidere nequeant in cœlesti illo tabernaculo obtulerit, proindeque non cum sanguine sed tantum fuso prius sanguine, seu interveniente sanguinis sui fusione in sancta fuerit ingressus: idcirco divinus autor minus de legali pontifice dixit, quam res erat, vel potius ambiguitate particulæ "per" quæ etiam idem quod "cum" in sacris literis significare solet, comparationis concinnitati consulere voluit.* In saying all this, Schlichting avoids coming into conflict with his own previously drawn conclusion at viii. 3: *ex his autoris verbis apertissimum est, Christum nunc in cœlis offerre, nempe ut infra* (ix. 14) *docet autor, se ipsum Deo.* Hofmann, who, as we have seen, will not admit this conclusion (rendering viii. 3, "*whence a necessity that this One also should have something which He has offered*"), agrees otherwise with Schlichting in the views here expressed. In the *Schriftbeweis* he plainly denies the possibility of the existence of glorified blood in the heavenly world:[2] *e.g.* ii. 2, 197, "*His life is still a life*

[1] See Note P.

[2] In the *Weiss. u. Erfüll.*, on the other hand, he once wrote: "*Christ*

in the body, and indeed in the same body as before His passion; but in so far as that former life on earth was a life in blood, it belongs now to the past. That outpoured blood is no longer contained in the Lord's glorified body, or in any other part of heaven; it works atonement, as the once shed on the altar of the cross." And again, at ii. 2, 209, he says further: "*That communion with the humanity of our blessed Lord, which is vouchsafed in the holy supper, consists mainly in the communion of His glorified body, in virtue of which He possesses a nature that is one with ours; but His blood, the communion of which is attached to the sacramental cup, is the blood once shed for us upon the cross, and is only so far present now as His bodily life, which was once given up in that great blood-shedding, is now restored, but without being again a life in or sustained by blood.*"

That in this way the reality of the presence of the blood of Christ in the holy sacrament is seriously threatened, is plain enough. The old Socinians (such as Schlichting) naturally cared nothing about maintaining such real presence, being content with a *fusi pro nobis sanguinis repræsentatio et adumbratio*. But neither does Hofmann's doctrine properly admit of it. The Lord's bodily life is now for Him a bloodless one: "*The gift of Christ's glorified body, through the consecrated bread, is followed in the sacrament by the administration of the chalice, simply in order to realize in us the derivation of His present heavenly life from the former earthly one, through death and blood-shedding.*" But how is it thus realized? Not by any real communication of the Lord's blood; for that, according to Hofmann, is no longer in existence. The Lord's words, therefore, "*This is my blood,*" mean something different from what they say. His body is present in the holy communion, but not His blood. We receive the one really, the other at the most only *dynamically*. Origen, whose teaching is very similar to this, distinguishes between *sanguis carnis* and *sanguis Verbi*,—a distinction which enables him to maintain the reality of the presence and

entered through the veil into the holy of holies, not without blood, but that glorified."

communication of the Lord's blood in the sacrament, so far, at any rate, as the words are concerned: and perhaps, indeed, he means actually to do this; for while he sometimes uses *vitalis virtus* as equivalent to *sanguis*, he also says that what is meant by *caro et sanguis Verbi* is known to those who are initiated into the holy mysteries.[1]

Bengel likewise (in the *Excursus* to Heb. xii. 24) maintains the bloodlessness of the Lord's glorified body, but escapes the evil consequence of such a position in a peculiar way. *Vita gloriosa*, he argues, *non desiderat circulationem sanguinis; tota ex Deo est.* But neither (he maintains, appealing to 1 Pet. i. 18 sq.) can the precious blood of the unspotted Lamb have passed away like perishable things: Christ, our High Priest, has carried His own blood for us in separation from His body into heaven, even as the high priest of the law carried the blood of others into the earthly sanctuary. And much, we must allow, may be said for this position, which is also that of Oetinger, Steinhofer, and Stier. That the Lord entered heaven, not without blood, is required by the type. That the sacred writer, instead of saying διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος, might equally well have said ἐν ἰδίῳ αἵματι, is evident from ch. viii. 3. That the διά of mediation does not exclude (as Schlichting thought), but rather includes,[2] the ἐν of accompaniment, we have already proved. It remains, therefore, a very natural inference, that the Lord took the blood of atonement into the presence of

[1] *Vid.* Höfling, *Lehre der Aeltesten Kirche vom Opfer.* p. 170.

[2] That this is the natural impression made by the words, is evident from the following citations, in addition to those made by Bengel in the 5th section of his *Excursus*:—(α) Primasius: *non cum sanguine legalium animalium, a quo perfecte justificatio non poterat dari, sed cum sanguine passionis suæ introivit in patriam cœlestem.* (β) Henr. Bullinger (1532): *ille inferebat sanguinem beluinum, hic vero proprium, humanum et sanctum.* (γ) Jo. Gerhard: *Christus sanguinem suum in ara concis in sacrificium effusum in cœleste sanctuarium intulit.* (δ) Seb. Schmid: *Christus ante Patrem suum in cœlis non sanguinem tantum suum adfert, sed vulnera et passiones corporis sui simul repræsentat pro nobis intercedens.* These are but echoes of the scriptural word itself. How the act was done, is left unexplained.

the Father, in outward separation from His glorified body. And this inference is the more natural, as the blood of Christ in the sacrament is administered in outward separation from the body. So, again, from ch. xii. 24 (comp. x. 22) and 1 Pet. i. 2, it would seem (as the blood of sprinkling) to have a continuous presence; as such, moreover, it is contrasted with the blood of Abel, and is repeatedly spoken of as something different and apart from the person of the glorified Jesus. Compare ch. x. 19–21, 29, and ch. xiii. 11 sq., where σῶμα and αἷμα are significantly distinguished.

But all this notwithstanding, I cannot acquiesce in this conclusion. The "blood of Jesus Christ shed for us" means His life given up on our behalf. That material substance, which was the medium or instrument of His bodily life, when separated from His body, to whose life it ministered, ceased to live, and is now therefore no more. But the body which is given us in the holy sacrament is the body of the living Jesus; and so likewise the blood which we there receive is the blood of One who, having died, now lives for evermore. As the flesh and blood of which He speaks in the sixth of St. John, and on which faith continually feeds, are instinct with life, both in themselves and in their operation, so are they likewise full of living energy as sacramental gifts. We should be compelled, therefore, to suppose rather a revivification of the Lord's blood in separation from His risen and glorified body (which were indeed a strange and inadmissible conjecture), or such a *reassumptio* as that imagined by our earlier dogmatists. So Quenstedt (*col.* 1223): *Nothing in the Lord Jesus Christ could see corruption, and therefore not His sacred blood: St. Peter speaks of it as unlike corruptible gold and silver, and therefore incapable of dissolution; even in its effusion it remained in union with the divine hypostasis, and was still the blood of God* (Acts xx. 28), *and consequently was reassumed by Him at the resurrection. The blood of Christ, the price of our redemption, was in no wise inferior to His sacred flesh. We are therefore piously convinced, that not one precious drop shed for us on the cross remained behind, but that it was all gathered again into His*

sacred veins on the morning of the resurrection. So Thomas (Aquinas), following St. Augustine, holds that every drop of the Lord's blood, as belonging to the truth of His human nature, was raised and glorified. Nor may we make distinctions, with Prierias and Cajetan, between natural blood and that shed with saving power for our redemption. The blood of Christ is all one and the same substance, and the whole of it was reassumed.

Thus argues Quenstedt. In reply to Hofmann, and those who agree with him, we may first remark, that there seems no good reason for supposing the glorified body of the Lord to be therefore bloodless. If possessed of flesh and bones (Luke xxiv. 39), without thereby becoming psychical, why should it not also contain blood without losing its spiritual (pneumatic) character? Moreover, if the glorified One gives us His flesh to eat and His blood to drink, we cannot, without exegetical evasions, deny both flesh and blood to His glorified humanity. Again, the supposition that our Lord presented in heaven His sacred blood apart from His own personality, is certainly against the tenor of this epistle. The προσφέρειν τί of ch. viii. 3 becomes the προσφέρειν τὸ ἴδιον αἷμα of ch. ix. 12, and this again is explained and defined by the προσφέρειν ἑαυτόν of ch. ix. 25. And lastly, there seems no occasion to have recourse to the hypothesis of a reassumption of the blood shed upon the cross, any more than of the bloody sweat of Gethsemane, or the holy tears at the grave of Lazarus. The notion, too, that our blessed Lord shed all the blood of His sacred body on the cross, is without any warrant in holy Scripture—a mere fancy. Without going into medical details on so sacred a subject, we may say it is inconceivable. The hypothesis, then, of a *redintegratio*, is far more acceptable than that of a *reassumptio*. The sacred blood thus *redintegrated*, remains and is the same as that which was shed. "*The Lord's glorified body retains the virtue of that sacrificial death in which it was once offered, and so His blood the virtue of that atonement which it was once shed to procure.*" So may we say with Kahnis, without lowering the substance of the sacramental

gift to a mere *vigor mortis*. And with Thalhofer we may add, without drawing his conclusions in favour of the sacrificial theory of the mass: "*The sacrificial action of the God-man was not limited to the moment in which flesh and blood were outwardly separated on the cross. The glorified Redeemer still continues it in will, and therefore in substance. The same self-sacrificing love which accomplished the work of Calvary, still agitates His heart in heaven, and pulsates therein upon our altars.*" The sacrifice of Christ (so far as it was antitypical of the slaying of the victim, and its presentation on the altar) was accomplished on the cross. But the antitypical correlative of the presentation of the blood before the mercy-seat was our Lord's appearance before God the Father, bearing in His glorified body (identical with that which suffered) His own precious blood, now also glorified (yet still identical with that which had been shed). That high-priestly self-presentation of the Redeemer is the eternal conclusion and ratifying seal of the work of redemption.

We recall to the recollection of our readers that this second or middle portion of our epistle (forming an almost independent treatise on the priesthood of Christ) is divided into three sections: the first of which (ch. vii. 1–25) compares Melchizedek with Christ, as "priest after the order of Melchizedek;" the second (ch. vii. 26–ix. 12) compares Christ as "high priest" with the high priests of the Old Testament; and the third (ch. ix. 13–x. 18) exhibits the whole redeeming work of Christ as the one "eternal high priest after the order of Melchizedek." Having reached the end of the second section, we now enter upon the third.

THIRD SECTION.

THE ETERNAL AND ABSOLUTE HIGH-PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST AND ITS FINAL OPERATION SUPERSEDING ALL THE TYPES AND SHADOWS OF THE LAW.

CHAP. IX. 13–X. 18. *The self-sacrifice of Christ cleanses the hearts to which its blood is applied, and so prepares them for the living service of the living God; His death is the consecration of a new covenant, and of the things in heaven; His entrance into the eternal sanctuary is the seal of the absolute remission of sin, beyond which nothing more remains in prospect but His ultimate return to manifest our salvation* (ix. 13–28). *In contrast with the oft-repeated sacrifices of the law, Christ by His one self-offering has fully accomplished the will of God, and obtained a perfect sanctification for us; henceforth He sits enthroned expecting final victory: the new covenant is now established, and needs no other sacrifice than His, being based on the absolute forgiveness of sins procured thereby* (x. 1–18).

THIS third section is a development and expansion of the last clause of the preceding one, which we have just been considering: *αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος*. Its first half (ix. 13–28) attaches itself chiefly to vers. 11, 12, and consists of three paragraphs, of which the first (vers. 13, 14) refers to the *διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος* of ver. 12; the second (vers. 15–23) to the *ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν* of ver. 11; and the third (vers. 24–28) to the *εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια* of ver. 12. In the second half of this section (ch. x. 1–18) all the threads of the discourse beginning at vii. 1 are again taken up and

interwoven with a fresh quotation from a prophetic psalm (Ps. xl.). The exaltation of Jesus Christ above Aaron, through His own high-priestly sacrifice of Himself, His royal session after the manner of Melchizedek at God's right hand, and the present realization of the new covenant predicted by Jeremiah,—all find in this concluding paragraph a final and fullest-toned expression.

In thus subdividing this part of the epistle, it is not our meaning that the sacred writer himself made a conscious break at vii. 25, or at ix. 12 here. His well-connected thoughts, and the well-fitting words in which they find expression, flow on in one continuous stream; but looking back from the termination, we see these turnings in it. It need not therefore disturb us to find the commencement of this third section at ver. 13 so closely connected with the preceding clause of ver. 12, and thus proceeding:—

Vers. 13, 14. *For if the blood of bulls and goats, and ashes of an heifer sprinkling the defiled, sanctifieth to the purity of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without fault to God, purify*[1] *your conscience from dead works, to serve the living God!*

The particle εἰ (as Baumgarten observes) is not to be taken *dubitative* and *conditionaliter*, but *antecedenter* and συλλογιστικῶς. The sacrifices and purifications of the Old Testament did indeed accomplish *something*, but the blood of Christ has accomplished infinitely more. He mentions (1) *the blood of bulls and of goats* (comp. ch. x. 4, and Isa. i. 11, LXX.)—τὸ αἷμα ταύρων καὶ τράγων; or, as we ought to read it, with Lachmann and Tischendorf (following A.B.D.E.),[2] τράγων καὶ ταύρων, "*of goats and bulls.*" The yearly sacrifices of the day of atonement are those referred to: the ταύρων being equivalent to the μόσχων of ver. 12;

[1] The original part of the Codex Vat. breaks off at ΚΑΘΑ in καθαριεῖ: what follows is by a later hand, and is referred to by Tischendorf as b instead of B.

[2] So also the Codex Sinaiticus.—Tr.

and the τὸ αἷμα (not simply αἷμα) expressing the fact that the whole blood, not simply a part of it, was expended in the work of atonement. He mentions (2) *the ashes of an heifer*—σποδὸς δαμάλεως ῥαντίζουσα τοὺς κεκοινωμένους. We shall better understand what the writer here affirms of the operation of these rites of the Old Testament, if we examine in detail this particular rite of sprinkling (הזאת) with water of purification (מי נדה חטאת), in respect both to its ritualism and its symbolical significance.

We read, then (Num. xix.), that first of all a perfectly spotless, and as yet unyoked red heifer, was to be taken: *spotless and unyoked*, because destined to subserve the composition of a sacred water of purification; and *red*, as the colour of life, because that purifying composition was to cleanse those who had suffered defilement through contact with the dead. A female animal was to be taken, because the female sex is חוה, ζωογόνος; and a cow, because as פרה, symbol of fruitfulness, it would be the directest antithesis to the unfruitfulness of death. The animal was to be brought to Eleazar the priest, and to be slain by him without the camp, not to Aaron the high priest, because all, even the remotest contact with death, was for him unbecoming;[1] and without the camp for a similar reason, because the camp of Israel, with the sanctuary in the midst of it, was holy, and not to be defiled by any conscious or designed connection with death. After slaying the red heifer, Eleazar was to dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle it seven times in the direction of the tabernacle. The blood of a sin-offering made for the whole congregation, which was slain in the court of the tabernacle, was also sprinkled seven times within the holy place, before the Parôcheth: here, on the other hand, the sprinkling was made in the air, lest the defilement of death, which is the prominent thought in the whole ceremony, should seem to be brought into any connection with the sanctuary of God; but at the same time it was made *towards the tabernacle*, in order to impart to the sin-offering there presented somewhat of its

[1] The high priest was not even permitted to approach the dead bodies of his parents.

cleansing, death-destroying power. After this the heifer was to be entirely burnt, flesh, skin, blood, and all; and into the burning the priest was to cast cedar wood, hyssop, and a crimson band or ribbon. In the case of the sin-offering for the congregation, the rest of the blood was poured out at the foot of the altar, the fat pieces consumed on the altar, and the remains of the sacrifice burned without the camp. What is unexampled here is, that the blood of the heifer is also burned; but the meaning of this is not hard to discover;—the purpose of the whole ceremony being to produce a heap of ashes possessed of the highest purifying energy, the blood, which, in consequence of the sprinkling towards the holy place, had become impregnated with purifying and atoning power, would naturally form a principal ingredient. The three articles superadded to the burning seem to be rather *medicamenta* than symbols properly so called. The fragrance of the cedar wood would act against the odour of death; the hyssop was regarded by all antiquity as an instrument of purification; and the crimson band, coloured with the cochineal dye, may indeed (as Bähr and Kurtz maintain) have symbolized life; but the cochineal was itself regarded in antiquity as a cordial.[1] The priest, the man who burned the body, and the man who collected the ashes, were all three "unclean until the evening:" "unclean," because engaged in a rite connected with the uncleanness of death; but only "till the evening," because the removal of such uncleanness was the very end of the ceremony. The red heifer herself was, on the other hand, not regarded as unclean. On the contrary, the whole was a חטאת (sin-offering), and consequently "most holy" (קדש קדשים): it was only the intention or thought of uncleanness inseparable from the preparation of an antidote, which rendered those unclean for a time who were concerned in such preparation.

The rite being thus completed, the ashes were to be laid up in a clean place outside the camp, to serve (when rinsed with the naturally purifying element of water) as a means

[1] These ingredients were, however, used in such small quantities, as not to have more than a symbolical significance. See Note Q.

of cleansing for those who had been defiled by contact with a dead body: for that purpose, such persons were to be sprinkled with the water on the third and on the seventh day, and so purified; the same rule applying also to the house of the dead, and to the furniture and clothes contained in it. A man, who himself was in a state of ceremonial purity, had to perform the act of sprinkling (with a bunch of hyssop), but became thereby unclean until the evening, and had to wash his clothes. The proper name of this "water of sprinkling," or "of separation," was in Hebrew מֵי נִדָּה (LXX. *ὕδωρ ῥαντισμοῦ*), and also מֵי חַטָּאת, "water of purification" (Num. viii. 7, LXX. *ὕδωρ ἁγνισμοῦ*).

This Greek (Septuagint) term *ὕδωρ ῥαντισμοῦ* was in the sacred writer's mind when using the bold abbreviation, *σποδὸς δαμαλ. ῥαντίζουσα τοὺς κεκοινωμένους* (instead of *ῥαντιζομένη ἐπὶ τοὺς κεκοιν.*). The "unclean" (LXX. and Philo, *ἀκάθαρτοι* and *μεμιασμένοι*) are here called *κεκοινωμένοι*, the antithesis of חול (*κοινόν*) and קדשׁ (*ἅγιον*) being confounded with that of טמא (*ἀκάθαρτον*) and טהור (*κάθαρον*).[1] (Comp. Acts x. 14 sq., 28, xi. 8 sq., and xxi. 28.) It is further evident from all the ritual thus detailed how truly and properly the "ashes of the heifer" might be said to "sanctify" (*ἁγιάζει* is a more significant term than *ἁγνίζει*) "unto the purity of the flesh," *i.e.* so as to produce a ceremonial and external state of purity (*πρός* indicating here the result, not the purpose, as it would have done had the phrase been *πρὸς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς κάθαρσιν* instead of *καθαρότητα*). Philo also says of the legal *λουτρὰ καὶ περιῤῥαντήρια*, that they are directed towards a *κάθαρσις τοῦ σώματος* (ii. 251, 8); but the writer of this epistle extends the statement to all sacrifices (which latter, according to Philo, were intended to produce a *κάθαρσις τῆς ψυχῆς*), and even to the sprinkling of the blood on the day of atonement. From which it is evident

[1] At Lev. x. 10 there are properly two quite distinct antitheses: on the one hand, that of clean (טהור) and unclean (טמא); on the other, that of "holy" (קדשׁ) and "common" (חול), *i.e.* the loose, unbound (from חלל, to loose), unguarded, unreserved, left free for the use of all (comp. 1 Sam. xxi. 5).

that he is contemplating the Levitical sacrifices (apart from any spiritual blessings that may have accompanied them) simply in their naked objectivity as outward acts, and regards that membership in the commonwealth of Israel which the Levitical sacrifices maintained or restored as confined to the sphere of the *σάρξ*, *i.e.* of the natural and earthly life consecrated by the benediction of the Levitical covenant. His thought may be thus expressed: The sacrifices and purifications of the old covenant were unable to form a spiritual church on the ground of a spiritual regeneration, and yet in their outwardness *were* able to effect an outward sanctification: how much the rather may we now expect an inward spiritual blessing from the operation of the blood of Christ! The logical relation of the two clauses is not so much that of Rom. v. 10 as that of Matt. vii. 11. On the one hand, we have the blood and ashes of animal sacrifice; on the other, the blood of Christ—*τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὃς διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου ἑαυτὸν προσήνεγκεν ἄμωμον τῷ Θεῷ.*

To enter into the proper meaning of these words, we must surrender, in the first place, the reading supported by not a few, but those confessedly inferior authorities,[1] *διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου.* This reading must be rejected on purely critical grounds, but has also the context against it. Bleek's remark, "*The divine element in Christ is, in fact, the Holy Spirit,*" is contrary to Scripture; and De Wette's, "*The Holy Ghost is meant, which on Christ was bestowed without measure,*" is inapplicable, inasmuch as the expression in its present context denotes evidently something belonging to the essence of the Lord's personality. We give up, in the second place, any reference of *προσήνεγκεν* here to Christ's heavenly *προσφορά*, such as that assumed by Bleek and the Socinian and Arminian commentators. Whenever the sacrifice of Christ[2] is

[1] Viz. D*, many cursives; the Coptic, Itala, and Vulgate versions; Chrysostom, Damascenus, the *Glossa interlinearis*, and other Greeks and Latins,—among the latter, Ambros.; finally, Luther.

[2] The sacrifice of the cross is, as we have often remarked before, the antitype both of the שחיטה, the slaying of the victim, and of the הקטרה, its consumption on the altar.

typically and antithetically compared with the sacrifices of the Old Testament, it is His self-oblation on the altar of the cross which is the point of comparison. That such is the case here is evident from the epithet ἄμωμον = תמים, involving a reference to the requirements made of victims offered under the law;[1] in accordance with which observation we must interpret the διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου of the present text. Nor have I myself ever been able to understand this πνεῦμα αἰώνιον otherwise than as expressing *that* element in the sacrifice of Christ which answers to the animal soul (נפש) in the expiatory sacrifices of the Old Testament:[2] so that διὰ πν. αἰων. would mean, "through the medium of His own eternal Spirit," *i.e.* the whole divine and human, but more particularly the divine inward being of the God-man, the divine eternal personality which at the resurrection interpenetrated, transfigured, and as it were absorbed the σάρξ, so that He is now altogether πνεῦμα (1 Cor. xv. 45; 2 Cor. iii. 17 sq.). And so πνεῦμα is used in antithesis to σάρξ at Rom. i. 4 (comp. 1 Tim. iii. 16 and 1 Pet. iii. 18).[3] This the inward being of Christ is called here *eternal Spirit*, because absolute, divine, and purely self-determined. The act of self-sacrifice *through*

[1] The old Socinian commentators understood ἄμωμον here to apply to the glorified humanity of the exalted Saviour, Schmalz making it almost identical in meaning with "bloodless."

[2] For an examination of Hofmann's interpretation, see Note R.

[3] It is quite against St. Paul's phraseology and sentiments when Zeller and Lipsius say of our Lord, that "the divine πνεῦμα obtained in Him personal existence:" it would have been more correct to say that the πνεῦμα of the Godhead, so far as it is πνεῦμα of the Son, obtained a human personal existence in Him. Used in this sense, πνεῦμα designates the inward spiritual being of the incarnate One, as when Ignatius speaks of an ἕνωσις σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος in Christ, and Barnabas calls the body of Christ σκεῦος πνεύματος, and Lactantius calls His pre-existent being *Sanctus Spiritus* (Dorner, *Dogma von der Person Christi*, i. 209–213, and Schmid, *Neutest. Theologie*, ii. 297). Among the older commentators who have taken this view of the meaning of πνεῦμα αἰώνιον, Beza is worthy of special note; his words are: *Opponit pecudum sanguini sanguinem ejus, qui non homo duntaxat, quales ceteri, sed Deus etiam fuerit, nam Spiritus æterni appellatione Deitatis in humanitate assumpta efficacitatem infinitam intelligo, quæ totum hoc sacrificium consecravit.*

this eternal Spirit is an ethical one of absolute validity and worth;[1] "*through*" (διά) being here = "in virtue of," and used in the same sense as at Acts i. 2, xi. 28, and xxi. 4. For the animal soul or נֶפֶשׁ, a sacrificial death is a matter of constraint, unconsciously, or at any rate unwillingly endured; but that of Christ made in the energy of eternal Spirit is a fully conscious and absolutely free act of obedience and love (*per ardentissimam caritatem a Spiritu ejus æterno profectam*, Œcolampadius), and therefore productive not of a shadowy, but of a real atonement before God: it is the self-surrender of a pure and sinless, and at the same time infinite and ever-during life, and a work of infinite intensity and saving power commensurate to the needs not of individuals only, but of all mankind. This its universal application is indicated here by the comparison not with ordinary sin-offerings made by individuals, but with that of the day of atonement made for all Israel, and with the universal means of purification provided for the whole people in the ashes of the red heifer. And hence also the ὑμῶν of the *text. recept.* to which on internal, if not on external grounds, the preference is to be given over the ἡμῶν of Lachmann and Tischendorf.

With the word ὑμῶν the sacred writer now consciously addresses himself to the church of the New Testament, and reminds her how far more effectual and universal a means of cleansing she is possessed of in the blood of Christ once offered, and henceforth glorified, than had that of the Old Testament, in all its ashes of purification and sacrifices of atonement. Cleansing of the conscience from dead works, for the service of the living God, is the blessed effect of the due application of this sacred blood of God Himself (Acts xx. 28), and the gracious motive through which it was outpoured. Its operation is not a surface one, but central. It

[1] *Jam vero* (says Seb. Schmid) *cum hic Spiritus æternus adeoque infinitus sit, utique pondus meriti et satisfactionis, quod ab eodem spiritu est, æternum et infinitum est. Quodsi æternum et infinitum est, ne quidem infinita Dei justitia in eo aliquid desiderare potuit.* This rational conclusion in the spirit of the church doctrine of the atonement is scriptural and unassailable.

cleanses the συνείδησις (*i.e.* a man's own inward consciousness of his relation to God) ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων; *i.e.* it relieves the mind from that shameful burden of a sense of impurity and alienation, which, making of the inward man a living corpse, produces only works (and among them even those of apparent legal righteousness[1]) in which no pulses of the higher life are found. There is no leaping here, as De Wette supposes, from the idea of atonement to that of regeneration or renewal. Both ideas, justification and sanctification, lie involved together in the one καθαρίζειν; comp. 1 John i. 7.

The purpose of this justifying and sanctifying operation of the blood of Christ, is to produce a living witness of its reality in a life of holy service—εἰς τὸ λατρεύειν Θεῷ ζῶντι.[2] The man ceremonially cleansed and externally atoned for under the Old Testament, had at once a right to join in the outward worship of God and the outward common life of the congregation of Israel, although no inward change may have passed over him; but he who has been reconciled and cleansed by the inward operation of the blood of Christ, stands henceforth in living communion with God his Saviour, and is empowered to serve the living God with living works and inward service. And it is just this disburdening purification of the conscience by the blood of Christ, independently of all outward performances, which proves that the entrance of Christ διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος into the presence of the Father was indeed the accomplishment of an eternal redemption, and has put an end to the expiations and lustrations of the law.

We now come to the second paragraph of this third section. It occupies vers. 15–23, and is an expansion of the ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν of ver. 11.

Ver. 15. *And for this cause he is the Mediator of a new testament, in order that, a death having taken place for the propitiation of the transgressions under the first testament, they*

[1] See commentary on ch. vi. 1.

[2] Lachmann, following A. and other authorities, reads καὶ ἀληθινῷ, which seems to be a gloss from 1 Thess. i. 9.

which have been called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance.

The διὰ τοῦτο here must be referred backwards to the preceding context.[1] *On this very account*, viz. that the blood of Christ has an inwardly purifying power, and such as was wholly wanting in the sacrifices and purifications of the law, even then *for this very reason* He is a διαθήκης καινῆς μεσίτης. The emphasis lies on καινῆς, and the sentence might accordingly be thus inverted: the διαθήκη of which Christ is μεσίτης must therefore be a new one (see Note on ix. 1). Hofmann says (*Schrift.* ii. 1, 298): "*We have already learned that the proper meaning of* διαθήκη *is* 'ordinance' *or* 'settlement,' *like that of the Hebrew* ברית, *as rendered in Chaldee by* קְיָם; *and when Bleek maintains that the designation of Christ as* μεσίτης διαθήκης *here proves that* διαθήκη *must be taken in the sense of a covenant between two parties, he makes a mistake, which a reference to Gal.* iii. 19 *would be sufficient to dispel. The mediatorship of Christ is wrongly conceived as an action towards both sides, by means of which a mutual agreement or covenant is carried out. For, as we have seen, the* καινὴ διαθήκη *of the prophecy cited at* viii. 10 *is simply an* 'ordinance' *on God's part for us, and the* μεσίτης *or mediator is he by whom this ordinance is executed.*" Against this position of Hofmann's we would remind the reader that we have already (at vii. 22) proved, that in ברית the notion of two concurrent parties is as clearly impressed on the word as possible, and that the rendering "*settlement*" or "*ordinance*" is founded on an unproved meaning assigned to ברה; the only apparent justification for Hofmann's view being, that in no case could a ברית between God and man be an agreement between two *equal* parties, but must necessarily be an arrangement, commencing with a condescending offer on

[1] Schlichting, Böhme, Bleek, would give τοῦτο a *forward* reference; against which Hofmann remarks, that in that case the author must have written, not διὰ τοῦτο—ὅπως, but διὰ τοῦτο . . . ἵνα (2 Cor. xiii. 10; 1 Tim. i. 16; Philem. 15). This I would hardly venture to maintain. Comp. Xen. *Cyrop.* ii. 1, 21: οἱ σύμμαχοι οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο τρέφονται ἢ ὅπως μαχοῦνται ὑπὲρ τῶν τρεφόντων.

God's part, to whom alone it appertains to determine the conditions of mutual relationship. And here the very use of the word *μεσίτης* shows that the writer of this epistle has the ordinary meaning of ברית in view. Whenever *διαθήκη* and *μεσίτης* are used together, the *μεσίτης* must be (as St. Paul may be said to have ruled at Gal. iii. 20) not of one only (*ἑνός*), but a middle person between two others, acting in the way of giving and taking towards both sides, and therefore necessarily partaking of the character of each, *i.e.* in this case must be both human and divine, not merely acting as God's representative towards men, but standing between both parties, and so uniting them. We ought therefore properly to have translated here, *for this cause He is mediator of a new covenant;* but prefer to keep the old rendering, "*testament,*" because the notion of *διαθήκη* = ברית, *covenant,* though here retained, passes over in the following sentence into that of *a testamentary disposition* = the talmudic terms. צואה, דיתיקי. This ambiguity or double meaning of the word Hofmann endeavours to escape, by attaching both to *διαθήκη* and ברית an original signification, embracing both meanings; and is so far more successful in one respect than Ebrard, who would retain the meaning of "covenant" throughout the present paragraph.

But the assumed interchange of meanings attached to *διαθήκη* is in Hofmann's view not merely a harmless want of dialectic accuracy (De Wette), or an allowable logical inconsistency (Tholuck), but an unpardonable confusion of thought. Such, however, in our judgment, is not the case. The sacred writer thinks not in German, but in Greek, and expresses himself accordingly. The Greek word *διαθήκη* is more expressive and comprehensive than the Hebrew ברית. It includes and combines the notions of covenant arrangement between two parties, and of testamentary disposition or settlement. Now if only one of these two notions had been applicable to the subject in hand, and the sacred writer had made, nevertheless, a thoughtless and irrational use of both, he would justly incur blame for such confusion of thought. But if both meanings of *διαθήκη are* applicable, we cannot

blame him for availing himself of the doubly significant word. And they are thus applicable. The old commentator Schlichting has observed already: *de tali re sermo est quæ utrique vocis significationi, et "testamento" et "fœderi," aliqua ratione sit communis. utrobique enim, ut sive testamentum sive fœdus plane ratum sit, mortem accedere oportet.* This explanation is, however, not perfectly satisfactory. The *res communis* in the two notions of "covenant" and "testament" which are combined in διαθήκη may be better conceived as follows: In the διαθήκη of the gospel, regarded in its first signification of a "covenant" between God and man, there are certain conditions and expectations which have for their object a future divine blessing; that blessing is throughout the Old Testament frequently designated by the term "inheritance" (נחלה, κληρονομία); and this idea of an *inheritance* is one which has exercised a very powerful and pervading influence on the minds of all the writers of the New Testament. The sacred writer here makes a step still further in advance, and (with this notion of an *inheritance* in his mind) employs the term διαθήκη in its second signification of *a testamentary disposition*, and so connects the notion expressed by κληρονομία with that of *testamentum*, being the latter one of those represented by διαθήκη. Hofmann himself cannot deny that such is the case. And inasmuch as the notion of a testament, *i.e.* of a disposition of property made by a man in his lifetime to have effect only after his death, is one foreign to Israelite antiquity, and yet (as Hofmann is compelled to grant) plainly connected with διαθήκη here, the conclusion is unavoidable, that an *Hellenic* conception is attached to the word which confessedly represents the *Hebrew* ברית; and so (under Hofmann's own guidance) we come back to the very "confusion" of ideas which he has so severely condemned.

Both these significations, "covenant" and "testament" (as represented by διαθήκη), must be referred to the common notion of "disposition" or "settlement." On this point we are all agreed; and inasmuch as we, for our part, are perfectly prepared to acknowledge that, in the case of a covenant

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between God and man, the human factor must be all but absorbed in the divine, it seems to me that there can be no essential difference whether we say that the notion of a divine "covenant," or that the notion of a divine "settlement," passes over here into that of "a testamentary disposition." Not, however, that the one notion is to be regarded as here substituted for the other. The sacred writer keeps them both (the notion of a covenant and that of a testament) in view in speaking of our Lord as διαθήκης καινῆς μεσίτης; so that all that follows is but a development of what is here in thought combined. The very use of the term κληρονομίας at the end of this first sentence, shows that he regards διαθήκη as a covenant, involving the promise of an inheritance: so that the μεσίτης here is, on the one hand, as towards men, recipient of the inheritance on their behalf; and on the other, as towards God, fulfiller of the covenant conditions on which this inheritance depends.

The clause ὅπως θανάτου γενομένου, κ.τ.λ., declares two things: first, what the Mediator has done for the accomplishment of the divine purpose; and then what that purpose is—His own pontifical self-sacrifice of blood, and the thereby rendered possible entrance into the promised inheritance of those who are the called. We must not render οἱ κεκλ. τ. αἰων. κληρ. (with Tholuck and others[1]), "*those who are called to the eternal inheritance*" (which would be for our author too harsh a construction, and one, moreover, easily misunderstood), but connect τῆς αἰων. κληρ., *per hyperbaton*,[2] with τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν as its dependent genitive; the αἰώνιος κληρονομία being the governing thought of the clause, and therefore placed emphatically at the end. We have here again a phraseology that reminds us of St. Luke, in ἐπαγγελία,[3] used not for the word of the promise, but for its object. Compare Acts ii. 23.

The object of the divine promise under the covenant of

[1] *e.g.* Ebrard, and formerly the Peshito and Luther (till 1530).

[2] Comp. ver. 16 and ch. xii. 11.

[3] Comp. κληρονομεῖν τὴν ἐπ., ch. vi. 12, 17; ἐπιτυχεῖν τῆς ἐπ., vi. 15; and κομίσασθαι τὴν ἐπ., x. 36 and xi. 39.

which Moses was Mediator, was an "inheritance" (נחלה) or "everlasting possession" (אחזת עולם); but it soon became manifest that the land of Canaan, though bearing this title, could not be the abiding rest of God's people, nor His true and final dwelling-place among men,—that the *αἰώνιος κληρονομία* of which the covenant spoke must be a future and unearthly one, the right to which was to be ultimately extended from Israel to all mankind, and to be realized only in the world to come. This "eternal inheritance," then, is the sum total of the *μέλλοντα ἀγαθά* of ch. ix. 11: it is the *μέλλουσα οἰκουμένη* of ch. ii. 5, the glorified and transfigured world of the future; and the *κεκλημένοι* are not merely those to whom the promise of this inheritance was first addressed, but all members of the human family to whom, in accordance with the divine purpose, its possession should be ultimately vouchsafed. And Christ is the Mediator of a new covenant, through which all the called among mankind are to be put in possession of this inheritance; and that by means of a work on His part which is also included in the divine plan—hence the *διὰ τοῦτο* at the commencement of the sentence—namely, a redeeming and atoning death — *Θανάτου, γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων.*

Christ, then, is Mediator of a new covenant, which offers the promised inheritance not merely as a future expectation, but as a present good; and in this consists its *differentia* from the old covenant. But before this new covenant can be established and come into operation, a death must have taken place atoning for all the transgressions that have gone on accumulating during the continuance of the first covenant, and so capacitating the *κεκλημένοι* to enter at once upon the inheritance thus assured and made over to them.[1] *Διαθήκη* is evidently here taken in the sense of *testamentum*. In common life, an heir can only enter on his inheritance by the death of the person whose will has been made in his favour. But in this case it is an atoning death[2] which must intervene,

[1] For this use of *ἐπί* = upon, alongside of, compare Winer, § 48.

[2] A scholion in Matthæi to *θανατ. γενομ.* remarks: *ἔδει γὰρ ἡμᾶς καὶ τιμωρίαν δοῦναι ἐφ' οἷς ἐπλημμελήσαμεν.*

a death εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρ. διαθ. παραβάσεων. Hofmann's interpretation is: "*Not men themselves, but their transgressions, are here said to be redeemed: the genitive παραβάσεων cannot signify that from which, but only and simply that which is itself redeemed. We are not therefore to compare (with Bleek and Kuïnœl) ἀφαίρεσις ἁμαρτιῶν, nor (with De Wette) καθαρισμὸς ἁμαρτιῶν, but rather the phrase ἱλάσκεσθαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας. It is the transgressions (παραβάσεις) themselves which are regarded as having fallen under the wrath of God, and so liable to punishment, and as delivered from this fall and liability by the work of the Redeemer.*" This is hardly the right interpretation of the genitive παραβάσεων. Just as we say ἐλευθερία τινος, freedom from something, κάθαρσίς τινος, purification from something, and ἐλευθεροῦν, λύειν, ἀπολύειν τινά τινος, instead of ἀπό τινος; and just as our author himself speaks of a καθαρισμὸς τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν (ch. i. 3) instead of ἀπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν; even so here, τῶν παραβ. is equivalent to ἀπὸ τ. παράβ. (Tit. ii. 14) ὃς ἐκ τ. παραβ. (1 Pet. i. 18).[1]

In thus speaking of the transgressions accumulated on the first covenant, the sacred writer has Israel mainly in view (who, as the people of that covenant, were destined to form the first congregation under the gospel), but not Israel exclusively, any more than at Rom. iii. 25 (πάρεσις τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων). "*He has in his mind's eye not merely the transgressions of the present generation, but those of the whole series of generations since the establishment of the covenant of the law on Sinai, and regards the history of God's relations to mankind as one great whole, of which the religious history of Israel forms a typical part, exhibiting in one crucial instance the incapacity of the whole human race to satisfy the requirements of the divine will. From this point of view atonement of transgressions under the law will mean the same thing as atonement of the sins of men in general, regarded as violations of the revealed will of God; and the death of Christ will be an*

[1] It is possible that even the τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος of Rom. viii. 23 is to be explained in the same way as = redemption from the body of death (Rom. vii. 24).

atonement not merely for sin in the abstract, but especially for sin in its most aggravated form, as conscious transgression of that revealed will. The special reference here made to transgressions under the covenant of Sinai has its ground not only in this, that that covenant had a real significance for mankind in general, but also that the point which the sacred writer has here mainly in view is the transition from it and its failures to the saving dispensation of the gospel. That transition could not take place without a death which should annihilate the transgressions of the former covenant." So Hofmann (ii. 1, 300); and the meaning of the sacred writer could hardly be expressed in more appropriate terms. But still the question remains, Was it then the view of the writer of this epistle, that there was absolutely no forgiveness of sins whatsoever under the Old Testament? Such could not possibly have been his view. Both the sacrificial ritual and the book of Psalms afford proof of the contrary. The ordinary sin-offerings were, indeed, mainly directed to the atonement of sins of ignorance (*ἀγνοήματα*); but there were other sin-offerings (such as the goat offered at the new moon, passover, pentecost, the feast of trumpets, and on the seventh and concluding day of the feast of tabernacles) which had no special reference to any particular class of sins, and on the head of the scape-goat of the day of atonement the high priest laid *πάσας τὰς ἀνομίας τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, καὶ πάσας τὰς ἀδικίας αὐτῶν καὶ πάσας τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν* (Lev. xvi. 21).[1] But all such atonements and remissions as these bore no comparison for depth, reality, or endurance with that which is here called *ἀπολύτρωσις τῶν παραβάσεων*. They were re-

[1] It should be observed that *παράβασις* as = פֶּשַׁע is not a Septuagint word. It occurs once, Ps. ci. 3, as rendering for עֹשֵׂי סֻרִים. Nor is the word *παραβάσεων* used by our author here in order to exclude certain graver kinds of sin for which (as alleged by Schlichting, Limborch, and others) no atonement was provided by the law (comp. Hofmann, *Weiss.* ii. 165). In the remarkable parallel passage, Acts xiii. 38, 39, the meaning is, not that we are justified by Christ from all kinds of sin which could not be forgiven under the law, but that the whole burden which rested on the conscience, and which ceremonial justifications were powerless to remove, is in Him taken away.

stricted to the performance of ceremonial acts, which being unable to give the conscience any enduring satisfaction, had to be repeated year after year; and these ceremonies themselves rested on legal ordinances which restricted the promise of grace and acceptance to those who belonged to the commonwealth of Israel. A general act of grace, assuring the divine forgiveness to all mankind, was utterly unknown under the Old Testament. Before a new διαθήκη could be established, there must be such a general and absolute forgiveness of sins as that foretold by Jeremiah (see above, viii. 12); and in order to such forgiveness, and to the reinstatement of mankind in their promised inheritance, an atoning death was required.

Ver. 16. *For where there is a testament, there must also of necessity be understood the death of the testator.*

As the former verse has an excellent parallel in Acts xiii. 38, 39, so is this verse not less like St. Luke both in thought and expression. The phrase διατίθεσθαι διαθήκην, which occurs viii. 10 and Acts iii. 25, in the sense of "making a covenant," is here used in that of "making a testament" or "will." Properly speaking, God (the heavenly Father) is ὁ διαθέμενος, the will-maker or testator; but (inasmuch as He has placed the whole inheritance destined for mankind in the hands of Christ as Mediator) the διαθέμενος is here our Lord, who before His passion said of Himself (St. Luke xxii. 29 sqq.), κἀγὼ διατίθεμαι ὑμῖν, καθὼς διέθετό μοι ὁ Πατήρ μου, βασιλείαν—*I assign to you, as the Father hath assigned to me, a kingdom*; ἵνα ἔσθητε, κ.τ.λ., ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ μου. The "kingdom" thus assigned to Christ, and by Him assigned to us, is the eternal inheritance: consequently He is the transmitter of the inheritance; and His death being necessary to that transmission, our author, in order to exhibit that necessity, says here, ὅπου γὰρ διαθήκη, κ.τ.λ.

Jerome, following the Itala, renders thus: *Ubi enim testamentum, mors necesse est intercedat testatoris*, taking φέρεσθαι in the sense of γενέσθαι. So also Luther: *there must of necessity take place* (geschehen) the death of him that maketh the testament. But this rendering is incorrect. Φέρεσθαι

may indeed be used of the advance or progress of a thing or person, but not of the occurrence of a single event. A better rendering would be, "*The death of the testator must be a fact of common notoriety*," and as such, need no further proof (on the principle, *notorium non eget probatione*). We have also the choice of another rendering, that of Lünemann, Ebrard, Bleek, De Wette, Tholuck, Böhme, Valckenaer: "*The death of the testator must be alleged*" (*afferri* or *proferri*), *i.e.* in a legal or forensic sense. This rendering of φέρεσθαι (which is already found in Hammond, Elsner, and Baumgarten) has much in its favour. So we find Acts xxv. 7 (*text. rec.*), αἰτιώματα φέρειν; John xviii. 29, κατηγορίαν κατά τινος φέρειν; and in Demosthenes, μάρτυρα φέρειν, αἰτίας φέρειν (to bring up a witness, to adduce proofs), etc.; and in Roman law, *ferre sententiam, testimonium, suffragium, exempla.* But inasmuch as φέρεσθαι is not met with in the exact sense here proposed, of alleging a matter of fact, and moreover would require us to take θάνατον in a metonymic sense (= the fact of the testator's death as legal condition), I prefer myself the former rendering: "*Where a testament is, there must also* (in order to its validity) *be current as a matter of notoriety the fact of the testator's death.*" Before that is known and established, the testament has no legal force.

Ver. 17. *For a testament is of legal validity in the case of there being some that are dead, since surely it is of no force at all while he that made it is still living.*

The expression ἐπὶ νεκροῖς is peculiar. A testament is of force "*upon the dead*," *i.e.* on condition that some persons (or things) should have died (see Winer on ἐπί, § 48, *c*). The reason for employing such a mode of expression is, however, plain: the sacred writer would prepare the way for what follows (ver. 18 seq.) concerning the old διαθήκη, which likewise was ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βαβαία, the death of the sacrificial victims having been an essential condition of its establishment. The following clause, beginning with ἐπεί, appeals to the sense of the readers of the epistle as to the matter of fact in the case of an ordinary testament, and may be re-

garded as a question (Bengel, Lachmann, Hofmann, and others) addressed to them. So ἐπεί elsewhere is used to introduce an interrogative clause (see ch. x. 2; Rom. iii. 6; 1 Cor. xiv. 16 and xv. 29), and μήποτε occurs both in direct (John vii. 26) and indirect (Luke iii. 15; 2 Tim. ii. 25) questions, and sometimes so that ποτε loses its temporal signification altogether, and merely emphasizes the interrogative. It is, however, unnecessary to assume such to be the case here, and still less necessary to prefer, with Isidorus of Pelusium (Ep. iv. 113), the reading μὴ τότε, which at present has only one MS. authority in its favour, the Codex Claromontanus (D*). The order of thought is by no means tautological: "Where a testament is, *i.e.* in any case where a testament becomes a subject of interest and discussion, it is also a point assumed and notorious that the testator is himself deceased (ver. 16); for a testament has no legal validity except in the case of some one's death (ver. 17*a*), but may be altered or destroyed at any moment during the testator's lifetime; for indeed (as the readers must be well aware) there has been no instance of a testament coming into operation under other circumstances" (ver. 17*b*). But how does all this apply to Christ? To this question Hofmann replies (*Weiss.* ii. 165): "*The very notion of a* διαθήκη, *when taken in this absolute sense, of a disposition made in respect to the whole of a man's possessions, requires as a previous condition the death of him who thus disposes of his entire property; for so long as the man himself lives, the possibility of his acquiring yet more will remain, and any previous disposal of his property may cease to be a* διαθήκη *in this absolute sense. And so it was with Christ. So long as He continued to live in the flesh, His* τελείωσις *was still a thing of the future. Only by death could He be made perfectly free from all the bands of fleshly life, and capable of making us partakers of His own glorified humanity.*" This explanation of the ἀνάγκη θάνατον φέρεσθαι is unsatisfactory. Why may not a man dispose or nominate an heir of his whole property by anticipation twenty years before his death as well as a few hours? The thought, therefore, that the perfection of our Lord's human

nature, and by it the perfecting of the κληρονομία, was only attainable by death, though in itself most true, is out of place here. The death of Christ is here contemplated, in the first place, simply as the previous condition, without which the transference of property disposed of by will cannot take effect—the διαθήκη being regarded as a testamentary disposition. (Not, of course, that in dying Christ may be thought of as losing any part of that glory of which we become partakers. In first dying and then returning to the Father, He is at once, and in one person, the testator who leaves us the inheritance, and the executor who carries out the testator's will.) But, in the second place, if the διαθήκη be also regarded as a disposition of property made by covenant, the death of Christ becomes a factor in such διαθήκη in a much fuller and deeper sense. It is His death alone which, in accordance with the terms of the covenant, releases the inheritance for us: for, first, it is the means whereby God is made willing to hand over the inheritance to us sinners, or whereby He creates for Himself the possibility of doing so; secondly, it is the atonement or purification which renders us sinners capable of receiving the inheritance; and thirdly, it is through the effectual discharge of all obligations and transgressions attached to the old covenant, the abolition of that covenant and the constitution of the new.

Thus understood, the whole paragraph (vers. 15–17) is an expansion of the διὰ τοῦτο of ver. 15. Christ, in virtue of His own blood-shedding, is Mediator of a new testamentary covenant, "death" and "testament" being two correlative notions: in accordance with which, the sacred writer proceeds to point out that even the old testamentary covenant was not made effectual without a death, without a blood-shedding.

Ver. 18. *Whence neither is the first* [testament] *consecrated without blood.*

The old covenant was also (in accordance with the double sense of διαθήκη) a testamentary disposition, in so far as God bound Himself by promise to bestow, on Israel continuing

faithful, an "eternal inheritance" (נַחֲלַת עוֹלָם). (The expression is found in numerous places, *e.g.* Ex. xxiii. 30, xxxii. 13, Deut. xv. 4.) And being thus a testament, it is also not without such a death as a testament requires, albeit an inadequate foreshadowing of the death of the true διαθέμενος: οὐδὲ[1] ἡ πρώτη (διαθήκη[2]) χωρὶς αἵματος ἐγκεκαίνισται. The Alexandrine word ἐγκαινίζειν answers in part to the Hebrew חָדַשׁ (to renew), and in part to חָנַךְ (= חָנַשׁ, to consecrate); whence חֲנֻכָּה, ἐγκαινισμός, ἐγκαίνια, *consecration, dedication* (John x. 22). Ἐγκαινίζειν, in this latter sense, is to solemnly inaugurate or present something new as such, to put it in use or actual operation. In the present passage, it is not so much the ceremonial solemnity of inauguration, as the inauguration itself, which the sacred writer has in view; of a covenant relation between God and Israel, connected with the promise of an eternal inheritance. The reference is to the great covenant sacrifice of Ex. xxiv., which followed immediately on the promulgation of the Sinaitic code of laws (ch. xix.–xxiii.), then first committed to writing in the "book of the covenant."

Vers. 19–21. *For when every precept had been spoken in accordance with the law by Moses to the whole people, he took the blood of calves and of goats, with water, and scarlet wool, and hyssop, and sprinkled both the book itself and all the people, saying, This is the blood of the testament which God hath ordained in reference to you. Moreover, the tabernacle, and all the vessels of the* [divine] *ministry, he likewise sprinkled with the blood.*

[1] So Lachm. and Tisch., instead of the οὐδ' of *text. rec.*, following A. C. D. E. I. *b'*. (*b.* being the continuation of the Codex Vaticanus (B.) by a later hand; B. concludes abruptly with the ΚΑΘΑ of καθαριεῖ of ix. 14). All these testimonies notwithstanding, it remains uncertain whether our author really wrote οὐδὲ ἡ or οὐδ' ἡ. [The Cod. Sin. has οὐδ' ἡ.—Tr.] There are a hundred instances in which even a Demosthenes omitted the elision for either logical or rhythmical reasons; but οὐδὲ ἡ appears to me here a more odious hiatus even than the οὐδὲ ὧν of the second philippic (§ 1) apostrophized by Vömel.

[2] διαθήκη is actually supplied by D*, E*, and *It.*

Our thoughts are carried back by these words into the midst of the great sacrificial action by which the covenant of Sinai was inaugurated (Ex. xxiv. 1–8). Moses, after coming down from the mount, had "*told the people all the words of Jehovah, and all the judgments*," *i.e.* the "ten words" or "commandments" (Ex. xx. 2–17), and the other fundamental laws which follow (ch. xx. 22–xxiii.); and "*the whole people*" (כל־העם) had voluntarily committed themselves to the obligations thus imposed, answering "*with one voice, All the words which the Lord hath said will we do* (ch. xxiv. 3), *and be obedient*" (ver. 7). In λαληθείσης . . . πάσης ἐντολῆς κατὰ νόμον, the κατὰ νόμον (Lachm. κατὰ τὸν νόμον) is not to be taken with π. ἐντ. (as in the Vulg. *omni mandato legis*[1]), but with λαληθείσης, "every commandment being spoken by Moses in agreement with the law," which is itself a body of ἐντολαί (Eph. ii. 15): each of these ἐντολαί having now been recited by the lawgiver in the hearing of the people, and that in the exact terms in which he had himself received it from the mouth of Jehovah; because the institution of a covenant was in question, requiring the most careful consideration of all the conditions proposed. That the Mosaic dispensation is really to be regarded as being strictly such a covenant between two parties, is evident from the representation of it as a marriage contract (*fœdus matrimonii* in the language of Roman law), which repeatedly meets us in the Old Testament (Jer. ii. 2; Ezek. xvi. 20; comp. Mal. ii. 14). The people's unanimous נעשה ("we will do") on that occasion concluded the covenant of which Moses was mediator; and the covenant sacrifices which immediately followed served to inaugurate and consecrate it with the divine blessing, and by a further self-dedication on the part of Israel.

The writer of the epistle omits the statement found in Ex. xxiv. 5, that Moses deputed young men of Israelite families to "offer up burnt-offerings" (עולות), and to "sacrifice sacrifices" (זבחים); these latter being more closely defined as

[1] And so also Bengel, Bleek, De Wette, and many others, "every commandment belonging to or in accordance with the law."

שלמים לה', "peace-offerings to the Lord,"[1] and as consisting of "oxen" (פרים).[2] "Sin-" and "trespass-offerings" are not mentioned, being unknown to the pre-Mosaic time (according both to the Pentateuch and the book of Job), and, in fact, being later developments from the burnt-offerings and peace-offerings of the patriarchal age. In like manner, we find Moses' father-in-law Jethro, at Ex. xviii. 12, taking "*a burnt-offering and sacrifices*" (זבחים, peace-offerings), and afterwards inviting Aaron and the elders of Israel to the sacrificial banquet, but no mention made of אשם or חטאת. In both cases a thankful recognition of divine mercies, and willing submission to the divine will, were the feelings which primarily sought expression; and the sin- or trespass-offering, as such, would have been out of place. Moreover, so far as in the sacrifices of Ex. xviii. or Ex. xxiv. the need or fact of an atonement for sin required recognition, such recognition might be found in the blood-shedding and blood-sprinkling which were connected with them. The main purpose in the great covenant sacrifice of Israel was, on the one hand, to set a seal on their new relation with Jehovah; on the other, to have that relation sealed by Him:[3] and the young men, who were *perhaps* first-born

[1] Our English version of Ex. xxiv. 5 is not quite literal: "*which offered burnt-offerings and sacrificed peace-offerings of oxen unto the Lord.*" It should be: "*which offered up burnt-offerings*" (*i.e. holocausts*, sacrifices wholly consumed on the altar), "*and sacrificed sacrifices*" (or *slew victims*), "*peace-offerings to the Lord, oxen.*" The Vulgate rendering is more exact than ours: "*immolaveruntque victimas pacificas Domino, vitulos.*"—Tr.

[2] This is not the place to explain the meaning of the sacrificial term שלמים. But the reader may be reminded of two ancient sayings: First, that of the *Midrash Tanchuma*: "*The Shelamim*" (peace-offerings) "*are great, because they make peace between Israel and their Father in heaven.*" Secondly, that of Guillaume of Paris: "*Manifestum est hujusmodi sacrificia participantibus imprimere familiaritatem et proximitatem ad Deum, dum eos Dei commensales quodammodo efficiebant.*" שלום is properly "fulness," "completeness," "well-being;" and thus denotes, according to the context, either a pleasant friendly feeling of one towards another, or of several among themselves.

[3] Compare Philo (Qu. in Ex. xxiv. 5): "Duplex igitur genus sacri-

sons,[1] represented, as sacrificing priests commissioned by Moses, the totality of Israel, which was likewise indicated by the twelve pillars of the altar. Moses himself is the mediator between God and His people, chosen for that purpose by God Himself. But here it is not so much the sacramental (so to speak) as the sacrificial side of his mediatorship which the sacred writer has in view.

Concerning Moses' part in the sacrificial action, the Pentateuch relates that he first sprinkled half the blood upon the altar, and then put the other half in basons, from which, after reading the statutes contained in the book of the covenant which had been already orally delivered to the people, and after receiving the renewal of their vow of obedience, he proceeded to sprinkle the whole congregation, saying (according to the LXX.): *ἰδοὺ τὸ αἷμα τῆς διαθήκης, ἧς διέθετο Κύριος πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ πάντων τῶν λόγων τούτων.* The writer of the epistle substitutes here *τοῦτο* for *ἰδοὺ* (*τὸ αἷμα*), with conscious or unconscious reference to the sacramental words of the holy eucharist; while *ἧς διέθετο Κύριος* he changes into *ἧς ἐνετείλατο . . . ὁ Θεός*, retaining, however, the *πρὸς ὑμᾶς* of the LXX., where we might have expected *ὑμῖν*. On *ἐνετείλατο* Böhme well remarks, *Testamenti notionem innuit;* for *ἐντέλλεσθαι διαθήκην* is the ordinary Septuagint rendering for צִוָּה בְּרִית, and the post-biblical term for a testament or will is צַוָּאָה. The substitution of *ὁ Θεός* is to mark the sentence as belonging to the Old Testament, and to avoid any confusion of thought arising from the evangelical sense of *Κύριος*. But the variations in matters of

ficiorum hic melius perficiatur: holocaustum videlicet in honorem patris dona vix accipientis, quod nemini alii præstatur, sed ei qui honoratur; et salutare quod jam fit propter nos, qui beneficia probavimus probamusque et expectamus; reddimus enim sacrificia sanitatis et salutis, universorumque bonorum Deo, qui illa dat mortali genti." Hofmann is led by the one-sidedness of his view of the meaning of ברית to deny this: "Israel" (he says) "did not on that occasion offer sacrifices by way of expressing their relation to God," etc.

[1] The law commanding the redemption of the first-born had not yet been given, nor that for the substitution of the Levites.

fact from the Mosaic narrative are still more remarkable. We must consider them in detail.

(1.) The first variation is in the clause *τὸ αἷμα τῶν μόσχων καὶ τράγων*, "calves and goats,"—the Pentateuch speaking only of "calves" (*μόσχους, μοσχάρια*); a circumstance noticed by Philo (Qu. in Ex. xxiv. 5): *non autem agni neque hœdi afferuntur.* The mention of "goats" here by the writer of the epistle is the more striking, that while, according to the Mosaic law, any male of the herd or flock was admissible for the burnt-offering, the goat is never mentioned as so employed, but always as a חטאת, or sin-offering, and as especially subservient to the work of propitiation (Num. xxviii. 30). Hence it has been concluded that this trait is borrowed by the sacred writer here from the ritual of the great day of atonement (עבודת היום). So Bleek, De Wette, Bisping, and others. For my part, I should prefer to assume that *μόσχοι* (*ταῦροι*) *καὶ τράγοι* is used by our author as a general term for all bloody sacrifices, just as he uses elsewhere *δῶρά τε καὶ θυσίαι* for sacrifices of all kinds. (2.) The second addition to the Mosaic narrative is the *μετὰ ὕδατος καὶ ἐρίου κοκκίνου καὶ ὑσσώπου.* The bunch of hyssop fastened to a stick of cedar-wood, and wrapped round with scarlet wool[1] to absorb the blood, is mentioned as an instrument for the besprinkling of the leper at Lev. xiv. 6, 7, and of one defiled by contact with a corpse at Num. xix. 19; but our author here may have specially had in view the sprinkling with hyssop of the blood of the paschal lamb, enjoined at Ex. xii. 22. In the ordinary sacrificial ritual, the hyssop was not so employed, but only the blood poured out around the altar. The employment of water, moreover, is mentioned only in the two cases above referred to—in Lev. xiv. and Num. xix. In the case of the

[1] The hyssop, according to Jewish tradition, was the plant called *origanum* (*ὀρείγανον*), *i.e.* wild marjoram (in German, *Wohlgemuth*, or *Dost*). See Winer *sub voce*, and the various opinions on this subject put together in Scheiner-Häusle's *Zeitschr. für die gesammte Kath. Theologie*, viii. 1, 1856. In medieval Latin, *hyssopus* is simply the instrument of sprinkling (Du Cange *s.v.*).

leper, we read (Lev. xiv. 1–7) that two clean birds were to be taken, and one of them at the priest's command to be killed "in an earthen vessel over running water;" and the other living bird to be dipped in the blood, along with hyssop, cedar wood, and scarlet wool,—the hyssop being fastened, as we have said, to the cedar-stick by means of the scarlet band, so as to form an instrument for sprinkling: that thereupon the leper was to be sprinkled seven times, and the living bird set free. The water (which was to be fresh, or "living" water), besides its symbolical meaning, would prevent the blood from coagulating,[1] and increase the quantity of liquid. The same purpose would have been served by the use of water in the great covenant sacrifice of Ex. xxiv., and would indeed have rendered it necessary, inasmuch as a large quantity of liquid must have been required for the sprinkling of the blood on the whole body of the people. This addition, therefore, to the Mosaic narrative, whether derived from tradition or conjecture, was a natural and obvious one. (3.) *Αὐτό τε τὸ βιβλίον . . . ἐῤῥάντισεν*[2] is another addition made by the sacred writer here. The narrative in Exodus says nothing of the book itself being sprinkled with the blood. Some have endeavoured to get rid of the discrepancy by making *αὐτό τε τὸ βιβλίον* governed like *τὸ αἷμα τῶν μόσχων . . .* by the participle *λαβών*, so that the only object of *ἐῤῥάντισε* would be *πάντα τὸν λαόν*. But this, beside the awkwardness of the construction, would only make the matter worse. For that Moses actually did sprinkle the book of the covenant with the sacrificial blood, might be inferred by analogy; while it would involve the grossest anachronism to suppose that he

[1] The coagulation of the blood was, in the ordinary sacrificial ritual, prevented by stirring. Lightfoot, on St. John xix. 34, says: "*Aut labitur memoria mea, aut legi alicubi apud Scriptores Hebræos, sed infeliciter excidit locus, quod cum mora aliqua interponenda erat inter mactationem victimæ et sparsionem sanguinis super altare (qualis erat mora cum Moses legeret articulos fœderis) commiscuerunt aquam cum sanguine ne congelesceret aut coagularetur.*" We can certify that the great Hebraist is here mistaken as to what he supposes himself to remember.

[2] All the uncials agree in reading *ἐῤῥάντισεν*.

so treated (4) *καὶ τὴν σκηνὴν δὲ καὶ πάντα τὰ σκεύη τῆς λειτουργίας*, which had not yet come into existence at the time of the covenant sacrifice. But if we give up the unnecessary assumption that the *καὶ . . . καὶ . . .* are correlatives, there is nothing against our assuming that ver. 21 relates a subsequent but kindred transaction to that of vers. 19, 20; *καὶ . . . δέ* being equivalent to "and on the other hand," or "and moreover." (See Buttm. § 149, 10.) Even so, a variation from the exact letter of the Thorah will still remain to be accounted for. The Thorah speaks, indeed, of an "anointing" of "the tabernacle, and all that is therein" (*σκηνὴ καὶ πάντα τὰ σκεύη αὐτῆς*, Ex. xl. 9),[1] with *oil*, but not with *blood*. The application of blood to the *σκεύη τῆς λειτουργίας* is mentioned only in the following cases: (*a.*) In the sin-offering, the peace-offering, and the burnt-offering, the blood was sprinkled, or rather scattered, from the bason (not with the finger) "upon the altar round about." This action was called זריקה. (*b.*) In the case of every sin-offering the horns of the great altar were smeared with the blood, which was applied by a finger dipped in the bason, and the rest of the blood was poured out at the foot of the altar. These actions were called respectively נתינה or מתנת, and שפיכה or יציקה, "application" and "outpouring." (*c.*) In the case of the high priest's sin-offering, for himself or for the congregation, the blood was "sprinkled" (וְהִזָּה) seven times before the veil, then "applied" (וְנָתַן) both to the horns of the brazen altar and to those of the altar of incense, and finally the remainder poured out at the foot of the brazen altar. (*d.*) A still fuller ritual of the same kind was observed on the day of atonement. On that day the blood of the bullock (the high priest's sin-offering) was first sprinkled seven times upon the mercy-seat (Cappôreth), and the same

[1] This refers, probably, to the same anointing of the tabernacle and its furniture as that mentioned in Lev. viii. 10 as accompanying the consecration of Aaron and his sons. Aaron's consecration is enjoined at Ex. xxix., and accomplished at Lev. viii. The anointing of the sanctuary is enjoined at Ex. xl., and the most suitable time for the fulfilment of such injunction would be when we think we find it at Lev. viii. 10.

done with the blood of the goat (the people's sin-offering); after that, the mixed blood of both sacrifices was applied to the horns of the altar of incense, and the altar itself sprinkled therewith seven times. These are the only instances mentioned in the Thorah of the sprinkling with blood of the vessels of the sanctuary. It might, accordingly, seem a probable conjecture that the sacred writer is here consciously combining other atoning rites,—first (vers. 19, 20) with the covenant sacrifice (of Ex. xxiv.), and then (ver. 21) with the consecration of the tabernacle (as described Ex. xl.); or we might say, with Menken, that he combines the ritual of the great covenant sacrifice with that of the day of atonement in one grand twofold representation. But the fact is really otherwise. Josephus also, in describing the consecration of the priests (*Ant.* iii. 8. 6), says that Moses during the seven days sprinkled not only their garments,[1] and the priests themselves, but also *τήν τε σκηνὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν σκεύη*, with fragrant oil, and the blood of the slain bullocks and rams. If, then, the anointing of the sanctuary enjoined at Ex. xl. be the same as that which accompanied the consecration of the priests described at Lev. viii. (which is highly probable: see note above), we have here, in fact, a literal agreement between Josephus and the writer of this epistle in reference to the same transaction; and we are justified in concluding that, where our author goes beyond the letter of the Thorah, both in describing the covenant sacrifice and the consecration of the tabernacle and its furniture, he follows a then existing tradition, of which other traces are now lost. The main point with him is evidently this: that in both cases the dedication did not take place without the employment of sacrificial blood.

With regard (1) to the meaning of the covenant sacrifice,

[1] When Kurtz says (*Mos. Opfer*, p. 239) that at the consecration of the priests the sacred vessels were sprinkled with the blood of atonement, he is relying simply on the authority of Josephus, for the Thorah only says that the priest's garments were so sprinkled with blood and oil,—with blood for purification from profane defilements, with oil for sanctification to holy uses.

I fully agree with Ebrard against Hofmann, that the dividing of the blood into two portions has a reference to the twofold character of the ברית; and also that the blood here, as in every sacrifice, has a reference to atonement. Atonement (כפרה) is indeed the fundamental thought in all sacrifices expressed by the effusion of blood; and on such a basis is here established, by means of the double transaction with the sacrificial blood, the covenant between Jehovah and His people Israel. One half is sprinkled on the place of sacrifice, to express the gracious relation in which God vouchsafes to enter with His reconciled people; the other on the people themselves, to meet their longings for such covenant grace with the assurance of its bestowal. Hofmann's assertion (*Schrift.* ii. 1. 76; comp. *Weiss.* i. 137) against Kurtz, that this sprinkling on the people had for its object "not atonement, but consecration," makes contradictories of notions which are easily combined, and which in the Thorah are synonymous (טָהֵר, קִדֵּשׁ, כִּפֶּר): Israel is consecrated to the service of God by the assurance of their reconciliation or atonement with Him; being sprinkled with the blood that has been sprinkled on the altar, they are united to the God with whom they have been reconciled. What else can be the meaning of the *οὐδὲ χωρὶς αἵματος* of ver. 18, than this, that the first covenant was itself consecrated by the sprinkling of atoning blood upon the covenant people? It was, in fact, a twofold type of what in the new covenant is antitypically fulfilled, when the blood of Christ first earns our pardon and redeems the inheritance, and then by a personal application cleanses the conscience, and admits to the inheritance each one who is thus cleansed.

These considerations will enable us to understand (2) the sprinkling of the blood on the book of the covenant, and subsequently on the tabernacle and the vessels of the ministry. At the consecration of Aaron and his sons, at Lev. viii. 15, we read that the blood of the bullock of the sin-offering was "applied" by Moses "with his finger" to the horns of the altar "round about" (סביב), as elsewhere only on the day of atonement, and that for the purpose of "purifying it from

sin" (חַטָּאת); the rest of the blood being afterwards poured out at the bottom of the altar for its sanctification (לְקַדֵּשׁ), and for "making atonement upon it" (לכפר עליו). It cannot be that both these acts are designated here by the single word *ἐράντισεν*, which must certainly apply to a procedure with the blood similar to and connected with the sevenfold sprinkling of the altar with the anointing oil (Lev. viii. 11). The purpose of the sprinkling with oil was to "hallow" or "sanctify" (לְקַדֵּשׁ); that of the application of the blood, as we learn from the ritual of the day of atonement, and from Lev. viii. 15; could only have been to "atone," or "purify from sin" (לְכַפֵּר, לְחַטֵּא), and therefore also to "sanctify" (לקדש); the blood being the negative (as removing impurities), the oil the positive instrument of sanctification (as symbolically imparting grace). That the vessels of the sanctuary, and the sanctuary itself, needed such purification, was the result partly of their origin, as made by human hands, and partly of their use, as visited or handled by the unclean. The tabernacle or temple was from one point of view the chosen dwelling of Jehovah among His people; from another, the dwelling-place which His people had provided for Him. The sanctuary itself, and every portion of it, especially the altar, had this twofold character, sacramental and sacrificial: sacramental, as ministering to God's manifestations to man; sacrificial, as subservient to man's approaches to God. The indispensable condition for their efficiency in this twofold work, was purity or sanctification: when the medium itself was unclean, the whole operation was vitiated; the very means of approach became a wall of separation. Hence the necessity of a consecration of all the holy things along with that of the Aaronic priesthood, and that an atonement or "reconciliation" of the sanctuary, and especially of the horns of the altar of incense, should be annually repeated on the great day of atonement (Lev. xvi. 20). That the same process was not repeated at the same time with the altar of burnt-offering, may be accounted for by the observation that that altar was daily cleansed by the sacrificial blood perpetually shed and offered upon it, and that the

incense-altar which was within the sanctuary represented more fully, with its incense-offering, the normal relations of the covenant people to Jehovah, who, as the God of the covenant, had in the great sacrificial inauguration of that covenant on Mount Sinai first drawn and consecrated His people to Himself. The horns of the incense-altar symbolized the divine favour and mercy; and the annual application to them of the blood of atoning sacrifices had a quasi-sacramental purpose. It renewed the expression of that favour to Israel, when forfeited or suspended by Israel's sin. From these considerations will readily appear why the book of the covenant was also consecrated with sacrificial blood, when the covenant itself was first established at Sinai. That book, though containing divine words, was formed and written by human hands, and as such would be affected by human impurity, and need an atonement, in order to become the immaculate monument of an abiding διαθήκη. The αὐτὸ τὸ βιβλίον, moreover, has further reference to the following verse, in which both the sprinkling of the holy things, including the book, and that of the people, are shown to be exemplifications of a general law.

Ver. 22. *And almost everything is cleansed in blood, according to the law; and without blood-shedding remission taketh not place.*

The word σχεδόν occurs only twice elsewhere in the N. T., and on both occasions is used by St. Luke (Acts xiii. 44 and xix. 26) in immediate connection with the adjective πᾶς. Here it takes the first place in the sentence, and is separated by ἐν αἵματι from the πάντα, to which it belongs. Bleek, Tholuck, and Lünemann explain this position of σχεδόν by its supposed reference to both the following clauses; but Stier remarks with perfect accuracy, that while the former clause is only *almost*, the second is quite universally true. Σχεδόν therefore belongs only to the former clause, but to every word of it, and therefore takes precedence of them all: "almost might one say, that everything is purified by the application of blood." This is the rule:

the *κατὰ τὸν νόμον* indicates the authority on which the rule is based. The Thorah (*ὁ νόμος*) speaks indeed, in certain cases, of water and fire as means of purification; but wherever there is a special need of cleansing, blood is invariably prescribed. Hence the significant position of *ἐν αἵματι* before *πάντα* here.

In the second clause it is asserted that the ethical cleansing of individual personalities, the *ἄφεσις* (*i.e. ἁμαρτιῶν*)—a term of frequent occurrence in St. Luke—*never* takes place without blood-shedding: *χωρὶς αἱματεκχυσίας*. The rule is based on Lev. xvii. 11, and is thus expressed in later Jewish phraseology: אין כפרה אלא בדם, *there is no atonement except in blood* (*Talm. babli, Joma 5a*). The vegetable sacrifices, or unbloody oblations, called *Minchah* (pl. Menâchôth), had no atoning power; but simply expressed a thankful recognition of the divine goodness, in the offering to God of His own gifts. It is only blood which is able to atone; and being Jehovah's appointed medium of atonement, it effects its purpose on the soul (על נפש) of the offerer by means of the soul (בַּנֶּפֶשׁ) contained in itself (Lev. xvii. 11). [*The soul of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it unto you upon the altar to make atonement for your souls; for it is the blood which maketh atonement by means of the soul.*] No gift or sacrifice is well pleasing to God unless the offerer be himself in a state of atonement or reconciliation, and therefore the blood is first poured out upon the altar before the sacrifice itself is offered. The word *αἱματεκχυσία* is probably a composition of our author's. The question may be asked, to what action it here specially refers—whether to the previous slaughter of the animal, or to the presentation of its blood at the place of sacrifice. For the latter view may be urged the following reasons: (1) The שחיטה in the Old Testament ritual lies outside the sacrificial action, which properly begins with the priest's reception of the blood in the sacrificial bason (קבלת הדם); and (2) the usual Septuagint expression for the outpouring (שפיכה or יציקה) of the blood of the sin-offering at the foot of the altar is *ἐκχέειν τὸ αἷμα* (*παρὰ* or *ἐπὶ τὴν βάσιν τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου*). Nevertheless I regard it as more

probable that the sacred writer has here in view the שחיטה, or actual slaying of the victim. Not that therefore he regards the slaying itself as the act which makes atonement (מכפר). He does not say of the *αἱματεκχυσία* that it actually procures remission of sin, but only that without it no remission is procurable, inasmuch as nothing else but the slaughter of the victim could supply the offerer with that soul-containing blood wherewith alone atonement can be made. The consideration which mainly induces me to suppose that the sacred writer is here referring (by *αἱματεκχυσία*) to the שחיטה of the victim, and not to the sacrificial שפיכה of the blood, is the remarkable parallel in the words of institution (*τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐκχυνόμενον*) of the Lord's Supper (Luke xxii. 20), and the similar phrase applied to the martyrdoms of the prophets at Luke xi. 50. The notions of *αἷμα* and *θάνατος* are, from ver. 13 onwards, closely connected throughout the whole paragraph; and indeed the blood-shedding in the antitype must, from the nature of things, have had a far deeper significance than it could possess in the typical sacrifice. In the case of the latter, the slaying of the victim was, as we have seen, but a means to an end—that of providing first blood for atonement, and the flesh for sacrificial food for Jehovah on His altar. It was on the victim's part an involuntary suffering without moral significance, except so far as the shadow of such significance was imparted to it by the סמיכה, the ceremonial imposition of the offerer's hand. The death of Christ, on the other hand, was a conscious act of loving free-will, the central act of His own self-sacrifice, the solution of the enigma of the נתתיו of Lev. xvii. 11, in which the saints of the Old Testament had to rest with implicit faith. Of the three assertions contained in vers. 18–22—"Blood is an instrument of consecration," "Blood is an instrument of purification," "Blood is an instrument of propitiation," or "atonement"—the second is the most important, involving both the others: all consecration and all remission of sin may be regarded as purification or cleansing, and as such is regarded by the sacred writer here. The conclusion, how-

ever, which he draws from thence, that blood is, in so wide an application, so universal a means of cleansing, is very remarkable.[1]

Ver. 23. *It was therefore necessary that the figures of the things in the heavens should be purified with these; but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these.*

After ἀνάγκη οὖν we may understand either ἦν or ἐστίν. (Compare viii. 3 and ix. 9.) The former (ἦν) is preferable here, as the sacred writer is concluding, from the annual cleansing of the sanctuary and its furniture on the day of atonement, the necessity of a cleansing of the heavenly things once for all, and not the repetition of such a cleansing. From the premises laid down in the preceding verse, a twofold consequence is drawn in this,—the main stress being laid on its second part. "If the one is or was necessary, then must the other be or have been necessary too." At ch. viii. 5 the Mosaic tabernacle was spoken of as ὑποδείγμα καὶ σκιά of the heavenly sanctuary: the ὑποδείγματα here include, with the tabernacle itself, its sacred furniture, which all are types and shadows pointing onwards and upwards to the realities of the heavenly world—τὰ ἐπουράνια, τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, *ipsa cælestia*. Those earthly types are cleansed "*with these*"—τούτοις. The plural is variously understood: "with the blood and the ashes of the red heifer" (Lünemann); "with blood and the like" (De Wette); *talibus nempe rebus leviticis* (Böhme). Lünemann's interpretation is inadmissible, as involving an inaccuracy; the ashes of the heifer having never been employed in the ceremonial cleansing of the tabernacle. De Wette's might be allowed, if the "anointing oil" (Lev. viii. 10) had been previously alluded to; but of such allusion there is here no trace. Böhme's is too vague. The τούτοις must therefore refer simply to the blood of various kinds, *i.e.* of various animals,—the αἷμα μόσχων καὶ τράγων, as used especially on the day of atonement. From the cleansing of the earthly types with such

[1] See Note S, at the end of this volume.

blood, he infers the cleansing of their antitypes *with better sacrifices—κρείττοσι θυσίαις.*

But how are we to understand this sacrificial cleansing of the *ἐπουράνια*? (1.) Schulz, like Luther, escapes raising the question by the rendering, "But the heavenly things *require* better sacrifices,"—a mode, however, of filling up the ellipsis which, even on the supposition of a *zeugma*, is quite inadmissible. (2.) De Wette, with others (*e.g.* Ebrard and Lünemann), would substitute in the second clause the more general notion of *dedication* or *consecration* (*ἐγκαινίζεσθαι*) for that of *cleansing* (*καθαρίζεσθαι*) in the former. But this, again, is merely to evade the difficulty: a dedication by means of sacrificial blood would still involve the notion of *cleansing* or *atonement.* (3.) Others (*e.g.* Bengel, Menken, Tholuck) follow the interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas: *Mundantur cœlestia quatenus homines mundantur a peccatis.* But this, after the distinction indicated above between the atonement made for persons and that made for the sanctuary, would be here an inadmissible *quid pro quo.* (4.) Akersloot adheres more closely to the letter of the text, when he refers this "cleansing" of the *ἐπουράνια* to the expulsion of Satan from heaven (Luke x. 18; John xii. 31),—an interpretation which Bleek is also disposed to follow, with a further reference to Rev. xii. 7–9; to which we might add, "*the destroying by death him that had the power of death, that is, the devil,*" of ch. ii. 14 of our epistle. But this explanation is likewise inadequate. The *cleansing* here meant is one of atonement, and must therefore refer immediately to the renewal of right relations between God and man, and not to the mere expulsion of an evil element. (5.) Hofmann, who makes the heavenly sanctuary to be the glorified humanity of Christ, and its extension in the church of the New Testament, explains this "cleansing" as an immediate consequence of the death of Christ and His return to the Father, whereby, being perfected Himself in divine communion, He by that communion perpetually renews the purification of His redeemed. (*Weiss.* ii. 189; *Schriftb.* ii. 1. 307.) All which, though quite true in itself, is not satisfactory to us as an interpre-

tation of the present passage, inasmuch as it depends on Hofmann's peculiar view of the meaning of the heavenly sanctuary, which we have shown to be inadmissible here. (6.) Stier's interpretation comes very near the truth, when he says: "*In consequence of the presence of sin in us, the holy of holies in the heavenly world could not be re-opened for our approach until it had been first itself anointed with the blood of atonement.*" He is wrong, however, in restricting the ἐπουράνια here to a celestial holy of holies: the "heavenly things" here spoken of include, as we have seen, celestial antitypes of the earthly tabernacle as well as of its inner sanctuary; and so the question still remains: In what sense could these heavenly things be said to be cleansed, not in figure only, but in truth, by the atoning death and blood of Jesus? Unless I be mistaken in my view of it, the sacred writer's meaning is fundamentally this: The supramundane holy of holies, called in ver. 24 *αὐτὸς ὁ οὐρανός*, *ipsum cœlum*, *i.e.* the eternal uncreated heaven of God Himself, though in itself untroubled blessedness and light, yet needed cleansing (*καθαρίζεσθαι*), in so far as its light of love had been lost or transmuted for mankind, through the presence of sin, or rather had been overclouded and bedarkened by a fire of wrath; and in like manner, the heavenly tabernacle, the place of God's loving self-manifestations to angels and to men, needed also a cleansing, in so far as mankind through sin had rendered unapproachable to themselves this their spirit's natural and eternal home, until by a gracious renewal of God's forfeited mercy it should have been once more transformed into a place for the manifestation of His love and favour. In reference, therefore, to the entire *τὰ ἐπουράνια*, *i.e.* both the *τὰ ἅγια*, or eternal sanctuary, and the *σκηνή*, or heavenly tabernacle, there was required a removal of the consequences of human sin as affecting them, and a removal of the counter-workings against sin, *i.e.* of divine wrath, or rather (which comes to the same thing) a change of that wrath into renewed love. This last interpretation assigns its full meaning to *καθαρίζεσθαι*, which at Ex. xxix. 36 is the Septuagint rendering of חִטֵּא, and at Ex.

xxx. 10 that of כִּפֻּר. The plural *κρείττοσι θυσίαις* is the so-called *pluralis generis* (Winer, xxvii. 2), or, as De Wette calls it, the plural of the category.

And now, according to this interpretation, ver. 24 follows quite naturally. The heavenly sanctuary needs for its purification a better kind of sacrifice than the animal sacrifices offered under the law; and this is evident from the greatness and transcendent reality of that one oblation presented to the Father in the courts above. The antitypical reality is alleged in confirmation of the truth of the previous interpretation given to the type.

Ver. 24. *For not into a sanctuary made with hands is Christ entered, a mere counterfeit of the true, but into the heaven itself, now to manifest himself in the presence of God on our behalf.*

We must here remind our readers that the whole paragraph, vers. 13–28, is a development of the theme proposed in vers. 11, 12. The first sub-section of this paragraph (vers. 13, 14) we have found to be an expansion of one term of the theme, the *διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος* of ver. 12*a*; the second sub-section (vers. 15–23) to be a development of another term, the *ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν* of ver. 11. We have now (in vers. 24–28) a similar expansion of the third term, the *εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια* of ver. 12. The heavenly sanctuary stood in need of sublimer sacrifices than its earthly type, seeing that Christ our sacrifice accomplished its purification by entering not into a sanctuary made with hands like that of Moses, but into the eternal, archetypal, supra-mundane place of God Himself.

The earthly *ἅγια* are *χειροποιητά*;[1] and for that very reason not God's true dwelling-place, but only *ἀντίτυπα* of the true sanctuary. We have found *τύπος*, at ch. viii. 5, used in the sense of an original figure—a model from which a copy is made: such copy from an original (or archetype) is that designated as *ἀντίτυπα* here. *Τύπος*, again (as at Rom. v. 14),

[1] Compare Acts vii. 48 and xvii. 24, *ὁ Θεὸς οὐκ ἐν χειροποιήτοις ναοῖς κατοικεῖ.*

is used in the sense of a prophetic foretype, of which the accomplishment is reserved for the future (*τύπος τῶν μελλόντων*); and that accomplishment is again called *ἀντίτυπον* (antitype): *e.g.* baptism, at 1 Pet. iii. 21, is in this sense an *ἀντίτυπον* of the deluge. The earthly reflection of the heavenly archetype, and the actual fulfilment of the prophetic *τύπος*, are each called *ὀντίτυπον*. The heavenly sanctuary is archetypal and eternal, the earthly is but a passing shadow. Christ (*ὁ Χριστός*, the pre-ordained and long expected one) is entered into the former—*εἰς αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανόν*. The antithesis of this with (*ἅγια*) *χειροποίητα* shows that by the *ἅγια* here is meant not the whole sanctuary, including both tabernacle and holy of holies (which the sacred writer distinguishes from one another at ver. 11 and at ch. viii. 2), but simply the latter, the inner sanctuary or sanctuary proper. "Heaven itself" is the highest or innermost heaven, the divine place of God's own self-manifestation in glory. *Cœlum in quod Christus ingressus est*, says Sebastian Schmidt, *non est ipsum cœlum creatum quodcunque fuerit sed est cœlum in quo Deus est etiam quando cœlum creatum nullum est, ipsa gloria divina.* Into this divine heaven Christ is entered, *νῦν ἐμφανισθῆναι τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν.*

Hofmann objects to the rendering of De Wette and many others, "in order now to appear continually," on the ground that the aor. *ἐμφανισθῆναι* could not be used of a continuous action. But this epexegetical "infinitive of intention" (Winer, § xliv. 1) is not seldom met with in the aorist, in cases where the action expressed is from the nature of the case continuous (*e.g.* Matt. xx. 28; Luke i. 17). The aorist *ἐμφανισθῆναι* does not indeed in itself express the continuousness of the self-presentation here; but that lies in and is inferred from the *νῦν*, which undoubtedly refers to the continuous present of the new dispensation (commencing with Christ's entrance into the heavenly places), in contrast with the typical and shadowy past. This *νῦν*, therefore, is no isolated point of time, but the commencement of a long-linked series: Christ's activity on our behalf before the

Father, consisting in a perpetual presentation of Himself as of Him who died for our sins and is risen again for our justification.[1]

Ἐμφανίζειν is a verb of frequent occurrence in this epistle and in the writings of St. Luke; the latter using it both in the sense of *making known* (Acts xxiii. 22), and in that of *presenting oneself*, or *appearing* (Acts xxiv. 1),—*ἐμφαίνεσθαι* being = *ἐμφανίζειν τινὶ ἑαυτόν*. The clause might be rendered in Hebrew thus: פְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים (אֶת־) עָתָּה לְהֵרָאוֹת בְּעַדֵנוּ. The Septuagint, however, it must be observed, do not render the נִרְאָה of the Pentateuch (in reference to the triennial appearance of the tribes of Israel in the holy place) by *ἐμφανισθῆναι τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, but by *ὀφθῆναι ἐνώπιον*; nor is the word נראה ever applied to the entrance of the legal high priest into the holy of holies. The very unusualness of the term here employed indicates the infinite superiority of the Antitype. The high priest of the law could only enter with the blood of his sacrifices, under the clouds of incense-smoke from the incense of the golden altar previously carried within the veil; and when, moreover, the Lord Himself appeared above the Cappôreth, it was still בֶּעָנָן (Lev. xvi. 2). Contrast with this obscurity of revelation the *ἐμφανισθῆναι* (= *ἐμφανῆ γενέσθαι*) *τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ* here! To the high priest of the Old Testament God could not reveal Himself, without at the same time hiding Himself so as to make the vision supportable to mortal eyes; but between Christ and God neither cloud of incense nor cloud of glory is suffered to intervene. Christ is for God simply *ἐμφανής*, and the divine *πρόσωπον* has for Christ no veil: He contemplates it *immediately*, and not *ἐν κατόπτρῳ*.[2]

And this self-presentation of Christ before the face or

[1] See Hofmann, *Weiss.* ii. 192.

[2] Compare Philo's interpretation of Moses' prayer (Ex. xxxii. 13), *ἐμφάνισόν μοι σαυτόν*: Reveal Thyself to me not by means of heaven or earth, or air or water, or anything else that is merely creaturely: let me not see Thy essence (or essential form, *τὴν σὴν ἰδέαν*) in some other substance, as in a mirror, but in Thyself, O God; seeing that all images impressed upon the creature are but transitory, and only those proceeding from the Uncreated remain for ever (i. 107. 36).

presence of God is *for us, on our behalf* (ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν placed for the sake of emphasis at the end of the sentence). The final object of His entrance as high priest and sacrifice into the eternal heaven is there to appear before God *for us*, presenting on our behalf no exhausted sacrifice, nor one of transient efficacy or needing repetition, but Himself in His own person, as an ever-present, ever-living victim and atonement. And this object is attained at once, and attained for ever.

Ver. 25. *Nor yet* (is he entered in) *that he should offer himself often, as the high priest entereth into the holy of holies year by year with alien blood.*

The comparison is between the offering of the Jewish high priest within the veil, and that of Christ in the eternal sanctuary: the προσφέρειν ἑαυτόν here spoken of cannot therefore be (as Tholuck, De Wette, Ebrard, and Lünemann suppose) the self-sacrifice of Christ upon earth, but a self-presentation subsequent to that. The Jewish high priest goes year by year into the typical sanctuary, ἐν (= *in accompaniment of* or *with*: comp. 1 Cor. iv. 21; 1 John v. 6; Lev. xvi. 3, Sept.) αἵματι ἀλλοτρίῳ, *i.e.* to offer there the blood of a sacrifice which is not himself. Not so with Christ. He is gone into the heavenly sanctuary once for all, not to offer Himself first now, and then again some time hence, and again afterwards, and so on in perpetual succession; but that νῦν ἐμφανισθῆναι once made, is an act of perpetual validity and duration. *Tunc sæpius* (says Schlichting) *se ipsum offerre diceretur Christus, si coeptam semel coram Deo apparitionem et oblationem abrumpens et e sacrario egressus denuo in illud repetendæ oblationis causa intraret, nam oblationis semel coeptæ duratio seu continuatio nequaquam multiplicat.* So Schlichting quite correctly. Hofmann, moreover, puts the argument rightly thus: Christ having once entered into the presence of God, has no longer something fresh to do in the discharge of His priestly service: His offering being, not the blood of any other victim, but Himself, He could not repeat that offering when once

made, without a repetition of His sacrificial death,—a thing clearly impossible.

Ver. 26*a*. *For otherwise it were necessary, that he should oftentimes suffer* (death) *since the foundation of the world.*

The sacred writer might have said, ἐπεὶ (εἰ πολλάκις προσφέροι ἑαυτόν) ἔδει ἂν αὐτὸν, κ.τ.λ.; but to express the absolute certainty of the consequence, he uses ἔδει (*oportebat*) without the ἄν: *for otherwise* (so this ἔπει, after which a hypothetical sentence is to be supplied, might be rendered) *He would be under a necessity of, ofttimes suffering* (Winer, p. 254). An oft-repeated self-oblation (πολλάκις προσφέρειν ἑαυτόν) would have been impossible without an oft-repeated suffering of death (πολλάκις παθεῖν). Compare xiii. 12, where παθεῖν is also used of the suffering of death. The writer's meaning is not, as commonly understood, that Christ, in order to offer Himself repeatedly to God, would have again and again to return to this world and there suffer. He does not say, as this conception of his meaning would require him to say: ἔδει αὐτὸν πολλάκις παθεῖν καὶ εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὰ ἅγια. Every הקריבה in the sanctuary had, no doubt, a certain שחיטה for its present antecedent. But the Jewish high priest at his third entrance, on the day of atonement, carried both the blood of the bullock and that of the goat into the holy of holies, so that that third entrance had for its antecedent a twofold שחיטה. This is the proceeding which the sacred writer has here in view. Christ, he says, has entered the sanctuary not with the blood of other victims, but to offer up Himself. And if that self-oblation were repeated, it would imply a previous repetition of the death which is its necessary antecedent, *i.e.* a repeated dying on the Lord's part ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου (comp. Luke xi. 50). Every *oblatio* (such is the thought here) implies a previous *mactatio*, every προσφέρειν a previous παθεῖν. A πολλάκις προσφέρειν ἑαυτόν in eternity, would therefore imply a previous πολλάκις παθεῖν in time, or, as the sacred writer expresses it, "since the foundation of the world." The train of thought is simple and logical, and it is to be hoped

that no one will think again of putting the clause *ἐπεὶ . . . κόσμου* between brackets, as in the editions of Griesbach and Knapp, and formerly by De Wette himself.

Such a repetition, then, of the Lord's passion is not to be thought of as possible. It *could* not be that Christ should have oftentimes suffered since the foundation of the world, and in accordance with this self-evident impossibility are the actual facts of the case.

Ver. 26*b*. *But now once at the end of the ages is he made manifest for the putting away of sins through the sacrifice of himself.*

All the latest interpreters agree that *πεφανέρωται* is here to be understood of our Lord's first "manifestation in the flesh" (1 Tim. iii. 16, comp. 1 Pet. i. 20), in antithesis to the *ἐκ δευτέρου . . . ὀφθήσεσθαι* of ver. 28, and not to His self-presentation before God (the *ἐμφανισθῆναι* of ver. 24), as some formerly explained it. *Ἅπαξ* is here the antithesis of *πολλάκις* above, *ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων* of *ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*; and *πεφανέρωται εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας διὰ τῆς θυσίας αὐτοῦ* sets the Lord's own great historical self-oblation for the putting away of the world's sin in contrast with the frequently repeated *παθεῖν* of the sacrificial victims for atonement. These antitheses, thus complete and thorough, are introduced by *νῦν δέ*, which we prefer to the *νυνὶ δέ* of Lachmann and Tischendorf. (See note on viii. 6.) It is to be taken not in a temporal, but an argumentative sense, and the *ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τ. αἰών.* resembles in meaning the *ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τ. ἡμερῶν* of i. 1 (comp. ix. 15). The latter designation (*ἔσχατον τῶν ἡμερῶν*) is biblical (אחרית הימים), while *συντελ. τῶν αἰών.* is post-biblical, corresponding to the קֵץ הָעוֹלָם of the synagogue, which recurs frequently in the *συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος* of St. Matthew. The plural *τῶν αἰώνων* here implies that the course of history is regarded as a succession of various periods, of which the Lord's manifestation forms the conclusion.

"Hath now appeared at the conclusion of the ages." We, with the facts of history behind us, would rather say,

that Christ has appeared in the midst of the ages, and should do so with equal propriety. But the primitive church took naturally a different view. For her, the period between the first and second coming of our Lord, which divine long-suffering has already extended to near 2000 years, was almost as a vanishing point. The foreshortening perspective of the end, whose "times and seasons" the Father had kept in His own power, and the energy of hope, which looked onwards to it as the one desired goal of all expectations, made the prospective interval of waiting seem so brief. The primitive mode of expression is also fully justifiable. Christ is in very deed the end of the world's history, the terminus towards which all the æons of the past have been tending: the beginning of this end is the incarnation; its consummation is the second advent;—and of these two, the former does actually divide the course of history into two periods, albeit of unequal duration. The question why Christ should have been manifested so late, is not answered here. Nor does the obvious thought here find expression, that His sacrifice has not been repeated often "since the foundation of the world," because, taking place at "the termination of the ages," its energetic operation reaches backwards through them all. And the motive for such reticence in this place, on the part of the writer of the epistle, is not far to seek. His purpose being to warn the Hebrew Christians against an undue and unchristian attachment to the typical worship of their forefathers, he is naturally led to lay special stress on the negative and impotent character of all the types and ceremonies of the Old Testament, and of the whole ancient covenant itself. At the same time it is evident, from his language at ver. 15, concerning the relation in which the death of Christ stands to "the transgressions under the first covenant," that such backward-working operation of its atoning power was fully recognised by Him. The same may also be inferred from the absolute way in which the purpose of Christ's entrance on the stage of history is here expressed as being εἰς ἀθέτησιν ἁμαρτίας—an entire doing away of sin, as such, in all its forms and manifestations. (Compare ch. vii. 18, where the

annulling of the law is spoken of as the result of the sacerdotal power and operation of Christ.)

The words διὰ τῆς θυσίας αὐτοῦ are connected by many interpreters (*e.g.* Schulz, Böhme, Tholuck) with πεφανέρωται —Christ is manifested by means of His sacrifice: an interpretation neither justified by the use of διά at vers. 12 and 14, nor by such alleged parallels as Rom. ii. 27 and 1 John v. 6. Θυσία here denotes neither an abiding condition nor an accompaniment or means of Christ's self-manifestation, but simply a gracious action, by which, after His manifestation, the Redeemer has accomplished His purpose of destroying sin.

That the sacrifice of Christ is a single act, and has been made once for all, is regarded as a self-evident proposition. Nor is it less so that it consists in the offering up of Himself, without its being necessary (with Tholuck) to aspirate the αὐτοῦ here. Had the sacred writer meant this, he would rather have written θυσία ἑαυτοῦ, if indeed either θ. αὐτοῦ or ἑαυτοῦ could be regarded as a suitable mode of expressing *immolatio sui ipsius*, for which we should rather expect (in accordance with vii. 27) προσφορὰ ἑαυτοῦ.

Christ, then (such is the sacred writer's thought), has once for all stepped forth from the mysterious background of the divine counsels on the stage of this world's history, in order to perform one sacrifice, by which, without any repetition or addition to it, He has once and for ever put away the condemning power of repented and forgiven sin. This has been already accomplished on His first advent; and (καί) nothing more remains to be done at His second coming but a glorious manifestation of Himself for judgment.

Vers. 27, 28. *And inasmuch as there remaineth for men once to die, and thereafter judgment; so also Christ, having once been offered to bear the sins of many, shall be manifested a second time without sin to those that wait for him unto salvation.*

A comparison is employed to illustrate the impossibility of such a πολλάκις προσφέρειν ἑαυτόν in the heavenly world

as must have been preceded by a πολλάκις παθεῖν in this. The comparison is of the nature of an argument from analogy; hence in the first member, καθ' ὅσον instead of καθώς: the truth concerning Christ resembles and may be measured by the divine ordinance concerning mankind in general; and there is indeed an inward relation between the two members of the parallelism. If man, as such, can die but once, so must it be with Jesus Christ likewise, when He takes human nature upon Him, and is made in all things like unto His brethren. But this point, on which most interpreters lay undue, because a one-sided emphasis, does not by any means exhaust the parallel. It is the judgment to come, which awaits all men beyond the grave, which is here put in comparison with the second advent of the Lord in glory. It follows as a result, that there can be no repeated self-offering of Christ, even in heaven, between the first and second Advent. As human life, with all its works, comes to an end in death, and only judgment follows, so the ministerial work of atonement accomplished by our Lord in His earthly passion is now complete, and nothing remains for Him to do but to return as Judge in glory (Hofmann).

Let us consider in detail, first, what is here said of man as such. (1.) He has once to die. This is what as man awaits him. The verb ἀποκεῖσθαι, in the sense of to lie on one side, to be reserved for the future, is used in the New Testament both by St. Luke (xix. 20) and by St. Paul (Col. i. 5; 2 Tim. iv. 8). The emphatic word in the clause is ἅπαξ: the having once to die, and *only* once, on the part of man, has for its reverse or analogon the impossibility of a πολλάκις παθεῖν on the part of Jesus Christ. That once appointed necessity of dying is not to be followed by a second, but by a κρίσις (κρ. without the article, because equivalent to κριθῆναι, a being judged), not in the sense of condemnation or punishment (as at ch. x. 27), but simply of judgment passed on the deeds done in the body, whether for good or evil. This κρίσις, moreover, is not a judgment passed upon the soul at death, as is evident from the last clause of i. 28, and τοῖς ἀνθρώποις here, but the final judgment of the last day.

Now follows, in the second place, introduced by *οὕτως καί*,[1] the analogous assertion concerning our Lord, (2) that He could but once offer Himself in the way of suffering, and that His passion will be followed hereafter by a second coming for final deliverance. (*a*) He has once been offered—*ἅπαξ προσενεχθεὶς εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας*. The participial construction (*προσενεχθεὶς . . . ὀφθήσεται*) is not intended to subordinate the former to the later event, but simply to mark the closeness of the connection between the future reappearance of the now hidden Saviour and His former self-offering here on earth. But why does the sacred writer use the passive *προσενεχθείς*, and not (as we might have expected) *ἑαυτὸν προσενέγκας*? To mark the Lord's atoning death as being, in the first instance, not so much an action as a *πάθημα*. The passive form has here a passive, not a middle sense; nor can we supply, with St. Chrysostom, a *ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ* after it, as if the meaning were, "offered by Himself." Neither can we properly supply a *ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, though the transaction on Mount Moriah and Rom. viii. 32 might be cited in favour of such an interpretation. Properly speaking, it is humanity itself which makes the offering, as Abraham was bidden to offer up Isaac. The victim to be offered is "given" (*δοθείς*), or "given up" (*παραδοθείς*), "by God" (*ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ*), but not in the proper sense of the term "offered" (*προσενεχθείς*) by Him. At the same time, it would not be more correct to supply the ellipsis by *ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*. Those by whom the Lord was slain had no thought of an atonement; His own gracious intention and will made of His death an atoning sacrifice. While, therefore, the passive *προσενεχθείς* refers to the dæmoniac violence of the act of betrayal and crucifixion, the *εἰς τὸ πολλῶν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας* which follows marks the divine

[1] This *καί* is omitted in the *textus receptus* by an oversight of R. Stephens, ed. 1550. For the thought of death as possible for man but once, compare Sophocl. *Fragm.* ap. Nauck (*Tragicorum Græcor. Fragm.*), p. 114:

> Τὸ ζῆν γὰρ ἓ παῖ, παντὸς ἥδιστον γέρας·
> Θανεῖν γὰρ οὐκ ἔξεστι τοῖς αὐτοῖσι δίς.

purpose to which that violence was made subservient. *Ἀνενεγκεῖν* is wrongly taken here also in a sacrificial sense by the Peshito and others—*per semet ipsum immolavit* (רבח) *peccata multorum;* Chrysostom, Œcumenius, and Theophylact vainly attempting to justify the interpretation, by the view that our Lord is represented as offering (or presenting) our sins to the compassion of the heavenly Father, in order to their forgiveness and removal. Hofmann and Lünemann, following Luther and other older interpreters, would render *ἀνενεγκεῖν* "to remove" or "take away," as = *ἀφαιρεῖν* in x. 4. But this is likewise wrong. The taking away of sin is indeed a consequence of the *ἀνενεγκεῖν*, but is not expressed in the term itself, which never has that meaning. The reference in the sacred writer's mind is to Isa. liii. 12, *καὶ αὐτὸς ἁμαρτίας πολλῶν ἀνήνεγκε*, where the word in the original is נשׂא, which (like *αἴρειν*) combines the meanings "bear" and "take away" (comp. Isa. liii. 4, where the corresponding word in the parallel is סבל = *φέρειν*). The former meaning, "bear," or rather "take upon oneself" (*ἀνα-φέρειν*), is the only one properly represented by *ἀνενεγκεῖν* here. (Compare for this sense, "take on oneself," the classical phrases *κινδύνους ἀναφέρειν*, to incur dangers, and *ἀναφέρειν κλυδῶνα*, to bring on oneself a sea of troubles.) We therefore render, "*in order to take upon Himself* (*i.e.* to make atonement for or bear the penalty of) *the sins of many.*" *Ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας* corresponds exactly to the Hebrew נשׂא, with following accusative of the sin whose guilt (Lev. v. 1, 17) or penalty (Lev. xvii. 16, xx. 19 sq., xxiv. 15) is incurred. This נשׂא, both in the Pentateuch and Ezekiel, is commonly rendered in the Septuagint by *λαβεῖν ἁμαρτίαν*, once by *ἀποφέρειν*, and so also by *ἀναφέρειν* (Num. xiv. 33 sq.). That this *λαβεῖν* and *ἀναφέρειν* are to be understood of an atoning "bearing" of sin, and not of a mere "putting away," is superabundantly evident from Ezek. iv. 4–8, where the prophet's שׂאת עון is symbolically represented. It is this vicarious endurance of punishment for the sins of others which is spoken of by our author here as an *ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας πολλῶν*, and the sense is well rendered by the *ad multorum*

exhaurienda peccata of the Itala and Vulgate. Πολλῶν is here not simply "the many," by whom the redemption thus provided is appropriated, but mankind in general, for whose sake it is obtained. It is opposed to ἅπαξ, and stands for πάντων, in the same way as in the sacramental words of institution, τὸ περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυνόμενον. "All men" are in fact "many;" but the offering made on their behalf is made but "once."

And this offering "once" made, and once only (and therefore of eternal validity), is to be followed hereafter (*b*) by only one more manifestation of the Redeemer, and that of a different kind: ἐκ δευτέρου χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας ὀφθήσεται, κ.τ.λ. This χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας proves the correctness of our interpretation of ἀνενεγκεῖν. Had ἀνεν. simply meant "to put away," *i.e.* "destroy" sin, the χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας predicated of the Redeemer in His second manifestation would have been unintelligible and disturbing. But when ἀνενεγκεῖν is taken in the sense of a vicarious assumption of the guilt or penalty of sin, the unmistakeable meaning of χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας will be, "without any further sin being laid upon Him," or "unburdened further by any sin;" and that without any necessity for regarding ἁμαρτίας (with Klee, Tholuck, and others) as a metonym for the "guilt" or "penalty" incurred by "sin." And this interpretation is true in fact as well as in grammar. In his ἀνενεγκεῖν (πολλῶν) ἁμαρτίας the sacred writer is thinking not merely of the natural consequences to the Lord of glory of a union with and incorporation into our sinful and suffering humanity, not merely of sufferings endured out of sympathy with us, or imposed on Him simply by the malice of Satan and ungodly men, but of a real vicarious endurance of the penalty of sin, imposed by the will and counsel of a heavenly Father, angered indeed, but willing to show mercy. When He shall appear or be manifested, *i.e.* "become visible," or "become visibly present,"[1] to the world of humanity a second time" (ἐκ δευτέρου, as at Acts x. 15, xi. 9, and elsewhere),

[1] ὀφθήσεται, in accordance with which our Lord's second coming, παρουσία, is called an ἀποκάλυψις (2 Thess. i. 7 and 1 Pet. iv. 13).

then His manifestation will be, not as the Sin-bearer, but as the Judge.

It is quite incredible that the sacred writer could have been thinking (as Bleek imagines), not of Christ Himself, but of God the Father as the future Judge. That would be a sentiment directly opposed both to our Lord's own utterances concerning Himself, and to the whole witness of New Testament Scripture, which expressly teaches that it is by Christ that God will hereafter judge the world. And scarcely less strange is his further imagination, that the meaning of *χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας* should be, that when Christ re-enters the world all opposition to the divine will will have so entirely disappeared from the created universe, that nothing will remain obnoxious to judgment, and so the second coming be a coming "without sin." Both imaginations are refuted by the passage before us. Throughout both the Old and the New Testament the final manifestation of Jehovah and of Christ is a judicial one with a twofold aspect, bright and fiery, loving and wrathful, for reward and for vengeance; and now the one aspect, now the other, is made the more prominent. To the suffering church which longs and prays for His coming, that coming brings ישועה; to the company of her oppressors, נקם; to both, a due reward for the deeds done in the body. He, then, who is to appear hereafter *τοῖς αὐτὸν ἀπεκδεχομένοις* for salvation, is Christ the Judge, as at Isa. xxv. 9, lii. 10, Jehovah.[1] The very term *εἰς σωτηρίαν* implies the continued existence of evil or sin, from which *σωτηρία* is the final setting free. The *ἀπεκδεχόμενοι* are the faithful, who cease not to desire the return of their Lord and Saviour, now hidden in God,—the term being a favourite one with St. Paul; comp. 1 Cor. i. 7 and Phil. iii. 20. For their sakes, to deliver them from an evil world and gather them to Himself, He will break through the invisibility in which He is now shrouded (comp. Isa. lxiii. 19).

Some (*e.g.* Primasius) would connect *ἀπεκδεχομένοις* with

[1] Chrysostom: *πῶς ὀφθήσεται; κολάζων φησίν. Ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶπε τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ φαιδρόν (id quod est lætum et jucundum)*. Stier's interpretation, "No longer as Priest, ministering for the removal of sin, but as King,

εἰς σωτηρίαν—"*for salvation to them that wait for Him;*" and to this construction is probably due the glossematical reading (adopted by Lachmann in 1831, and given up again in 1850), εἰς σωτηρίαν διὰ πίστεως or διὰ πίστεως εἰς σωτηρίαν.[1] But the dative τοῖς αὐτὸν ἀπεκδεχομένοις is more naturally referred to the main verb, and the parallelism likewise requires it. (Comp. the phrase so frequently found in the Old Testament, ἐγένετό μοι εἰς σωτηρίαν, Ex. xv. 2, Isa. lxiii. 8, and frequently.) The purpose of our Lord's first manifestation is the working out of our redemption by vicarious atonement; the purpose of His second coming will be the complete realization of the redemption thus obtained.

We now enter on the second half of the third section, which completes the treatise that forms the central portion of the epistle; and recall to the recollection of our readers that each of these three sections may be distinguished by one word, giving the fundamental tone of the whole division. The first of these sections might thus be entitled *ΜΕΛΧΙΣΕΔΕΚ* (ch. vii. 1–25); the second, *ΑΡΧΙΕΡΕΥΣ* (ch. vii. 26–ix. 12); the third, *ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΑΙΩΝΑ* (ch. ix. 13–x. 18). This third section is throughout a development of the idea contained in the concluding words (ix. 12) of its predecessor—αἰωνίαν λύτρωσιν εὑράμενος. The development is also threefold, carrying out and perfecting the thoughts contained in the two last verses of the preceding section (ix. 11, 12).

The eternity of the redemption obtained by Christ is demonstrated, first (ix. 13, 14), with reference to the διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος of ver. 12, from the infinite power of cleansing in His atoning blood, as the vehicle of a life supported by

casting it beneath His feet," is perfectly correct as sentiment, but the latter thought is not here expressed.

[1] The most important authority for the reading διὰ πίστεως is the Alexandrine MS.; but the learned copyist or his original indulged not unfrequently in peculiar thoughts, *e.g.* Jas. ii. 3, ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιον (τῶν ποδῶν) with reference to Ps. cx.,—a reading which Lachmann has likewise adopted in his stereotype edition.

Πνεῦμα αἰώνιον, an eternal Spirit; secondly (ix. 15–23), with reference to the *ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν* of ver. 11, from the testamentary consignation by His death of an *αἰώνιος κληρονομία*, an eternal inheritance; and thirdly (ix. 24–28), with reference to the *εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια* of ver. 12, from the absolute and conclusive validity of His one atoning self-oblation, once presented by His ascension to the eternal Father, after which nothing remains to be accomplished but a re-manifestation in glory to judge the universe, and confer the final and eternal fruits of that oblation on the whole company of His redeemed. Such are the contents of the first half of the third section of this part of the epistle.

The description of the eternal redemption obtained by Christ is now, therefore, complete; and the sacred writer might, as Hofmann remarks (ii. 1, 312), have at once proceeded to the practical exhortation, which commences at x. 19; but before doing this, he expressly demonstrates, for the sake of those of his readers whose minds might still be disquieted by their exclusion from the services and communion of the Mosaic sanctuary, how all need for such services is for ever passed away, now that we have Christ Himself as our High Priest exalted to the right hand of God. This practical purpose and meaning in the passage (x. 1–18) is not to be overlooked or denied; but there is more in it than that. Forming, as it does, the second half of the concluding section of the main and central portion of the epistle, it recapitulates the principal thoughts of the whole treatise, and gives them at the same time a higher and more perfect expression. These thoughts are, as Hofmann himself has elsewhere observed (*Entstehung*, p. 344), the three following: (1.) Christ's own sacrifice of Himself, once offered, is in antithesis to the annually repeated legal sacrifices (bulls and goats) of the day of atonement, the complete and only adequate fulfilment of the will of God (x. 1–10). (2.) Christ's priestly service, in antithesis to the daily renewed and ever imperfect ministries of the legal priesthood, was discharged and perfected once for all in that great pontifical action; and He is henceforth a Priest upon His throne,

with God waiting as a King for the final subjugation of all His enemies (x. 11–14). (3.) Christ's atoning death is the inauguration of that new and everlasting covenant, which was foretold in the prophetic word as a future inward realization of the divine law, and assurance of the perfect forgiveness of sins, and as such exclusive of every other possible offering for sin (x. 15–18). In these three thoughts we have an echo of the watchwords of the whole treatise: (1.) Christ, by His atoning sacrifice accomplished here below, is our *Ἀρχιερεύς*; (2.) by His royal priesthood in the courts above, He is *Κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισεδέκ*; and (3.) by His position as Mediator and Surety of an everlasting covenant, founded on a perfect remission of sins, He is a Priest *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*.

This second half is attached to the former by the particle *γάρ*, the reference being to the whole paragraph (ix. 24–28). The principle being assumed, that the typical shadow represents and interprets the antitype, it is shown from the inadequacy and repetitions of the sacrifices of the law, what Christ has really and fully accomplished by His atoning death at the altar of the cross, and His entrance thereupon into the antitypical sanctuary.

Ch. x. 1. *For the law having a shadow of the good things that are to come, not the very image of the things, can nevermore year by year, with those same sacrifices which they offer continually, make them that draw nigh perfect.*

We follow in our translation the *textus receptus*, which is accepted by all our now living critics, except only that Bleek and Tischendorf would substitute for *ἅς* the attractional *αἷς* (so D.N. and *D.E. lat. quibus offerrent*). Lachmann, on the other hand, insisted on putting a full stop after *πραγμάτων* (in the ed. of 1831), leaving out *ἅς* (with A, and seemingly with the Peshito, Philoxenian, and Armenian versions), and reading *δύνανται* (with A, C, and D [in the latter a correction], the Peshito, and the Philoxenian; which last read with A**, *αἱ . . . δύνανται*. Theophylact also, notwithstanding the solœcistic construction, felt bound, from

the weight of MS. authority, to accept this reading). The three sentences thus produced (reduced to two by Lachmann himself since 1850, by the insertion of the relative ἅς before προσφέρουσιν) would be, as Bleek and Lünemann have fully shown, nothing but miserably *disjecta membra*. If δύνανται were the right reading, we should in any case have to regard the Σκίαν γὰρ ἔχων ὁ νόμος as a nominative absolute, for which one might possibly compare viii. 1 and Luke xxi. 6 (Winer, § 63, *d*; cf. Nägelsbach, *Anm.* p. 244). The construction would be *anacolouthic*, like Xenoph. *Cyrop.* v. 4, 34, τῆς γὰρ μεγίστης πόλεως Βαβυλῶνος ἐγγὺς οὖσα (the province of my father being near the great city of Babylon), ὅσα μὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι ἐστιν ἀπὸ μεγάλης πόλεως, ταῦτα ἀπελαύομεν. But apart from the harshness of construction, so unlike our author's style, the plural δύνανται is in itself improbable, inasmuch as it would here be attributing to the priests what is elsewhere said of the law itself, or of the legal sacrifices (comp. vii. 19, ix. 9, and x. 11),—a consideration which led Bleek, with reason, to be disposed to regard it, even had it appeared in the sacred writer's own autograph, as an involuntary slip of the pen. We adhere, therefore, to δύναται (with D, and as a correction *EIK*), and in general to the reading of the *textus receptus*, thus rendered by St. Jerome, in a language more capable of representing the construction and *ordo verborum* of the original than our Teutonic: *Umbram enim habens lex futurorum bonorum, non ipsam imaginem rerum, per singulos annos eisdem hostiis, quas offerunt indesinenter, nunquam potest accedentes perfectos facere:* for which the old Itala has, *per singulos annos iisdem hostiis quas* (or after D and E, *quibus*) *offerunt infrequentiam nunquam potest accedentes emundare* (after the reading καθαρίσαι of D, E). The main clause of the sentence, on which the rest depend, is ὁ νόμος οὐδέποτε δύναται, the participial clause σκιὰν ἔχων ὁ νόμος giving the ground of this impotency. The law has but a shadow (σκιά) of the good things of the future world (*umbra, adumbratio;* cf. viii. 5 and note there). These good things (*bona*) are still *future*, not only from the standing-point of the law, but also for us: we still "look for"

them; but, for us, since Christ has become our high priest (cf. note on ix. 11), they are already *dynamically* present (vi. 5). Instead of *οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα* for the antithesis, we might have expected *οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα*, as in the sense-related passage, Col. i. 15; and the Peshito accordingly renders *εἰκών* here by *substantia*, Luther by "Wesen." But such is not the true meaning of the word. Bleek, De Wette, v. Gerlach, Lünemann, and the older commentator Schlichting, suppose *εἰκών* here to be the representative image by which the original is symbolized or expressed. This meaning is quite a possible one (compare the *εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ* of Col. i. 15); but using *εἰκών* in this sense, the sacred writer would be attributing the characteristic of being an image or representation to the New Testament as well as to the Old, and the *οὐκ αὐτήν* would be denying something of the Old Testament which it affirmed of the New. His meaning consequently would be: The law hath but a mere shadow or sketch, and not even a lifelike or proper representation, a mere outline (as Menken expresses it), of the pattern shown to Moses on the mount. (See note on viii. 5.) It is, however, far more natural to assume that by *εἰκών* here the sacred writer would designate something which characterizes the New Testatment in antithesis to the law. Bengel accordingly interprets it, *Imaginem archetypam et primam, solidamque;* Böhme, *Ipsas res* (*πράγματα*) *certa sua forma et effigie præditas;* Stier, *The lively and express form of the heavenly things;* Ebrard, *The true bodily shape which properly belongs to the things themselves, and not merely a shadowy image of them;* and, best of all, Tholuck, *The archetype itself, which is the essential form of the things themselves in relation to the merely typical and shadowy representation of them.* We have indeed to understand *εἰκών* here in accordance with Col. iii. 10, *τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν*, and with Rom viii. 9, *συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ*. The meaning in both these passages is, not that the new man is only like the image of his Creator, and not like the Creator Himself, but rather that the Creator Himself, the Son of God Himself, is that image or original to which the new man

of the resurrection is to be conformed. And so the *πράγματα* here are themselves the *εἰκών*, the genitive (*τῶν πραγμάτων*) being a genitive of apposition, or, as Ebrard not inaptly calls it, a *genitivus substantiæ*. The Old Testament is but a shadowy and unsubstantial sketch or outline of the good things of the future world, not the substantial image and form, which is that of the realities themselves. To express this more clearly, the sacred writer uses not simply *αὐτῶν*, but *πραγμάτων*, *πρᾶγμα* being the actual substance, the thing itself, in contradistinction to a sketch or copy of it. These *πράγματα*, moreover, are not, as Hofmann and Baumgarten (*Zech.* ii. 215) maintain, the fundamental facts of the New Testament, but the heavenly realities which through those facts are made accessible to us, present to our faith and assured to our hope.

The law being thus an unsubstantial shadow of divine realities, its impotence is made every year more manifest: *κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ταῖς αὐταῖς θυσίαις, ἃς προσφέρουσιν εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς, οὐδέποτε δύναται τοὺς προσερχομένους τελειῶσαι.* The *προσφέροντες* (מקריבים) are the priests, or rather the high priests, of the law; the *προσερχόμενοι* are the members of the congregation of Israel who bring the sacrifices (בעלי הקרבנים); and the sacred writer says *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν*, not *καθ' ἡμέραν*, because it is the yearly day of atonement which he has in view. Many interpreters connect this *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν* with *ταῖς αὐταῖς θυσίαις* = *ταῖς αὐταῖς κατ' ἐν. θυσίαις*, or *ταῖς αὐταῖς θυσίαις, ἃς κατ' ἐν. τὰς αὐτὰς προσφέρουσιν.* [So the authorized English version: *can never with those sacrifices which they offered year by year continually.*] That such a construction is unallowable, I would not maintain: *κατ' ἐνιαυτόν* might, as not unfrequently *ἀεί*, *ἔτι*, and *πολλάκις*, especially in the poets, be thus transposed; but the construction with *οὐδέποτε δύναται* (Ebrard, Hofmann) is more natural here, and also more in accordance with the author's meaning, which is not, that the law is nevermore capable of bringing to perfection by means of sacrifices which are annually repeated; but that this its incapacity is annually manifested, viz. on the great day of atonement, when a fresh cycle of

legal sacrifices commences anew. Nor is it necessary (as Hofmann would do) to connect εἰς τὸ διηνεκές with τελειῶσαι. Surely προσφέρειν εἰς τὸ διηνεκές, "to offer continually" or "continuously," may be said of an unbroken series of annually repeated sacrifices; and being allowable, it is, from the order of the words, the more natural and obvious construction. Bleek and Lünemann are also quite right in observing that the relative sentence ἃς προσφέρουσιν would, without the addition εἰς τὸ διηνεκές, be bald and unmeaning; an objection which Hofmann fails to meet successfully by making προσερχόμενοι the subject of προσφέρουσιν, against the *usus loquendi* of the epistle, which, without exception, uses προσφέρειν of sacerdotal ministrations, and at vii. 25 distinguishes the priest from the προσερχόμενοι. Hofmann's conception of the meaning of the passage is accordingly: The law is unable year by year, *i.e.* on the annual return of the day of atonement, to make perfect for a continuance them that draw nigh, by those very same sacrifices (*i.e.* animal sacrifices) which they (the προσερχόμενοι) are wont at other times to offer. But had such been the sacred writer's meaning, he must surely have written, ταῖς αὐταῖς θυσίαις ταῖς καθ' ἡμέραν ὑπ' αὐτῶν προσφερομέναις, or the like; perhaps ταῖς αὐταῖς θυσίαις ἃς οἱ προσερχόμενοι διαπαντὸς προσφέρουσιν. But in the words actually made use of by him there is nothing to indicate the thought which Hofmann would find there. The incapacity of the sacrifices of the day of atonement to perfect the worshippers is not proved by their resemblance to the daily sacrifices offered by inferior priests, but simply by the fact of their perpetual repetition; and Tholuck observes with striking truth, that this threefold κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, ταῖς αὐταῖς θυσίαις, εἰς τὸ διηνεκές, represents almost pictorially the ever self-repeating cycle of those annual acts of atonement. And from this it is evident that the following question must refer to those annual sacrifices of the Levitical high priest, and not to the daily offerings of ordinary worshippers (Hofmann), or of the inferior priests, though what is truly said of the one must be *à fortiori* true of the other.

Ver. 2. *For would they not then have ceased to be offered, on account of the worshippers having no more a consciousness of sins after being thus once cleansed?*

The reading ἐπεὶ ἂν ἐπαύσαντο, *for then they would surely have ceased to be offered*, is that of the *textus receptus* according to the Elzevir edit. (but not that of Rob. Stephens), of Beza since 1582, the Complutensian, and other old editions. It gives a well-connected sense, but has all the uncials against it, and very few authorities in its favour (even the Vulgate, *alioquin cessassent offerri*, being somewhat doubtful). Its substitution for the other reading is probably explained by the fact that the latter was liable to be misunderstood (by not being taken as an interrogative), and supposed to imply what was evidently (even from the following verse) not the case when the epistle was written, viz. that the ceremonial of the day of atonement had already ceased in Israel (Œcumen., Theophyl., Mill, etc.). On the other hand, ἂν ἐπαύσ. instead of ἐπαύσ. ἄν is no real difficulty—conjunctions like ἐπεί readily attracting ἄν, *e.g.* ἐπάν or ἐπήν (cf. Rost, § 120, Anm. 5)—and ἐπεί is often followed by an interrogative in St. Paul as well as in this epistle (ix. 17). (Comp. Klotz on *Devar.* ii. 542.) The construction of παύεσθαι with the participle is, moreover, the regular one, and like Acts v. 42, οὐκ ἐπαύοντο διδάσκοντες. The combination of ἄν with the historical tense (Winer, 42. 1) implies that it may be taken for granted that, had those yearly repeated sacrifices been able to make perfect, they would before this have ceased to be offered, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἔχειν ἔτι συνείδησιν ἁμαρτιῶν τοὺς λατρεύοντας ἅπαξ κεκαθαρμένους, or (as, with Lachmann against Tischendorf, we should prefer to read) κεκαθαρισμένους (so A, C, D, E, K). The τελείωσις of the worshippers is the complete restoration of their peace with God; and this can only be attained by the complete removal of the barrier formed by sin, by making them in the fullest sense κεκαθαρισμένους. Had this ever really been once effected for the congregation of Israel by the annual sacrifices of the day of atonement, no need would have been felt for a repetition of them. But it was not so.

Ver. 3. *Nay, but in them is involved a fresh remembrance of sin every year.*

It comes to the same thing whether we regard ἀλλά here as referring to the negative proposition of ver. 1, and having simply the meaning "but," or as referring to the concluding words of ver. 2, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν, and having that of "Nay but," *immo:* whether we render, *The law can nevermore make perfect them that draw nigh, . . . but there is involved* (in its repeated sacrifices) *a renewal of the thought of sin every year;* or, *Would there not have been a cessation of the Levitical sacrifices on account of the cleansing of the conscience once for all by one acceptable sacrifice? Nay, but* (so far is this from being the case, that) *there is a fresh remembrance made before God of sins every year.* The latter seems to be the more natural construction, and there is no valid objection to it.

The word ἀνάμνησις may be understood of the *publica s. solemnis commemoratio* of sins made by the high priest in the three formal confessions of the day of atonement, especially in the third, which began thus: "*O Lord! Thy people, the house of Israel, have erred, and transgressed, and sinned against Thee;*" but the other interpretation of ἀνάμνησις, *in memoriam revocatio,* as having a wider bearing, is certainly to be preferred, and may equally involve an allusion to those three liturgical acts of confession. It is confirmed, moreover, by a parallel usage in Philo: *e.g.* ii. 244, 7, εὔηθες γὰρ τὰς θυσίας μὴ λήθην ἁμαρτημάτων, ἀλλ' ὑπόμνησιν αὐτῶν κατεσκευάζειν; i. 345, 27, *God hath, indeed, delight in fireless altars round which the choirs of virtues move, but not in those* (material) *ones, though burning with much fire, kindled for the unconsecrated sacrifices of ungodly men,—sacrifices which only bring to mind* (ὑπομιμνήσκουσαι) *the errors and sins of each.* Καὶ γὰρ εἰπέ που (he proceeds) Μωϋσῆς θυσίαν ἀναμιμνήσκουσαν ἁμαρτίαν (referring to Num. v. 15, where the "offering of jealousy" is called θυσία μνημοσύνου ἀναμιμνήσκουσα ἁμαρτίαν); ii. 151, 21, where it is said of the prayers of the unjust and unthankful, οὐ λύσιν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπόμνησιν ἐργάζονται. In a like sense, then, we are to under-

stand the ἐν αὐταῖς ἀνάμνησις ἁμαρτιῶν here. The γίνεται added by D and other authorities is not wanted, the meaning being simply that in these annually repeated sacrifices is involved (*iis inest*) an annually renewed remembrance of sin. The sacred writer has in view what our older theologians were wont to call the *usus legalis sacrificiorum*, without excluding from view altogether the *usus evangelicus*. That the worshippers under the law derived some spiritual benefit from a faithful, loving use of the legal sacrifices, would not surely have been disputed by him; but that those sacrifices had in themselves any inward or inherent purifying power, he could never more allow.

Ver. 4. *For it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sins.*

Neither the blood of the bullock nor that of the goat (the sin-offerings of the day of atonement) could, on the one hand, weigh in the balance against the guilt of a human soul, nor, on the other, exercise any spiritual or cleansing power on the inward man. It could not take away (ἀφαιρεῖν) sin, and therefore could not really make atonement. (Cf. Isa. xxvii. 9, LXX., where ἀφαιρεθήσεται is the rendering of יכפר.) It could only sanctify πρὸς τὴν τῆς σαρκὸς καθαρότητα (ix. 13), by restoring the worshippers to membership and communion with the congregation of Israel, *i.e.* the church as constituted under the Old Testament, which, confined as it was to the limits and determined by the circumstances of a single nationality, could have for its main characteristic only sanctified nature, and not spiritual regeneration.[1] The blood of animal sacrifices offered on the altar was indeed, under the Old Testament, a divinely appointed means of

[1] The excursus, *Quid sit sacrificium et quæ sint sacrificii species*, which forms part of Melanchthon's *Apology for the Augsburg Confession*, puts it thus: *Levitica illa sacrificia propitiatoria tantum sic appellabantur ad significandum futurum piaculum; propterea similitudine quadam erant satisfactoriæ redimentes justitiam legis ne ex politia excluderentur isti qui peccaverant.* The older scholastic theology had affirmed with not less truth, that these so-called sacraments of the Old Testament had no operation of grace *propria virtute*, but simply *per accidens*, by means of the

making atonement for human souls (Lev. xvii. 11, "I have given it"), but a means manifestly inadequate to accomplish its end, and therefore one ordained merely by way of accommodation, and for a temporary purpose. The animal sacrifice was but a shadow, and yet, as ordained by God, a true indicator and prophecy, of another sacrifice in which the divine will would be fully accomplished.

Vers. 5–7. *Wherefore, entering into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and oblation thou willedst not, but a body preparedst thou for me: in whole burnt-offerings and sin-offerings thou tookest no pleasure: then I said, Lo, I am come, in the roll of the book it is written concerning me: for the sake of doing thy will, O God.*

The self-oblation of Christ is that perfect end to which all the imperfect sacrifices of the law point onwards; and a prophetic anticipation of this the sacred writer finds in the citation which he makes from Ps. xl. 7–9 (E.V. 6–8). His object is not so much to prove that already in the Old Testament itself we find the need expressed of a better sacrifice, but rather to describe in Old Testament language the self-determination of Christ to present Himself in sacrifice to God over against the sacrifices of the law, and so to become the oblation of the New Testament, accomplishing what they were unable to accomplish. In this one and (in this respect) unique passage of Scripture, the unsatisfactory nature of the legal sacrifices, and their impotence to effect any real reconciliation between God and man, is set in the clearest contrast with the personal self-oblation of Christ, in its infinite power to accomplish the divine will by effecting that reconciliation. The author, regarding it in the light

faith which they excited or maintained in the future sacrifice of the cross. This conditional operation by means of the offerer's faith was called an *operatio per opus operans*, and as such contrasted with the indwelling grace of the sacraments of the New Testament, to which was attributed an *operatio ex opere operato*. Against the confusions induced by this unfortunate terminology, Melanchthon directs his argument in that part of his *Apology*.

reflected upon it by the New Testament, finds in these words of the typical David an utterance of his divine Antitype, and of Him as *εἰσερχόμενος εἰς τὸν κόσμον, i.e.* as the incarnate Messiah of the New Testament, in the year of His self-determination to choose the infinite and enduring good (Isa. vii. 16). Other interpretations of the *εἰσερχόμενος* seem inadmissible: *e.g.* the "about to enter," *venturus*, of Erasmus (there being no need to assign to the present this future sense here); or the "entering on the public stage of the world" of Bleek and De Wette (whereas the words are addressed to the Eternal Father, and not to any human auditory); or, finally, the *nascendo* of Böhme, the "about to take upon Him human nature" of Hofmann, since in that case the *σῶμα κατηρτίσω μοι* would be hardly appropriate. The words, moreover (*εἰσέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον*), may be understood as not referring to any single point of time. The language expresses the thought and will of the incarnate Saviour, in the whole of His conscious work for God.

Regarding this fortieth Psalm from the point of view of historical criticism, its language may be assigned to David at a definite period of his life. It belongs, if we assume the credibility of the inscription, to the times of the persecution of Saul. Among the last Psalms of this period of nearly ten years, may be placed Ps. lxi. (a cry "from the ends of the earth," *i.e.* from Philistia, during David's second residence there), Ps. xxxi. (where David, finding himself already in the secure refuge of "a strong city," can praise God for His acts of marvellous loving-kindness), and this fortieth Psalm, where, though many mercies are behind him in a gracious past, he is still looking and longing for the final deliverance. In these Psalms David cries shame upon himself for his weakness of faith (Ps. xxxi. 23), is sensible of his nearness to the promised kingdom (lxi. 7), and exclaims, in consciousness of his high vocation, *Lo, I come!* (xl. 8): praise and thanksgiving for mercies already received outweigh complaints and supplication for those still needed. The fortieth Psalm has one peculiar feature: beginning with praise, it ends with com-

plaint. The psalmist has experienced the divine deliverance; he is still compassed with danger and infirmity. His faith and trust in God has not disappointed him; God has put into his mouth a new, triumphant song of praise for the encouragement of others (vers. 1–3); he celebrates the happiness of the man who, like himself, has put all his trust in that God who has wrought so many wonders for the deliverance of Israel. But how shall he, the psalmist, now thank his Saviour? Since neither animal nor vegetable sacrifices have any value in the eyes of Jehovah, he determines, instead of a victim, to offer himself; and instead of vegetable offering or Minchah (*oblatio*), to utter words of praise. The words taken by our author from this context read in the original as follows (vers. 7–9 or 6–8):—

Victim and Minchah Thou desirest not,
But ears hast Thou pierced for me!
Burnt-offering and sin-offering Thou requirest not.
Then said I: Behold, I come
With the roll of the book which is written concerning me:
To do Thy will, O God, is my desire,
Yea, and Thy law within my heart.

David's utterance here, with the promised throne of Israel full in view, is the echo of that judgment which had condemned Saul: *Hath the Lord delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams!* (1 Sam. xv. 22.) It is in accordance with these words of the prophet Samuel, of which in a certain way the whole poetry of the Psalter is an echo, that we must understand the אזנים כרית לי of the present passage, which, properly rendered, is, *Aures fodisti, i.e. concaras reddidisti mihi*— Ears hast Thou bored, or hollowed out, for me, *i.e.* given me the sense and faculty of obedience to Thy recognised will. Then follows with אז David's consequent resolution, on discerning, by this spiritual sense of hearing, that obedience and not sacrifice is demanded by God. The "roll of the book" with which he comes is the divine Thorah, especially

(it would seem) the book of Deuteronomy, which by the *lex regia* of ch. xvii. 14–20 is ordained to become the inseparable *vade mecum* of the future King of Israel: the בְּ is that of accompaniment (like Ps. lxvi. 13)—"*with* the book-roll which is written;" and the עַל introduces the subject of the writing (as 2 Kings xxii. 13, and frequently after דִּבֶּר)—"*concerning* me." It is with the Thorah, as the written embodiment of the divine will, that David (resolved to do that will) now presents himself, and so doing can say (ver. 9) that willing obedience is his desire, and that the Thorah is not merely an outward companion, but inscribed in his heart. But now comes the question, With what right does the sacred writer regard these words as an utterance of Messiah on His entrance into the world? Not, surely (we confidently reply, against many interpreters, including Baumgarten and Masch), because he regards Messiah simply as the subject of the whole Psalm. A mere glance at its second half, where David speaks of "iniquities more than the hairs of my head" as overwhelming him, is sufficient to disprove this. The theory of a typical interpretation is manifestly the only applicable one, and that with the fullest right here: (1) Because David, the anointed one, now on his way to the throne—a way marked by trial and suffering—is the ancestor and type of Jesus Christ; (2) because the Psalm, in rejecting material sacrifice, substitutes for it the spiritual offering of the New Testament, whose object, truth, and end is Jesus Christ; and (3) because the passage (Ps. xl. 7–9), however interpreted, remains without a parallel in the rest of the Psalter, nay, in the whole of the Old Testament,—a mysterious utterance of the first David, which to the instructed ear is also one of the Second, his antitype: comp. St. John viii. 29 and xvii. 6. In the version of the Septuagint, which is also a monument of Old Testament Scripture, and as such regarded with reverence by the writers of the New Testament,—a work not without traces of the influence of the Divine Spirit,—this prophetic and typical character of the passage is yet more evident. For,

(1.) The אזנים לי is there rendered by σῶμα δὲ κατηρ-

τίσω μοι, "A body hast Thou prepared me;" so that the notion of an inborn capacity of recognising and obeying the divine will is expanded into that of a body given and prepared for self-surrender to that will. That ΣΩΜΑ is an error of some ancient copyist for θελησαC ΩΤΙΑ (as Bleek and Lünemann conjecture), is highly improbable: very few MSS. have the reading ὠτία or ὦτα, and that derived from the version of Theodotion, or from the fifth and sixth versions in Origen's *Hexapla;* whence Eusebius and Jerome, *aures autem perfecisti mihi;* while Augustine, in the ante-Hieronymian version which lay before him, found only *corpus autem perfecisti.* Still more impossible is it that the writer of our epistle should have himself accommodated the translation of the original to the facts of the New Testament history; such alterations and accommodations of the received text, or its Septuagint translation, being unknown to writers of the New Testament. We must therefore infer that the Septuagint translator himself substituted, for the strange-sounding and easily misunderstood ὠτία ὠρυξάς (διωρυξάς) μοι, the σῶμα and κατηρτίσω μοι of the text; κατηρτίσω being by itself an easier and more general rendering of the Hebrew כרית. Again,

(2.) The rendering ἐν κεφαλίδι βιβλίου γέγραπται περὶ ἐμοῦ favours the assumption that He who is here speaking is the One of whose coming Moses and all the prophets had spoken. Nor can the rendering of the LXX. here be on grammatical grounds objected to. The κεφαλίς is the roll of parchment, so called from the projecting end of the cylinder (Lat. *umbilicus*) on which it was rolled. The Hebrew may be easily understood as *sententia nominalis—in volumine libri scriptum est de me;* and if we take in as here = *cum*, yet the עלי certainly means "concerning me," whether as the subject of a precept or that of a prophecy. The latter view connects itself more naturally with the Greek rendering γέγραπται περὶ ἐμοῦ, and even so might be not improperly understood to apply to David as a commencing fulfilment of the prophecies made to the patriarchs—the king of the tribe of Judah. The sacred writer, moreover, here

would seem to be quoting the LXX. from memory. The LXX. has, *ὁλοκαυτώματα* (B *ὁλοκαύτωμα*) *καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας οὐκ ἐσήτησας* (A^2, B, *ἤτησας*); for which our author substitutes, without any change of sense, *εὐδόκησας*, or (according to A, B, C, D^*, E, N) *ηὐδόκησας*. Further, in the clause *τοῦ ποιῆσαι τὸ θέλημά σου, ὁ Θεός μου, ἠβουλήθην*, he leaves out the two last words, and so brings *τοῦ ποιῆσαι* into immediate grammatical dependence upon *ἥκω*. Taking the original Hebrew text, it would indeed be possible to render (with Hofmann, *Weiss.* i. 158, ii. 167), "to do Thy will, O my God, *wherein* I have great pleasure;" but unnecessary, and somewhat against the *usus loquendi*, which employs ב to designate a person in whom one takes delight, but ל, or a simple infinitive, to denote the action. The abbreviation, however, in our epistle (whether intentional or otherwise) serves undoubtedly to heighten the christological character of the passage, and is in full accord with the spirit of the original; for the divine will of which the Psalmist speaks is that inscribed in the Thorah, and to fulfil that will is the purport of his mission. David presenting himself to God, and declaring his readiness to accomplish God's will concerning him as king of Israel, speaks *ἐν πνεύματι*, and therefore in typically-ordered words, which issue, as it were, from the very soul of the antitype, the Anointed of the future, who will not only be King of Israel, but also Captain of their salvation, as of that of the whole world, and speaks in words which express the spiritual sacrifice of heart and will in such clear antithesis to the legal sacrifices as was only fully realized in the self-offering of Christ, the end and antitype of all other offerings. It is not as if Christ, and *not* David, were the speaker: David speaks; but Christ, whose Spirit already dwells and works in David, and who will hereafter receive from David His human nature, now already speaks *in* him.

Now follows the sacred writer's interpretation of this mysterious and significant utterance.

Vers. 8, 9. *Above, when he saith, Sacrifices, and oblations, and whole burnt-offerings, and sin-offerings, thou wouldest not,*

neither hadst pleasure therein; such as are offered by the law: he then saith, Lo, I am come to do thy will. (So) *he taketh away the first, that he may establish the second.*

That the sacred writer prefers, instead of the simpler and more regular *ἀνώτερον εἰπών . . . ὕστερον λέγει*, to write *ἀνώτ. λέγων . . . τότε εἴρηκεν*, is to be explained thus: he is more concerned to emphasize the internal connection of the two utterances than their temporal sequence. He places both by means of *λέγων . . . εἴρηκεν* in one line, and marks by *τότε* (= the אז of the original) that the one is the *consequens* of the other. For the very reason that God's will and desire is not set on material sacrifices, the coming Christ declares His readiness to make an offering of Himself in order to accomplish that will. The *textus receptus* has in the first half of the repeated citation *θυσίαν καὶ προσφοράν*, and *ὁ Θεός* in the second, both due to the conforming hand of some copyist. The reading adopted (from A, C, D *, It., and Vulg.) by Lachmann and Tischendorf, *θυσίας καὶ προσφοράς*, is more suitable to a free recapitulation: God has no pleasure in any kind of material sacrifices and oblations, neither in *θυσίαι* = זבחים or שלמים, nor in *προσφοραί* elsewhere called *δῶρα* = מנחות, nor in *ὁλοκαυτώματα* = עולות, nor in *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* = חטאות. The relative sentence *αἵτινες κατὰ τὸν νόμον* (Lachm. and Tisch. *κατὰ νόμον*) *προσφέρονται* refers to all the above-named species of sacrifice, which indeed may all be comprehended under the term *θυσίαι* (the meat-offering itself, *προσφορά*, being also called *θυσία*). The relative *ὅστις* is used instead of *ὅς*, to denote that the persons or things referred to are considered with reference to their qualities or kind (Bäumlein, § 317). It is those very sacrifices which are still offered in accordance with the law that are here designated as not properly in accordance with the divine will by Him, who therefore adds: *Lo, I am come to do Thy will!*

Neither *αἵτινες . . . προσφέρονται* nor the following *ἀναιρεῖ τὸ πρῶτον . . .* are to be regarded as parentheses (Lünem.): *αἵτινες* belongs to the premiss, *ἀναιρεῖ* forms the conclusion. Neither may we supply *θέλημα* after *τὸ πρῶτον* and *τὸ δεύτερον*. It is not two divine wills (a first and a second) which

are here spoken of (Hofm. *Weiss.* ii. 167); but simply that which God willeth not is opposed as "a first," which is taken away to that which He willeth as "a second," which is established and abides. What God doth not will, is the offering of material sacrifices; what He wills, is the free self-oblation of a rational personality. The self-oblation of Christ is therefore in entire accordance with the will of God, and as such is opposed to, and takes the place of, all other sacrifices, animal and material. "*In Christum*," says Origen, "*omnis hostia recapitulatur.*" The antithesis of *ἀναιρεῖν* and *ἱστάναι* is similar to that of *καταργεῖν* and *ἱστᾶν* (*ἱστάνειν*) at Rom. iii. 31. For the conclusion drawn by *ἀναιρεῖ* without *οὖν*, comp. *βλέπετε* in this epistle, ch. iii. 12 and xii. 25.

A new sentence now begins, but is not introduced abruptly, inasmuch as the *τὸ δεύτερον* of this last clause is the *θέλημα* referred to in ver. 10.

Ver. 10. *In which will we have been sanctified through the oblation of the body of Jesus Christ once for all.*

The sacred writer advances from the threshold of the action prophesied of in the Psalm, to its consequences to ourselves. The accomplishment of the divine will of which the Psalm speaks has the salvation of all men for its end. That will therefore is not, in our author's conception, a legal or primitive will, but a gracious and redeeming will. It refers to another sacrifice than those of the law,—a sacrifice which they could but faintly foreshadow. In this will we are or have been once for all sanctified; *i.e.*, in the accomplishment of this will is based all our sanctification, effected by the self-offering of Christ, or, as it is here called, with reference to the *σῶμα δὲ κατηρτίσω μοι*, an offering of the body of Christ, —*προσφορὰ τοῦ σώματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (omit the *τοῦ* of the *textus receptus*).

Instead of *σώματος*, D* and E* read *αἵματος*, an alteration which betrays and condemns itself. The unusual expression *προσφορὰ τοῦ σώματος* may be justified by an appeal to Rom. vii. 4, Col. i. 22, and elsewhere. The sacrificial death of Christ is here contemplated not (as it would be

with the reading *αἵματος*) from the point of view of the typical שחישה, but from that of the הקטרה. The cross is the altar on which He offered Himself for us as a *προσφορὰν καὶ θυσίαν τῷ Θεῷ, εἰς ὀσμὴν εὐωδίας* (Eph. v. 2). His blood-shedding was our propitiation, the offering of His body our sanctification, even as in the typical sacrifices the shedding of the blood of the victim was for the reconciliation of the offerers with the Godhead, while the offering of the flesh of the victim by the so reconciled offerers renewed and re-knit their communion with God. The adverb *ἐφάπαξ* belongs here neither to *διὰ τῆς προσφορᾶς* . . . by itself (as, for example, Bloomfield), nor to it along with *ἡγιασμένοι* (as Winer), but to the latter exclusively (so Bleek, Lünemann, Hofmann, and most others); and this not so much because it ought otherwise to have been written *τῆς ἐφάπαξ* (cf. Winer, § 20, 2), as because in the present context it is the most natural construction. That inward holiness, which the sacrifices of the law with all their annual repetitions were unable to produce, has been effected once for all through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ. The same would be the case also with the other reading adopted by Tischendorf, *ἡγιασμένοι ἐσμὲν οἱ διὰ τῆς προσφορᾶς . . . ἐφάπαξ*: here likewise we should have to supply in thought *ἁγιασθέντες, ὄντες*, or *γενόμενοι* after *οἱ*. But this harsh elliptical *οἱ* (found in the *textus receptus* as presented by Stephens, but omitted by Beza and the Elzevirs) spoils the rhythm of the sentence, and introduces a needless tautology. It is probably due (as already observed by Bleek) to a thoughtless blunder of some copyist writing *ἡγιασμένοι ἐσμὲν οἱ*.

The writer of the epistle having thus shown (vers. 1–10) that the self-oblation of Jesus Christ, in contrast with the sacrifices of the law, was the only true realization of the divine will for our sanctification, proceeds (vers. 11–14) to exhibit Christ's priestly service in contrast with the daily repeated, because ever inefficient, service of the priests of the law, as for ever perfected by one high-priestly act, which has issued in His kingly exaltation and waiting for the final subjugation of His foes. The concluding thought (1–10)

was, that our sanctification as the fruit of Christ's self-oblation had been provided for ἐφάπαξ; and now the thought to be expressed (11–14) is, that Christ's self-oblation is μία, and accomplished ἐφάπαξ; that He is henceforth seated at the right hand of God, instead of ministering as a priest before Him, as having accomplished by His one offering all that the priests of the law were unable to effect; that He is now with God, ruling, not ministering, and waiting on His throne for the ultimate reward of His priestly ministry (Hofmann, *Schriftb.* ii. 1. 316). With the καί of ver. 11 is introduced a new contrast between the priesthood of the New Testament and that of the Old—the Melchizedekian or royal character of the former. The priests of the law are for ever engaged in unremitting but fruitless labours; the High Priest of the gospel has entered into a royal and heavenly rest.

Vers. 11, 12. *For while every priest standeth day by day ministering, and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, the which nevermore can take away sins; this man, on the contrary, having offered one sacrifice on behalf of sins, sat down for perpetuity on the right hand of God.*

Authorities waver between the ἱερεύς of the *textus receptus* and the ἀρχιερεύς of Lachmann. Tischendorf in 1841 preferred ἀρχιερεύς, in 1849 ἱερεύς, and in 1855 (in the Triglot edition) he returned to ἀρχιερεύς. One may see from this wavering, that the external evidence is about equal on both sides. De Wette asserts that internal probability may with equal propriety be claimed for both. Bleek and Lünemann, on the other hand, decide for ἀρχιερεύς, because (as they say) the whole parallelism between the high priest of the Old Testament and the High Priest of the New would be weakened if the final conclusion were drawn from a comparison with the ordinary priests; against which De Wette remarks, that the writer of the epistle advances here from the special comparison with the high priest's sacrifices on the day of atonement, to a general one with those of the ordinary priests at all times. Tholuck, in the same strain, says

better: "*The same wearisome circle of ineffectual efforts which has been shown to characterize the performances of the high priest on the day of atonement, is now exhibited as characteristic of the priestly institute in general.*" And still better Böhme: "*Stantibus Judæorum sacrificulis pontifex cœlestes sedens e regione ponitur.*" Hofmann also excellently: "*Hitherto the argument has been, that Christ's high-priestly action was the only adequate fulfilment of the divine will for our sanctification, and that this has been accomplished once for all; now, on the other hand, it turns on His session at the right hand of God, as a proof that no further priestly ministration on His part is necessary. The contrast, therefore, is now drawn between Him and the priests of the law in general, and not merely the high priest in particular.*"

But apart from all such arguments, the reading ἀρχιερεύς is to be rejected as an unfortunate correction made from vii. 27, v. 1, viii. 3, and ix. 25. To say that the high priest of the law stands daily ministering would be a monstrous error; and we have already shown at vii. 27, that our author could not have been so strangely ignorant of the law and the Levitical customs as such an error would imply. Bleek's conjecture (accepted also by Lünemann), that even those sacrifices which the high priest did not offer himself might be attributed to him (on the principle, *facit per alios, facit per se*), is one unsupported by Scripture or Jewish opinion. On the other hand, Bleek and Lünemann's objection, that had the sacred writer meant to use ἱερεύς, he must have written *οἱ ἱερεῖς*, and not πᾶς ἱερεύς, because it is not true that *every* priest ministered *daily*, is easily answered. The writer is not concerned to affirm a daily ministration on the part of each individual priest: it is enough for him that the ministry itself is a daily one, in which each priest takes his turn by lot or order, as the case may be. That he clearly has the service of the temple in view, is evident from his use of the word ἕστηκεν, "to stand before the Lord" (עמד לפני ה׳) being the standing term for Levitical service (Deut. x. 8 and xviii. 7). No priest, indeed, nor any other person but the king of the house of David, was permitted to sit down in

the inner court, and the priests only to sit outside it when engaged in the duties of the watch.

To λειτουργεῖν is added, as its principal feature, προσφέρειν with καί (=and especially). His office is to minister as a priest, *i.e.* especially to offer sacrifices. Of this sacrificing Levitical priest the sacred writer affirms three things: (1.) He offers sacrifices oftentimes, again and again (πολλάκις). (2.) He offers always the same sacrifices (τὰς αὐτάς). (3.) They are of such a kind (αἵτινες) that they cannot really take away sins. Περιελεῖν is to take clean away (compare Acts xxvii. 20, περιηρεῖτο πᾶσα ἐλπίς), *i.e.* to put off like the garment which clings to the person, or the ring on the finger; as, for instance, the besetting sin of xii. 1, εὐπερίστατον ἁμαρτίαν, or the besetting infirmity (περίκειται ἀσθένειαν) of ver. 2. The sacred writer does not mean to say that sins were not forgiven to sacrificial worshippers under the law, but that the legal sacrifices had no inward spiritual power to give peace to the conscience, or any assured sense of pardon, purity to the heart, or any really new beginning of spiritual life (ch. ix. 9). With these in their subject-matter and their inadequacy, ever similar and oft-repeated sacrifices, he contrasts (ver. 12) the μία ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν θυσία of Jesus Christ, which (as every reader knows) is no other than Himself. The force of the antithesis does not, however, lie in the participial clauses, but in those of the main sentence: πᾶς μὲν ἱερεὺς ἕστηκε καθ' ἡμέραν . . . οὗτος δὲ . . . εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ Θεοῦ. A glance at this antithetical parallelism is sufficient to show that εἰς τὸ διηνεκές is not to be referred to the participial sentence, as by Theophylact, Castellio, Valcken., Böhme, Kuinœl, and Lachmann (in which case Luther's translation would be correct: *now that He has offered one sacrifice for sin, which is of eternal validity* [and so, according to our pointing, the English version: *after He had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever*]; or, as it might be rendered better still: *having offered one sacrifice for sins of eternal validity*), but to the final clause of the main sentence. And, moreover, the process of the argument is against such a construction: in vers. 1–10 the

main thought is indeed the sacrifice made once for all (ἐφάπαξ), but now in vers. 11–14 it is the enthronement for eternity. As at i. 13 the καθίζειν of the Son is opposed to the ἀποστέλλεσθαι of the ministering angels, so here the ministerial ἑστηκέναι of the priests on earth to the royal καθίζειν of Christ in heaven, who, according to the reading οὗτος (which on MS. authority is to be preferred to the αὐτός of the *text. rec.*), is also a Priest; no longer indeed a ministering, but a ruling Priest—a royal Priest—a Priest, in fact, after the order of Melchizedek. Menken says well and truly: The priest of the Old Testament stands timid and uneasy in the holy place, anxiously performing his awful service there, and hastening to depart when the service is done, as from a place where he has no free access, and can never feel at home; whereas Christ sits down in everlasting rest and blessedness at the right hand of Majesty in the holy of holies, His work accomplished, and He awaiting its reward.

Ver. 13. *From henceforth expecting until his enemies be made the footstool of his feet.*

The citation (made already, i. 13) is from the 110th Psalm. It is re-introduced here to remind the readers of all that has been said before of the Priest after the order of Melchizedek. The words are cited in a similar way by Ignatius in the Epistle to the Trallians, ch. ix. (but using περιμένων instead of ἐκδεχόμενος). By the "enemies" are to be understood all opposing powers (1 Cor. xv. 23–26). For their subjection He will wait (τὸ λοιπόν) all the remaining time till the end of the present world, in whose history the great turn was made by His great self-sacrifice (ch. ix. 26). That end will consist in His second advent (ix. 28), when the victory accomplished by His death and resurrection will be fully realized by the separation, binding, and elimination of everything in the universe opposed to God, in the order described by St. Paul (1 Cor. xv.), between whom and the author of our epistle here there is no contradiction, as Lünemann imagined.

But here two questions arise, demanding an answer:—(1.) How can the sacred writer mean to say that Christ no longer performs any priestly service, when, according to viii. 1 et sq., He is the λειτουργός of a sanctuary, and hath something wherewith to offer? Answer: Those statements are not contradicted here, but explained to mean that the heavenly priesthood of Christ, consisting solely in the presentation of Himself as the high-priestly sacrifice, involves no changes of ministerial activity, and imposes no further burden of atonement-making work; He is now and henceforth the High Priest upon His throne,—none other, in fact, than the Eternal King, seated in unapproachable and everlasting rest. But again, (2.) Is not our author's statement here inconsistent with that of St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 23–26), who makes the καταργειν of death to be the work of Christ? A reference to ii. 14 and ix. 28 is sufficient to show that our author himself could have meant no otherwise. The antithesis on which he is here dwelling is simply between the labour and passion of His earthly life, and the unchanging blessedness of its perfection above. Christ no more descends to fight; His strivings are over: He takes part as to His whole being in the omnipotent dominion of the heavenly Father, and awaits the final manifestation of His power.

Ver. 14. *For by one oblation hath he perfected for perpetuity them that are being sanctified.*

This εἰς τὸ διηνεκές corresponds to that of ver. 12. Christ is evermore enthroned, because He has perfected for ever. The work of sanctification being once for all accomplished by His one sacrifice, He needs not to leave any more His everlasting rest in order to offer any further sacrifice. We might accentuate thus, μία γὰρ προσφορά (=*for one oblation hath perfected*, etc.); but it is much more probable that in the sacred writer's mind Christ is still the subject, his purpose being to show on what grounds, and by what right, He can thus enjoy so triumphant a rest. It is because His work is accomplished, and needs nothing more to complete it, nor any repetition. Τετελείωκεν, it is perfect, requiring no addi-

tion; but, at the same time, it is not as to its effect a past work, but one perpetually realized in those who accept it, and as thereby being sanctified (*τοὺς ἁγιαζομένους*, pres. part.). It needs therefore no repetition. The force of Hofmann's argument, against Bleek, De Wette, and others, that *τοὺς ἁγιαζομ.* is to be understood here, not of a personal apprehension of the Lord's redeeming work, but of reception into the Christian community, I cannot see. The meaning surely is similar to that of the *ἁγιαζόμενοι* of ii. 14, where we showed that *καθαρίζειν* and *ἁγιάζειν* are synonymous. The *ἁγιαζόμενοι* are those who by acts of faith (comp. Acts xx. 32 and xxvi. 18, *ἁγιασμέν. πίστει*) make the accomplished work of Christ individually their own. For this reason the sacred writer says not *τοὺς τελειωμένους*, but *τοὺς ἁγιαζομένους*. The being sanctified (in which is here included both imputed and imparted holiness, and cleansing from sin, justification and sanctification) is the subjective process by which the perfected objective work of Christ is realized in believers. Those who submit themselves to the gracious rule of the high-priestly King, find in Him all that they need for their perfecting. He has provided all that they can require by His one self-sacrifice: they can add nothing to His perfect work.

That so it is, is testified by the prophetic word which, in foretelling the future establishment of a new covenant, makes one of its characteristic notes to be an absolute forgiveness of sins.

Vers. 15–17. *And a witness to us hereof is also the Holy Spirit: for after having said before, This is the covenant which I will covenant with them after those days, the Lord saith, Putting my laws upon their hearts, and on their minds will I write them; and their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more.*

The Holy Ghost is the Spirit of prophecy, and from Him comes the whole God-inspired (*θεόπνευστος*) written word. He also in that word is the witness, that with Christ's return to the Father all is accomplished, and nothing remains

to be done to procure for us inward perfecting, and a complete restoration to communion with God. In ἡμῖν the author assumes identity of faith and conviction in his readers and himself. He gives an extract from the words already cited (at viii. 8–12) from the prophecies of Jeremiah. The words αὕτη ἡ διαθήκη . . . . ἐπιγράψω αὐτούς are from Jer. xxxi. 33*a*, and the following καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν . . . ἔτι are from Jer. xxxi. 34*d* (its final clause). Instead of the τῷ οἴκῳ Ἰσραήλ, retained at viii. 10, we find πρὸς αὐτούς here, the prophecy being thus raised above its national limitations, and, as it were, universalized. Instead of διδοὺς νόμους μου εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ καρδίας αὐτῶν ἐπιγράψω αὐτούς, we have here, without any special motive for the change, the apparently accidental inversion: διδοὺς . . . . ἐπὶ καρδίας αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διανοιῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιγράψω αὐτούς. (Lachmann and Bleek, following A, C, D*, and other authorities, read ἐπὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.) Instead of the ὅτι ἵλεως ἔσομαι ταῖς ἀδικίαις αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν (to which the *textus receptus* adds, καὶ τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτῶν) οὐ μὴ μνησθῶ ἔτι, we have here the contracted sentence, καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτῶν οὐ μὴ μνησθήσομαι ἔτι. The sacred writer regards the words which he is citing as an utterance of the Holy Spirit, and yet deals so freely with them; but this very freedom with regard to the mere letter of Scripture is also a work of the Holy Spirit. The prophecy thus cited consists of two parts. The first is introduced by the formula μετὰ τὸ προειρηκέναι, "after having said—before" (προ [omitted by Lachmann and Bleek, after A, C, D, E, Peshito, Philoxenian, etc.] is to be taken not in the sense of Rom. ix. 29, but in that of ἀνώτερον at ver. 8); the second is indicated by no such corresponding formula (which induced some copyists and translators to introduce before ver. 17 a ὕστερον λέγει, τότε εἴρηκεν, or the like). It is generally allowed, since Beza and Camerarius, that the sacred writer uses the λέγει ὁ Κύριος of the original to introduce the second half of his citation (after having said before, "This is the covenant," etc., the Lord goes on to say, "Putting my laws," etc.). We should therefore after

λέγει Κύριος set a colon, and with Lachmann and Tischendorf begin the following clause, Διδοὺς, κ.τ.λ., with a capital letter, but not treat the καί at the beginning of ver. 17 in the same way as, for instance, Böhme and Kühnöl. Καί is indeed used by our author to introduce a fresh quotation (as at i. 10, according to Bleek and Hofmann, and probably also at i. 8; see note there), but here it would be disturbing to the sense to divide the promise of forgiveness of past transgressions of the divine law from its necessary condition—the writing of that law upon the heart. God the lawgiver cannot deny Himself. The νόμος of the Old Testament is not destroyed, but deepened and spiritualized. The law once written on the heart, passes from the condition of a mere γράμμα to that of πνεῦμα: man's relation to God becomes inward and spiritual, and his desire for salvation ceases to demand an outward work, but concentrates its view upon the grace already procured, and seeks to enter into and apprehend it. This once for all justifying grace is the basis on which, according to Jeremiah, the new covenant is founded. It follows, therefore, plainly from this prophecy, that the new covenant, of which the Mediator has appeared in the person of Jesus Christ, must be the end of all the sacrifices of the Old Testament.

Ver. 18: *For where there is forgiveness of these, there is no more sacrifice for sin.*

Where there is an ἄφεσις τούτων (*i.e.* τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνομιῶν), *i.e.* where there is an absolute forgiveness of sins, no room or necessity remains for any sin-offering, any further atonement, and consequently for the legal sacrifices which were instituted to meet man's need and craving for such atonement, but were unable in themselves to satisfy it.

We have now reached the conclusion of the great tripartite treatise, which forms the central main division of our epistle (vii. 1–25, vii. 26–ix. 12, and ix. 13–x. 18); "Christ, after the order of Melchizedek, High Priest for eternity," being the great theme which is here worked out. The three

main thoughts developed are, as we have seen: (1) That Christ's priesthood, being of Melchizedek nature, is as highly exalted above the Levitical as heaven is above earth (vii. 1–25); (2) that Christ has accomplished, by His one high-priestly self-oblation, that which the Levitical priesthood with all its sacrifices was unable to accomplish (vii. 26–ix. 12); and (3) that our present and future salvation is assured in Him who, as the eternal Priest upon His royal throne, awaits the appointed time when He shall come again, no longer as a sin-bearer, but in heavenly majesty for final judgment (ix. 13–x. 18). In vii. 1–25 is shown what is meant by saying that Christ is a priest after the order of Melchizedek, and not after that of Aaron; in vii. 26–ix. 12, that He is nevertheless, in virtue of His one oblation, presented in the heavenly sanctuary the antitype of Aaron, whose priestly functions were types and shadows of His. He is not only Priest, but High Priest. And in ix. 13–x. 18 is shown, in contrast to the wearisome cycle of legal sacrifices, the eternal validity of the one high-priestly self-sacrifice of Christ. The latter half of this third section (x. 1–18) recapitulates, as we have shown, the main thoughts of the whole treatise. The high-priesthood of Christ based on His one sacrifice of Himself, its royal Melchizedek character, and the eternal validity of its accomplished work, are all recapitulated and reinforced by fresh appeals to Old Testament Scripture—to Ps. xl., to Ps. cx., and to Jer. xxxi. It should also be observed that already, as far back as ch. v. 1–10, the sacred writer began preparing his readers for the developments of this treatise. After showing there the essential resemblances between the priesthood of Aaron and that of our Lord, he is proceeding to speak of the higher dignity and Melchizedekian character of the latter, when he suddenly pauses and interrupts himself. So impressed, indeed, is he with the low condition of spiritual discernment in his readers, and their consequent peril from temptations to apostasy, that, breaking off at the point already reached (v. 10)—"called by God an high priest after the order of Melchizedek"—he continues with a parenthetical episode of rebuke, warning, and exhortation

(extending from v. 11 to vi. 20), and so at length, at the end of the sixth chapter, returns to the theme already laid down, that Christ, after the order of Melchizedek, has become an high priest, and that for eternity. [Compare the *κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισεδὲκ ἀρχιερεὺς γενόμενος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* of vi. 20 with the previous *προσαγορευθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀρχιερεὺς κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Μελχισεδέκ* of v. 10.] From this it will be seen that there is the closest connection between the section ch. v. 1–10 and the following treatise (ch. vii. 1–x. 18), and that the whole section ch. v. 11–vi. 20 is in fact an episode. Moreover, if, omitting this episode, we regard v. 1–10 and vii. 1–x. 18 as forming one whole, then v. 1–10 will be the preface or introduction, and x. 1–18 the epilogue or conclusion. And if we look back further still, to the commencement of the epistle, and review the whole argument from the first verse to the point we have now reached (ch. x. 18), we shall see that the superiority of the new covenant to the old is throughout, and from all sides, illustrated by the superior dignity of its Mediator. The super-angelic character of the Divine Son and Prophet, in comparison with whom Moses and Joshua were but servants; the high-priestly character of Him who, for our sakes, has been made like unto His brethren; and the royal dignity associated with it, of Him who is returned to God, and is now reigning with God,—all this now stands clear before our minds: the glory of the new covenant is as that of the sun when he goeth forth in his strength, and the moonlight of the old has paled away before it.

THIRD PART OF THE EPISTLE.

CHAP. X. 19–XIII.

THE DISPOSITION OF MIND AND MANNER OF LIFE REQUIRED OF US IN THIS TIME OF WAITING BETWEEN THE COMMENCEMENT AND THE PERFECTING OF THE WORK OF OUR SALVATION.

CHAP. X. 19–39.—*Exhortation to approach the newly opened heavenly sanctuary with full assurance of faith; to hold fast the confession of our well-assured hope; to exercise mutual vigilance over one another, in expectation of the inevitable day of judgment which will overtake with its penalties all those who wilfully apostatize from the once received truth; and to abide in the stedfastness of former days of trial, so as not finally to lose the recompense of reward which that day will bring to those who live by faith.*

THE treatise (vii. 1–x. 18) which forms the central main division of the epistle has suffered no interruption from any of those episodes of exhortation by which the whole of its former portion was characterized. Down to ch. vii. 1, exhortation followed exposition in rapid interchange. Even (ch. v. 1–10) where the sacred writer approaches the exposition of his grand theme, he quickly breaks off again to pour out his heart once more towards his readers in earnest admonition (ch. v. 11–vi. 20). But with all this manifestation of feeling, he remains throughout master of himself and of his subject. The

art and skill of the arrangement of the whole (whether we insist on the consciousness of his scheme in the author's own mind or not) are evident from this, that the exhortation with which he closed (at iv. 14–16), before entering (at v. 1–10) on the main argument, is here (x. 19–23) resumed, so that this third part of the epistle reaches out, as it were, a hand to the first, over the central or main division. The exhortations *κρατῶμεν τῆς ὁμολογίας* and *προσερχώμεθα μετὰ παῤῥησίας τῷ θρόνῳ τῆς χάριτος*, are here repeated in *προσερχώμεθα μετ' ἀληθινῆς καρδίας ἐν πληροφορίᾳ πίστεως* and *κατέχωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν*; and so also the motive-giving *ἔχοντες* of iv. 14 in the *ἔχοντες οὖν* of x. 19. But the renewed exhortations, though in meaning and expression so like the former, are given in deeper and fuller tones. They are based on two motives, which we must first consider.

Vers. 19–21. *Having therefore, brethren, a joyous confidence for entrance into the holies in the blood of Jesus, which he inaugurated for us a new and living way, through the veil, that is, his flesh; and having a great priest over the house of God.*

The purpose of the whole preceding exposition, to which the *οὖν* (of *ἔχοντες οὖν*) refers, may be summed up in the two following results: (1) Christ is through death, by which as our high priest He effected our atonement, gone back to God; and (2) He is now partaker of co-equal majesty with the heavenly Father: and on the basis of that once accomplished reconciliation, He rules and acts as our high-priestly intercessor. On these two great results of the whole previous exposition (vii. 1–x. 18), as on two mighty columns, the sacred writer now bases the exhortations which follow, this *ἔχοντες* being placed significantly in the foreground. We Christians have and possess, in consequence of those two great facts, Christ's return to the Father, and His majestic session at God's right hand, a twofold position of privilege: (1.) We have *παῤῥησίαν εἰς τὴν εἴσοδον τῶν ἁγίων ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰησοῦ*, *i.e.* our first privilege is a right of entrance into the divine sanctuary; and then, (2.) as a consequence

of having this right, a joyous confidence to avail ourselves of it. It is this feeling of confidence which is expressed in *παῤῥησία* (comp. iii. 6 and iv. 16, and notes there). (Compare also Isocrates, *Bus.* 16, *παῤῥησία εἰς τοὺς θεούς*.) Our being entitled to enter the heavenly sanctuary, the place of God's essential presence, is a source of joyful confidence to our minds: we may approach now with perfect confidence, as being assured of admission. The דרך הקדש is now open to us (comp. Gen. iii. 24). And this confidence we have *ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰησοῦ*. Bleek and Stier erroneously refer this *ἐν* (in the sense of *cum*) to *εἴσοδον* (comparing ix. 25): "for entrance into the holies with the blood of Jesus, *i.e.* exhibiting that blood as the ground of our reconciliation." But thus to enter the holy of holies with sacrificial blood is an exclusively high-priestly function. Christ has done that for us once for all; and we follow Him into the sanctuary, in order to be with Him there in the presence of God. *Ἐν* must therefore be connected with *παῤῥησίαν*, as at Eph. iii. 12, *ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν παῤῥησίαν καὶ τὴν προσαγωγήν*. It is the blood of Christ shed for our reconciliation which is the basis and the source of our confidence. Christ, in high-priestly wise, has preceded us (comp. the *πρόδρομος* of vi. 20); we follow Him along the way which He has opened and formed for us, knowing ourselves to be now reconciled and sanctified by the one oblation (*προσφορά*) of His blood outpoured on earth and presented in heaven. The opening and formation of this way of approach is expressed in the relative clause attached to *εἴσοδον*: *ἣν ἐνεκαίνισεν ἡμῖν ὁδὸν πρόσφατον καὶ ζῶσαν*—He has consecrated, or inaugurated, the entrance-way (*εἴσοδος*). *Ἐγκαινίζειν* in Hellenistic Greek is the term for dedicating or setting apart for future use (so Deut. xx. 5, of the dedication of a newly built house). *Πρόσφατος* would signify undoubtedly, in accordance with its etymology (like *νεότομος*), newly slain, just killed (so in Homer, *Il.* xxiv. 757); but we can hardly admit an allusion here to the Lord's death (Gerhard), as the etymological meaning is quite lost sight of in later classical and Hellenistic usage (*e.g.* Deut. xxxii. 17, the word is used for "new gods;" Ecclus. ix. 10, for "a new friend;"

Joseph. *Antiq.* i. 18. 3, for recent disagreement in contrast with former concord). *Πρόσφατος* has here, therefore, simply the meaning of newly made or recent: *ὅδον πρόσφατον*, a hitherto untrodden, newly opened way (Hofmann); *ὡς τότε πρῶτον φανεῖσαν* (Theodoret). The heavenly way opened for us by the entrance of Jesus Christ is compared with that into the earthly sanctuary (ch. ix. 7 sq.)—one never trodden before. No saint of the Old Testament, in whatever degree he might stand of preparatory or prevenient grace, could (as Stier rightly interprets) draw nigh to God so confidently, so joyously, so familiarly as we can now. This new way, whose formation constitutes a broad division between the Old and New Testaments, is also *ζῶσα*. This *ζῶσα* is variously explained: a way "leading to life" (De Wette); a "life-giving" way (Olshausen); an "abiding, imperishable" way (Bleek), "consisting in an act of living power" (Ebrard). This last is also Stier's interpretation: "To go this way is no dead work of the dead, but truth, and power, and life before God." My own interpretation was formerly very like this: "The Old Testament way into the sanctuary was an outward and symbolical one, earthly and carnal, belonging to the present cosmical order of things; the way of the New Testament is a spiritual way, that must be walked in the Spirit, and have for its ground and basis a regenerate life from God." But all this does not strike the real key-note. Weiss rightly explains the *ἐλπὶς ζῶσα* of St. Peter (which Bleek refers to here) as a hope which is an effect and sign of regeneration,—"a living energy, not a lifeless conviction or sentiment, but one affecting and transforming the whole inward man, and influencing every part of the outward conduct." So *ζῶσα* is here the antithesis of that which is lifeless and powerless. The way into the sanctuary of the Old Testament was simply a lifeless pavement trodden by the high priest, and by him alone; the way opened by Jesus Christ is one that really leads and carries all who enter it into the heavenly rest, being in fact the reconciliation of mankind with God, once and for ever effected by Him through His ascension to the Father,—a "living way," because

one with the living person and abiding work of Jesus Christ (Hofm. *Schriftb.* ii. 1. 320).

This entrance to the heavenly sanctuary, this new and living way, Christ has opened to us—"through the veil"—*διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσματος τοῦτ' ἔστιν τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*. This may be explained either by a reference to St. John ii. 21, where the Lord speaks of the temple of His body, or to St. Matt. xxvii. 51, where the rending of the veil of the Jewish temple at the time of the Lord's death exposed to view the inner sanctuary. The latter is the right reference. The rending of the earthly temple-veil at the crucifixion was really an emblem of that of which the sacred writer here speaks. In the former passage (John ii. 21) the Lord regards His own body as a temple indwelt by the Godhead, whereas here the point of view is different. It is not as God-man, but as High Priest ministering before God, that the writer of our epistle is here regarding Him. While He was with us here below, the weak, limit-bound, and mortal *σάρξ* (ch. v. 7) which He had assumed for our sakes hung like a curtain between Him and the divine sanctuary into which He would enter; and in order to such entrance, this curtain had to be withdrawn by death, even as the high priest had to draw aside the temple-veil in order to make his entry to the holy of holies. The Lord in death laid aside the Adamite conditions of His human nature, to resume it again transfigured and glorified; and in this way He reconciled (*ἀποκατήλλαξεν*) us in the body of His flesh through death (Col. i. 22), so that as now between Him and God, so also between God and us, the flesh should be no more a separating barrier. The sacred writer's meaning cannot be, that the new and living way thus opened for us has still a *καταπέτασμα* through which it passes; and it is therefore unallowable to connect *διὰ τοῦ καταπετάσματος* with *ὁδόν*, or to supply an *οὖσαν* or *ἄγουσαν* (with Bleek, De Wette, v. Gerlach, and Lünemann). It is indeed through faith in Christ crucified that we enter now in heart and mind the heavenly sanctuary; but the veil which was rent by the Lord's death in order to our entrance was that pierced body of humiliation, which under its then

conditions is a thing of the past, and needs no further withdrawal now. To understand *οὖσαν* or *ἄγουσαν* after *ὁδον* would, at any rate, be liable to suggest the interpretation here disclaimed, and therefore be misleading, even though those who proposed the one may not all have fallen into the other. We must therefore (with Schlichting, Böhme, and Hofmann) connect *διὰ τοῦ καταπ.* with *ἐνεκαίνισεν*, in the sense that Christ has inaugurated or opened for us the way of approach to God, by passing Himself through the veil, *i.e.* His flesh. *Ἐγκαινίζειν* is here used in the sense of opening a way, or making approachable. The other construction of the sentence, viz., "*which* [*entrance*] *He inaugurated for us a new and living way*, leading or made through His flesh," is harsher, and every way less suitable.

The sacred writer proceeds to a second fact on which to base his exhortation; viz. the eternal priesthood of the ascended Jesus, as now exercised in the immediate presence of the Father: *καὶ* [*ἔχοντες*] *ἱερέα μέγαν ἐπὶ τὸν οἶκον τοῦ Θεοῦ*. Both in the Septuagint and Philo, *ὁ ἱερεὺς ὁ μέγας* stands occasionally for הכהן הגדול; but our author always uses the composite *ἀρχιερεύς*, and in one place speaks of our Lord as *ἀρχιερέα μέγαν* (ch. iv. 14). By *ἱερέα μέγαν*, therefore, here we are to understand not simply a high priest, but one who is at the same time Priest and King (*sacerdos regius et rex sacerdotalis*, Seb. Schmidt), one who is enthroned as Priest above all created heavens. The next question is, What are we to understand by the *οἶκος τοῦ Θεοῦ* here? Comparing iv. 14, viii. 2, ix. 11, xii. 24, and the *εἴσοδον τῶν ἁγίων* of ver. 19, together with John xiv. 2 (*ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τοῦ Πατρός μου*), it would seem that the heaven of glory, the place of angels and blessed spirits, is what is here called the house of God. A reference, on the other hand, to iii. 3–6 might seem to decide in favour of the church on earth, as being that "house of God" *in* which (*ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ*) Moses ministered as servant, but *over* which (*ἐπὶ τὸν οἶκον*) Christ is placed as Son.[1] But do these interpretations thus really

[1] For the former interpretation, compare Theophylact, Böhme, Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann: for the latter, Theodoret, Œcumenius, Tholuck,

exclude one another?··The term "house" designates both the dwelling-place of the family, and the family itself. So that even if the first intention of the word be here to designate the heavenly tabernacle (*σκηνή*), where God reveals Himself in glory to the church triumphant, it may be held to include at the same time the members of that church, the company of the blessed for whom faith has been changed to vision, and that without excluding even the members of the church here, who are already citizens of that heavenly city. (See note on xii. 22 sq.) But to have so great a Priest over us in our pilgrimage towards the eternal home, and to be enabled even now in prayer to reach the inmost recesses of the divine sanctuary, the very heart of God, how great are these privileges, how full of comfort, but also how full of warning! So—

Ver. 22. *Let us draw near with a true heart, in full assurance of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our body washed with pure water.*

We assume as certain, that both participial clauses depend on *προσερχώμεθα*. This Bleek has elaborately proved, and De Wette assents; and so the sentence is rendered in the Peshito, Itala, Vulgate (as understood by Primasius), and by Luther. *Προσέρχεσθαι* is a technical liturgical word, and sprinkling and washing are liturgical acts of preparation. This being clearly understood, it is a matter of comparative indifference whether we put a full stop or a comma at the end of ver. 22. For my own part, I should prefer, with Tholuck, to place a comma only after *καθαρῷ*. Many interpreters, however, insist on attaching the second participial clause *καὶ λελουμένοι, κ.τ.λ.*, to *κατέχωμεν*, in preference to *προσερχώμεθα*. So Erasmus, Beza, Bengel, Griesbach, Kuinœl, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Böhme, Schulz, Ebrard, and Lünemann; and it has even been maintained that the period commencing with *ἔχοντες* concludes with

Hofmann; and also Lactantius, *Inst.* iv. 14,—a passage which, speaking of the *sempiternum sacerdotium Christi* in the great and everlasting temple of His church, seems to be an echo of our epistle.

πίστεως, and that both the participial clauses are to be connected with the following κατέχωμεν. (So Hofmann, *Weiss.* ii. 234; *Schriftb.* ii. 2. 160; and *Entsteh.* 345.) Both constructions seem to us unnatural in the highest degree. The former separates two closely connected liturgical acts, those of sprinkling and washing: the latter separates them from the liturgical προσερχώμεθα. To say that the clause ἔχοντες introduces the exhortation προσερχώμεθα, and the clauses ἐῤῥαντισμένοι and λελουμένοι the exhortation κατέχωμεν, is to misstate the relations of thought in the whole paragraph. Rather say: As the double clause commencing with ἔχοντες and ending with ἐπὶ τὸν οἶκον τοῦ Θεοῦ states the objective privileges of the Christian covenant, by which our approach to the throne of grace, or God Himself, is rendered possible; so the double clause ἐῤῥαντισμένοι and λελουμένοι, ending with καθαρῷ, expresses the subjective conditions of a personal apprehension of those privileges by us. The entrance to the divine eternal sanctuary is henceforth opened to us, its great High Priest being there as our reconciler. But how could we avail ourselves of that privilege, if we approached the sanctuary as still unsanctified? In reply to this question, the later participial clauses tell us of a twofold sanctification provided for us, which once for all has rendered it possible for us to enter as hallowed persons the holy of holies. And between the objective and subjective conditions of this approach comes the μετὰ ἀληθινῆς καρδίας ἐν πληροφορίᾳ πίστεως, stating the disposition of mind in which each act of approach should be made. First, we must come "with a true heart," *i.e.* a heart entirely that which it ought to be—a heart without hypocrisy, without double-mindedness; comp. the בלב שלם of Isa. xxxviii. 3 ("with a perfect heart"), rendered thus by the Septuagint, ἐν καρδίᾳ ἀληθινῇ. And secondly, we must come "with full assurance of faith" (comp. vi. 11), *i.e.* without any disbelief or diffidence as to our right of approach and certainty of acceptance, through the entrance and presence of our great High Priest. Our right, indeed, and fitness to draw nigh to the place of God's presence, is a far higher one than that of Israel of old when

sprinkled with the blood of the covenant at the foot of Sinai (ch. ix. 19), or than that of the Levitical priesthood when prepared for the services of the sanctuary on the day of their consecration, by being first "washed with water" (Lev. viii. 6), and then anointed on ear and hand and foot with the blood of the ram of consecration (Lev. viii. 23); who also, before every sacrificial service, had to wash hands and feet in the great laver before the tabernacle (Ex. xxx. 39); and whose chief, the high priest, on the day of atonement, had (according to the ritual of the second temple) to bathe five times, and wash hands and feet ten times. [So the Talmudic tract *Joma*, iii. 3 (in Robert Sheringham's edition, p. 46). The Thorah (Lev. xvi.) prescribes only a twofold bath—λούειν τὸ σῶμα.]

To these merely typical and external sprinklings and washings under the law, is now opposed a twofold antitypical operation of divine grace, which once and for ever cleanses us in body and spirit, and so provides the necessary קְדֻשָּׁה before our entrance into the heavenly קֹדֶשׁ.

We are (1) ἐῤῥαντισμένοι (for which Lachmann and Tischendorf, after A, C, D*, ρεραντισμενοι) τὰς καρδίας ἀπὸ συνειδήσεως πονηρᾶς, *i.e.* sprinkled as to our hearts, these being the objects of the action; and with this consequence, that they are thereby delivered from an evil conscience: ῥαντίζειν ἀπό being used *sensu prægnante* for to sprinkle, and thereby cleanse or purify; and συνείδησις πονηρά for the inward consciousness of guilt or sin; for "when a man's life and action are evil, his very conscience, so far as it is conscious of such evil, is itself πονηρά" (*Psychol.* p. 103). It is then an inwardly justifying and sanctifying ῥαντισμός which has been vouchsafed to us, namely, "the sprinkling (ῥαντισμός) of the blood of Jesus Christ" (1 Pet. i. 2), which, having been shed for this purpose, is called (xii. 24) "the blood of sprinkling" (αἷμα ῥαντισμοῦ, comp. ch. ix. 14).

Again, we are (2) λελουμένοι τὸ σῶμα ὕδατι καθαρῷ. To understand this expression with Ebrard (following Calvin and Limborch, etc.) as a merely symbolical or figurative

one for an inward and purely spiritual operation of divine grace, is impossible with the antithesis so marked here of τὸ σῶμα and τὰς καρδίας. Even Beza recognises a reference to baptism, and contents himself with interpreting ὕδατι καθαρῷ by *Spiritus Sancti gratiâ*. Menken, too, understands the words as referring to baptism; without so explaining away the water as to overlook the *unio sacramentalis*. The appeal to Ezek. xxxvi. 25, "I will sprinkle upon you pure water" (καθαρὸν ὕδωρ), in favour of the figurative interpretation here is inadmissible. The prophet is indeed himself speaking figuratively, and the sprinkling with him is as purely figurative as the water; but it must be borne in mind, that in prophecy it is not only the substantial meaning but also the very form itself which is prophetic; and so here in Ezekiel, then, is a real prophecy of the grace of baptism as clothed in a visible sacramental form. Baptism is in the New Testament a laver or bath of regeneration (ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος); and the water thus specified is not only a figure, but also a vehicle of the Spirit. There was likewise a ὕδωρ καθαρόν under the Old Testament (מים קדושים), or "water of holiness," by the operation of which the adulterous woman was punished for her sin (Num. v. 17). From its judicial, punitive, sin-condemning, and so sin-destroying energy, it was called "water of sanctification," or "pure water." But its action after all was confined to the region of the σάρξ. Not so with the water of which the apostolic writer is speaking here. It is called "pure water" because its operation is a purifying one in reference to man's relations with God. It is a purification of a spiritual nature with an outward, bodily, sacramental form. The writer uses the word σῶμα, and not σάρξ, with intention. The σῶμα has a twofold character. It has one side which is merely outward, tangible, and visible, and another beyond the range of the dissecting knife and microscope which is inward and psychical, the seat and organ of the animating soul. It is this internal side of the σῶμα to which the sacred writer is here referring. As the word of God is said (ch. iv. 12) to penetrate ἄχρι μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος, ἁρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν, so the water of

baptism is a pure water as effecting not merely an outward and ceremonial purification, but as being the sacramental vehicle of an inward divine operation, by which the spiritual side of this earthly σῶμα is consecrated for the future resurrection and for the present indwelling of the Holy Spirit. In this way both our personal and our natural life receives a special consecration for divine service and communion, by which we are enabled to approach with confidence the throne and presence of the Holy One.

A question remains to be answered: whether the divine operation here spoken of on the συνείδησις is to be regarded as extra-sacramental, and that on the σῶμα as a sacramental one; or whether, as Hofmann lays down, both operations are different effects of one and the same sacrament of holy baptism, as consecrating both our personal and natural life for that fellowship with Jesus Christ which has for its basis and condition the indwelling of the Holy Spirit vouchsafed by Him to His Church. I decide for the former alternative. For though the believer obtains in baptism the washing away of sins (Acts xxii. 16; 1 Cor. vi. 11), and although baptism as the sacrament of regeneration exerts both a justifying and sanctifying energy, and as such hallows both the personal or moral and the natural or bodily life, yet the expression nowhere occurs in Scripture, that we are therein or thereby "sprinkled" with the blood of Christ. To refer the ῥαντισμὸν αἵματος of 1 Pet. i. 2 to baptism is precarious: the allusion in the first instance being to Ex. xxiv. 7 sq., and so rather to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper than to baptism (see Weiss, *Petrinischer Lehrbegriff*, pp. 269–273). It is therefore but a few interpreters who, like Horneius, have thus referred to baptism the ἐῤῥαντισμένοι of our text, the far greater number—ancients (Greek and Latin), Reformers, and post-Reformers (as Gerhard, Sebastian Schmidt, etc.)—interpreting it of a purely inward and spiritual operation of divine grace. Had, indeed, the sacred writer meant to be understood otherwise, he would surely rather have given precedence to the clause which unmistakeably refers to baptism, and substituted for the (in this connection) less

appropriate term ἐῤῥαντισμένοι ("sprinkled"), one more suitable to the action implied by the terms βαπτισμός, λοῦτρον, טבילה, such as κεκαθαρισμένοι. As in reference to the other sacrament we are compelled by our Lord's teaching in the 6th of St. John to recognise an extra-sacramental reception of the body and blood of Christ, of which the sole instrument is faith, so beside and after baptism may we likewise recognise a purely spiritual sprinkling or washing with the blood of Christ, by means of faith, of which the Christian daily stands in need for the cleansing of his garments (Rev. vii. 14) and for his progress in sanctification (1 John i. 7). We, as Christians, are all priests, having received a sacerdotal sprinkling, and being cleansed in a sacerdotal laver,—a sprinkling with the blood of Christ which imparts a joyous sense of justification before God, and so daily relieves the conscience from the pollution and burden of unpardoned sin; and a laver of baptism whose cleansing waters have penetrated not only into the depths of our moral consciousness, but also into the very ground of our bodily nature with a spiritually quickening and healing power: we therefore are sanctified, not carnally, or in mere outward show, but inwardly and spiritually, and yet so that the whole of our being, body, soul, and spirit, partakes of the new impulse. Sprinkled with that blood which speaketh evermore in the heavenly sanctuary, and washed with baptismal water sacramentally impregnated with the same, we are at all times privileged to approach by a new and living way the heavenly temple, entering by faith its inner sanctuary, and there presenting ourselves in the presence of God. The unspeakable blessings which this entry procures to us form the ground (comp. iv. 14–16) of the following exhortation:

Ver. 23. *Let us hold fast the confession of hope as indefectible; for faithful is he that hath given the promise.*

Heaven is now accessible to us, but as yet only in the spirit and by faith. Christ is our High Priest there, but as yet unseen; we are still among those members of His family whose pilgrimage is not yet over. To see Him as He is, in

royal state, triumphant over every foe, and to enter on the riches of our own inheritance in Him, is still for us an object of hope, which as an anchor of our souls is fixed already in the sanctuary above. But this hope in us (1 Pet. iii. 15), like the faith from which it springs, being full of joyous assurance (ch. vi. 11), cannot remain dumb; it must speak, and give a reason both to friends and enemies of its own existence. It utters itself in a frank confession which we are to hold fast (*κατέχειν*; compare iii. 6, and *κρατεῖν* at iv. 14): *ἀκλινῆ*,—so fast and stedfast (*βέβαιαν*, iii. 14) as neither to be allured nor frightened from it, nor tempted by the unpromising aspect of the present to depreciate its grandeur or to doubt its reality. And of this hope we need under no circumstances of discouragement be ever ashamed: *πιστὸς γὰρ ὁ ἐπαγγειλάμενος*, the God who has made the promise on which it leans is the absolutely faithful and true (נאמן); perjury or breach of promise are in the widest antithesis to His nature (vi. 18); He must be as good as His word. We are reminded here of the oft-recurring Pauline formula, *πιστὸς ὁ Θεός* (*Κύριος*): 1 Thess. v. 24; 2 Thess. ii. 3; 1 Cor. i. 9 and x. 13, and frequently elsewhere; passages which alone are sufficient to prove that hope occupies as high a place in St. Paul's theology as in that of our epistle, and even as in that of St. Peter, who might be called *par excellence* the Apostle of Hope. And how beautifully is the exhortation here disposed in conformity with the Pauline triad of Christian graces (1 Cor. xiii. 13; 1 Thess. i. 3, v. 8; Col. i. 4)! First, the injunction to approach in the full assurance of *faith;* then that to hold fast the confession of our *hope;* and now a third, to godly rivalry in the manifestations of Christian *charity:*

Ver. 24. *And let us have regard to one another in respect to a provocation unto love and good works.*

This third exhortation is also subordinated to the *ἔχοντες οὖν* . . . of vers. 19–21. The sacred writer is addressing all his readers as *brethren* (*ἀδελφοί*, ver. 19), having in common equal rights of approach to the eternal sanctuary, and to a

share in all the blessings of the household of Christ. As such, they must act in a brotherly way one towards another. This first and obvious meaning of the sentence is obscured by the interpretation which makes the purpose of this mutual observation to be a self-provoking on each man's part to imitate the love and the good deeds of his neighbour (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact, Primasius, Peirce, Michaelis, Bleek). The exhortation *κατανοῶμεν ἀλλ.* is rather in opposition to that selfish indifference to the condition and interests of one's neighbour which characterizes the man of this world; and the *παροξυσμός* which is its result is the only "provocation" worthy of the Christian, a stirring up the brethren to a rivalry in good works. Some commentators (Limborch, Lünemann, and even De Wette) would combine both interpretations; but that is hardly admissible: in the one case the individual *παροξυσμός*, as a result of the *κατανοεῖν ἀλλήλους*, would be the chief point in view; in the other, the mutual *κατανοεῖν* with a view to a mutual *παροξυσμός*. The verb *κατανοεῖν*, as already observed (at iii. 1), is one specially familiar to St. Luke. *Παροξυσμός* recurs only once in the New Testament, and again in the writings of St. Luke (Acts xv. 39), but there in a bad sense, the "irritation" of the dispute between St. Paul and St. Barnabas. Here, of course, it is used in a good sense, as the verb (*παροξύνειν*) is by Xenophon, *Mem.* iii. 3, 13. The Latin rendering is "*in provocationem amoris et bonorum operum*," on which Bengel makes the delicate comment, *cui contraria provocatio odii.* The substantive is indeed more naturally used in a bad sense, to which an allusion is traceable here. The genitive *παροξ. ἀγάπης κ. καλῶν ἔργων* is like *ἀνάστασις ζωῆς* and *βάπτισμα μετανοίας*, and the like; it is equivalent to *πρὸς*, *ἐπὶ*, or *εἰς ἀγάπην . . .* It is evident from what follows that *κατανοῶμεν ἀλλήλους* is to be taken in the same sense as *ἐπισκοποῦντες* at xii. 15, and that *παροξυσμός* is to be understood of a friendly *παράκλησις*:

Ver. 25. *Not forsaking our church assembly, as is the*

custom with some, but using exhortation, and that so much the more as ye see the day drawing nigh.

It is thus shown them what they must avoid and what they must practise, in order to secure this wholesome Christian influence of one man upon another. They must beware of laxity in attendance on religious assemblies, and encourage the practice of Christian exhortation. *Ἐπισυναγωγή* has been here interpreted of the church, *e.g.* by Böhme in the sense: you are not to forsake the poor persecuted flock, the "*societas Christiana*," but to render it faithful assistance; and by Bleek: you are not to intermit your charitable exertions on its behalf. But this interpretation of *ἐπισυναγωγή* is inadmissible. The church is always styled *ἐκκλησία*, and the term *ἐπισυναγωγή* is never applied to the religious community, whether Jewish or Christian. It occurs once only in pre-Christian literature (*ἐπισυναγωγὴν τοῦ λαοῦ*, 2 Macc. ii. 7), and is there used of the regathering of the Diaspora, and only once more in that of the New Testament (2 Thess. ii. 1), and there applied to the gathering together of the saints around the Lord at His second coming (*ἡμῶν ἐπισυναγωγῆς ἐπ' αὐτόν*). In accordance with both these passages, the meaning of *ἐπισυναγωγή* in our text will be an assembling together for church purposes, for common worship, *i.e.* a church-assembly, but not (as Bengel and even Primasius, with his *congregationem fidelium*, take it) church-fellowship or communion. (So Tholuck, De Wette, Ebrard, Lünemann, Hofmann.) The difference between *ἐπισυναγωγή* and *συναγωγή* is probably similar to that of עֲבוֹר (*cœtus*) and כְּנֶסֶת (*ecclesia*): *ἐγκαταλείπειν τὴν ἐπισυναγ.* does not mean to forsake the public assembly of the church by going out, but by failure of attendance (comp. ch. xiii. 5; 2 Cor. iv. 9; 2 Tim. iv. 10, 16). Our author probably uses *ἐπισυναγωγή* here simply to avoid the Judaic-sounding term *συναγωγή*, which is applied once only to a Christian assembly in the New Testament, and that in the Epistle of St. James (ii. 2). (Contrast with this the *συναγωγὴ τοῦ Σατανᾶ* of Rev. iii. 9.) It is evident from the *καθὼς ἔθος τισίν* that it is not absolute apostasy which the sacred writer has here in view, but simply such

negligence and lukewarmness as came perilously near it. Every one, he teaches, is bound in duty to the whole congregation to minister to its edification both by word and example. If he neglect this, he incurs a great responsibility. And the duty is enforced by a further consideration—*τοσουτῳ μᾶλλον ὅσῳ βλέπετε ἐγγίζουσαν τὴν ἡμέραν*, which we need not to refer back with De Wette to ver. 23, nor with Bengel to ver. 22. It is naturally suggested by the terms of this third exhortation, with which, indeed, it is syntactically connected. Let us (says the author) be the more zealous in promoting an advancement of holiness amongst ourselves, the more evidently the day of the Lord is seen to be approaching. We are not to combine *ὅσῳ* with *ἐγγίζουσαν*, as if the meaning were *quanto propinquiòrem*, but with *βλέπετε*, as equivalent to *quanto magis* (*ὅσω = ὅσῳ μᾶλλον*) *videtis*. Among the various designations of the second advent of Christ for judgment, this *ἡ ἡμέρα* (here, and 1 Cor. iii. 13) is the briefest. It is the day of days, the final, the decisive day of time, the commencing day of eternity, breaking through and breaking up for the church of the redeemed the night of the present. In *βλέπετε* the *ἀνακοίνωσις* is exchanged for direct address. The author of the epistle appeals to his readers' own sense and conviction of the approach of this great day. The day of Christ, indeed, is ever nigh, continually approaching nearer: we must at all times be prepared for it. But at the time when this epistle was written the approaching judgment on Jerusalem, of which so many signs filled the sky, brought home the thought in a peculiarly vivid manner to men's minds. That judgment, indeed, though not the day itself, was truly its fiery and blood-red dawn.

The approaching day is the day of Christ, who comes not now for atonement, but for final judgment. Hence the necessity of perseverance in fellowship with His church in giving and receiving, and in mutual exhortation to love and good works, is deduced from the hopeless and terrible future which awaits apostasy.

Ver. 26. *For if we sin wilfully after we have received the*

knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more a sacrifice for sins.

Ἁμαρτανεῖν is here the same as περιπεσεῖν at ch. vi. 6, and ἀποστῆναι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ at ch. iii. 12 (comp. 2 Pet. ii. 4, and ἁμαρτία at iii. 13 of our epistle). The sin meant is that of apostasy; unfaithfulness to God, and to His manifestation in Christ, being the ground and foundation of all other sin. This sin, called also פשע in the Old Testament (*e.g.* Isa. lxvi. 24), is committed by the man who, having from a Jew become a Christian, willingly and knowingly forsakes the services and communion of Christ's people to make common cause with the antichristian synagogue. Its special nature and characteristics are unmistakeably indicated by the present participle ἁμαρτανόντων, and the added clause μετὰ τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας. The present ἁμαρτανόντων indicates perseverance and continuance in apostasy; the sin here spoken of is not a momentary or short-lived aberration from which the infirm but sincere believer is speedily recalled by the convictions of the Spirit, but one wilfully persisted in: the μετὰ τὸ λαβεῖν, κ.τ.λ., expresses also the condition without which such irrecoverable failure is not to be assumed as possible, viz. a previous experience and knowledge of the grace and truth of the new covenant. Neither ἐπίγνωσις nor ἀλήθεια occur again in this epistle; but ἐπιγν. [τῆς] ἀλήθ. recurs at 1 Tim. ii. 4 and elsewhere in the Pastoral Epistles. It is sometimes said that γνῶσις is the weaker, ἐπιγ. the stronger term; γνῶσις the more general, ἐπιγν. the particular; or that, while the former expresses an habitual state or condition of mind, the latter denotes an active operation. The truth of all which is, that ἐπίγνωσις designates an active application of the mental powers to some one definite object, and consequently a complete and intelligent apprehension of its nature: whence it follows that we may speak of a false γνῶσις, but not of a false or unreal ἐπίγνωσις. The sacred writer, therefore, clearly intimates by the very choice of the word that it is not a mere outward and historical knowledge of which he is here speaking, but an inward, quickening, believing apprehension of revealed truth. That after such

apprehension of truth apostasy is *possible*, that even those once truly converted *may* fall away from grace, has been already shown at ch. vi. 4–8; and we have already come to the conviction that the impossibility of renewal there predicated of such apostates is not to be understood as a merely relative, but as an absolute impossibility. The same assertion is made here. "To those who after full enlightenment thus fall away, all prospect of future grace and repentance is foreclosed. There is but one sacrifice that can take away sin." That sacrifice is the self-oblation of Jesus Christ. He who knowingly and wilfully rejects that sacrifice, suppressing by an act of self-will his own better knowledge and convictions, in order to return to the dead works and lifeless service of Judaism, for him no other sacrifice for sin is kept in reserve. (For ἀπολείπεται here, compare ch. iv. 6–9.) The meaning is not merely that the Jewish sacrifices to which the apostate is returned have in themselves no sin-destroying power, nor even that there is no second sacrifice additional to that of Christ, but further, that for a sinner of this kind the very sacrifice of Christ itself has no more atoning or reconciling power. He can hope for no more forgiveness. His desperate condition is both the natural consequence of his wilful error, and also a condign punishment inflicted by a divine hand. He not only shuts out himself from grace, but the door of repentance is shut behind him; and he has before him only the prospect of a damnation from which there is no escape.

Ver. 27. *But a certain fearful expectation of a judgment and jealousy of fire that one day will devour the adversaries.*

Of this δέ after a negation, corresponding to the Latin *imo*, we have already spoken at ch. ii. 5. It is a term of expression familiar with our author (comp. iv. 13, 15, vi. 12, vii. 3, ix. 12, x. 5). "No sin-offering remains for such; nay, but rather a fearful expectation of judgment to come." This last is not to be interpreted *per hypallagen* as = φοβερᾶς ἐκδοχὴ κρίσεως: the ἐκδοχή itself is terrible; a dread and shuddering anticipation of future punishment afflicts already

the inmost soul of the apostate. Its awful character is further intimated by the added τις: see Kühner, § 633; Winer, § 25, 2; Nägelsbach, *Lat. Stylistik*, § 82, 3, where this τίς, δή τις, *quidam*, is explained as making an impression of grandeur and fulness by a vagueness which leaves to the imagination of the auditor or reader to fill up what is not expressed. So here, the awe and terror of this anticipation can only be faintly imagined by the mind which has not felt it, and is in itself inexpressible. This is all that remains for the apostate Christian; καὶ πυρὸς ζῆλος ἐσθίειν μέλλοντος τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. We must not render this πυρὸς ζῆλος (with Luther) by *Feuereifer*, "fiery zeal." The Hebrew phrase is קנאה אש (fire of wrath or jealousy), but not קנאת אש (jealousy of fire). (See Zeph. i. 18; Ezek. xxxvi. 5; Ps. lxxix. 5.) Most recent interpreters, therefore (Böhme, Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann), assume that the fire is here personified, or regarded as an animated subject. So also Theophylact: ἐψύχωσε τὸ πῦρ. This is not wrong, only behind this personification stands a fuller truth than behind an ordinary figure of speech. We have something similar here to the personification of the λόγος at ch. iv. 12. As the divine Word, so this divine fire has a divine personality behind it. God Himself is in Scripture both light (φῶς) and fire (πῦρ). As ἀγάπη He is light, and both as ἀγάπη and ὀργή He is fire. Fire, according to the view maintained throughout Scripture, occupies a mid position between light and darkness, and קנאה (literally "burning heat," from קנא, *incandescere*) is the fiery glow both of the jealousy of love and of that of indignation. The jealousy here spoken of is that of the indignant Judge; the "fire" is the wrath which jealousy kindles, or rather God Himself as the Πῦρ κατανα-λίσκον of ch. xii. 29 (אש אכלה). "Jealousy of fire," therefore, is equivalent to jealousy of wrath, or rather jealousy of God, the Wrathful One. The omission of the article before κρίσεως and πυρὸς μέλλοντος, κ.τ.λ., makes the image more concentrated and pictorial, and the whole impression more vivid. Μέλλοντος refers to the day of ver. 25, on which day the long-pent-up wrath of Him who now waits to

be gracious, and will have then waited so long, will at length break forth with irresistible consuming power and destroy all that opposes itself to God. *Μέλλειν* is used of that which is in the process of becoming, and whose presence, therefore, is divined or felt before its actual manifestation. The sacred writer has probably Isa. xxvi. 11 in view, where, in the midst of a hymn-like prophecy of the restoration of Israel and the destruction of their oppressors, the singer bursts forth with the exclamation, "*Jehovah! uplifted is Thine hand, and yet they see not. See shall they, and be ashamed, for jealousy* (ζῆλος) *on behalf of a people* (Israel), *yea, a fire shall devour Thine adversaries*" (*πῦρ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἔδεται*).

The greatness of the inexorable judgment which will befall those who, having been among Christ's favoured ones, make Him their enemy, is now further illustrated by the inexorable penalty which awaited those who wilfully and obstinately violated the injunctions of the Mosaic law:

Vers. 28, 29. *Hath any one despised the law of Moses, without mercy he dieth under one or two witnesses: of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy, who hath trampled under foot the Son of God, and accounted common the blood of the covenant in which he was sanctified, and insulted the Spirit of grace?*

Some eleven or twelve kinds of sin are denounced in the Mosaic law as incurring the extreme penalty of death, *e.g.* wilful murder, obstinate disobedience to parents, kidnapping, adultery, etc. Here the cases had in view seem to be chiefly the sins of blasphemy (Lev. xxiv. 11–16), idolatry and seduction thereto (Deut. xvii. 2–7), and false prophesyings (Deut. xviii. 20); but especially those denounced at Deut. xvii. 2–7, where the exact phrase *ἐπὶ δυσὶ μάρτυσιν ἢ ἐπὶ τρισὶ μάρτυσιν* occurs as the condition required before passing sentence of death, and the prescribed mode of carrying out that sentence is characterized by more than usual harshness, and is suggestive of the expression here made use of—*χωρὶς οἰκτιρμῶν*. But the main point is, that there is the strictest

analogy between the two cases. Apostasy from Jehovah for the service of other gods is denounced in this passage of Deuteronomy as the extremest breach possible of the Mosaic law, and as such visited with the extremest penalties. And the like character is assigned in our epistle to the sin of apostasy from Christ for the fellowship and services of anti-christian Judaism, whose God even is no longer the true God, inasmuch as He is not recognised as the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. If the apostate under the Old Testament was punished with such inexorable severity, how severer must be the penalty incurred by the sinner under the New Testament against fuller light and holier privileges? This thought is pressed home to the consciences of his readers by means of the parenthetical δοκεῖτε. It consists of a *gradatio a minore ad majus*, for which compare ii. 2 and xii. 25. In ἀξιωθήσεται we are to understand God Himself as the ἀξιῶν by whom all actions are weighed and their worth determined (ἄξιος from ἄγειν), and the measure of penalty needed to vindicate the majesty of the law laid down. (*Τιμωρία*, punishment in the sense of vindication or saving of honour, occurs only here in the New Testament; but compare Acts xxii. 5 and xxvi. 11.) The aorist participles and their clauses describe in its essential features the special sin of the apostate Christian. 1*st*, It is a sin against the sacred person of the Mediator of the new covenant: ὁ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ καταπατήσας. He is styled "Son of God" because it is just His eternal Sonship which constitutes His superiority to the mediator of the old covenant, its prophets, and its angels. To trample Him under foot—the gracious and almighty Heir of all things, who is now seated at God's right hand—what a challenge to the Most High to inflict the severest and most crushing penalty! Καταπατεῖν is not merely to reject or cast away as something unfit for use which men carelessly tread upon (Matt. v. 13; Luke viii. 5), but to trample down with ruthless contempt as an object of scorn or hatred (Matt. vii. 6). 2*dly*, It is a sin against the sacrifice and seal of the new covenant: καὶ τὸ αἷμα τῆς διαθήκης κοινὸν ἡγησάμενος. Commen-

tators vary in their interpretation of κοινόν. Some (with Bleek and De Wette) render it "profane," "common;" others (with Böhme, Ebrard, Lünemann), "impure," "unholy;" many (with Bengel and Tholuck; see also St. Chrysostom) waver between both interpretations. The Itala and Peshito render it "communem;" the Vulgate and Luther, "pollutum." Both are grammatically admissible. We have already seen at ch. ix. 13 that κοινόν (κοινοῦν = חֻלִּל) sometimes extends its meaning beyond its first intention—common, non-sacred (חל as opposed to קדוש)—to the notion of the absolutely impure and unholy. The first meaning may here be adhered to, the antithesis being marked by ἐν ᾧ ἡγιάσθη. Is the sacrificial blood of animals under the law a sacred thing (Lev. vi. 20)? has it as αἷμα ραντισμοῦ (דם הזאה) a sanctifying power, and consequently a character especially sacred?—how much more must this be the case with that blood which was poured out in the power of an eternal Spirit for our reconciliation, and which as the covenant blood of sprinkling of the New Testament (ch. ix. 20; Luke xxii. 20) has opened for us an approach into the holy of holies! To treat this blood, by a return to Judaism, as the blood of an ordinary man, nay (as too likely), as that of a misguided or guilty criminal!—what a profanation of the most sacred thing, what a provocation to the severest vengeance on the part of Him who has thus been treated with the blackest ingratitude! The words ἐν ᾧ ἡγιάσθη are wanting in A and in St. Chrysostom, but not on that account to be rejected. Lachmann readmitted them to his text in 1850. Nor have they any appearance of being a gloss. Neither are they to be understood (with Stier and a reference to ver. 10) of a consecration in the divine purpose and will, but of an inward experience, a former sanctification of heart and life in the person of the now apostate. Such an irrecoverable fall would indeed, without some such gracious experience, have been impossible. What was expressed by ἅπαξ φωτισθέντας καλὸν γευσαμένους Θεοῦ ῥῆμα, etc., at ch. vi. 4 sq., is expressed here by the simply indispensable ἐν ᾧ ἡγιάσθη. And 3*dly*, There is also here a sin against the Holy Ghost: καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα

τῆς χάριτος ἐνυβρίσας,—that is, the sin of all sins, which, as here implied, is impossible without an inward experience of grace. Most moderns understand by "Spirit of grace" here, "the Spirit which is the gift of grace" (Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann); but the phrase is to be interpreted (in connection with the רוח חן of Zech. xii. 10, LXX. πνεῦμα χάριτος καὶ οἰκτιρμῶν) as designating the Spirit as the source of grace; and this interpretation is favoured by the strong personal term ἐνυβρίσας. It is as a loving, living, gracious Person that such despite is done to the Holy Spirit. All gifts of grace under the New Testament are here summed up in and referred to the πνεῦμα τῆς χάριτος. A wider antithesis could not be imagined than this of ὕβρις and χάρις. To contemn or do despite to (ἐνυβρίζειν with following accusative as in Sophocles, *Philoct.* 342) this Holy Spirit is to blaspheme the whole work of grace of which one has once been the subject, and to exhibit it as a deception and a lie. It is profanely to contradict the very truth of God, and draw down upon oneself a vengeance which cannot fail:

Vers. 30, 31. *For we know him that said, "Vengeance is mine. It is I that will recompense, saith the Lord." And again, "The Lord shall judge his people." A fearful thing it is to fall into the hands of the living God.*

We know—such is the main thought here—the judicial earnestness and severity of God: that earnestness, that severity, is testified to in God's own word, in Holy Scripture. The first testimony is taken from the לי נקם ושלם of Deut. xxxii. 35, thus rendered by the Septuagint (both B and A): ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐκδικήσεως (so also Philo) ἀνταποδώσω. Our author, adhering to the Septuagint as closely as he may, renders the original with more literal fidelity: ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις, ἐγὼ ἀνταποδώσω. So also St. Paul, Rom. xii. 19. The citation in this form may have been stereotyped by apostolic example in the language of the primitive church. The addition λέγει Κύριος, which has all authorities in its favour at Rom. xii. 19, is omitted here by D* and the oldest versions; but as the previous τὸν εἰπόντα obviously renders it super-

fluous, it seems probable that the omission may have been an early one, due to a sense of convenience and propriety. We decide, therefore, for its retention, with Lachmann, Bleek, and others. For a like reason I would read for the second citation: ὅτι κρινεῖ Κύριος τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ (with D, E, K, It., Vulg.), assuming that the inconvenient ὅτι was omitted (A, Peshito, Philox.), and Κύριος κρινεῖ inverted, as in our present *textus receptus*. The original form in the Septuagint, both at Deut. xxxii. 36 and Ps. cxxxv. 14, is ὅτι κρινεῖ Κύριος, κ.τ.λ. The reference in our author's mind was doubtless to the passage in Deuteronomy, as being the original utterance in the Thorah. In both passages the meaning of דין in the Hebrew text is "execute judgment for," or "on behalf of," *i.e.* that God will avenge His people on their enemies; and so the Greek translation must have understood it, seeing that the parallel clause in both places is καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτοῦ παρακληθήσεται. The Septuagint not seldom uses κρίνειν in this sense, *e.g.* Ps. liv. 3, κρῖνον με = κρῖνον τὴν κρίσιν μου; as also in the sense of just impartial government, as in Ps. lxxii. 2, κρίνειν τὸν λαόν σου ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ. But there is no need to assume (with Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann) that the writer of this epistle uses the citation in a sense foreign to the original. His meaning may well be, that the Lord will execute judgment on behalf of His people against those who desert the sacred cause, against traitors and blasphemers. So understanding it, the first quotation declares that God is a just Judge,—the second, on whose behalf, and only indirectly against whom, His judgment will be executed.

The words φοβερὸν τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς χεῖρας Θεοῦ ζῶντος form a kind of epiphonema to this terrible warning. The meaning is quite different from that of 2 Sam. xxiv. 14 (1 Chron. xxi. 13), Ecclus. ii. 18, where David says he would rather fall into the hands of God than into those of man. *Bonum est*, says Bengel, *incidere cum fide, temere terribile.* The hands of God are His almighty operation, whether in love or wrath. He is Θεὸς ζῶν, The energy of His action is measured by the absoluteness of His energy of life. How

fearful to fall into His punitive hands, who is at once Almighty and the Ever-living One!

The argument now takes a similar turn to that at ch. vi. 9. After depicting the miserable present and terrible future of wilful apostasy, the sacred writer reminds his readers of their own gracious past and of a former stedfastness, which leaves him full of hope for the future. He holds before their eyes a picture of their first love.

Vers. 32, 33. *But call up to remembrance the former days, in which, when first enlightened, ye endured a great fight of afflictions; partly in that ye were made a gazing-stock both by reproaches and tribulations, and partly in that ye became partakers of them that lived in like manner.*

The imperative ἀναμιμνήσκεσθε (call up to remembrance) separates more widely the present from the past than the μιμνήσκεσθε of ch. xiii. 3: the former is more commonly followed by the accusative, the latter by the genitive, of the thing to be remembered. The days which they are to call to remembrance are those of their conversion,—days which, in comparison with the present gloom, were days of enlightenment (comp. ch. vi. 4 with x. 26). In those former days they had endured, without losing heart or hope (that is the force of ὑπομένειν), a conflict made up of, or consisting in, sufferings (παθημάτων, *gen. attrib.*). This conflict had been πολλή, *manifold*, both inwardly and outwardly—"great and manifold." Compare the πολὺς πόνος of Sophocles, *O. C.* 1673. The participles in ver. 33 add some details as to the nature of this conflict. It had been partly immediate in their own persons, partly mediate in the person of others. The idiom τοῦτο μὲν . . . τοῦτο δέ, *partly . . . partly*, is not met with elsewhere in the New Testament, but is frequent in Herodotus and elsewhere (*vid.* Winer, § 21, Anm. 2). The verb θεατρίζεσθαι (= θέατρον γίγνεσθαι, 1 Cor. iv. 11) is not found elsewhere, though Polybius frequently employs ἐκθεατρίζεσθαι. Its proper signification is to be exposed in the theatre for shameful punishment, or to be made a spectacle of shame to the world, having to endure both scornful

taunts (*ὀνειδισμοί*) and active persecution (*θλίψεις*). These they suffered partly in their own persons, partly in the way of sympathy with others, making themselves fellow-sufferers with *τῶν οὕτως ἀναστρεφομένων*. These last words cannot mean, "those who showed the like endurance" (Böhme, Bretschneider, etc.), *ὑπεμείνατε* being too remote for *οὕτως* to refer to it. Rather we must refer *οὕτως* (with Tholuck, Bleek, De Wette, Ebrard, Lünemann) to *ἐν ὀνειδισμοῖς καὶ θλίψεσι*. But the rendering of *τῶν οὕτως ἀναστρεφομένων* by "them who were so used" is not adequate. *Ἀναστρέφεσθαι* has throughout the New Testament and in this epistle (ch. xiii. 18) an ethical significance. Nor is it ever a mere passive; *e.g. ἀναστρέφεσθαι* in Xen. *Ages.* ix. 4 is *to lead* a life of pleasurable enjoyment, not simply to have a pleasurable existence. The meaning of the phrase, therefore, is here: those who, leading a Christian life, suffered the like things. The *taliter conversantium* of the Itala and Vulgate has probably the same meaning, and is at any rate to be preferred to the *taliter patientium* of Mutianus. Among the persecutions and trials thus alluded to, we may reckon not only the great "affliction" (*ἡ θλίψις*) which followed the martyrdom of Stephen (Acts viii. 1, xi. 19), and the various proceedings against the church by which Herod Agrippa sought to flatter the religious pride and fanaticism of his subjects (Acts xii.), including the martyrdom of St. James the elder, but perhaps also the brief persecuting activity of the Sanhedrim appointed by the Sadducean high priest Anan, between the death of the Roman governor Festus and the arrival of his successor Albinus, which culminated (Jos. *Ant.* xx. 9. 1) in the martyrdom of St. James the Just; and beside these, imprisonments of apostles (Acts iv. 3, v. 18), prohibitions to preach in the name of Jesus (Acts iv. 18), the fanatical rage of Saul (viii. 3), and his own persecutions and imprisonment as the Apostle St. Paul, ending in a final loss of personal liberty (Acts xxi. 27): all this had been witnessed by these Hebrew Christians, and they had had therefore abundant opportunities both of stedfastly enduring themselves, and of sympathizing with others under the like circumstances.

They had done both, as the writer goes on to show, beginning with the second point.

Ver. 34. *For ye both showed a fellow-feeling for them that were in bonds, and accepted joyfully the spoiling of your goods, knowing that ye have of your own a better and an enduring possession [in heaven].*

The *textus receptus* has δεσμοῖς μου (*my bonds*); so D***, E, I, K, and many other MSS. This reading is also found in Clemens Alexandrinus (*Strom.* iv. 16. 103), and is appealed to by Euthalius (*ob.* 462) in proof of the Pauline authorship of the epistle. It was preferred by Laurentius Valla (*ob.* 1467) to the reading of the Vulgate, *nam et vinctis compassi estis*, and by most post-Reformation Protestant interpreters. Among the latter Seb. Schmidt rejects the Vulgate rendering with the acrid remark: *Vulgato errare solemne est.* But the reading δεσμίοις, on which the rendering of the Vulgate is based, has weighty authorities in its favour: *e.g.* A and D* (all the more important, as B and C, here fail us), about 12 cursives, and of versions, the Vulgate, Coptic, Armenian, Peshito, Philoxenian, Arabs Erpen., and also St. Chrysostom, Œcumen., and various other Greek and Latin fathers. Another reading is simply δεσμοῖς, without μου: this is found in Origen (*Exh. ad martyr.* § 44); and the rendering of the Itala, *vinculis eorum*, is evidently founded on it. The remark of Estius is here perfectly correct, that δεσμοῖς is a faulty reading derived from δεσμίοις, and δεσμοῖς μου an expansion of δεσμοῖς, the μου being a gloss added *per epexegesin.* The assumption that St. Paul as prisoner in Rome was the writer of this epistle, would, in connection with Col. iv. 18 and other passages in the Epistles to the Philippians and to Philemon, naturally suggest the μου here. It would, on the other hand, be difficult to see how the reading δεσμίοις could have been derived from δεσμοῖς μου. This consideration seems to establish δεσμίοις as the original reading. Critics, therefore, both earlier and later, decide in favour of δεσμίοις, *e.g.* Grotius, Bengel, Wetstein, Griesbach, Scholz, Kuinöl, Lachmann, Tischendorf. Matthias and Rink, on the other hand, are in favour of δεσ-

μοῖς μου; Mill and Nösselt, of δεσμοῖς. The sacred writer praises both their courageous active sympathy with prisoners (τοῖς, generic article, *those in bonds*), and also the joyous resignation with which they had taken the spoiling of their own earthly possessions. Τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τινος (as Luke xi. 21), or τινί (as Luke viii. 3), is any one's property, that of which he has the disposal or the use: προσδέχεσθαι, generally, to receive as an object of expectation in the future; here, as in the present, *to accept:* and this they had done *willingly* (comp. Luke xv. 2), *with joy,* μετὰ χαρᾶς (Col. i. 11), counting it an honour and a grace to have thus to suffer in the cause of Christ. The participial clause which follows assigns a special reason for this joyous taking of the loss of earthly possessions—the consciousness of a hold on nobler realities. The *textus receptus* reads: γινώσκοντες ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κρείττονα ὕπαρξιν ἐν οὐρανοῖς καὶ μένουσαν. The two expressions ἐν ἑαυτοῖς and ἐν οὐρανοῖς are not easily combined: the one affirming of the treasure that it is in themselves, in their own hearts, as a present spiritual possession; the other that it is laid up in heaven for future inheritance. But ἐν ἑαυτοῖς has but little authority in its favour. Our choice must really lie between ἑαυτούς (Lachmann and Bleek, following A, N, the Itala, the Vulg., and other ancient versions, though some of these, including the Peshito, דאית לכן, are doubtful) and ἑαυτοῖς (Tischendorf, following D*, E, I, K, Chrysost., Theodoret, etc.). The majority of cursive MSS. is in favour of ἑαυτοῖς. Internally the reading ἑαυτούς is decidedly the inferior one, as being tautological or superfluous. But with the reading ἑαυτοῖς (without the prep. ἐν), the other, ἐν οὐρανοῖς, would be quite compatible. This reading is found in D***, E, I, K, Peshito, Philox. (Origen, Chrysostom, etc.), but is omitted by A, D*, Itala, Vulgate, Kopt., Æthiop. (and by various fathers): it is not easy to account for this omission by such ancient authorities if the reading were really genuine. It is most probably a gloss, and as such its position varies. Chrysostom with the Peshito has it after ὕπαρξιν, Theodoret after μένουσαν. It is, in fact, easily dispensed with. Every reader of the epistle cannot fail to see that the substance or posses-

sion spoken of is the heavenly inheritance, the world to come, whose powers are already stirring within us. Ὕπαρξις is a word used by St. Luke (Acts ii. 45); κρείττων (κρείσσων) is a favourite word with the writer of this epistle, especially when speaking of heavenly things; μένουσα is equivalent to the ἀσάλευτος of ch. xii. 12 and the ἄφθαρτος of 1 Pet. i. 4. Instead of ἔχειν (ὑμᾶς), he says emphatically ἔχειν ἑαυτοῖς. When they have deprived you of every earthly good, you know that you have for your own a better and inalienable possession. In this way the sacred writer raises the hearts and minds whom his previous language might have depressed. He has led them to the brink of a terrible precipice of negligence or apostasy, down which they seemed in peril of falling, and now he leads them back from it to the contemplation of their own stedfast and favoured past.

Ver. 35. *Cast not away, therefore, your confidence, for it hath great recompense of reward.*

As ἀποβάλλειν often occurs simply in the meaning of involuntary loss, the rendering of the Itala and Vulgate here (to which add Peshito and other versions), *Nolite amittere*, cannot be regarded as absolutely wrong: it is, however, better to adhere to the original sense of the verb, and render *Nolite abjicere*—Cast not away, like cowardly or desponding soldiers, the weapons of your spiritual warfare. That joyous confidence of faith and hope, and that boldness in confessing Christ, which is here and elsewhere designated by παῤῥησία, is indeed the Christian's noblest weapon, both offensive and defensive, against all assaults and dangers, from both outward and inward temptations. Another merit of this παῤῥησία is expressed in the relative clause ἥτις ἔχει μισθαποδοσίαν μεγάλην (Lachm. reads μεγαλ. μισθαπ. with A, D, E, N, etc.); it deserves to be thus held fast, because so sure of a final reward: ἔχειν being here used in a *sensus prægnans*, as in ver. 34, and μισθαποδοσία in the same sense as at ch. ii. 2, xi. 26 (comp. ver. 6). (The classical form of the word is μισθοδοσία.) This exhortation to the Hebrews thus to hold fast their παῤῥησία, is now enforced by the

consideration that stedfastness is an essential condition of obtaining the fulfilment of the divine promise.

Ver. 36. *For ye have need of stedfastness, that, doing the will of God, ye may receive the promise.*

The ὑπομονή here commended consists in the μὴ ἀποβάλλειν τὴν παῤῥησίαν: it is only that unshaken, unyielding, patient endurance under the pressure of trial and persecution, that stedfastness of faith, apprehending present blessings, and of hope, with heaven-directed eye anticipating the glorious future, which obtains what it waits for. In the phrase χρείαν ἔχειν the verb is generally placed second, but here the substantive, to throw on it the emphasis, as well as on ὑπομονῆς—ὑπ. ἔχετε χρείαν. Ἐπαγγελία is here not the word of promise, but its object, the thing promised (comp. ix. 15 and xi. 13, 39), *i.e.* the promised reward of stedfastness and victory in the Christian warfare (comp. the ὑπομονῆς βραβεῖον of Clem. Rom. c. 5, and the κομίζεσθαι τὸν τῆς δόξης στέφανον of 1 Pet. v. 4). The exhibition of this stedfastness is further described as *a doing the will of God.* The aorist participle ποιήσαντες is better rendered by a present than by a past participle here (comp. note on ii. 10). The doing the divine will and the receiving the promise are not thought of as events separated in time, but as the one the direct cause of the other, which accompanies and crowns it; and the will of God is not the primary original divine counsel fulfilled by Christ in the work of our redemption (ch. x. 7–10), but a secondary will and purpose concerning us, the redeemed, viz. our stedfast perseverance in faith and hope—τὸ ἄχρι τέλους ἐγκαρτερῆσαι. The reward to be obtained is the eternal inheritance (ix. 15), which indeed is ours already, and of which we begin even here to taste some fruit, but the possession of which is still hidden, and its enjoyment variously interrupted and obscured. Its revelation will be coincident with the second coming of Christ (Col. iii. 3), which will complete and crown His redeeming work (ch. ix. 28). Between His first advent in humility and His second advent in glory lies an unknown interval, during which the church, as

once her now exalted Head, must be content to go the way of the cross. The stedfastness of faith which she requires to perform this duty, the sacred writer goes on to prove by prophetic words from Old Testament Scripture.

Vers. 37, 38. *For yet a very little while, and he that is coming shall come, and shall not tarry. But the just man shall live by faith; yet if he draw back, my soul hath no pleasure in him.*

The words *μικρὸν ὅσον ὅσον* are probably a reminiscence of, and it may be an allusion to, Isa. xxvi. 20: "*Go, my people, within, into thy chambers, and shut the door behind thee: hide thyself for a little moment* (LXX. *μικρὸν ὅσον ὅσον*), *till the indignation be overpast.*" The church must enclose herself, as it were, in her life of prayer while the tempest of divine wrath is raging in the outer world; for they only can escape from it who thus by prayer hide themselves in God. But this wrathful judgment lasts but a little while (במעט־רגע, Isa. x. 24 sq., liv. 7 sq.; comp. Ps. xxx. 6), a time shortened for the sake of the elect: when it comes to an end, their glorification will immediately follow. This *μικρὸν ὅσον ὅσον*, taken from the thoroughly apocalyptic section of Isaiah, ch. xxiv.–ch. xxvii., is prefixed by the sacred writer to a longer quotation from Hab. ii. 3, 4, in which the prophet warns earnestly to prepare for the Lord's coming. It is either to be regarded as an accusative of duration (*paulum quantillum quantillum*; Winer, § 36, 3 Obs.), or more probably as a nominative absolute (like *ἔτι μικρόν*, St. John xiv. 9; comp. Isa. xxix. 7 in the Hebrew), *restat paululum temporis*. The first clause in the citation from Habakkuk has for its subject in the original text the vision (חזון) of the fall of the Chaldean monarchy, with the glory of the divine *παρουσία* seen in prophetic perspective immediately behind it: "*if it linger, wait for it; for it cometh, cometh: it shall not remain behind.*" The Septuagint rendering is, *ἐὰν ὑστερήσῃ ὑπόμεινον αὐτὸν, ὅτι ἐρχόμενος ἥξει καὶ οὐ μὴ χρονίσῃ*, making the subject a person; not the vision, but the Lord Himself, Jehovah or Messiah. Our author

makes the reference to a divine person more definite by adding the article, ὁ ἐρχόμενος. The day of Jehovah (the Lord) becomes in the New Testament the day of Christ the Judge. He is here called ὁ ἐρχόμενος, not ὁ ἐλευσόμενος, because since His ascension He has been always coming, His return a matter of constant expectation. Whenever He comes it will be suddenly—οὐ χρονιεῖ: there will be no delay beyond the final term fixed by the divine wisdom, long-suffering, and mercy.

The following words in the original text of Habakkuk are: "*Puffed up with pride, his soul is not right in him* (spoken of the Chaldean conqueror); *but the just man shall live by his faith.*" The Septuagint version, on the contrary, is: "*If he* (the subject indicated by the pronoun is uncertain) *draw back* (ὑποστείληται), *my soul* (נפשי instead of נפשו) *hath no pleasure in him; but the just man shall live by* (lit. *out of*, ἐκ) *his faith in me*" (ἐκ πίστεώς μου). So B; whereas A reads, "*but my just one* (ὁ δὲ δίκαιός μου) *shall live by faith.*" The μου, corresponding to the Hebrew suffix, is in any case genuine, and ought doubtless to follow πίστεως (באמונתי). MSS., versions, and fathers have this μου, some after πίστεως (D*, Syr., Copt., Itala, Eus., Theodoret, Cyprian, etc.), some after δίκαιος (A, N*, Vulg., Armen., Clemens Alex., Beda): the texts, too, of Eusebius and Theodoret place it elsewhere, after δίκαιος; and so Lachmann, Tischendorf, Bleek. It seems, however, most likely that our author, whom in another place we have found agreeing with St. Paul in the form of a citation from the Old Testament (against the Septuagint), would also cite the present passage, in accordance with St. Paul's citation at Rom. i. 17 and Gal. iii. 11; and therefore we would abide by the *textus receptus* (ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται), which omits the μου, with D***, E, I, K, Chrys. Damasc. (inferior authorities, it must be allowed); μου is also struck out by a second hand in N. Our author inverts the two clauses, thus diverging from the verse as it stands both in the original and the versions, leaving the subject of ὑποστείληται no longer doubtful, and making more impressive the warning against apostasy. It is also evident that, such being his purpose, ἐκ

πίστεως (as in the original and the LXX.) must be connected with ζήσεται, not with ὁ δίκαιος, as probably we must also connect it in the two Pauline citations. It is faith which brings life to the just man (justified by his faith), in the midst of a judgment which brings destruction to unbelievers. The prophet's meaning is the same as St. Paul's, and as that of the apostolic writer of our epistle, only that the utterance of the Old Testament is here illumined by New Testament light. אמונה (faith) is the property or condition of the אמין or נאמן (the faithful one, or believer), viz. an unshaken trust in and cleaving to God's word and grace, a stedfast onward and upward glance,—a trust, fidelity, and confidence, that rests upon and hides in God. If the divine word is regarded as its object, this אמונה is a resting on or cleaving to that word: in any case, its best rendering is "faith," the nature of which it expresses better than the Greek πίστις, as being an ἐμ-μένειν (א־מן).

The divine word of promise which the prophet had in view was the overthrow of the powers of this world (concentrated in the Chaldean monarchy), and the manifestation or παρουσία of Jehovah; that which the apostolic writer has here before his eyes is the final triumph of the church of the redeemed, and the manifestation or second advent (παρουσία) of Christ. The faith, and the object of faith, is for both essentially the same—an abiding, living, and life-giving trust in God the Saviour, and the promised salvation which He is pledged to bring. Our author adheres as closely as may be, though not slavishly, to the rendering in the Septuagint. If on the one hand he omits the μου (in accordance with the original Hebrew), he on the other retains the δέ (notwithstanding his inversion of the clauses) in its original place (viz. in the second clause, which he makes the first), and so is compelled to connect the two clauses by a καί where δέ would otherwise have seemed more natural (καὶ ἐὰν ὑποστείληται, κ.τ.λ.). It is evident that the Septuagint translator must have read עלפה (instead of עפלה); for the ordinary Septuagint renderings of עלף are (in the *Pual*) ἀπορεῖσθαι, and ἐκλύεσθαι, and (in *Hithpael*) ἐκλείπειν, and

ὀλιγοψυχεῖν, *i.e.* synonymes of ὑποστέλλεσθαι, the proper meaning of which is, to withdraw oneself, or shrink back in timidity or cowardice. (Comp. ὑποστέλλειν ἑαυτόν, Gal. ii. 12.) To insert an imaginary τις (with Grotius), or an ἄνθρωπος (with Winer and De Wette), before ὑποστείληται ("*but if any man draw back*"), would thoroughly pervert the writer's meaning. The subject in both clauses is the same—the just man, the man who is justified by his faith; and the sense in which ὑποστέλλεσθαι is here used is that of not keeping faith, wavering in faith, forsaking the path of faith and the community of the faithful. (The just man, the man accepted before God, lives by faith; but if he loses his faith, and faithlessly draws back from the right path, his acceptance is forfeited.) That such apostasy is possible even for those who have been truly justified, *i.e.* for Christians who have had more than a superficial experience of divine grace, is one of the main points of instruction in this epistle. To teach this lesson, the two clauses are inverted of the prophetic utterance. The second, as it stands here, is a warning to the readers of their own danger, a warning as from the mouth of God Himself, a warning in a high prophetic tone. But the writer, as twice before, resumes the language of comfort and encouragement after words of the saddest foreboding. He proceeds, therefore, with pastoral gentleness and wisdom to encourage the fainthearted and establish the wavering, by rousing their Christian confidence, and associating himself with them as exposed to the same dangers, and courageously defying them.

Ver. 39. *But we are not of backsliding to perdition, but of faith to the gaining of the soul.*

The idiom εἶναί τινος with personal subject, and a genitive of quality, signifies to be of such or such a character, to bear such or such an impress, to be in such or such a condition. Compare Luke ix. 55 (*text. rec.*), Acts ix. 2. The Itala and Vulgate supply the supposed ellipsis here by *filii*, misleading the old Latin commentators, *e.g.* Primasius, Remigius,

Haymo. Mutianus' version is much better: *nos autem non sumus subtractionis ad perditionem, sed fidei ad acquisitionem animæ.* The persons meant are not Christians in general, but the writer of the epistle and his readers. Our way, he says, is not that cowardly shrinking back from Christian faith and confession which the God of prophecy has denounced as so infinitely hateful to Himself, and which leads to destruction (*ἀπώλεια*, antithesis of *ζωή* and *σωτηρία*), but a stedfast, abiding faith and reliance (אמונה), which bases itself on the *ζήσεται* of the prophetic promise—has for its end the salvation of the soul. The backslider and apostate loses his soul in a miserable condition of being, which, instead of the liberty of self-control, has only the unfreedom of self-abandonment; and instead of life eternal, is a never-ending state of death, a being brought to naught without annihilation. The man of faith, on the other hand, the man who keeps his faith unto the end, he saves his soul, wins her back as from the pit of destruction which threatened to devour her, and so may be said to gain and possess her for the first time as now truly his. We must beware of interpreting *εἰς περιπ. ψυχῆς* as if simply equivalent to *εἰς περιπ. ζωῆς* or *σωτηρίας* (1 Thess. v. 9). It is the soul itself which is the subject of life and salvation. Faith saves the soul, because it unites her to God the Living One and the Saviour. The faithless man is said to lose his soul, because, having lost communion with God, he is no longer master of himself, and knows that his whole personal being is henceforth exposed to the divine wrath, and the evil powers which that wrath unbinds.

CHAP. XI.—*Faith, a firm, unhesitating assurance of the future and the unseen, was, as the sacred history shows, from the beginning the essential characteristic of every God-accepted life, the condition of every divine blessing and success, the strength of every spiritually heroic action or suffering; faith, namely, in the divine promises, whose*

fulfilment the fathers hailed only afar off, that having been reserved for us, so that they without us could not be made perfect.

Our way, our characteristic, it has just been said, is not backsliding or apostasy, but faith. With this utterance of Christian confidence, the sacred writer endeavoured to arouse the moral courage of his readers, and lift them up with himself to higher things. He now exhibits for their instruction and further encouragement the nature of that faith which can thus assure to the soul her threatened life, and whose possession by them and himself he, in reliance on divine grace, so confidently assumes.

Ver. 1. *Now faith is a confidence of things hoped for, an assurance as to things that are not seen.*

The *textus receptus*, till the time of Griesbach and Kuinœl, placed a comma after πίστις (as if the meaning of ἔστι δὲ πίστις were: Now faith is; there is such a thing, such a reality, as faith); an interpunctuation which would reduce what follows to a mere apposition, instead of its being (as we take it) the predicate of the sentence (for to use the comma in this way, for the purpose merely of showing that the following genitive, ἐλπιζομένων, depends on ὑπόστασις and not on πίστις, would be a misleading employment of that lectional sign). Böhme is probably the last interpreter who thus explains the words ἔστι δὲ πίστις, *est vero fides hoc est, non solum merumve nomen sed res utique verissima.* The reason which he gives, that otherwise our author must have written ἡ δὲ πίστις ἐστίν or πίστις δέ ἐστιν, is groundless. The *verbum substantivum* thus placed at the beginning of the sentence has by no means always this purpose (like the etymologically related Hebrew particle יֵשׁ) of affirming the reality of an existence (comp. ch. iv. 13; Acts xiii. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 5, xv. 44; Tit. i. 10; John viii. 50; 1 John v. 16), or the certainty of an occurrence (Luke xxi. 25), but is often simply the logical copula, so placed for the sake of emphasis, of which, as Buttmann observes (*Ausf. Gramm.* i. 552), it is quite capable, and

to be accentuated accordingly. In the present instance, the emphasis on the ἔστι denotes certainty of connection between subject and predicate, the assured truth of the affirmation made. (Comp. Luke viii. 11; Acts x. 34, xix. 26; 1 Tim. vi. 6; Matt. xiii. 57; Mark xii. 27; Jas. iii. 15; John v. 45, xiii. 16.) The sacred writer's meaning is not, "There *is* such a faith, which is so and so;" but simply, "The faith of which I speak (ch. x. 39), as shared by us, has such and such a character."

The predicate following ἔστιν (thus prefixed) may be, but is not necessarily, a strict definition of the subject. So some interpreters take this verse as a definition proper of faith in the abstract (*e.g.* Lünemann, after Theodoret, ὁρισάμενος αὐτήν, Thomas Aquinas, Melanchthon in the *Loci*, etc. etc.); while others deny that it is a definition at all (*e.g.* Erasmus, who calls it an "*encomium fidei*"), or, at any rate, a definition of justifying faith (so Gerhard and Sebastian Schmidt). Tholuck regards it not as a general or theoretical, but simply a practical definition, suited to the immediate purpose; and others as a description of what faith is—not as the principle of justification in antithesis to the works of the law, but simply as the spirit of trustful stedfastness, in contrast to the impatience of diffidence and despondency when the promised vision is delayed (so Calvin, Hofmann, Bleek, Ebrard). But surely it is not mere accidents, but constituents and essential characteristics, of faith which are here laid down. If we would define in the most abstract way possible the proper objects of faith, should we not say that faith always has for its object something transcendent, either beyond sense or beyond time—the glorious future, or the infinite unseen? And could the sacred writer better describe faith in its relations to these objects, than by the terms which he has selected here? It seems to us that a more complete and accurate definition of faith, and one more generally applicable, could not be devised than that which is here given. It is a generic, not a specific definition, and was necessarily conceived in these general terms: 1*st*, Because the writer's purpose is to direct the minds of these Hebrew Christians to

the glorious future of the new dispensation, in such striking contrast to its poor and suffering present (ch. x. 36–39); and 2*dly*, To prove by historical examples, in the section of his epistle which is now beginning, that it is just faith, maintained against appearances, in the future and invisible which in all ages has characterized God's true servants, and upheld them in acceptance and communion with Him, and in a life of active obedience. At the commencement of such an historical summary, a comprehensive and general definition of what faith is in itself, apart even from the distinctive revelations of the Gospel, the entrance of which into the world is described as an ἐλθεῖν τὴν πίστιν (Gal. iii. 28), was the only definition suitable or possible.

It has been said that this generic definition of faith is peculiar to the writer of this epistle (see Köstlin, *Joh. Lehrbegriff*, p. 448), or that he more nearly identifies it with hope (ἐλπίς) than is the case with St. Paul (Bleek, De Wette), or even that he altogether confounds the two graces (Weiss, *Petr. Lehrbegr.* p. 67). Before we can decide how much there be of truth or untruth in all this, we must examine more closely the twofold definition of πίστις here given. The very *ordo verborum* shows that the apostolic writer lays the main stress on the objects of faith (τὰ ἐλπιζόμενα and πράγματα οὐ βλεπόμενα), not on its inward or subjective relations to them (the ὑπόστασις and the ἔλεγχος). This emphasis is weakened, and the arrangement of the words misunderstood, by those who would connect ἐλπιζομένων πραγμάτων as adjective with substantive. (So, among the ancients, Chrysostom and Œcumenius; among moderns, Böhme.) We have already seen (at ch. vi. 11, comp. x. 1) that πρᾶγμα sometimes denotes an historical fact, sometimes a supersensuous reality: it is in the latter sense that πραγμάτων is used here, and so evidently belongs more properly to the οὐ βλεπομένων, in order to distinguish the unseen realities which are objects of faith from the shadowy dreams which are the creations of human fancy. The objects of faith are partly ἐλπιζόμενα and partly πράγματα οὐ βλεπόμενα. The latter is a wider, more comprehensive term than the

former. It would not be true to say, with Köstlin, that the two terms are equivalent, inasmuch as every unseen and transcendent reality, whether past, present, or future, may be regarded as an ἐλπιζόμενον—a matter of which the full knowledge and fruition is still an object of hope and desire. If so violent a confounding of ideas as this were admissible, it would be no wonder if the notion of πίστις were identified with that of ἐλπίς. It is indeed true that all the objects of Christian hope belong to the sphere of the invisible, but it is not true that all that is unseen and apprehended by faith belongs to the sphere of hope. For example, the creation of the world by divine power is an event of the past, and as such an object of faith, though not of hope; and so also the omnipresence of God, the heavenly session and reign of Christ, and His present divine supra-mundane existence, are supernatural facts of the invisible world, which only faith, breaking through the veil of the material universe, can reach and apprehend: yet they are not, properly speaking, objects of hope. Moreover, whatever interpretation we may give to ὑπόστασις in the first member of the definition, the slightest inspection of ἔλεγχος in the second is sufficient to teach us that the πράγματα οὐ βλεπόμενα are here regarded as objects not of hope, but of knowledge. We now turn to the twofold designation of that relation to two classes of objects in which πίστις is said to consist.

First, then, faith is defined to be ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις. The term ὑπόστασις has various meanings: (1.) That of "putting under," as *action*, or of "standing under" (understanding), as *condition*. (2.) It denotes that which is placed or stands under something else, in various applications: *e.g.* *fundamentum* = *substantia* in the twofold signification, first of the true essence or being of a thing, which stands under the appearance or phenomenon, and secondly of the truth or reality as opposed to mere fancies or conceptions, the body as opposed to its shadow (the Latin *substantia* has both these meanings). (3.) Ὑπόστασις is sometimes used in the sense of putting oneself under, or standing fast under something else, and so comes to signify boldness, stedfastness, confi-

dence. But which of these meanings has the word here? First of all, we must beware of endeavouring to unite incompatible senses, so as to get as much meaning out of or into the word as possible. Take Stier, for example: "*ὑπόστασις is such 'a confidence' as is at the same time 'a foundation-stone' within us, on which we may build further; it is indeed the promised future good things themselves, on which we establish ourselves by faith as on a firm foundation.*" Here is not only a palpable confusion of "under" (*ὑπό*) with "on" or "over," but also a method of interpretation which admits of the insertion or extraction of every possible variety of meaning. Nor is Beck's view much less inadmissible, that *ὑπόστασις* has here both an objective and subjective sense: objective, as signifying substantial, spiritual reality; and subjective, as signifying the inward reception which faith accords to the divine reality. It is scarcely conceivable how the word could be used in both these senses at the same time. Setting, then, Beck's and Stier's and the like methods of interpretation aside, only three senses remain to be assigned to *ὑπόστασις* here: either it is used, as at ch. i. 3, for "substance," whether in the sense of "essence" or in that of "reality;" or for "confidence," as at ch. iii. 14; or for "foundation," as, for instance, in the *Acta Pauli et Theclæ*, § 37, *οὗτος* (*ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*) *ζωῆς ἀθανάτου ὑπόστασις*. But as *ὑπόστασις* is not elsewhere used by our author in this last sense of "*fundamentum*," we should only be prepared to admit it here in case both the other interpretations were shown to be impossible. It is maintained, however, among others, by Faber Stapulensis, Calvin, Hunnius, Schulz, Stein, Steugel, and Von Gerlach. The Vulgate rendering is a happy correction of the confused translation in the Itala, *est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium;* and the profoundest, most spiritual interpretation of the definition thus translated is to be found in Dante's *Paradiso*, xxiv. 52–81. There the poet-guest in Paradise is, at the instance of Beatrice, examined by the Apostle St. Peter as to his faith. The first question put to him is, *What is faith?* whereupon he turns to Beatrice, and

receiving from her signs of encouragement to speak his inward mind, thus proceeds:[1]

"May grace that suffers me to make confession,"
Began I, "to the great Centurion,
Give my conceptions all a due expression."

And thus continued: "As the truthful pen,
Father! of thy dear brother wrote of it,
Who put with thee Rome into the good way,

Faith is the substance of things hoped for,
And argument of those which are not seen;
And this appears to me its quiddity."[2]

Then heard I: "Right and truly dost thou deem,
If well thou understandest why he placed it
'Mong substances, and then 'mong arguments."

Whereafter I: "The things mysterious
That here vouchsafe to me their apparition,
Unto all eyes below are so concealed,

That all their being lies in faith alone,
Whereon high Hope proceeds to base herself,
And so Faith takes the place and rank of substance.

And it behoveth us from our belief
To draw conclusions without other sight;
And hence Faith takes the place of argument."

Then heard I: "If whatever is acquired
Below by learning thus were understood,
No sophist's subtlety would there find place."

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[1] I follow the translation in Göschel's profound and interesting treatise, "*Dante Alighieri's Osterfeier im Zwillingsgestirn des himmlischen Paradieses*," 1849, and would further direct the reader's attention to Göschel's own observations and interpretations, as well as to those of Philalethes (King John of Saxony) derived from Thomas Aquinas. [The English rendering is chiefly taken from Longfellow.—Tr.]

[2] It is evident from this that Dante regarded Heb. xi. 1 as a strict definition, and that he combined the words *sperandarum substantia rerum.* So likewise St. Jerome, *in Ep. ad Gal.*, "*est autem fides sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum necdum apparentium;*" and so the verse is interpreted by Primasius. St. Ambrose and St. Augustine connect "*rerum*" with "*non apparentium.*" Dante follows his master. St. Thomas.

If with this we compare the interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas, as finally reduced to a scholastic form (repeated subsequently by Lyra and others), *Fides est habitus mentis, quo inchoatur vita æterna in nobis, faciens intellectum assentire non apparentibus*,[1] we must needs acknowledge that the great theological poet has here the advantage of the angelical doctor. Aquinas takes *substantia* in the sense of *principium primum*, a fundamental principle containing potentially all future developments; so that the *assensus fidei* is the *prima inchoatio rerum sperandarum*, all which hoped-for things faith already carries (*virtute*) in herself. Dante, on the other hand, takes *substantia* in its first obvious meaning, without making it simply equivalent to *fundamentum*. But the truth is, that if ὑπόστασις be here equivalent to *substantia*, it must be used *per metonymiam*, and faith be called "the substance of hoped-for things," because it is that condition of mind which apprehends them in their substantial reality (*substantia = receptaculum substantiæ*). So, among moderns, Beck, and somewhat similarly (though yet differently) St. Chrysostom: "*Things existing only in hope are ἀνυπόστατα, and seem to be mere shadows; but faith gives them the reality they are in need of, or rather does not give them reality, but is itself their essence* (*οὐσία*). *For example, the resurrection has not yet taken place, and is therefore not yet a reality; but faith substantiates it in our soul* (*ὑφίστησιν ἐν ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ*)." Mutianus' rendering of the last words is, *sed fides facit eam subsistere in anima nostra*; which is correct, unless we assume that Chrysostom takes ὑπόστασις first in the sense of substance or substantiation, and then in that of mental apprehension or realisation—the *subjectio* of Castellio, the "darstellung" of Menken. But

[1] Compare *Secunda Secundæ*, qu. 4, art. 1: "Respondeo dicendum (quod hæc sit competens fidei definitio, Fides est substantia, etc.) quod licet quidam dicant prædicta apostoli verba non esse fidei definitionem, quia definitio indicat rei quidditatem et essentiam, ut habetur 6 Metaph. text. 19, tamen si quis recte consideret, omnia ex quibus fides potest definiri in prædicta descriptione tanguntur, licet verba non ordinentur sub forma definitionis (chiefly inasmuch as '*substantia et argumentum sunt diversa genera non subalternatim posita*'); sicut etiam apud Philosophos, prætermissa syllogistica forma, syllogismorum principia tanguntur."

ὑπόστασις in this last meaning (which would yield but a meagre sense, as the same might be said of the power of imagination or mere fancy) is found only as the name of a rhetorical figure (*vid.* Passow, *s.v.*); and it is and remains highly improbable that the writer of this epistle should have used the word in a different sense from those found in other parts of his work, or in Hellenistic writers generally. In the LXX. the word has various meanings, all connected with the notion of standing or standing under: *e.g.* Wisd. xvi. 21, the manna (as the staff of Israel's wilderness-life) is called ὑπόστασις Θεοῦ, God's "sustenance" (*i.e.* the food supplied by Him); elsewhere it is used as = ὕπαρξις and οὐσία for "substance," in the sense of wealth or property; and finally, as the translation of תוחלת and תקוה for *perseverantia*, endurance, patient expectation, stedfast hope. Now, when we consider that ὑπόστασις is found used in this last sense at ch. iii. 14 of this epistle, and as a synonym of πίστις and ἐλπίς; that it is also employed by St. Paul (2 Cor. ix. 4, xi. 17) as = *fiducia*, and that this meaning is the ordinary one in which it is used by writers in the κοινὴ διάλεκτος (comp. Diodor. Sic. xx. 78, where ὑποστατικός is the antithesis of ἀπελπίσας),—it seems scarcely doubtful that such must be its meaning here, connected as it is with ἐλπιζομένων, and contrasted with ὑποστολή, viz. a stedfast confidence with regard to the objects of hope, in contrast to the wavering and despondency which would faithlessly abandon them. Against this being here the meaning of ὑπόστασις, I used to remark formerly, that in all the instances alleged by Bleek (ii. p. 463 sq.) (from other than New Testament writers) of ὑπόστασις used in the sense of *fiducia*, the genitive dependent on it always denoted the person by whom the *fiducia* was exhibited; *e.g.* ὑπόστασις αὐτοῦ, of the bravery of Horatius Cocles, in Polybius. But as in one instance, at any rate, the object of ὑπόστασις is expressed in the dative after ὑπό (viz. Jos. *Ant.* xviii. 1. 6, τῆς ὑπὸ τοιούτοις ὑποστάσεως, of the adherents of Judas the Galilean, who remained stedfast under the most cruel tortures), so at least in one other we find it with the genitive (Ruth i. 12, where Naomi

exclaims: If I thought ὅτι ἔστι μοι ὑπόστασις τοῦ γενηθῆναι με ἀνδρί . . . could ye wait?) We would render therefore here (with Luther, Melanchthon, Grotius, Böhme, Tholuck, Bleek, De Wette, Bloomfield, M'Lean, Ebrard) unhesitatingly: "*Faith is a confident assurance of such things as are hoped for.*" It is self-evident that ὑπόστασις cannot here be equivalent to "hope"—"an assured hope of things hoped for," what a tautology!—but to "stedfast assurance of the reality of things which, being future, are objects of hope." Stedfastness, patience, confidence, courage, in opposition to all that is threatening or depressing in the present, are the notions here combined.

We now come to the second member of the definition here given of faith: πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων. The term ἔλεγχος has also various meanings. (1) It may signify simply a proof, *e.g.* τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸν ἔλεγχον δώσει (Dem.)—*the matter will give its own proof;* or (2) the process of proving, convincing, or convicting. So in the LXX. it is employed as the rendering of תוכחת for the "discovery" or "conviction" of guilt. (3) Ἔλεγξις and ἐλεγμός being not very usual words, ἔλεγχος is frequently used for conviction in the passive sense of being convicted or convinced. This is the sense intended by the *argumentum* of the Vulgate, the *convictio* of Mutianus (probably also the נלינא of the Peshito), the *demonstratio* or *evidentia* of Calvin, the *firma persuasio* of Hammond, the "nicht zweifelt" (*doubteth not*) of Luther. This meaning *conviction*, or *firm persuasion*, seems a natural one to assign to ἔλεγχος here, after that of "confident assurance" assigned to ὑπόστασις; and in the phrase εἰς ἔλεγχον πίπτειν (ἐλθεῖν) it comes very near to it. But Tholuck is right (though without assigning any reason) in disputing its having this meaning here. Standing thus independently, ἔλεγχος can hardly have any other meaning than "proof," "evidence," or "certification." We decide, therefore, for this last, with Bengel, Böhme, M'Lean, Stier, Ebrard, Hofmann, and others, because in this sense it best fits in with ὑπόστασις in the previous clause. Faith is its own certification, its own proof or evidence of divine realities,

being itself a confident assurance (*ὑπόστασις*) of them. It is not a mere passive conviction (as Ebrard correctly observes), but an active argument or evidence for their existence: it proves the reality of its own objects. For faith recognises itself as an operation from above; and as standing in living communion with the unseen God and the invisible world, it tastes the powers of the world to come (the future æon) projecting themselves into the present; it discerns by an *actus reflexus* the divine seal impressed on its operations; it exhibits itself both in doing and suffering as a supernatural sustaining and motive power. Faith, then, is its own proof of the existence and active energy of unseen facts and realities, and able by its own immediate intuitions to dispense with the evidence of the senses and laborious proofs of reason. It carries the imperious conviction of the truth it holds within itself.

If now we examine the two halves of this definition in their relation to one another, we shall find that it may be said that the former describes the nature of faith in accordance with the etymon of אמונה, and the latter in accordance with that of *πίστις*. The essential characteristic of faith as אמונה is stedfast, patient resting in the divine word and promise (Isa. vii. 9); the essential characteristic of faith as *πίστις* is an unhesitating conviction, or a profound submission to overwhelming evidence of goodness, truth, and power in its object (*πείθεται*, faith as *πίστις* yields and obeys; comp. Jer. xx. 7, "*Jehovah, Thou hast persuaded me, and I was persuaded; Thou art stronger than I, and hast prevailed*"). Faith thus conceived is an *ἔλεγχος*, a proof or evidence of the Unseen, inasmuch as it is a real communion of the soul with that one only true Being that lies behind all the phenomena of the creaturely universe. So Clemens Alexandrinus truly defines faith (though his interpretation is based on a false etymology) as *ἡ περὶ τὸ ὂν στάσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν*. The designations of faith in the Old Testament correspond naturally more closely to the first half of this definition, denoting faith by such terms as בטח, חסה, יחל, קוה, and other synonyms of hope and trust,—terms in which

the Old Testament, with its onward glance to an unrevealed but promised glorious future, is so rich. At the same time, one cannot see how any one can assert that the apostolic writer almost loses the idea of faith in that of hope here, without himself altogether losing sight of the second half of the definition. St. Paul likewise regards faith and hope as nigh-related notions. When, for instance, he opposes (2 Cor. v. 7) πίστις to εἶδος, he makes it refer to οὐ βλεπόμενα, which at the same time are ἐλπιζόμενα; and while in one place (Eph. ii. 8) he speaks of salvation as a fruit of grace through faith (τῇ χάριτι ἐστὲ σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως), he speaks in another (Rom. viii. 24) in the same way of hope (τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐσώθημεν). But though related, the notions are not identical. In our present passage it is not said of faith that it is μελλόντων ἐλπίς, but ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις. Hope is the blood-relation, because it is the offspring of faith. The proper object of hope is the future; the proper object of faith is the present but unseen. Hope is faith's comforter, and faith is hope's stay. The relation between them is similar to that between faith and love. Faith and love are not identical, but the one is offspring of the other. Faith is the root of love, love is the fruit and evidence of faith; faith is love's stay and motive power. When, therefore, the apostolic writer calls faith ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, he is by no means identifying it with hope, but indicating the true relation between those Christian graces. It is faith which upholds and quickens hope amid all the depressing influences of the present time, securing its permanence, and maintaining the freshness of its bloom. In brief, it is ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, a stedfast confidence as to things hoped for. These ἐλπιζόμενα embrace the second coming of the Lord in glory, and the glorification of His saints with Him in His kingdom, which are objects of faith so far as faith is the marrow and support of hope. To the πράγματα οὐ βλεπόμενα belong the all-sufficient sacrifice of Christ and its abiding efficiency, His royal session at the right hand of the Eternal Majesty, and His heavenly high-priesthood; and these are all objects of faith as such. This twofold

nature and character of faith, its onward look to a glorious future, its conviction of the realities of an unseen present, is now proved by a reference to the sacred history as recorded in the Scriptures of the Old Testament.

Ver. 2. *For it was this wherein good witness was borne to the elders.*

This use of μαρτυρεῖσθαι in the sense of being well spoken of, having a good name and reputation, is characteristic of St. Luke (comp. Acts vi. 3, x. 22, xvi. 2, xxii. 12): it occurs once in St. Paul, and once in the writings of St. John. "One bears a favourable testimony to another," is expressed by μαρτυρεῖ τις τινί (Acts xv. 8); "one is favourably reported of, or witnessed to, by another," is μαρτυρεῖται τινί ὑπό τινος (3 John 12). The matter of the witness is expressed in extra-biblical Greek by the nominative or accusative (*e.g.* μαρτυρειταί τινί τι in Dionys., μαρτυροῦμαί τι in Plutarch and Lucian), or by the dative following ἐπί (*e.g.* μαρτυροῦμαι ἐπί τινι in Athenæus and Lucian). Instead of this ἐπί τινι, our author uses διά τινος in vers. 4 and 39 of this chapter, and ἔν τινι here (comp. 1 Tim. v. 10). It is quite unnecessary to interpret this ἐν ταύτῃ, with Bleek, Bloomfield, and Lünemann, after Winer, by *hac in fide constituti, hac fide instructi*, and so separate it from ἐμαρτυρήθησαι. Elsewhere in the New Testament we have a similar construction, *e.g.* (1 Cor. xi. 22) ἐπαινεῖσθαι ἔν τινι for ἐπαιν. ἐπί τινος. It is the *ἐν regionis*, like the *in* in Cicero's phrase *vituperari in amicitia*, "to be blamed in the matter of friendship." The οἱ πρεσβύτεροι is not to be restricted to the ancient patriarchs and prophets of the primeval and legal periods, but extends to all the heroes and martyrs of faith under the Old Testament down to the Maccabean time, who, by their fidelity and stedfastness under inferior means of grace, became noble examples to the younger generation (ver. 40). All these received honourable testimony, viz. from God, and from the sacred Scriptures recording their exploits and their sufferings ἐν ταύτῃ. The sacred writer says purposely ἐν ταύτῃ, not ἐν αὐτῇ, to mark

that it was in the manifestation of just such and no other faith as he has been describing that they had obtained this gracious testimony. After this general statement, expressing the result of a wide review of the whole Old Testament history, he now proceeds to details.

Ver. 3. *By faith we understand that the universe was framed by the word of God, so that it was not out of things that appear* (to the senses) *that the visible came into existence.*

After the announcement in ver. 2 concerning the πρεσβύτεροι of the Old Testament, we should have expected an immediate enumeration of particular examples of heroic faith, such as actually follows in ver. 4, and onwards to the end of the chapter. But what is the meaning of this preceding utterance concerning the creation of the world as a noümenon of faith in general? Some (*e.g.* Brentius, J. D. Michaelis, etc.) assume that the sacred writer has actually here in view Adam and his immediate descendants, whose faith was tried and exercised by the recognition of the divine creative energy to which the visible universe around them owed its origin. "Instead of mentioning Adam by name," says Stier, "the writer of the epistle speaks of the first beginning of faith in mankind — faith in the Almighty power of God, not as Redeemer, but as Creator." (So also Seb. Schmidt.) Bleek inclines to the same view, and so likewise Hofmann, who is naturally led to take it, by his own interpretation of the records of creation in the book of Genesis, as describing the first impressions made under divine guidance on the faith of primitive humanity by the spectacle of the visible universe. This view of Hofmann's I have shown elsewhere to be insufficient. The history of the work of creation in Genesis contains far more than faith, however enlightened, could by itself discern. And however natural the reference to Adam and his immediate descendants may seem, it would be more likely that the sacred writer, if such were his real meaning, would have said, πίστει ἐνόησαν οἱ πρωτόπλαστοι, or the like, than what he has written—πίστει νοοῦμεν. Lünemann, taking these words

in their wide and obvious sense, regards them as a somewhat disturbing addition or interpolation in the course of the argument. But this judgment is an unreasonable one. The appeal to the witness of Scripture to the significance of faith does actually begin at ver. 2. Faith to recognise the divine origin of the created universe is not expressly attributed to the oldest fathers of mankind here, simply because Scripture does not expressly attribute it to them; but the meaning is much the same as if it did. Scripture starts with a fact which only faith can recognise: the divine origin of the universe is a noümenon of faith—of such faith as patriarchs and prophets and other saints continued to exhibit throughout the times of the Old Testament. St. Paul employs the verb *νοεῖν* at Rom. i. 20 in a similar sense to that in which it is employed here. He there speaks of the invisible things (*τὰ ἀόρατα*) of God as *νοούμενα*, which since the creation are through creaturely phenomena *mediately* visible to man (*καθορᾶται*), while *immediately* discernible only through the agency of the *νοῦς*, *i.e.* the rational and spiritual faculty, whose office and prerogative it is to penetrate to and discover the divine oneness which is the invisible root and origin of the manifold phenomena of the visible universe. *Νοεῖν* is that rational or spiritual action of thought which seeks for the ultimate roots and principles of outward things; *νοούμενα* are those roots and principles thus spiritually discerned. For such action of thought, in reference to the works of God, faith is a necessary condition; and therefore we read here, *πίστει νοοῦμεν*. Faith alone penetrates behind the veil; faith alone discerns the origin of the universe in the word of God. That universe is here (as at ch. i. 2) designated *οἱ αἰῶνες*; and its preparation, building, or framing during the great creative week (making it to correspond to the divine purpose of its Founder) is described as a *κατηρτίσθαι* (LXX. for נכן, Ps. lxxxix. 38; הכין, Ps. lxxiv. 16). The phrase ויאמר (*God said*) recurs ten times in the first chapter of Genesis. "The world came into existence by means of ten divine utterances" (מאמרות, *Pirke Aboth* v. 1). It was framed, as it is pre-

served, *ῥήματι Θεοῦ*. The notion of *ῥῆμα Θεοῦ* is narrower than that of *λόγος Θεοῦ* (*vid.* Ps. xxxiii. 6, *τῷ λόγῳ Κυρίου οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἐστερεώθησαν*) : *λόγος* combines the notion of that which is inwardly willed with that of the will expressed outwardly ; *ῥῆμα* has only the latter notion. (See Dähne (i. 221) on the passage in Philo : *διὰ ῥήματος τοῦ αἰτίου ὁ σύμπας κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο.*) God first willed that the world should be, and then gave expression to His inward thought. This thought or idea of the world is in its realisation something different from and lower than God Himself. The discerning and apprehending this is a work of faith. It is not meant, of course, that faith unaided by divine revelation could have discerned the fact that the world was made in just six days (neither more nor less), and by means of ten creative words (so many and no more); but that (as we see in the old Persian and some other cosmogonies) faith could and did discern in creation the working out of a divine purpose and uttered will, in a fixed order, and according to a certain predetermined plan. On this impression or perception of inquiring faith, Scripture sets its divine seal.

It is then in such a way, only discernible by the understanding of faith (*intellectus ex fide*), that the world came into existence : *εἰς τὸ μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων τὸ βλεπόμενον γεγονέναι.*

Instead of the *τὰ βλεπόμενα* of the *textus receptus*, we read, with Lachmann (A, D*, E*, 17, It., Kopt., and several Fathers), *τὸ βλεπόμενον*, which, as designating the visible universe as one great totality (and not a plurality of individuals or phenomena), is at once peculiar, and more expressive than the plural *τὰ βλεπ.*, and as such doubtless the original reading. The variation makes no difference as to the sense. The sentence is a difficult one, and interpretations diverge most widely. The first question is, whether the clause *εἰς τὸ μή* expresses a consequence or a purpose. Most commentators (with Köstlin, p. 448) take the former view; Hofmann and Lünemann, perhaps more correctly, the latter: for though *εἰς*, with following infinitive used as a substantive,

may have merely *eventual* (Luke v. 17), it has much more frequently *final* significance (comp. in this epistle, ch. ii. 17, vii. 25, viii. 3, ix. 14, 28, xii. 10, xiii. 21; Luke iv. 29 (*rec.*); and Acts iii. 9, vii. 19). Both senses are here combined. The world came into existence by the word of God, in order that it might not have a material middle cause. God's will was to be, not a mere δημιουργός, but also a κτίστης. The next question is: With what must we connect the μή? The majority of versions (*e.g.* the Vulgate, Peshito, Itala, and those of Erasmus, Luther, and Castellio) render as if the reading were ἐκ μὴ φαινομένων. Bleek and De Wette declare such a trajection to be inadmissible; Lünemann maintains that it is grammatically impossible; but surely St. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Œcumenius, and Theophylact, who all so construed this μή, must be allowed to have understood Greek. Valckenaer likewise—no bad philologer—accepts (with Camerarius) this construction, and calls it *consuetam Græcis transpositionem voculæ negantis;* and (to cite but one modern grammarian) Rost lays down (§ 135, 1), that "when a notion is to be emphatically denied which is expressed by a noun (substantive or adjective) to which an article and a preposition are attached, in such case the particle of negation is placed before the article and before the preposition." It is true that in many cases the negation belongs properly to the verb, even when preceded by it (*e.g.* Thuc. i. 5, ἡγουμένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων); but in many others such a combination would be quite foreign to the writer's meaning (*e.g.* Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* vii. 23, 12, οὐκ ἐπὶ μεγάλοις μεγάλως διεσπουδάζετο, which does not mean, "he applied not great diligence to great things," but, "he applied great diligence to things which were not great"); and in some it would be mere pedantry to insist upon it (*e.g.* Thuc. iii. 57, εἰ δὲ περὶ ἡμῶν γνώσεσθε μὴ τὰ εἰκότα, *i.e.* "things unseemly;" see other examples in Poppo's *Prolegg.* vol. i. p. 303). It is therefore quite possible that the reading of A at 2 Macc. vii. 28, οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων (instead of ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, the reading of B) ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ Θεός, is the right one, corresponding

to the regular Hebrew idiom, מדבר לא = "out of no-thing."[1] Neither is there in the clause before us any grammatical necessity for connecting μὴ with the verb γεγονέναι, as is done by Beza, Huet, Seb. Schmidt, Bengel, etc., and most moderns, except only Steugel, Bretschneider, and Ebrard.[2] The sense indeed remains, whichever way we take the μή, essentially the same, and the same difficulty of interpretation will have to be encountered. Whether we render the clause, "*that so the visible* (universe) *might not* (seem to) *have come into existence from visible things*," or "... *might* (be seen to) *have come into being out of things invisible*," the question still remains, in the case of the former rendering, "If not from visible things, from what things then did it come into being?" in the case of the latter, "What are those things invisible out of which it came?"—in both cases essentially the same question. The obvious answer would be, "Not out of visible things, but from the word of God;" or, "Out of things invisible, *i.e.* the divine word." But this answer is unsatisfactory, although most moderns would appear to be satisfied with it. For if we choose the construction ἐκ μὴ φαινομένων, it does not seem that such a term as μὴ φαινόμενα, or, not to insist on the plural, μὴ φαινόμενον, would be a suitable one to designate the divinely but inaudibly spoken word; or if we take the other construction, μὴ γεγονέναι, one does not see why, the author's intention being to deny the origination of the visible universe from other visible things, he should change the term, and write ἐκ φαινομένων instead of ἐκ βλεπομένων, or even ἐξ ὁρατῶν. Neither do we say the world came into being "from" or "out of," but "through"

[1] Saadia says, in his *Emunoth we-Dē-oth* i. 4, in reference probably to the Cabbalists: "I have met with people who do not indeed go so far as to deny that there was a Framer of the visible universe, but who, thinking it impossible that anything could have come out of nothing (דבר לא מדבר), and seeing that the Creator was the only being in existence at the time of the creation, maintain that He created all things out of His own substance."

[2] To whom may also be added Tholuck, of whom Krabbe writes (*de temporali ex nihilo Creatione*, p. 20): *Frustra hanc interpretationem* (the trajectional ἐκ μὴ φαινομένων) *revocare et defendere studuit Tholuceius.*

or "by means of," the word of God. Shall we then assume, with St. Chrysostom, Theodoret, Luther, Valckenaer, Chr. Fr. Schmid, and others, that ἐκ μὴ φαινομένων is equivalent to "out of nothing" or "not out of anything?" If that were really the sense here, the expression chosen could hardly be more unsuitable or less ambiguous; for that which does not appear, or is not obvious to the senses (the antithesis shows that such must be the meaning here of μὴ φαινομένων), is not therefore unsubstantial, or absolutely non-existent. The very opposite to this is the fundamental assumption on which the doctrine of this epistle rests, viz. that the super-sensual (τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα) alone has true being or reality, in accordance with the Pauline axiom (2 Cor. iv. 18), τὰ βλεπόμενα πρόσκαιρα, τὰ δὲ μὴ βλεπόμενα αἰώνια (which alone might have sufficed to convince Lünemann of the unsoundness of his position, that the negative particle, if meant to be attached to φαινομένων, must have been οὐ here, and not μή). The sacred writer's meaning must then be, that the world came into existence, by means of the word of God, out of the non-phenomenal, or, by means of the word of God, not out of the phenomenal. The question then would be: What is this "non-phenomenal?" or, What is the antithesis unexpressed to that which is here called "the phenomenal?" Various answers have been given.

Some interpreters have proposed the chaos which preceded creation—the "Thohu wa-Bohu" of Gen. i. 2—as being meant by the τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα, or as the antithesis to the τὰ φαινόμενα, of which the writer of our epistle is here speaking. (So Cajetan, Estius, Schlichting, Hammond, Limborch, Calmet, Baumgarten, M'Lean, etc.) The LXX. rendering of תהו ובהו is, at Gen. i. 2, ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος, with which compare Wisd. xi. 18, and also Jer. iv. 23, where the Sept. rendering of תהו ובהו is simply οὐθέν, nothingness. The ancient Jewish interpretation of "Thohu" was the absolutely formless material, or matter without any definite existence—matter in its non-apparent, non-phenomenal condition. The *Thohu* of Genesis might certainly be so understood without attributing to it the eternity of Plato's

μὴ ὄν, or the Hyle of Gentile philosophy; and Philo is careful on this point to avoid the imminent danger of infringing on the scriptural idea of creation. But the conscientious interpreter of Scripture must refuse here to read, as it were between the lines, a sense for this μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων which has no support in any other passage of the New Testament, and which requires careful cleansing from philosophic dross in order not to be directly anti-scriptural. No objection of this kind, or any derived from the *analogia fidei*, can be laid against Ebrard's interpretation, who explains the μὴ ἐκ φαιν. with reference to the divine powers exercised in the work of creation, and forming, as it were, the contents of the divine ῥῆμα, nor against Tholuck's former reference of μὴ ἐκ φαιν. to "the invisible causality of the divine omnipotence." Ebrard's words are: "The plural μὴ φαιν. cannot be taken to mean mere nothingness, nor to stand for the confused and extra-phenomenal realm of chaos: these μὴ φαινόμενα must rather be invisible powers, to the recognition (νόησις) of which the eye of faith is raised by the contemplation of the visible (τὸ βλεπόμενον)." This view is attractive; but I hardly think we could properly say of the divine δυνάμεις (which play so great a part in the system of Philo (*e.g.* i. 556. 20), and which in other systems of Jewish theology are supposed to be referred to in the plural אלהים) that the world was made (not δι' αὐτῶν, but) ἐξ αὐτῶν. I should therefore much prefer a different though similar mode of interpretation, which may also be illustrated by the language of Philo (ii. 261. 47), and which is found in Primasius and the schoolmen (*e.g.* Aquinas); namely, that these μὴ φαινόμενα are the divine ideas from which the visible universe sprang into being, and which were drawn from their divine seclusion in the mind of the Creator, by means of the creative word, into the region of mundane phenomenal reality. Compare Philo i. 4. 37 (ἐξ ὧν κόσμον νοητὸν συστησάμενος ἀπετέλει τὸν αἰσθητὸν παραδείγματι χρώμενος ἐκείνῳ) and 42 (where he says that ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος has its place in the Logos), together with i. 7. 47 (ὁ ἀσώματος κόσμος ἤδη πέρας εἶχεν ἱδρυθεὶς ἐν τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ, ὁ δὲ αἰσθητὸς πρὸς παρά-

δειγμα τούτου ἐτελειουργεῖτο), — thoughts which have an inward and necessary connection with the great fact revealed in the N. T., that God made the world by means of His Logos (i. 2, comp. with John i. 3), which has now been revealed to us in these last days in the person of Jesus Christ. Hofmann himself, with all his antipathy to acknowledging any relation between Alexandrinism and the New Testament, comes very near to this view.

If, then, that view be correct which I have elsewhere endeavoured to establish (*Bibl. Psych.* pp. 23, 24, etc.), that it is indeed a scriptural notion, that all events in creation and developments in history have had from eternity their spiritual images or archetypes in the mind of God; that the divine plan or idea of the universe that is to be, preceded the realisation of the universe as it is; and that there is therefore a world of ideas as well as a world of actualities having the divine Logos for its centre and point of union;—if this notion be at once scriptural, and (with certain modifications) Platonic, and Alexandrine, and if one fundamental doctrine of our epistle be, that there is an archetypal heavenly world containing the types and ideas of this (comp. ch. viii. 5 with Philo ii. 146. 35, τῶν μελλόντων ἀποτελεῖσθαι σωμάτων ἀσωμάτους ἰδέας), there does seem much to recommend the view that the μὴ φαινόμενα of our text (or the antithesis understood of these φαινόμενα) are the divine ideas in their unrealized condition. (So Alb. Magnus, Ribera, Molina.) Even Standenmaier, while making it the business of his life to expose the unscriptural nature of the philosophical doctrine of ideas, and to oppose the identification of the idea of the world with the divine Logos, is inclined to this view. Bisping also decides for it, and it appears to me the right one.

If, then, we take μὴ ἐκ φαινομένων together, the divine ideas are the invisible ground and origin from which God, by means of His creative word, drew forth into existence the visible universe; but if we prefer to connect μή with γεγονέναι (as I myself finally incline to do), we must then assume an ellipsis of ἀλλ' ἐκ νοητῶν, and these νοητά will be

the same ideas as the invisible archetypes of the visible frame of things derived from them.

The ordinary interpretation gives no adequate explanation of the substitution in the latter clause of *φαίνεσθαι* for the *βλέπεσθαι* of the former; nor with it is there any proper antithesis in the *ῥήματι τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which is regarded as a medium of creative energies, not the ground or substratum of creation itself.

At the same time, we would make no rash assertion as to the inner thought of the sacred writer here. Parallels from Philo may easily mislead an incautious interpreter. What Philo meant cosmologically is in our author's use changed and transubstantiated into theological and soteriological meanings and applications. Whether he thought of, or would admit, the cosmological meaning, is subject to doubt; but Scripture elsewhere seems to me to teach plainly enough that there is an upper heavenly world containing the archetypes and patterns of this (Matt. xxvi. 29). The present world is *anagogical*, ever pointing up to higher things—*ἀντίτυπα τῶν ἀληθινῶν*. It is faith, and faith only, resting on the revealed creative word, which penetrates through the veil of phenomena to the divine super-sensual ground behind it. Creation itself is a postulate of faith. The very formation of the stage of human history, on which God's dealings with man have been displayed, is a fact disclosed only to faith.

Having laid down this position, the writer proceeds, with the clue of Scripture statements in his hand, to review the enterprises and accomplishments of faith throughout the course of sacred history.

Ver. 4. *By faith Abel offered unto God a sacrifice of more worth than Cain, through which he obtained witness that he was righteous, God bearing witness unto his gifts: and thereby he, being dead, yet speaketh.*

Πίστει belongs grammatically to *προσήνεγκεν*, but logically it governs the whole sentence, both character and consequence of Abel's conduct being referred to faith as their ground and motive. It was both an act and a reward of

faith, that Abel offered to God πλείονα θυσίαν παρὰ Κάϊν: "*a greater*" (inwardly so, *potiorem*), "*better*," "*more excellent*," "*more effectual sacrifice*" (comp. iii. 3, Matt. vi. 25, where, as frequently elsewhere, πλείων is used of that which excels in inward worth) "*than Cain*"—"*before*" or "*beyond Cain*" (*præ Caino*)—whose sacrifice (the Mincha or vegetable offering is called θυσία at vii. 27) had not so great, or rather no value at all before God (παρὰ Κάϊν, like iii. 3, παρὰ Μωϋσῆν, does not, however, require to be interpreted by assuming an ellipsis for παρὰ τὴν θυσίαν τοῦ K.). The relative δι' ἧς is to be referred to πίστει, not (as by Cramer and Hofmann) to θυσίαν. Πίστις is throughout the main thought (comp. iv. 7, 39). Abel offered by faith, and through faith (διὰ τῆς πίστεως) he obtained the witness that he was a righteous man. So he is called by the Lord's own mouth (Matt. xxiii. 35; comp. 1 John iii. 12). But that this later witness is not that which (as Primasius thought) is here referred to, is evident from the following present participle μαρτυροῦντος (instead of μαρτυρήσαντος), which along with the ἐπὶ τοῖς δώροις αὐτοῦ shows that the reference is to the actual history as recorded in the Old Testament: καὶ ἐπεῖδεν ὁ Θεὸς ἐπὶ Ἄβελ, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δώροις αὐτοῦ (Gen. iv. 4). This "looking" by God upon Abel and his sacrificial gift involved a recognition that he was righteous; that is, so conformed in disposition and conduct to the divine will, that God could vouchsafe him a favourable regard.

The sacred writer but briefly recapitulates the Old Testament narrative, yet so as to throw considerable light upon its inward significance. The terms of the narrative seem to imply that the reason for the different acceptance of the two offerings might be found in their external character. Not, however, such a difference as suggested by the Emperor Julian, when he says, τιμότερα τῶν ἀψύχων ἐστὶ τὰ ἔμψυχα τῷ ζῶντι καὶ ζωῆς αἰτίῳ Θεῷ (Cyr. Alex. *contra Julian.*); for each brother offered of that which he possessed, and in accordance with his special work and calling. The difference to which the narrative itself points was of another kind. Abel's sacrifice was of the firstlings (בכורות)

of his flock, but Cain's was not an offering of first-fruits (מנחת בכורים). Abel offered his first and best (*of the firstlings of his flock, and of the fat thereof*); Cain offered only that which came first to hand. The outward difference betokened also an inward one. *Omne quod datur Deo* (says St. Gregory the Great) *ex dantis mente pensatur, unde scriptum est: respexit Deus ad Abel et dd munera ejus, ad Cain autem et ad munera ejus non respexit. Neque enim sacrum eloquium dicit: respexit ad munera Abel et ad Cain munera non respexit, sed prius ait quia respexit ad Abel, ac deinde subjunxit: et ad munera ejus. Idcirco non Abel ex muneribus sed ex Abel mu*nera *oblata placuerunt.* Abel's sacrifice was an expression of heartfelt thankfulness, or, as our author says, tracing the disposition of his mind to its root, an expression of his faith. But inasmuch as the relation between God and man had been disturbed by sin, Abel's faith exhibited itself in recognising and laying hold of the divine mercy in the midst of wrath and judgment,—an aspect of his personal standing with regard to sacrifice, which had its correlative in his offering being of a life and of blood. Even Hofmann recognises in Abel's sacrifice the expression of a need of atonement felt by him. But the point in the sacrifice on which he would lay stress is a different one from ours. Abel, he supposes, chose for himself the calling of a shepherd, and offered an animal sacrifice, because the skins of animals were by divine appointment employed to cover human nakedness. The sacrifice was at once a reminiscence of, and provided a relief for, sinful shame. Cain, on the other hand, in his sacrifice only thought of the support of natural life by the fruits of the earth. But Hofmann will not allow the existence of any idea of substitution in Abel's mind (*Schriftb.* ii. 1. 141). "It was not to atone for his sin, nor to avert the consequences of sin, death, that Abel brought his offering, but rather to express his thankfulness for pardon already vouchsafed, and for the tokens of that pardon thus graciously provided." But it would surely be a strange thing, if in the first bloody sacrifice recorded in Scripture the intention should be quite different

from that of all that follow. No trace is subsequently found in Scripture of the meaning here attached to animal sacrifices. Nor can we well imagine that the first bloody sacrifice was offered only to express thankfulness for the pardon of sin already vouchsafed, while in all later ones the offering of a life and the shedding of blood was regarded as the means of obtaining such pardon. Granted, too, that Abel's sacrifice, like Cain's, was in one aspect a thank-offering, we need not refuse to see that element of atonement in it which formed a constituent of all sacrifices of the like kind that followed. Nor can we allow the correctness of the assumption that Abel, in choosing the employment of a shepherd, thought only of providing garments of skin or wool, and not also of making use of the milk of his flock,—a use by no means forbidden before the flood. Nor, finally, if in slaying his victim Abel might remember with thankfulness the grace which had provided its skin as a covering for the nakedness of the body and its sinful shame, can we see why he might not also have thought, in shedding its life-blood, of the soul's life forfeited by sin. The doctrine that the "soul" (נפש) is in the blood, and that the blood of animal sacrifices was "given" by God to make atonement for the "soul" (Lev. xvii. 11), is taught in the Thorah; and in the case of most animal sacrifices, the subsequent offering of the fat on the altar is there expressly ordained or sanctioned. If Abel had learned to perform the one rite, why might he not in like manner have learned to understand the meaning of the other? Sacrifice, in its complete form, proceeds on a twofold assumption, or is the fruit of a twofold conviction in the human mind: first, that we are not our own, but God's, and owe to Him the voluntary surrender of all that we have and are, and that gratitude for His mercies should lead us constantly to do and express this; and secondly, that man in his present sinful condition is an object of divine wrath, and cannot offer any sacrifice that shall be pleasing to God until his sinfulness is destroyed or taken away, *i.e.* has been atoned for. Both thoughts find their full expression only in the bloody sacrifice. The acceptance of Abel's

offering by Jehovah was connected with this. It is not said that Abel kindled his own sacrifice: we may therefore infer that the "respect" (regard or look) which Jehovah had to it was a look of fire by which it was consumed (comp. Ex. xiv. 24). Theodotion renders, in accordance with this view, the Hebrew וישע יה by *καὶ ἐνεπύρισεν ὁ Θεός*.

And by it he, being dead, yet speaketh. Having already referred *δι' ἧς* in the previous clause to *πίστει* (as the ruling notion both in this sentence and in the whole chapter), it follows as a matter of course that we must also refer *δι' αὐτῆς* here to *πίστει*, and not to *θυσίαν*. The *text. rec.* reads, *καὶ δι' αὐτῆς ἀποθανὼν ἔτι λαλεῖται*, with D, E, J, K, the majority of MSS., and (among versions) the Itala, and possibly some others which may have taken *λαλεῖται* in a middle sense. All later critics since Griesbach (except only Matthæi) read *λαλεῖ* with A, some twenty cursives, and probably all the ancient versions except the Itala, and most commentators among the fathers (*e.g.* Chrysostom and Theophylact). The reading *λαλεῖται* gives no good sense: the middle, which would make it equivalent to *λαλεῖ*, is inadmissible; and the passive, = "he is honourably spoken of," hardly less so (*λαλοῦμαι* = *λαλεῖται περὶ ἐμοῦ* being nowhere met with); and at best, this sense would be poor and unmeaning, with no special force as applied to Abel. The reading *λαλεῖται* is due in all likelihood to the prevailing interpretation among the fathers, as thus echoed by Primasius: *adhuc loquitur, i.e. interemit quidem eum corpore, sed ejus gloriam non potuit interimere cum eo; dum enim gloria illius in toto mundo prædicatur, dum laus ejus in omnium ore versatur, dum eum omnes admirantur, quotidie adhuc defunctus loquitur.* So *e.g.* St. Chrysostom: *πῶς ἔτι λαλεῖ; τοῦτο* (namely, *τὸ λαλεῖν*) *καὶ τοῦ ζῆν σημεῖόν ἐστιν καὶ τοῦ παρὰ πάντων ἄδεσθαι, θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ μακαρίζεσθαι.* This interpretation he connects with another that corresponds better with the active *λαλεῖ*; namely, that Abel still speaks to us by his glorious example, exhorting us to follow him. (So also M'Lean.) But how poor and unmeaning is all this! The true interpretation is at once suggested by a reference to the original text, Gen.

iv. 10, "*Hark, thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground;*" and to ch. xii. 24 of our epistle, where the blood of Jesus that cries for mercy is contrasted with that of Abel which cries for vengeance (comp. Rev. vi. 9–11), and for a divine testimony on his behalf. Is it not clear as day that λαλεῖ must here express that cry of innocent blood, audible to God if not to man, which proves that the righteous man even after death is still an object of divine regard, is neither lost nor forgotten, but lives to God still? Calvin remarks excellently (referring to Ps. cxvi. 13, Heb. 15): *'inde patet reputari inter Dei sanctos quorum mors illi pretiosa est.* The pres. λαλεῖ may be, as Ebrard thinks, an historical present, referring merely to Gen. iv. 10. But the sacred writer has probably in mind the continued utterance of that cry in the record of Scripture. (So Böhme.) Abel continually speaks in Scripture, because God there refers to his speaking as a cry which has reached His ears. It is then manifest, even after death, what value his person has before God, what living power resides in it still—and all that *through faith!* Abel's example is now followed by Enoch's. Abel through faith lived on before God even after death; Enoch through faith was delivered from the present world, without passing through death at all.

Ver. 5. *By faith Enoch was translated that he should not see death; and was not found, because God had translated him: for before translation he receiveth the testimony that he had pleased God.*

The sacred writer adheres closely to the words of the LXX., and in the form in which they are preserved to us in the text of A^2: εὐηρέστησε δὲ Ἐνὼχ τῷ Θεῷ . . . καὶ εὐηρέστησεν Ἐνὼχ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ οὐχ ηὑρέσκετο διότι μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ Θεός (Gen. v. 22, 24). (Ηὑρίσκετο for the εὑρίσκετο of *text. rec.* is the reading of A, D, E in our text, and is adopted by Bleek, Lachmann, and Tischendorf; the reading of B, on the other hand, in the LXX. is εὑρίσκετο, and ὅτι instead of διότι.) The literal rendering of the original Hebrew is: *And Enoch walked with God; and he was not, because God*

took him. As *καὶ οὐχ ηὑρίσκετο* is an explanatory rendering of the Hebrew ואיננו (comp. Gen. xlii. 13, 36; Job vii. 8; and Gesenius, *Thesaur.* p. 82), so *μετέθηκεν αὐτόν* is of לקח אתו: God took Enoch (comp. Ps. lxxiii. 24, xlix. 16) into heaven (2 Kings ii. 3, 5). The infinitive with *τοῦ* (*τοῦ μὴ ἰδεῖν θάνατον*) is a not unclassical mode of expression, and according to Winer (p. 290) is in the New Testament specially employed by St. Luke: it expresses either a purpose (*that he might not:* comp. x. 7; St. Luke ii. 27, v. 7, etc.) or a consequence (*so that he did not:* comp. Acts iii. 12, vii. 19). The former is the more usual force of the expression, and not unsuitable here. It was God's purpose, in taking Enoch away, to deliver him from the power of death, as a reward of his faith in Himself the living God. This translation is not to be regarded as a *mors quædam extraordinaria* (Calvin), but as a miraculous deliverance from death itself. God's purpose thereby to reward Enoch's faith is begun to be proved in the following clause: *πρὸ γὰρ τῆς μεταθέσεως* (*αὐτοῦ* is to be rejected, with Lachm. and Tisch., after A, D, It., Vulg., Copt., and several cursives) *μεμαρτύρηται εὐαρεστηκέναι τῷ Θεῷ* (*textus receptus* has the temporal augment *εὐηρεστ.*, which is usually omitted after *ευ* and *δυς*, and generally in the *κοινὴ διάλεκτος*). The *μεμαρτύρηται* refers evidently to the testimony of Scripture; but a question may be raised, whether *πρό* has here temporal or local significance —whether the meaning is, that before his translation Enoch received the divine witness that he pleased God (Schlichting, Bengel, Hofmann), or that the scriptural witness is borne to him that he pleased God before the record is given of his translation (so, for example, Bleek and De Wette). The *ordo verborum* seems to favour the latter view, which indeed virtually includes the former.

The Hebrew phrase "התהלך את־הא (to walk with God), expressive of the closest intimacy and uninterrupted communion, occurs here only (Gen. v. 22, 24), and at Gen. vi. 9 (where it is said of Noah). The Septuagint rendering in both places is *εὐαρεστεῖν τῷ Θεῷ*, which means not only "to be well-pleasing to God," but also "to strive to please God,"

to lead a life well-pleasing to Him. Bengel compares St. Paul's use of *ἀρέσκειν*, 1 Cor. x. 33, Gal. i. 10. The expression had become a stereotyped one in reference to Enoch, as one sees from Ecclus. xliv. 16, Wisd. iv. 10. Scripture does not speak expressly of Enoch's "faith:" our author therefore goes on to remark that faith was the basis of his God-accepted manner of life.

Ver. 6. *But without faith (it is) impossible to please: for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he becometh a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.*

The *ἀδύνατον* clause is purposely made quite universal: there is no ellipsis therefore of *αὐτόν* (comp. viii. 3 and ix. 23). It is the general proposition on which the conclusion in reference to Enoch is based. (Faith essential to all well-pleasing; Enoch pleased God; Enoch therefore had faith.) This general proposition is proved by the following sentence with *δεῖ*, which here expresses not so much a moral obligation as a logical necessity. He that draweth nigh to God, *i.e.* in order to serve or hold communion with Him (*προσέρχεσθαι τῷ Θεῷ* = *ἐγγίζειν*, vii. 19; *λατρεύειν*, xii. 28, ix. 14; קרב, Ps. lxxiii. 28, Zeph. iii. 2, comp. ch. vii. 25), must have faith, or firm belief, (1) that God *is*, not indeed as an object of sense, but as a living unseen reality with whom we may hold communion, and stand in mutual relations of love and duty; and (2) he must believe that he does not draw nigh to this God in vain, that His promises to them that seek Him diligently (*ἐκζητεῖν* = Heb. דרשׁ, Acts xv. 17, as *ζητεῖν* = בַּקֵּשׁ) are no deceptions. To such he must believe that God becomes (*γίνεται*), not will or shall become (*γενήσεται*), by a law of His being a *μισθαποδότης*, a dispenser of rewards (comp. *μισθαποδοσία*, x. 35, xi. 26). The being of God is a *πρᾶγμα οὐ βλεπόμενον*; the reward of fidelity to Him is an *ἐλπιζόμενον*. The one requires faith of assured conviction, the other faith of confident expectation. Enoch's deliverance from death was a manifest reward of such faith. From Abel the martyr, and Enoch the immortalized, the sacred writer now proceeds to a third antediluvian pattern of faith—Noah the righteous.

Ver. 7. *By faith Noah, having received a divine admonition of things not yet seen, taking forethought, builded an ark for the saving of his house; through which (faith) he passed judgment on the world, and became heir of the righteousness which is according to faith.*

The whole sentence again is dominated by the main notion of πίστει, which belongs exclusively neither to εὐλαβηθείς nor to κατεσκεύασε, but to both in turn or together, as the practical expression of his faith. The arrangement of words in the sentence is skilful and significant; χρηματισθείς . . . coming first, as preceding in time the εὐλαβηθείς and the κατεσκεύασε, and immediately following πίστει as its occasion and object. The divine admonition received by Noah foretold the coming deluge, and the means by which he might save his family. All this was for a time a μηδέπω βλεπόμενον, a thing of the future (περί belongs here properly to χρηματισθείς: it is found indeed in Plato after εὐλαβηθείς, with τι but not with τινος). Noah, then, after receiving a divine warning concerning what for the present was not an object of sight, built the ark εὐλαβηθείς. This might be rendered (with Luther) "fearing God" (εὐλαβ. τὸν Θεόν), or "reverencing the oracle" (εὐλ. τὸν χρηματισμόν: so Carpzov, Böhme, De Wette, Hofmann). But the more usual sense of εὐλαβηθείς seems here the most suitable — "taking forethought," "in anxious care," as against the threatened danger to himself and the world (so Bengel, Rieger, Menken, Bleek, Ebrard, etc.). See notes on ch. v. 7, 8. One might indeed render it, with Lünemann, "in pious forethought," "with religious anxiety" (viz. in reference to the χρηματισμός); but even that cannot be said necessarily to lie in the word εὐλαβηθείς (compare εὐλ. at Acts xxiii. 10 with the patristic gloss (of St. Chrysostom, etc.) φοβηθείς, and the rendering in the versions (Peshito, Itala, Vulgate), *metuens*). While his contemporaries, whom he did not leave unwarned, went on in their heedless and carnal security, Noah took all due precautions for his own safety and that of his household: he built the ark. Compare for the like expression 1 Pet. iii. 20; κιβωτός used in both places almost

as a proper name, and therefore without the article (see my *Genesis*, i. 241).

The question remains, To what are we to refer δι' ἧς in the final clause, "*by which he passed judgment*," etc.? Cramer, Michaelis, Bisping, Hofmann, and most ancient commentators, refer it to κιβωτός. And this is not inadmissible, as a reference to σωτηρίας would be. The building of the ark was indeed an act of faith, by which Noah practically passed judgment on an unbelieving, mocking world. But after referring δι' ἧς at ver. 4 to πίστει (not to θυσίαν), we cannot hesitate to do the same here (with Bengel, Menken, Valckenaer, Böhme, Bleek, De Wette, M'Lean, Ebrard, Lünemann). Πίστει may, indeed, seem somewhat remote; but it gives the keynote to the sentence, which may be so read as to bring it sufficiently near. It is also more fitly said, that Noah condemned the world by his faith, than by his building the ark. It was the faith which inspired that action by which he passed judgment on the faithless generation among whom he lived (comp. Matt. xii. 41 seq., and Rom. ii. 27). And so, the sacred writer proceeds, thus believing, and giving this practical proof of his belief, he became τῆς κατὰ πίστιν δικαιοσύνης κληρονόμος. The righteousness κατὰ πίστιν is not different from that which is elsewhere called righteousness ἐκ πίστεως. The one (ἐκ πίστεως) designates faith as the source or ground of righteousness (justification), the other (κατὰ πίστιν) as its necessary condition or correlative. The "righteousness of faith" is the same here as in the acknowledged writings of St. Paul, only that here the doctrine and its expression are assumed as well known; which need not surprise us, as this epistle is at any rate later than those to the Romans and Galatians. The thought, too, involved in ἐγένετο κληρονόμος is Pauline. So, in Rom. i. 17, St. Paul speaks of the righteousness revealed in the gospel as a δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ. Man is heir of the righteousness of faith. It is not of his own earning or deserving, but a gift, a possession, which passes over to him from a heavenly Father. Noah is the first man of whom the Scriptures speak as δίκαιος, and indeed as τέλειος δίκαιος

(comp. Ecclus. xliv. 17; Ezek. xiv. 14, 20). The Thorah so designates him at the commencement of the history of the deluge (Gen. vi. 9). God's determination to save Noah and his family had its ground in the general conformity of his mind and life to the divine will. But Noah's righteousness found its special manifestation in consequence of the faith which received both the divine warning of approaching danger and the divine promise of ultimate safety, and inspired a corresponding course of action. So (Gen. xv. 6) Abram's righteousness is indicated as the consequence of a faith which unhesitatingly received the divine promise of a natural heir, and of a posterity that should exceed in multitude the stars of heaven. "Righteous by," or "according to faith," is not a single consequence of a single act of faith, but the continuing consequence of a continuous action. But the more decisive any particular trial of faith may be, the more decidedly will that inward righteousness which avails before God come forth into outward manifestation. In this sense, then, it is said of Noah, that, believing the divine warning and promise, and fulfilling the divine command, strange and unexampled as it might appear, amid the ridicule and mockery of a careless world, he became heir of the righteousness which is determined by and conditioned through faith.

Now follow (vers. 8–22) the examples of faith among the postdiluvian patriarchs, the ancestors of Israel. Our author began, as we have seen (ver. 3), with the invisible πρᾶγμα of the creation as the first object of religious faith, and then proceeded (vers. 4–7) to set before his readers the three great antediluvian exemplars of faith—Abel, Enoch, Noah. In virtue of his faith, the first of these offered to God an acceptable sacrifice; the second led a God-pleasing life; the third received and fulfilled a divine prophetic word of warning and promise. In the case of all three likewise, faith found its reward. The first died, but even in death was not lost to God, nor forgotten of Him; the second died not at all, but God took him, by miraculous translation, to Himself; the third was wonderfully preserved in life when

all the world perished. Thus all three were examples of the work of faith, and of faith's reward. From these πρεσβύτεροι of the ἀρχαῖος κόσμος, the sacred writer now proceeds to the πρεσβύτεροι of the postdiluvian patriarchal time. All that now follows has a special reference to a people of God which is hereafter to be born, redeemed, and sanctified. The promise is defined with increasing clearness in its relation to Israel. It concerns a land in which the patriarchs are still strangers, a Son that is not yet born, a people that hereafter is to come into existence.

The history of the patriarchs, as introductory to that of Israel, begins with the divine command to Abram to leave his country, kindred, and family, and journey towards a land which the Lord will show him.

Ver. 8. *By faith Abraham, when called, obeyed, in that he went out to the place which he should hereafter receive for an inheritance, and went forth, not knowing whither he goeth.*

The life of the forefathers of the chosen people was throughout a life ἐπ' ἐλπίδι παρ' ἐλπίδα—the present in the rudest contrast to the promised future. The history of the patriarchs, therefore, is rich before all others in examples of faith. Abraham's history is a continuous progress ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν. It begins with the divine call, the purpose of which was the formation of a God-fearing family separate from the heathen world, and the nucleus of a future God-chosen people. The use of the term καλούμενος here would naturally be in reference to this fact (comp. Isa. xli. 9), and the present participle (as again at ver. 17) has the force of a synchronistic imperfect: *fide quum vocaretur A. obedivit.* Lachmann's reading (after A and D), ὁ καλούμενος Ἀβρ., has therefore little in its favour. It could only mean, according to Greek idiom, *the so-called Abraham* (not as Lünemann would render it, "*Abraham who was called*"); and so it is rendered in the Itala and Vulgate, and explained by Theodoret and Valckenaer, and generally by those who adopt or represent this reading. (Comp. Plato, *Phæd.* p. 86 D, ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ; and Isocr. *ad Nicocl.* p. 45,

τὰς καλουμένας γνώμας; Kühner, § 476, 2 Anm.) But how unsuitable would be an allusion to the patriarch's change of name here, seeing that did not take place till some five-and-twenty years after the departure from Haran! Therefore, notwithstanding its critical recommendation, we feel compelled to reject Lachmann's reading, and adhere to the καλούμενος of the *textus receptus*, which is also that of the Peshito and of St. Chrysostom.[1] A divine call was vouchsafed to Abraham. He followed that call. Wherein his obedience to it consisted, is expressed by the following epexegetical infinitive sentence, ἐξελθεῖν εἰς τὸν (the article, which is superfluous, is omitted by Lachmann, after A and D) τόπον ὃν ἤμελλε (Lachmann and Tisch. read, with A, D, K, ἔμελλεν) λαμβάνειν εἰς κληρονομίαν. He obediently followed the divine call to go forth, (in that he went forth) to the place which he was afterwards to receive as an inheritance. But this divine ordinance on his behalf was only made known to him after his entrance into the land of Canaan (Gen. xii. 7); he knew not in going there that that was the final goal of his long pilgrimage: καὶ ἐξῆλθεν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος ποῦ ἔρχεται—he went forth in obedience to the divine admonition, not knowing whither he goeth. (For the construction ποῦ *c. indic.*, comp. Acts. xx. 18, ἐπίστασθε . . . πῶς μεθ' ὑμῶν ἐγενόμην, x. 18, xv. 36; see Winer, § 41, 4.) His faith was shown in his preference of the future and invisible for the seen and the present, and in the blindness of his confidence, or rather in that spiritual insight which was contented to see and walk only by the light of God. This faith found fresh exercise and trial in the land of promise.

Ver. 9. *By faith he sojourned as a stranger in the land of promise, as if it were a foreign country, dwelling in tents with Isaac and Jacob, the co-heirs with him of the same promise.*

In classical usage, παροικεῖν signifies to dwell alongside of or by another; in the Septuagint it represents the Hebrew גּוּר (which probably has the same root with the Latin *peregri-*

[1] [Cod. Sin. has also καλουμενος.]

narî), and is used specially of the pilgrim-life of the patriarchs, and in senses derived therefrom by Philo and the Fathers. In Philo, *παροικεῖν*, to dwell in a foreign land, is opposed to *κατοικεῖν*, to dwell in one's own land. (Comp. i. 511, 36; 310, 22; 416, 24; 417, 16, etc.) *Παροικεῖν* is here followed by *εἰς*, combining the notion of entrance into with that of continuance in the foreign country. *Παρῴκησεν* is = *παροικεῖν ἦλθεν* (Philo, i. 310, 22), *eo abiit, ut illic tanquam peregrinus habitaret* (Valck.), several examples of which might be cited from the diction of St. Luke. The most similar instance would perhaps be Luke xxiv. 18, *παροικεῖς εἰς Ἰερουσαλήμ*; if better attested. Comp. also Acts vii. 4, *εἰς ἣν ὑμεῖς νῦν κατοικεῖτε*; xii. 19, *εἰς τὴν Καισάρειαν διέτριβεν*; Luke xi. 7; Acts viii. 40, xviii. 21, and xix. 22, *rec.* Instead of *εἰς τὴν γῆν*, we must read, with Lachmann and Tischendorf, following A, I, K, and other authorities, *εἰς γῆν τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*. (The article is wanting, as in Acts vii. 4, *ἐκ γῆς Χαλδαίων*. It is indeed often omitted when a preposition comes before two nouns, the second of which is a genitive, or when the two form one notion: Winer, § 19, 2; Bernhardy, p. 321.) *As a strange country.* So the land of promise seemed to the outward eye. Abram entered it as a foreign country, subject to other lords and masters, without losing heart or faith. He entered and dwelt therein without having a foot-breadth (comp. Acts vii. 5) which he could call his own; and even after his purchase of a sepulchre at Hebron (confounded with Jacob's subsequent purchase of a similar piece of ground at Sichem by St. Stephen under the pressure of his rapid recapitulation, Acts vii. 16), he still dwelt as a stranger and wanderer in the land promised to him for an eternal inheritance: *ἐν σκηναῖς κατοικήσας, μετὰ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακὼβ τῶν συγκληρονόμων τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῆς αὐτῆς*. Isaac and Jacob are mentioned for the present, only as it were in parentheses, Abraham remaining the chief person. They are called *συγκληρ. τῆς ἐπ. τῆς αὐτῆς* (instead of *τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπ.*, comp. Luke ii. 8), not so much as being recipients of the same promise as Abraham, as because its fulfilment was equally to them an object of expectation. Abraham himself (and Isaac

and Jacob after his example) made no self-willed efforts to bring about the accomplishment of the divine promises: they gave up all claims for the present possession of the land, and were content to wait God's time and God's disposal. They built themselves, therefore, no houses, had no fixed dwelling-place, but moved about in tents (אהלים) and fragile tabernacles (סכות). Our author sees the motive for this voluntary life of pilgrimage on Abraham's part in his faith and expectation of no earthly or temporal inheritance, but of a higher and celestial home.

Ver. 10. *For he looked for the city that hath the true foundations, whose builder and maker is God.*

The promise made to the patriarchs related, so far as the outward word went, simply to future possession of the land of Canaan. But their inward longing in the midst of their earthly pilgrimage for a fixed dwelling-place rose beyond this. Unconsciously to themselves, or at any rate not with full consciousness, their desires reached on and upwards to the eternal city which the New Testament reveals as the home and expectation of all saints. Throughout the Old Testament the desire of believers is for a rest and a possession which is more and more clearly seen to lie beyond the realm of nature and the present world. The meaning of this desire is clearly revealed in the New Testament; and while it already receives a partial satisfaction now in present evangelical and spiritual blessings, its full contentment is assured to every individual believer in a no longer distant future. But even under the Old Testament this unveiling began. The translation of Enoch, and afterwards of Elijah, were glorious hints of a yet hidden glory. The ancient belief and confession of the synagogue, which apprehended the reception of all faithful Israelites into the heavenly communion of the divine shechinah, and distinguished between Jerusalem below and Jerusalem above (ירושלים של-מטה and ירושלים של-מעלה), was the outcome of revelations made under the Old Testament in word and miracle. The idea of a twofold Jerusalem is demonstrably older than the apos-

tolic preaching; St. Paul, in exhibiting it, appealed to the existing faith of Palestine, and the religious-philosophical speculations of Alexandria. The one was strengthened and completed, the other refined and purified, and both interpenetrated by gospel light. There can therefore be no doubt that "the city" which the sacred writer has here in view is no other than the heavenly Jerusalem, which he calls elsewhere μέλλουσα πόλις (xiii. 14) and πόλις Θεοῦ ζῶντος (xii. 22). It is a city which hath "*the foundations.*" In Ps. lxxxvii. it is said of the earthly Jerusalem, οἱ θεμέλιοι αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι τοῖς ἁγίοις; and of the heavenly at Rev. xxi. 14, τὸ τεῖχος τῆς πόλεως ἔχον θεμελίους δώδεκα. But here the heavenly Jerusalem is not contrasted with the earthly city, but with the frail and moveable dwellings of the patriarchs in their nomad life. Θεμέλιοι is a later and less used form of the plural than θεμέλια: both are found in the Septuagint. The article τούς is introduced for the sake of emphasis. This heavenly city alone has the true foundations which can never be moved. And further, it is a city ἧς τεχνίτης καὶ δημιουργὸς ὁ Θεός. As the heavenly sanctuary is one not made with hands, but pitched by God Himself (viii. 2) to be the archetype of the sanctuary on earth, so the heavenly city here is a formation and building of God, and an archetype of that earthly city which God had once so favoured with His presence, and to which the hearts of the readers of this epistle still so dangerously cling. God is its τεχνίτης, as having laid down its plan, and δημιουργός, as having framed it accordingly. To this true and heavenly home Abraham's faith and desires took their flight. "*He earnestly expected it;*" ἐκδέχεσθαι differing from δέχεσθαι, as ἐκζητεῖν does from ζητεῖν. Philo says, in his manner,[1] the same of the patriarchs

[1] The land promised by God to Abraham (Gen. xii. 1) is, according to Philo, πόλις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πολλὴ καὶ σφόδρα εὐδαίμων· τὰ γὰρ ὄντως ὄντα τοῦ Θεοῦ μεγάλα καὶ τίμια (i. 103, 44). It is that city of God to which, as the one great Citizen (πολίτης), God invites him who feels himself a stranger here (i. 161); for to the soul of the wise man heaven is a fatherland, and earth a strange country. In heaven it feels at home, and exercises its franchise (πολιτεύεται); on earth it is a stranger (παροικεῖ)

as the apostolic writer here. The promise made to them concerned, he says, a happy spiritual city, for whose franchise they longed in the mortal bodies of their earthly pilgrimage. But Philo's expressions, though remarkably similar, are yet not identical with those of our author. The latter has carefully wiped off from the mirror of the future the obscuring breath of philosophic speculation and *allegorèsis*, and is content to exhibit the naked spiritual truth freed from all false glitter and ornamentation. And further—which is the main matter—he avoids, or rather cuts through, Philo's confused mixture of physical and metaphysical, earthly and spiritual, carefully distinguishing in every utterance between the two economies of creation and redemption, and the two worlds of nature and grace. But that nevertheless there is a profound connection between the two writers and their schools of thought, remains a fact of the greatest significance. The gradual process of spiritual apprehension by which thinkers in Israel obtained clearer views of the divine purpose of redemption for themselves and mankind, was one by no means broken off with the appearance of the last canonical book of the Old Testament. To deny this were a grave sin against historic truth, which could not remain without its appropriate and self-inflicted punishment.

To Abraham's example of faith is now added that of his

(i. 416, 38). In this sense-bound mortal body the wise man is but a lodger (*πατροικεῖ*), but in the heavenly home he is an inhabitant (*κατοικεῖ*). To reach that *πάτρις* (*πατρῶα γῆ*) is his constant endeavour (i. 417, 16; 511, 36; 627, 20). Into that *μητρόπολις* of the supersensual world he will, when delivered from the bands of earth, be safely conducted by the heavenly Father (i. 648, 14). The doctrine of pre-existence is one of the unscriptural philosophemes which is mixed up by Philo with a view that is otherwise profound and true. The doctrine of ideas is also introduced. Philo's heavenly city is a *πόλις νοητή*, and perhaps he would therefore hardly speak of God as *δημιουργός* and *τεχνίτης* in reference to it. Both terms are, however, Philonic: the first is also familiar to the Stoics and Plato. For the latter, comp. Wisd. xiii. 1; and Philo, i. 47, 2, *οὐ τεχνίτης μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πατὴρ ὧν τῶν γιγνομένων*; 583, 3, *ὁ γεννήσας καὶ τεχνιτεύσας πατήρ*; and 583, 15, he speaks of man as a *δημιούργημα τοῦ τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν μόνου τεχνίτου*.

consort Sarah, because it was from the faith of each combined that Israel was destined to spring.

Ver. 11. *By faith Sarah likewise received strength to conceive seed even when she was past age, because she judged him faithful that had promised.*

All kinds of meanings have been found in the καὶ αὐτή applied to Sarah here: *e.g.* (*a*) "*even Sarah, the unfruitful*" (Schlichting), answering to the interpolated reading Σάῤῥα στεῖρα (also στεῖρα οὖσα and ἡ στεῖρα) of D*, Itala, Vulgate, and Syr.; (*b*) "*even Sarah, though a woman*" (St. Chrysost., Œcumen., Theophyl., Böhme); (*c*) "*even she who had so long doubted*" (Bleek, De Wette, Winer, Lünemann). But all these are needless glosses on the simple text; καὶ αὐτός having often merely the office of extending the predicate of a former sentence to a second subject: here it associates with the great forefather the honoured foremother of the chosen people. No New Testament writer uses αὐτός in the nominative so frequently as St. Luke; and it is worth observing that he uses καὶ αὐτός in a similar position to καὶ αὐτή (before Σάῤῥα) here, before proper names: *e.g.* Luke xx. 42, καὶ αὐτὸς Δαυίδ; xxiv. 15, καὶ αὐτὸς Ἰησοῦς; comp. Acts viii. 13, Σίμων καὶ αὐτός. Even at ii. 14 and iv. 15 καὶ αὐτός is simply equivalent to *et ipse*—he likewise. As Abraham did great things by faith, so Sarah likewise, within her womanly sphere, δύναμιν εἰς καταβολὴν σπέρματος ἔλαβεν. For the construction δύναμις εἰς, compare Luke v. 17, δύναμις Κυρίου ἦν εἰς τὸ ἰᾶσθαι αὐτούς, which shows that εἰς introduces the action which the δύναμις subserves. But καταβολὴ σπέρματος expresses in Greek the act of the husband, not of the wife. Böhme therefore, Stier, De Wette, Bleek, and Lünemann propose another rendering both of καταβ. and σπέρμ.—"for the founding of a family" (comp. iv. 3 and ix. 26). Reference is also made to Plato's πρώτη καταβολὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων and γενῶν ἄρχαι καὶ καταβολαί. But is it likely that the sacred writer would use καταβολὴ σπέρματος in a different sense from that which the words would naturally convey to every hearer and reader, from

that in which they were taken by all the ancient commentators, and in which they are rendered in all the ancient versions? We would interpret therefore, with Œcumenius, ἐδυναμώθη εἰς τὸ ὑποδέξασθαι παιδοποιὸν σπέρμα, or with Baumgarten, εἰς τὸ δέχεσθαι σπέρμα καταβεβλημένον. That this wonderful conception of Sarah's was the result of her faith, is further suggested by the addition, καὶ παρὰ καιρὸν ἡλικίας—*and that in contradiction to the time of life in which she then stood* (comp. Rom. i. 26, xi. 24, παρὰ φύσιν). Bleek and Lünemann take it differently: *and that in contradiction to the (youthful) time of life which she had already overpassed.* But ἡλικία, without any addition to define its meaning more closely, could only signify here the time of life which Sarah had actually reached. In that sense Philo speaks of Abraham and Sarah as ὑπερήλικες advanced in life. Ἡλικία itself is sometimes used for old age: *e.g. Il.* xxii. 419, where it is the parallel word to γῆρας; and Plato says, almost as if to elucidate this passage, οἱ δι' ἡλικίαν ἄτοκοι; compare also Plut. *an seni respublica gerenda sit*, c. 8, τῶν παρ' ἡλικίαν τὸ βῆμα καὶ τὸ στρατήγιον βαδιζόντων. The reading εἰς τὸ τεκνῶσαι, with omission of καί before παρὰ καιρὸν ἡλ., and the ἔτεκεν of the *textus receptus* after καί retained, are attempts to get rid of or to justify the apparently inconvenient but really quite suitable conjunction. Griesbach began omitting ἔτεκεν, and all later critics except Matthæi have followed his example. The καί may be regarded as *epexegetical*—"and indeed when past the time of life;" *or as intensive*—"even though she had passed the time of life;" or as at the same time both epexegetical and intensive—"and even when she had passed," etc. (Hartung, i. 145). Her long barrenness would itself have required faith in a promise of its removal: how much more, when her time of life seemed to render it impossible! But by faith she drew strength out of the divine fulness, inasmuch as she accounted the God of the promise (comp. Rom. iv. 21) faithful to the promise (comp. ch. x. 23). This faith of Sarah's, answering and supporting the faith of Abraham, was now gloriously rewarded: the promise was fulfilled in over-measure.

Ver. 12. *Therefore were there born even of one, and him as good as dead, as it were the stars of the heaven in multitude, and as the sand by the shore of the sea the innumerable.*

Therefore even of one. It is a consequence of Abraham's faith, and Sarah's, that their long fruitless marriage was crowned with such a reward. Faith brought them the thing hoped for. This διὸ καί, thus closely combining cause and effect, means and object, ground and consequence, is characteristic both of St. Luke (Luke i. 35; Acts x. 29, xiii. 35) and of St. Paul. It occurs again in our epistle at ch. xiii. 12. The promise had spoken of a posterity that should be numberless as the dust of the earth (Gen. xiii. 16) and as the stars of heaven (Gen. xv. 5); or like the stars of heaven, and like the sand on the lip, *i.e.* the shore, of the sea (Gen. xxii. 17). And such indeed were born to them. It is hard to decide between the readings ἐγεννήθησαν (*textus receptus* and Tischendorf, with D***, E, J, Syr., Kopt., and various Fathers) and ἐγενήθησαν (Lachmann, with A, D*, K, Itala, and Vulgate). The preposition ἀπό (ἀφ' ἑνός) appears to me to favour the latter; with ἐγεννήθησαν one would rather have expected ἐξ ἑνός. It is also uncertain whether the subject of ἐγεν. is τέκνα understood, or whether we are to regard καθὼς τὰ ἄστρα and ὡσεὶ (or ὡς ἡ) ἄμμος as virtually the subject. The latter seems to be the simpler construction, making καθώς, "like as" = *similes*, "those like." We read ὡς ἡ, with all the uncials, following Gen. xxii. 17 in the LXX. From so seemingly insignificant, nay, lifeless source (ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ ταῦτα νενεκρωμένου), has sprung in after centuries a race so innumerable—the people called in their own post-biblical poetry by the emblematical name מי־מנה (where is their like? Num. xxiii. 10). Abraham the One, notwithstanding his σῶμα ἤδη νενεκρωμένον (Rom. iv. 19), is the father of them all. Instead of καὶ ταῦτα, St. Paul always writes καὶ τοῦτο. (The *textus receptus* has also καὶ ταῦτα at 1 Cor. vi. 8.) This καὶ ταῦτα is frequently found in classical writers with the participle in the limiting sense of καίπερ. Lünemann, against the usage of the language, as well as against logic, finds a double allusion in it to both

Abraham and Sarah (comp. Plato, *resp.* iii. p. 404 B. Homer entertains his heroes at their banquets without fish, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ ὄντας; Kühner, § 667, *c*). So here—from one, although as good as dead. Isaiah (li. 1, 2) refers to this great example to cheer the hopes of the remnant of Israel in their exile: *Hearken to me, ye that follow after righteousness, ye that seek Jehovah: look forth unto the rock whence ye were hewn, and to the shaft of the pit whence ye were digged. Look unto Abraham your father, and unto Sarah that bare you: how he was but one when I called him, and blessed him, and increased him.* Abraham is here compared to a quarry from which the stones have been hewn for a stately mansion, and Sarah to a mine whence precious metals have been extracted. Abraham, as the one father of such great multitudes, is repeatedly called in Scripture "the one," almost after the manner of a proper name (האחד, Mal. ii. 15; comp. Ezek. xxxiii. 24).

Up to this point the sacred writer has exhibited the faith of the patriarchs (of Abraham, along with Isaac and Jacob) in its more passive aspects, as producing humble confidence in the divine promises, patient waiting for their fulfilment, and resigned obedience to the divine will. Before he now goes on to speak of the work of faith, in its more active character, as the source of deeds of transcendent heroism, he glances first at the lives' end of the patriarchs. They saw not the fulfilment of the great promise made to them, yet lost not their confidence in Him who gave it, and died in the faith in which they had lived, looking onward still to a glorious future.

Ver. 13. *According to faith died all these, as not having received the promises, but (as) having seen them from afar off, and saluted them, and confessed that they are strangers and pilgrims upon earth.*

According to faith: κατὰ πίστιν, not πίστει, *by faith.* The dying of the patriarchs was not, like their patience and obedience, a consequence of their faith, but part of the sphere in which it was exercised. They died, as they had

lived, *in faith*. The meaning of this sentence, however, is not that they died without having received the promised blessings, which in death they saw afar off, and saluted, etc.; for that would require us to take μὴ λαβόντες as a pluperfect, and the following participles as equivalent to presents, which is not likely to have been the writer's intention. His meaning must rather be taken to be: These all died in the attitude of faith, as men who had not received, but only seen afar off, etc. According to this interpretation, κατὰ πίστιν ἀπέθανον is an independent sentence; and μὴ λαβόντες, κ.τ.λ., gives the ground or occasion of it,—μή being used, not οὐ, because these participles are causal in significance, and capable of being resolved into subordinate sentences (Rost, § 135, 5). The emphasis must be laid on πόῤῥωθεν αὐτὰς ἰδόντες, κ.τ.λ., not on the previous μὴ λαβόντες. As merely not having received the promises, they might have died *in* faith, or *without* faith; but as being men who had seen and greeted afar off the promised good, and led in consequence a pilgrim-life, they died in the exercise of the same confident expectation—κατὰ πίστιν ἀπέθανον.

The ἐπαγγελίαι here referred to begin with Abraham. We cannot therefore make οὗτοι πάντες refer back (with Œcumenius, Theophylact, Primasius, and others) to Abel and all the fore-mentioned saints, except Enoch, but only to the three patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The plural "promises" might be understood of the one promise made to all three of future possession of the land of Canaan; but inasmuch as it was a promise that contained in itself a power of development into infinite blessings, the plural is rightly used here, as subsequently at ver. 17. [Reception of the promise is here, as at ix. 15, not reception of the word of promise, but of the things foretold (comp. Luke xxiv. 49; Acts i. 4). Lachmann's reading (after A), προσδεξάμενοι, is a poor gloss; the other reading, κομισάμενοι (comp. ver. 39), is better. The addition καὶ πεισθέντες in the *textus receptus* is another gloss connecting ἰδόντες with ἀσπασάμενοι: see the commentaries of Chrysostom and Œcumenius.] The adverb πόῤῥωθεν belongs both to ἰδόντες and ἀσπασάμενοι: they saw

and saluted from the far distance the blessings of the future. Such an ἀσπασμός we have in the mouth of the dying Jacob (Gen. xlix. 18): *For Thy salvation have I waited, Jehovah.* It is evident from the following ὁμολογήσαντες that all the participles are to be taken as pluperfects: the reference being, in the case of Abraham, to his calling himself πάροικος καὶ παρεπίδημος before the sons of Heth (Gen. xxiii. 4); and in that of Jacob, to his language before Pharaoh (Gen. xlvii. 9), when he speaks of his own and his father's homeless wandering life on earth as a pilgrimage (comp. Ps. lxix. 19, 54, xxxix. 13, and 1 Chron. xxix. 15), in contrast with the rest in God, which is the true home. It is untrue to say that the patriarchs had no thoughts of another world, and a life there. They were said to be gathered to their fathers before their burial, and that was a reunion, not of corpses, but of persons. That man did not cease to exist when the present life was ended, was a belief universal in the ancient world; and the patriarchs connected theirs with the assurance of divine favour, and the hopes cherished by the divine promises. But it lost almost all its consolation for them by the chilling interposition of the notion of Hades, and its lifeless gloom, over which their faith had to stretch its hand. And so they died κατὰ πίστιν, believing in an eternal, faithful God, the truth of His promises, and their own abiding relations with Him. The object of their hopes, then, was the same glorious world of the future which the New Testament reveals, though for them its true character, and their present hold upon it, might still be covered by an impenetrable veil. The sacred writer here derives all this as an inference from the terms which they used in speaking of the present life—their calling themselves strangers and pilgrims here.

Vers. 14–16*a*. *For they that say such things declare plainly that they are seeking after a native country. And if, indeed, they were thinking of that from whence they came out, they might have had opportunity to have returned. But now their desire is after a better, even a heavenly* (country).

Those who, like Jacob, speak of their earthly life as (מגורים) a wandering about in a foreign country, make it evident, or show plainly (comp. for *ἐμφανίζουσι*, Acts xxiii. 22, and the note at ch. ix. 24), that the object of their search and desires is a distant fatherland, where alone they could feel at home. And if that fatherland of which they thus make mention, or show that they are thinking (*μνημονεύειν*, not here *meminisse*, as at ch. xiii. 7, Luke xvii. 32, Acts xx. 31, 35, but *commemorare*, as at ver. 22; though we might say that the two meanings are here coincident), were that from which they originally came (*ἐξῆλθον*, or, as Lachmann, Tischendorf, Bleek, and others read, with A, D, E, *ἐξέβησαν*)—namely, Therah's country in the north-east of Mesopotamia, which formed part of the primeval empire of Nimrod—they might have had, at the time when they used such language, an opportunity to have returned to it (*εἶχον ἄν*: Winer, § 42, 2). But now (*νῦν δέ*, not *νυνὶ δέ*, the reading of *textus receptus* against the MSS.) the case is otherwise (*νῦν* is here used in its logical, not its temporal sense). Their glance is forwards, not backwards. The country they are longing to reach is a higher and a heavenly one. It must be confessed that we nowhere read of the patriarchs, that they expressed a conscious desire for a home in heaven. The nearest approach to anything of the kind is in Jacob's vision of the angel-ladder, and his wondering exclamation (Gen. xxviii. 17), זה שער השמים; but even there no desire is expressed for an entrance into the heavenly land, but the promise renewed of future possession of the earthly Canaan: "*The land whereon thou sleepest will I give to thee.*" Must we not say, then, that here again the apostolic writer of our epistle imports New Testament ideas into the histories of the Old? In a certain way this is true. He does explain and illustrate the promises and wishes of the patriarchs by New Testament light, and gives to both an evangelical expression. But in doing so, he discloses their true inward meaning. The promise given to the patriarchs was a divine assurance of a future rest: that rest was connected, in the first instance, with the future possession of an earthly home; but their

desire for that home was, at the same time, a longing and a seeking after Him who had given the promise of it, whose presence and blessing alone made it for them an object of desire, and whose presence and blessing, wherever vouchsafed, makes the place of its manifestation to be indeed a heaven. The shell of their longing might thus be of earth, its kernel was heavenly and divine; and as such, God Himself vouchsafed to honour and reward it.

Ver. 16*b*. *Wherefore God is not ashamed of them to be called their God; for he did prepare for them a city.*

The verb ἐπαισχύνεσθαι has here a twofold construction —first with the accusative of the person (αὐτούς), and then with the infinitive regarded as an accusative of the action (ἐπικαλεῖσθαι). The verb ἐπικαλεῖσθαι may be taken in its first obvious sense, *cognominari*. "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob" is a name which God gives Himself at Gen. xxviii. 13, and especially at Ex. iii. 6; and which again is given to Him by the patriarchs, Gen. xxxi. 5, xxxii. 10. It expresses a more than outward and transient relation. Those whose names are so associated with that of the Eternal One, are united to Him in a covenant of life for eternity (as our Lord Himself argues, Matt. xxii. 31 seq., because He is the God only of the living). The same is virtually the argument here—ἡτοίμασε γὰρ αὐτοῖς πόλιν. The aorist is here used for the somewhat heavy and awkward pluperfect (ἡτοιμάκει), which is frequently the case in subordinate sentences (Winer, § 40, 5; comp. Bäumlein, § 529), as a little lower down at ver. 18 (ἐλαλήθη). The meaning is, that God gave Himself, and suffered the patriarchs to give Him, that name, because He had prepared a city for them in which He was minded some day to receive them to Himself (Schlichting, Grotius, Böhme, De Wette, Hofmann). Comp. ἑτοιμάζειν at John xiv. 2, 3. The city is opposed, as there the μόναι, to the temporary shelter of earthly tabernacles. Philo somewhat paradoxically uses πολίτης of God in this sense. He is the only abiding One, the true Citizen, with whom to have fellowship is to have eternal life and rest. God, then, was

not ashamed to be called the God of the patriarchs, because He had prepared for them that eternal rest with Himself in His own city.

And so the patriarchs died, as they had lived, *in faith.* Wearied of this earthly life, death was to them a going home. Having thus exhibited the reflex of the promise in their disposition and character, the sacred writer goes on to speak of the heroic deeds to which the same faith moved them. He makes a beginning again with Abraham.

Vers. 17, 18. *By faith Abraham, being tempted, hath offered up Isaac; and he that had accepted the promises offered up his only begotten son, he to whom it had been said, "In Isaac shall be named for thee a seed."*

Abraham, in the obedience of faith, had entered the promised land; in the patience of faith, had spent many a long decade of his earthly pilgrimage therein; in the joy of faith, he had witnessed the fulfilment of the promise by which his long fruitless marriage had at last been crowned; and now the same faith must undergo its severest trial, in order that the victory of faith may be his also. The father of the faithful endured this trial, and came triumphant out of it. The perfect tense προσενήνοχεν expresses the reality of the offering of Isaac on his part as an accomplished fact. Abraham did indeed bring his son to the altar, and had stretched forth his hand to consummate the sacrifice, when the Lord Himself by His angel prevented the deed of blood, in order once for all to consecrate and sanction the typical animal sacrifice in lieu of that of human kind. But so far as Abraham was concerned, the offering *was* made (also once for all); and the participle πειραζόμενος may be taken as a synchronistic imperfect (comp. καλούμενος, ver. 8), expressing that the whole action from beginning to end was on God's part a trial of His servant's faith. The following καί is at once epexegetical, and marks the climax—Yea, offered up his only son, or was engaged in offering: the imperfect προσέφερεν transports us into the midst of this wondrous act of faith, in obedience to a divine command which was against nature, inasmuch as it

concerned his own natural offspring, and that an only child (the sacred writer here, as elsewhere, proves his independence of the Septuagint, rendering, as he does, the יחידך of Gen. xxii. 2, as also Aquila, by *μονογενῆ*, and not by *ἀγαπητόν σου*, wherewith the Sept. translated their reading of the original ידידך). The command to offer Isaac was not only against nature; it was also in itself paradoxical: he is bidden to do this, who with open eyes had received and accepted (*ἀναδεξάμενος*) the divine promises,—he that had heard how all were to be accomplished in this his only begotten son! The *πρὸς ὃν* of ver. 18 is to be rendered *ad quem* (not *de quo*, as by Bengel, who refers it to Isaac, and compares Luke xix. 9): he to whom it had been said, *ὅτι ἐν Ἰσαὰκ κληθήσεταί σοι σπέρμα*. As the words in the original begin with כִּי, it is a question whether *ὅτι* here represents this כִּי, or is the so-called *ὅτι recitativum* [comp. Rom. iv. 17 (Gen. xvii. 5); Rom. viii. 36 (Ps. xliv. 23); 1 Cor. xiv. 21 (Isa. xxviii. 11), where the same question might be asked]. That the author of our epistle does occasionally employ this *ὅτι recitativum*, is evident from ch. vii. 17 and x. 8; and so likewise does St. Paul, not only when introducing the *oratio directa*, as at Rom. iii. 8, Gal. i. 23, 2 Thess. iii. 10 (comp. Luke i. 25, 61, iv. 21, etc.), but also in making citations from Scripture, *e.g.* Rom. ix. 17 (Ex. ix. 16), 2 Cor. vi. 16 (Lev. xxvi. 11 seq.), Gal. iii. 8 (Gen. xii. 3),—a fact wrongly disputed by Bleek. In the present case, it would probably be most correct to say that our author adopts the כִּי of the original, but uses its equivalent *ὅτι* in the recitative sense. Three interpretations might be given of these words to Abraham: (1) After Isaac shall thy seed call themselves (Hofmann); or, (2) Through Isaac shall a seed be called into existence for thee (Drechsler); or, (3) In Isaac shall a seed be named for thee, *i.e.* In or through Isaac shall it come to pass that men shall speak of Abraham as having a seed (Bleek). Against (1) may be urged, that we should have expected בִּשְׁמ to be expressed if that were the meaning (comp. Isa. xliii. 7, xlviii. 1); and again, that God's ancient people, though frequently called after Israel, Jacob, and Joseph, are

only once called after Isaac (Amos vii. 9): against (2), that קרא is never so absolutely used for "call into existence" as here (but comp. Isa. xli. 4 and Rom. iv. 17). I therefore give the preference to (3): In Isaac shall that race which is properly called the "seed of Abraham" have its origin. In Isaac as a fresh starting-point shall all the blessings of the covenant be concentrated. Yet this his only son, the child of promise, Abraham is to sacrifice! "*God appeared in all this*," says St. Chrysostom, "*to contradict God, faith to be opposed to faith, and commandment to commandment.*" But fearful as the paradox might seem, Abraham was obedient.

Ver. 19. *Accounting that God is able to raise up even from the dead; from whence he also received him back in a figure.*

Abraham's faith appealed to the omnipotence of God, in order not to surrender its reliance on His truth. He considered that God could not be unfaithful to His own promise, and must have ways and means to bring about its accomplishment. There is no ellipsis of *αὐτόν* after *ἐγείρειν δυνατός*:[1] the sentence is first quite general, and only afterwards applied to this particular instance. Abraham bethought himself that God is Lord over life and death, able to kill and to make alive. And so from the dead he did indeed receive back his child, though only in a figure. The thought is so clear, and so clearly expressed, that it seems lost labour to go in search of any other interpretation. Yet, since Camer. and Raphelius, various unusual interpretations of *παραβολή* have been attempted, attributing to it here meanings found in other derivatives from *παραβάλλεσθαι*. So Tholuck, *Whence also he carried him back in a bold adventure;* and Lünemann, *Wherefore he also received him back, on account of his having surrendered him (to the death of sacrifice).* But although *παράβολος* and *παραβόλως* have the meanings, bold, adventurous, perilous, and the like, there

[1] Lachmann reads, following A, *ἐγεῖραι δύνανται*, which is inelegant, unsupported by other authority, and probably derived from reminiscences of Matt. iii. 9 and Luke iii. 8.

is no proof whatever that παραβολή was ever used in a similar sense;[1] nor does it seem to have once occurred to any of the ancient commentators, who themselves spoke Greek, and heard Greek spoken, that παραβολή could here have the meaning of "venture" or "surrender." We must hold, then, that such renderings are themselves too adventurous and violent to be resorted to, unless under pressure of the greatest difficulty. But is there any such difficulty here? Is not the meaning which παραβολή bears at ch. ix. 9, and elsewhere throughout the New Testament, quite admissible and intelligible in the present instance? *Whence, i.e.* from the dead, *he also received him in a figure.* Some (as Schulz, and before him Menken) would refer this to Isaac's birth of aged parents, because κομίζεσθαι has the meaning to derive from, carry off, but not that of *receiving back.* Yet Josephus (*Ant.* i. 13. 4) uses the same word in the same sense as our author here. Speaking of Abraham and Isaac after the transaction on Mount Moriah, he says, παρ' ἐλπίδας ἑαυτοὺς κεκομισμένοι, *præter spem sibi redditi;* and in like manner Philo speaks of Joseph's recovery by his aged father as a τὸν ἀπογνωσθέντα κομίσασθαι, *deploratum recipere.* More striking proofs that κομίζεσθαι might be used here of the recovery, or taking back from the dead, of one who had nearly perished in the act of sacrifice, could surely not be found. We would translate, therefore: *unde eum etiam in parabola recepit.*[2] It may also be a question whether we are to understand ὅθεν logically in the sense of "wherefore," as in the five other places of our epistle, or locally in the sense of "whence," as we have rendered it in our translation. Without ἐν παραβολῇ, the rendering, *Wherefore he received him back again* (as a reward of his faith), would

[1] Except perhaps in some glossators (comp. Hesychius' gloss on ἐκ παραβολῆς· ἐκ παρακινδυνεύματος, and on Thucyd. i. 131), and in one passage in Plutarch (*Arat.* c. 22) adduced by Tholuck, δι' ἐλεγμῶν καὶ παραβολῶν, where, however, the mathematical curves are meant.

[2] The rendering of Itala and Vulgate is: *unde eum et in parabolam accepit.* So in Sabatier; but the text of the Itala, as it lies before me in Primasius and Haymo, is *in parabola.* Luther read, *in parabolam:* "Wherefore he also received him back as for a figure."

give an admissible though somewhat meagre sense. And even with ἐν παραβ. most of the ancients do so interpret it, regarding Isaac as given back to Abraham, and received by him as a type of the Lord's passion (Chrysostom, Œcumenius, Primasius, etc., and also Carpzov) or resurrection (Theodoret and others). So quite recently Ebrard: "Wherefore he received him, given back as a type of the resurrection." And who could deny the typical significance of that transaction on Mount Moriah? Isaac there is a standing type of that Son of Abraham and Son of God who carried the wood of His own cross, and was really offered upon it, as in reality He also rose again. Abraham is a type of that heavenly Father who for our sakes spared not His only Son (Rom. viii. 32), who in His turn is the antitype both of the willing self-sacrifice of Isaac, and of the thorn-crowned ram that became his substitute (1 Pet. ii. 24). So, again, Isaac recovered from the dead, and espoused to a virgin of his father's house, who, veiling herself, steps down from her camel to meet her appointed husband, is a type of that crucified One who, rising from the grave, receives at His Father's hand the church of the redeemed, who then, in faith and repentance, throwing herself at the feet of the ever-living One, awaits His coming to fetch her home. These typical significances are not to be denied; but we can hardly think it probable that our author would expect such readers as those whom he was addressing to discern all this unaided for themselves. And this improbability is removed if we take ὅθεν as simply equivalent to ἐκ νεκρῶν, and interpret ἐν παραβολῇ simply from the context: he received him from the dead ἐν παραβολῇ, *i.e.* not in literal truth, but in a figure, as one whom his father's heart had already resigned, and from whom he had felt all the bitterness of separation (Bleek, De Wette, Stier, Hofmann). So Theodore of Mopsuestia: "After having for a short time and in a certain way tasted death, he rose again, without having really suffered death; ἐν παραβολῇ being therefore = ἐν συμβόλῳ." So Calvin: *Neque hæc spes frustrata est Abrahamum*, quia hæc quædam *resurrectionis fuit species, quod subito liberatus fuit ex media*

morte. So Castellio, who renders ἐν παραβ. by *quodammodo;* and so Beza, who renders it by *similitudine:* both renderings, however, too weak to express the full meaning. Were ἐν παραβολῇ merely equivalent to *quasi,* another term, such as ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, would have expressed the meaning better. What the sacred writer would say is, that Abraham received back his son from the dead, not literally, ἐξ ἀναστάσεως (comp. ver. 35), but ἐν παραβολῇ ἀναστάσεως. Isaac was like one who had really risen again. The preposition ἐν is used as at 1 Cor. xiii. 10, ἐν αἰνίγματι, or perhaps like ἐν ὑποδείγματι at iv. 11, so as to be equivalent to παραβολὴν ὄντα. The former appears to me the better explanation, though it comes to the same thing whether we say that Abraham received back his son *figuratively,* or received him back *as a figure.* The καί (comp. vii. 4, and note there) belongs to the whole clause, ἐν παρ. ἐκομίσατο, marking it as reward for Abraham's faith, that such joy was vouchsafed him after such a sorrow.

The sacred writer proceeds, without further interruption, with the patriarchal history.

Ver. 20. *By faith Isaac blessed Jacob and Esau even concerning things to come.*

As πίστει in all these sentences belongs to the verb expressing the main action, so here it must be taken in immediate connection with εὐλόγησεν (ηὐλόγησεν, Lachm., Tisch.), and not with περὶ μελλόντων, which is the object of the blessing, not of Isaac's faith (πίστις περί, conviction about any matter, is a classical, but not a New Testament, mode of expression). Πίστει καὶ περὶ μελλόντων εὐλόγησεν is therefore not = By faith even concerning things to come Isaac blessed (Lünemann); but = By faith Isaac blessed even with regard to the future. The καί is not epexegetical, but intensive, and marks Isaac's blessing as not only an act of faith, but a prophetic act of faith; the τὰ μέλλοντα, which were the object of that blessing, being not merely *pia desideria* on Isaac's part, but the divinely ordained future revealed to him by God. The blessing and the prayer of faith exercise

a binding power on divine omnipotence, because the whole energy of a mind instructed by the divine mind, and of a will united with the divine will, is therein concentrated. So was it in the case before us. The blessing of Isaac had in it the wondrous power of shaping and controlling the future of his posterity, because in virtue of his faith his mind and will had become one with the mind and will of God Himself. (Comp. Gen. xxvii. 37 with Jer. i. 10 and other passages.)

The blessing which Jacob and Esau received from their father was a prophetic history of the future fortunes of two great peoples. The age-long relations of Edom and Israel could not be more tellingly described than as a perpetual alternation of subjection, rebellion, and re-subjugation. *Thou shalt serve thy brother: and it shall come to pass, that when thou shalt have the dominion, thou shalt break his yoke from off thy neck* (Gen. xxvii. 40). On Jacob's blessings, however, one dark cloud still rests: it was under an Idumean dynasty that his own dominion and political independence came to a close, and as yet has known no resurrection.

The sacred writer now proceeds to another prophetic benediction—that which Jacob imparted to the sons of Joseph.

Ver. 21. *By faith Jacob a-dying blessed each of the sons of Joseph; and bowed himself in worship on the top of his staff.*

The reference is, in the first place, to the blessing of Ephraim and Manasseh, recorded Gen. xlviii., and here fitly connected with that bestowed on Jacob and Esau, inasmuch as in both instances the second son is, against nature and custom, preferred to his elder brother, and in this latter instance with the full consciousness and will of the human instrument of benediction. The blessing is therefore, on Jacob's part, a special act of faith. It is so in all particulars: first in the assumption of his grandchildren into the number of the twelve patriarchal tribes, and the giving to Joseph the double portion of the first-born son which Reuben had forfeited; and then, in yet greater measure, in the crossing of his hands over the heads of Joseph's sons, in order to lay the

right on Ephraim's head, and the left on Manasseh,—a proceeding for which there was no obvious occasion. That the sacred writer has here the narrative of Gen. xlviii. specially in view, is evident from the use of the word *ἀποθνήσκων* in allusion to Jacob's own words (ver. 21), *ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἀποθνήσκω* (*ἀποθνήσκειν* = to be in the act of dying, Luke viii. 42). The word *ἕκαστος* is used, because each child received his special blessing; Ephraim being the more favoured of the two, because the dying patriarch foresaw, in the spirit of prophecy, the future superiority of his tribe. The prediction was not, indeed, immediately fulfilled. Manasseh, when the census was made in the wilderness, still exceeded Ephraim in numbers by 20,000; but Ephraim afterwards became, and from the times of the judges continued to be, the greatest of the northern tribes in political power and extent of territory, and gave its name to the later kingdom of Israel.

The other act of faith recorded of Jacob in Genesis, and mentioned here, is the *προσκύνησις* of Gen. xlvii. 31. This took place not in connection with the blessing of Ephraim and Manasseh, but at the close of a previous conference between the aged patriarch and his son Joseph, in which he made him swear to bury him, not in Egypt, but in the grave of his forefathers in the land of promise. The two acts are mentioned in the reverse of their historical order (compare ver. 22 of this chapter and ch. vii. 6), probably in order to connect the two acts of blessing, that of the aged Isaac and that of the aged Jacob. But the *προσκύνησις* of the latter was also, in combination with the calm, unhesitating manner in which Jacob arranged for his own burial in the distant land of Canaan, an eminent act of faith. His earnest entreaty, that Joseph would solemnly promise this, showed how firm his reliance was on the divine promise, that the land of Canaan should be the future home and possession of his posterity; and when Joseph had given the promise, he further showed the energy of his faith by the energy and attitude of his thankful prayer. Notwithstanding the infirmities of old age, and the exhaustion of approaching death, he summoned all his bodily powers, and placed his aged limbs as well as he

could in the position of profoundest adoration. The words of the original Hebrew text, which clearly express this, have been frequently misunderstood. Baumgarten, for instance, explains them thus: "Jacob raising himself up, and so sitting at the upper end of his bed, bowed his head in token of worship." But the Hebrew word is וישתחוה, *se prostravit*, not ויקד, *se incurvavit* (from קדד). So again Lünemann: "*Israel leaned backwards over the head of his bed.*" But again, *se prostruere* is the very opposite notion to *se reclinare*. Hofmann's explanation (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 323) is the right one: "*Jacob turned round on his bed, with his face towards the head of it;*" *i.e.*, as we should say, turning his face to his pillow, he stretched himself out in the attitude of prostrate devotion. St. Jerome's rendering at Gen. xlvii. 31 is, *adoravit Deum conversus ad lectuli caput;* but here he retains that of the Itala, *et adoravit fastigium virgæ ejus.* Our author follows the Septuagint, which read the המטה of the original differently from the Masoretes (הַמִּטָּה instead of הַמִּטָּה).[1] Many ancient commentators (though not without opposition from some) find here an allusion to Joseph's staff, and suppose that his father, making on this occasion a reverence to it, fulfilled the son's prophetic dream. But, as already observed by Faber Stapulensis, the Latin rendering ought to have been, not *virgæ ejus*, but *virgæ suæ:* it is his own staff on which Jacob is here said to have bowed himself; probably that of which he speaks, Gen. xxxii. 10, *ἐν τῇ ῥάβδῳ μου διέβην τὸν Ἰορδάνην τοῦτον.* On this staff he had leaned in his pilgrimage through life; and now that he is come to the term of his pilgrimage, he bows over it in worship, commending himself to that God who will remain his God beyond the tomb (Hofmann). The deviation here from the Hebrew text need not disturb us. C. E. Stuart (an American divine), in the *Christian Annotator* for Jan. 1857, remarks well, in answer to those who think that the Masoretic text should in such a case be made to yield to

[1] Honcala (*Comm. in Genesin*), Faber Stapulensis, and Biesenthal in his Rabbinical Commentary, suppose the divergence to be due to the translator of a Hebrew original of our epistle.

the divine authority of the New Testament: "*Jacob's faith remained the same, whether he worshipped on his bed or leaned upon his staff; the apostle therefore did not think it necessary to correct the Septuagint.*"

The omission of Jacob's benedictory farewell to his twelve sons, in Gen. xlix., may here seem somewhat strange; and the conjecture naturally suggests itself, that Ἰωσήφ may have been a later interpolation, or even that the sacred writer may have written ἕκαστον τῶν αὐτοῦ υἱῶν καὶ τῶν υἱῶν Ἰωσήφ. So Böhme. "But this would be far too violent dealing with MS. authority, especially in an epistle which is certainly not a translation from a Hebrew original. Nor is the conjecture needed any way. The sacred writer (see ver. 32) is quite conscious of the fragmentary character of his recapitulation. Jacob's first act of faith in blessing his grandchildren (Gen. xlviii.), he seizes and makes use of for his immediate purpose; the second, the blessing of the twelve patriarchs (Gen. xlix.), he passes over. Gathering, as it were, a few flowers by the way, he leaves the rest for the research of his readers. And now, taking up the last thought, the allusion in προσεκύνησεν (an additional proof that such is the allusion) to Jacob's injunctions concerning his burial, he goes on to speak of a similar act of faith on the part of Joseph.

Ver. 22. *By faith Joseph, drawing to his end, made mention of the exodus of the children of Israel, and gave commandment concerning his bones.*

Neither did Joseph's heart cleave to Egypt, though in God's providence he had come, from a slave, to be rich and powerful there. His longings followed the direction of the divine promises, of whose fulfilment faith assured him. If he could not see that fulfilment in his lifetime, he willed that his bones might ultimately rest in the land of promise, when the time of that fulfilment should come. It was faith that moved him to make the children of Israel swear to carry his bones along with them in their then far-distant exodus to the promised inheritance. In the choice of the word

τελευτᾶν the author is guided, not by the thought of Joseph's eventful life (Stier), but by a reminiscence of Gen. l. 24–26, "*God will surely visit you, and bring you out of this land, unto the land which He sware to Abraham*" (ver. 24); in this way he made mention of their future exodus (ἔξοδος, יציאה). (For μνημονεύειν περί τινος, instead of τι or τινός, see Kühner, § 529, Anm. 1.) Joseph's last will was not forgotten. Centuries after his departure, Moses carried up his bones out of Egypt (Ex. xiii. 19); and their deposition at Sichem is recorded at the close of the book of Joshua (xxiv. 32). There they rested in the land of his fathers, as in the lap of the God of the promises.

The author having now passed through the book of Genesis, which concludes with the embalming of the body of Joseph, and its placing in a coffin, proceeds to the deeds of faith recorded in Exodus, and connected therefore with the person and history of Moses, whose parents, by their faith, saved in their new-born child the saviour of their people.

Ver. 23. *By faith Moses, when born, was hid three months by his parents, because they saw that the child was comely; and they feared not the ordinance of the king.*

The royal ordinance (διάταγμα; Lachmann's reading, δόγμα, after 34 and A, is not supported by sufficient authority) was, that every male child of Israelitish parents should be slain. This commandment Moses' parents broke, faith in God overmastering in their minds the fear of man. The Greek word for parents is here πατέρες, which it is mere perversion to render "fathers," and then make it refer to *Kohath* Moses' grandfather on his mother's side, and Amram his own father (so Bengel, Schmid, Menken, Stier, etc.), to the exclusion of his mother *Jochebed*. How could this be, when, according to Ex. ii. 2, the saving of the child's life was chiefly due to an act of faith on his mother's part? The Septuagint, indeed, renders ἰδόντες instead of ἰδοῦσα (at Ex. ii. 3), which probably suggested the πατέρες here; and yet Ezekiel, the Jewish Alexandrine tragic poet, though

for the most closely adhering to the Alexandrine version, makes Moses say, in his drama of the *Exodus*:

> *Ἔπειτα κηρύσσει μὲν Ἑβραίων γένει·*
> *Τ' ἀρσενικὰ ῥίπτειν ποταμὸν εἰς βαθύῤῥοον.*
> *Ἐνταῦθα μήτηρ ἡ τεκοῦς' ἔκρυπτέ με*
> *Τρεῖς μῆνας ὡς ἔφασκεν· οὐ λαθοῦσα δέ.*[1]

Nor could the writer of our epistle, though following the ἰδόντες of the LXX., have meant to exclude Jochebed, nor indeed does he do so: πατέρες elsewhere is not unfrequently equivalent to the more usual οἱ γονεῖς = parents, male and female. Comp. not only Bleek's citation from Parthenius, *Erot.* 10; but also Plato, *Legg.* p. 772 B, ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φύντι; Dion. Hal. *Ant.* ii. 26, ἵνα σέβωσι (οἱ παῖδες) τοὺς πατέρας; and *Rhet.* iii. 3, ποίων τινῶν προγόνων καὶ πατέρων. The πατέρες here, then, are Amram and Jochebed. These hid Moses three months—τρίμηνον. As both ὁ τρίμηνος (Xen. *hist. græc.* ii. 3. 9) and ἡ τρίμηνος (Her. ii. 124, and frequently) are used, as also τὸ τρίμηνον (see Passow), it must remain uncertain, in the absence of the article, whether τρίμηνον here is to be regarded as feminine or neuter. In assigning a special motive for this act of faith (διότι εἶδον ἀστεῖον τὸ παιδίον), the sacred writer adheres closely to the wording of the Old Testament narrative, as is done also by Philo: γεννηθεὶς ὁ παῖς εὐθὺς ὄψιν ἐνέφηνεν ἀστειοτέραν ἢ κατ' ἰδιώτην, ὡς καὶ τῶν τοῦ τυράννου κηρυγμάτων, ἐφ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ἦν, τοὺς γονεῖς ἀλογῆσαι (ii. 82. 6). The infantine beauty of their child appeared to them a mark of the divine favour, and to prognosticate a great and illustrious future,—a token that God had great things in store to accomplish by him, even as He had chosen the beautiful youth Joseph to be the saviour in Egypt of the house of Israel (comp. the ἀστεῖον τῷ Θεῷ of Acts vii. 20). *And they feared not the king's ordinance:* in this particular especially they manifested their faith. Against all appearances of possibility of

[1] See my *Geschichte der jüdischen Poesie*, p. 212 (out of print—Tr.); and compare Frankel, *Ueber den Einfluss der palästinens. Exegese auf die alex. Hermeneutik*, p. 116.

success, they courageously disobeyed the royal injunction, and performed their parental duty, looking for divine succour, and the fulfilment of the divine promises. And this they did πίστει. Their faith was rewarded by the wonderful deliverance of their child, and by a yet more wonderful deliverance of the whole people through him. For the faith which had animated his parents, and had been the salvation of his infant life, lived on in the heart of that gracious child.

Vers. 24, 25.[1] *By faith Moses, when grown up, refused to be called son of a daughter of Pharaoh; choosing rather to be afflicted along with the people of God, than to have a temporary enjoyment derived fom sin.*

The expression μέγας γενόμενος, taken from the Sept. of Ex. ii. 11, is simply equivalent to the παρελθὼν εἰς ἡλικίαν of Josephus, *Ant.* ii. 10. 1. Moses, having reached years of discretion and self-responsibility, refused the honourable name and position of an Egyptian prince, or member of the royal family. The omission of the article before θυγατρὸς Φαραώ[2] is intentional, to heighten the note of dignity by universalizing it, as *a king's daughter* is a grander sounding term than *the daughter of the king.* All this he refused, μᾶλλον ἑλόμενος συγκακουχεῖσθαι τῷ λαῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἢ πρόσκαιρον ἔχειν ἁμαρτίας ἀπόλαυσιν. The construction (μᾶλλον) αἱρεῖσθαι ἤ is a classical one: comp. Lysias, *Or.* ii. § 62, θάνατον μετ' ἐλευθερίας αἱρούμενοι ἢ βίον μετὰ δουλείας. The composite verb συγκακουχεῖσθαι occurs accidentally nowhere else in the range of Greek literature: κακουχεῖν (*to ill-treat*), on the other hand, and its passive (*to suffer ill-treatment*), are frequently met with: the substantive κακουχία is found in Æschylus and Plato. "The people of God" is

[1] The additional clause between vers. 23 and 24, found in D, E (πιστι μεγας γενομενος μωυσης ανιλεν του αιγυπτιον κατανοων την ταπινωσιν των αδελφων αυτου), is an interpolation by a later hand (comp. Acts vii. 23–28). It is found in the Itala, and in some MSS. of the Vulgate.

[2] Compare Philo, ii. 85. 48, θυγατριδοῦς (*e filia nepos*) τοῦ τοσούτου βασιλέως. Böhme conjectures that υἱὸν θυγατρός may be used here in the sense of "daughter's son" = θυγατριδοῦντα.

the antithesis of the idolatrous Egyptian people and its royal house, with all their unspeakable moral corruption. The *ἀπόλαυσις ἁμαρτίας* is not the enjoyment of sin (*gen. obj.*); but, as the antithesis shows, the pleasure which sin provides,—namely, the sin of apostasy. For here is contrasted (1) the fellowship of the people of God with this *ἁμαρτία*, apostasy from God and from His people; and (2) the affliction of God's people with the worldly ease and enjoyment which such apostasy would ensure. One of Moses' reasons for refusing the enjoyments and the splendours of a courtly life in Egypt is hinted in the word *πρόσκαιρον*. He knew them to be but temporary, and to have an eternally bitter end in prospect. And in that conviction consisted his faith, which looked through the deceptive appearances of worldly good things, to their inward and essential nothingness, and to their fearful end.[1] Therefore he suffered not himself to be dazzled by all the honours and luxury which his position offered him.

Ver. 26. *Accounting the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt: for he looked for the recompense of reward.*

This second participial sentence is subordinated to the former, and assigns the reason which chiefly influenced Moses in the choice he made. He estimated loss and gain not by outward and transient appearances, but according to inward truth and reality, which, though for the present hidden, would one day be manifested. His judgment and his deliberate choice, therefore, were fruits of faith. On the one side stood the treasures of Egypt[2] with their alluring

[1] Comp. Philo, ii. 86: *τὴν συγγενικὴν καὶ προγονικὴν ἐζήλωσε παιδείαν, τὰ μὲν τῶν εἰσποιησαμένων ἀγαθὰ, καὶ εἰ λαμπρότερα καιροῖς, νόθα εἶναι ὑπολαβὼν, τὰ δὲ τῶν φύσει γονέων, εἰ καὶ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἀφανέστερα, οἰκεῖα γοῦν καὶ γνήσια.* How much more simple, and at the same time how much more profound, is the language of our epistle!

[2] The correct reading, which has prevailed in critical editions since Griesbach, is *τῶν Αἰγύπτου θησαυρῶν*. The *textus receptus* reads *τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ θησ.* on very uncertain authority. Lachmann's reading (after A), *τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτου θησ.*, is rightly regarded by Fritzsche and Bleek as a

invitations; on the other, ὁ ὀνειδισμὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ in the fellowship of the people of God. The notion of "the reproach of Christ" is not fully represented by the explanatory term "reproach on Christ's behalf;" an interpretation which Ebrard endeavours to justify by the observation that the promise made to the patriarchs, though Moses may not have had any revelation on the subject, was indeed ultimately fulfilled in Christ. But the writer of our epistle is no modern divine, and the ultra-historical exegesis which would fain make him so becomes itself thereby very unhistorical. Böhme rightly refers to Acts iii. 21–23 and vii. 37, whence it appears that from the New Testament point of view Moses was believed not only to have hoped in the Messiah, but also to have directly prophesied concerning Him. But even this does not explain the genitive, "reproach of Christ," and still less Lünemann's interpretation, "reproach such as Christ Himself endured." Rather the ὀνειδισμὸς Χριστοῦ is, "that reproach which Christ endured in His own person, and had, or has still, to endure in His members" (Bleek). But the question remains, How can Moses be said to have borne the reproach of Christ in this more than comparative sense? Modern exegesis was the first to put this question seriously to itself, and has found for it different answers. And, 1*st*, the term may be justified by the *typical* connection between Christ and His ancient people. So Hofmann, *Weiss.* ii. 11 seq. The reproach of Christ is no other than the reproach

thoughtless confusion of the two. Mutianus' rendering, *majores divitias existimans thesauro Egyptiorum improperium Christi;* that of the Itala, *thesauris Ægyptûm;* and that of the Vulgate, *thesauro Ægyptiorum,* are all probably derived from the reading ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, which is also that of St. Chrysostom. The reading *Ægyptûm* may be an African peculiarity, but is probably only a clerical blunder for *Ægyptiorum.* The Latin text of D (E) abounds in errors evincing the ignorance of the copyist, and especially in this epistle, on which, from the disfavour with which it was regarded in the Latin Church, the less care would be likely to be bestowed. That codex, indeed, places the epistle merely as an appendix after those of St. Paul, from which it is separated by the insertion of the stichometrical catalogue of the books of the Old and New Testament, wherein its name does not even occur.

of Israel in Egypt, that is, of Israel according to its covenant vocation, not Israel according to the flesh. The reproach of Israel is the same as the reproach of Christ, so far as He providentially wrought in the fellowship and history of that people a type of Himself. And therefore the sacred writer says here, *reproach of* "*Christ*," not *of* "*Jesus*,"—Christ (Messiah) being the title by which the Son of God is set forth under the Old Testament, both in its historical foreshadowings and in its prophetic word. "Reproach of Christ" would accordingly be equivalent to "reproach of God's ancient covenant people," they themselves being a type of Christ. But, further, the explanation may be found, 2*dly*, in the *mystical* unity of Christ and His people. So Stier: "The whole people of God, in all ages, forms one community, of which Christ is the centre; and even the saints of the Old Testament were members of that one living body of which He is evermore the head." This combination of head and members, of Christ and Israel, is in itself a thought thoroughly scriptural; and by it must be interpreted the עבד ה" of Isa. xl.-lxvi., and its infinitely varied modifications.[1] Nor need we, in order to justify this interpretation, understand by τοῦ Χριστοῦ here merely the so-called mystical Christ of 1 Cor. xii. 12, made up of the Head, together with its members. Rather we would say: The reproach of Christ which Moses was willing to endure, was the reproach of Him who was then still to come,—the reproach which He was already enduring, in virtue of His vital mystical connection with the then members of His body. This *mystical* interpretation includes the *typical*, and we therefore give it decidedly the preference; but in order not to fall back into the merely typical conception, it seems that we must make

[1] See my *Schlussbemerkungen zu Drechsler's Comm. zu Jesaia*, iii. 366. When Meinertzhagen says (*Vorlesungen über Werth und Bedeutung der biblischen Geschichte*, 1849), "*The Servant of Jehovah* (in Isaiah) *is not* (*as it might seem*) *sometimes Christ, sometimes Israel, but Christ alone, i.e. the whole Christ, Christ Himself as one with His members*," he says what is quite true of the idea in itself, but not so of its development in that great section of prophecy.

yet a step forward, and find a yet deeper ground for this assumption of the presence of Christ in the Israel of the Old Testament. And this may be done by finding the explanation of *ὀνειδ. τ. Χρ.*, *3dly*, in the pre-existence of the Logos, and His covenant presence in the church of ancient Israel. So De Wette, and after him Tholuck. The "reproach of Christ" embraced by Moses would be the same, then, as "the sufferings of Christ" fulfilled by St. Paul, in virtue of His eternal presence and indwelling as the Word under both Testaments. This idea of the immanence and working of the Divine Logos in the history of ancient Israel appears to me a necessary addition to the typical connection asserted by Hofmann, and the *mystical* unity as maintained by Stier. And even to this may be added one more thought. We might find a further explanation of the "reproach of Christ" here, *4thly*, in that continuous preparation for the incarnation which constitutes the nucleus of the history of Israel, and in accordance with which St. Augustine treats (in the *De Civ. Dei*, lib. xvii. c. 11), *de substantia populi Dei quæ per susceptionem carnis in Christo est*, and of which he says there, *ipse Jesus substantia populi ejus ex quo natura est carnis ejus*. But of all four modes of interpretation this last would seem to be least likely to have been in the mind of the Pauline writer of our epistle, on whose real meaning perhaps 1 Cor. x. 4 (comp. 1 Pet. i. 10 sq.) may throw most light. The "reproach of Christ" would be for him the reproach of the Divine Word indwelling in and united with His ancient people, amongst whom He was then announcing in types and prophecies His future advent in the flesh.[1] This reproach Moses accounted greater riches, and a surer source of happiness and pleasure, than all the dignities and wealth of Egypt; for *ἀπέβλεπε εἰς τὴν μισθαποδοσίαν*: he looked away from the reproach as such, to the divine reward beyond it. The sacred writer still lingers over this history of Moses as the most eminent instrument of God under the

[1] Philo likewise recognises the immanence of the Divine Logos in the history of Israel, *e.g.* the pillar of cloud and fire; but the equation, Logos = Christ, is not apprehended by him.

Old Testament—the mediator of the law, and, through his faith, the saviour of Israel.

Ver. 27. *By faith he left Egypt, not fearing the wrath of the king; for he endured as seeing him who is invisible.*

Taking πίστει κατέλιπεν Αἴγυπτον by itself, and bearing in mind that Moses' first recorded act, after coming to man's estate (μέγας γενόμενος), was to revenge his fellow-countryman on the tyrannical Egyptian, one is naturally led to refer these words to Moses' flight into Midian; but of that occasion it is expressly said that he feared (ἐφοβήθη, Ex. ii. 14) that his deed had come to light, and fled in consequence, to escape from the wrath of Pharaoh (ἀνεχώρησεν ἀπὸ προσώπου Φαραώ, Ex. ii. 15; comp. the ἔφυγεν of Acts vii. 29, the φθάσας δὲ τὴν ὑποβουλὴν καταμαθεῖν λαθὼν ὑπέξεισε of Josephus (*Antiq.* ii. 11. 1), and the ὀργὴν ἀμείλικτον βασιλέως ἀποδιδράσκων of Philo, ii. 88. 35). Attempts, therefore, have frequently been made since Lyra and Calvin, to make the words refer to the departure from Egypt at the exodus. So Calvin: *omnibus expensis ad secundum exitum referre malo, tunc enim intrepide regis ferociam despexit, tanta Spiritus Dei virtute armatus, ut furiosam illam bestiam ultro subinde lacesseret.* The expression κατέλιπεν Αἴγυπτον does not exclude such a reference: see Josephus (*Ant.* ii. 15. 2), κατέλιπον δὲ τὴν Α. μηνὶ Ξανθικῷ. But it is surely against it, that Moses' final departure from Egypt at the exodus took place, not against, but in accordance with, the wish of Pharaoh himself, although his demand (Ex. xii. 31 sq.) was rather wrung from him by terror and necessity than voluntarily given. The expression, moreover, is too individual, if applied to the exodus; in reference to which Moses and Israel are always associated together (comp. Isa. lxiii. 11–14) as prince and people, shepherd and flock. The chronological sequence would also be violated by such an interpretation, without any assignable ground. For in ver. 28 follows the celebration of the first passover which preceded the exodus, and ver. 29 the passage of Israel through the Red Sea, which formed its most characteristic

circumstance. We must therefore renounce this means of evading the difficulty. Those among later commentators who have had recourse to it, are Klee, Böhme, Bleek, Menken (against Bengel), Bloomfield, Ebrard, Bisping, and some others. Bengel, on the other hand, Rieger, Tholuck, von Gerlach, and most decidedly Lünemann, adhere to the older interpretation, which refers *κατέλιπεν* to the flight into Midian. One great point in its favour is, that none of the ancients, Greek and Latin, ever seem to have thought of any other. The first natural impression, therefore, must have been from the first very strongly for it. But how, with such a reference of *κατέλιπεν*, are we to explain the *μὴ φοβηθείς*? Lünemann's explanation is: The fear attributed to Moses in the narrative of the Pentateuch, is quite different from that from which the Epistle to the Hebrews pronounces him free. The former fear had a merely objective character: it was simply a dread lest the consequences of a particular act might be fatal to himself, when he found that that act, contrary to his previous expectation, had become known. But this kind of objective fear was quite compatible with the *subjective* fearlessness of which the epistle speaks, in virtue of which Moses retained his conviction that God had chosen him to be the deliverer of His people, and feared not to renounce, amid all temptations to the contrary, his allegiance to an earthly king. This interpretation of the *μὴ φοβηθείς*, though not altogether untrue, seems, with its distinction of objective fear and subjective fearlessness, somewhat too artificial. But we may put the matter so: Would the writer of our epistle have thus expressed himself: *πίστει ἔφυγεν εἰς γῆν Μαδιὰμ μὴ φοβηθεὶς τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ βασιλέως*? The answer must be, Certainly not; the truth being, that Moses "fled" because he "feared." But it is quite another thing to say that Moses, the son of a king's daughter, "left" or "forsook" (*κατέλιπεν*) the country, in which he held so great a position, without being deterred (*μὴ φοβηθείς*) from doing this by the wrath which such a desertion of his post would entail. If such a distinction between *φυγεῖν*, from fear, and *καταλιπεῖν*, without fear, still

appear to some too subtle, the following clause nevertheless will prove that something of the kind was really in the mind of the sacred writer: τὸν γὰρ ἀόρατον ὡς ὁρῶν ἐκαρτέρησεν; *i.e.* for he endured, was stedfast in his purpose (among all the hardships of a long voluntary exile[1]) to remain at a distance from Egypt and its king (whose wrath would doubtless require his return and submission, and whose grace he might have conciliated thereby), and that because his inward eye was fixed upon the divine invisible King (βασιλέα: so I would complete the ellipsis, with Böhme). What needed he to care for the awakened wrath of an earthly sovereign, when assured of the grace and protection of the King of heaven! The Pharaoh whom Moses thus deserted died without having an opportunity of expending his wrath upon him; but under another Pharaoh he returned, strengthened by divine revelations and communion in the wilderness of Midian and Sinai, to become the saviour of his people.

Ver. 28. *By faith he has celebrated the passover and the effusion of blood, that the destroyer of the first-born might not touch them.*

The assumption of Böhme, Bleek, and Lünemann, that in πεποίηκεν τὸ πάσχα here the notions of celebrating and instituting the passover are combined, is not only of doubtful correctness (De Wette), but decidedly wrong. The Hebrew phrase (עשׂה פסח לה׳) of which it is the rendering occurs frequently (*e.g.* Ex. xii. 48; Num. ix. 2; Josh. v. 10; Matt. xxvi. 18), but only in the sense of "keeping" the passover. The nearly equivalent phrase is φαγεῖν τὸ πάσχα. The notion may, however, be involved in the perfect πεποίηκεν, that Moses' first celebration in Egypt (the *Pésach Mitzraim*), as a finished and accomplished fact, was the foundation and inauguration of that which has continued to be observed in after times[2] (the *Pésach Ha-Dôrôth*). The passover proper

[1] Comp. Jos. *Ant.* ii. 11. 1: ἄπορός τε ὢν τροφῆς ἀπηλλάττετο τῇ καρτερίᾳ καταφρονῶν.

[2] Compare the προσενήνοχεν of ver. 17. [The reader must bear in

was kept on the night between the 14th and 15th of Nisan: to this was afterwards added *the feast of Mazzoth* (unleavened bread), which began on the 15th, and lasted seven days. This feast preserved the memory of the unleavened bread which the Israelites ate in their haste as they forsook the land of their captivity. Here τὸ πάσχα is the passover proper, the night of preservation itself (ליל שמורים), with its various ordinances. That original Mosaic celebration was characterized by two actions in which his faith (πίστις) was manifested: (1) the affusion or sprinkling of the blood of the lamb on the two side posts and upper door-post of every Israelite dwelling (by means of a bunch of hyssop), that Jehovah, seeing it, might "pass over" (פסח) their houses, and not suffer the destroying angel to enter them (Ex. xii. 7, 13, 22, 23); (2) the eating of the passover in haste, with loins girt, shoes on feet, and staff in hand (Ex. xii. 11), in expectation of departure (ἔξοδος) at break of day. Both these actions Moses enjoined and carried out in virtue of his faith (πίστει), first in the divine grace which had tied itself for that occasion to the apparently worthless and incongruent medium of the πρόσχυσις τοῦ αἵματος,[1] and secondly in the

mind that, at the time when this epistle was written, the passover still continued to be observed in its complete form at Jerusalem, the temple then standing. In *every other place* except Jerusalem it was *then*, and in *every place* including Jerusalem it is *now* (*i.e.* ever since the destruction of the temple), observed in *a modified form* (πάσχα μνημονευτικόν),—namely, as a sacred family supper, accompanied by ancient paschal prayers and hymns (among which the Haggadah, the Annunciation, or showing of Ex. xiii. 8, 14, holds a chief place), the blessing and drinking of the four paschal cups of wine, and the blessing and eating of the Mazzoth (cakes of unleavened bread), eaten partly as a continuance of the ancient rite, and partly in memory of and substitution for the omitted paschal lamb.—Tr.]

[1] That divine grace, when thus sacramentally manifesting itself, demands faith, may be seen, for example, in the profane exclamation of a German professor: "One must be out of one's mind to believe that it could really have been necessary for Jehovah to see the lamb's blood on the doorpost!" (Redslob, *Stiftung und Grund der Passahfeier*, p. 45.) In things divine, whatever is proposed as an object of faith, has always something absurd in it for the ordinary understanding.

approaching fact of a free exodus from the land of captivity, so long promised by God, and obstinately denied by man.

The term here employed, *πρόσχυσις τοῦ αἵματος*, might seem less suitable to the original action (which the use of the hyssop shows to have been a *sprinkling*: comp. Lev. xiv. 7; Num. xix. 19, וְהִזָּה), as to its imitation in the later rite, according to which, under the second temple, the paschal blood was *poured out* at the foot of the altar.[1] It must, however, be observed that this rite, as performed before the exile, is described (2 Chron. xxx. 16, xxxv. 11) not as a שְׁפִיכָה, outpouring, but as a זְרִיקָה, sprinkling or shedding, and that the regular Septuagint rendering for the phrase זרק את־הדם is *προσχέειν τὸ αἷμα*.[2] The following clause, *ἵνα μή*, κ.τ.λ., belongs only to *καὶ τὴν πρόσχυσιν τοῦ αἵματος*; the atoning power of the passover lying only in the sprinkling of the blood, and not in the eating of it. By *ὁ ὀλοθρεύων* an angel doubtless is intended, who served as the executioner of the divine justice. In the same sense we must understand Wisd. xviii. 25 and 1 Cor. x. 10, following 1 Chron. xxi. 12 (*ἄγγελος Κυρίου ἐξολοθρεύων*); and so the המשחית of Ex. xii. 23 appears to have been already understood by Asaph when he wrote Ps. lxxviii. 49.[3] Instead of *ὀλοθρεύων*, Lachmann and Tischendorf write, with A, D, E, *ὀλεθρεύων*, which orthography is also preferred by Bleek. The Codex Alex. of the Septuagint constantly substitutes ε in this word for the ο of the Codex Vaticanus.[4] It seems hardly worth observing that *αὐτῶν* does not belong to *τὰ πρωτότοκα* (firstlings of men and cattle), but that *τὰ πρωτ.* is governed by *ὀλοθρεύων*, *αὐτῶν* by *θύγῃ* (comp. xii. 20). Luther's rendering is quite

[1] See my paper, *über den Passaritus zur Zeit des zweiten Tempels* [on the Paschal Ceremonial under the Second Temple], *Luther. Zeitschrift*, 1855, 2.

[2] Once only it is the rendering of שפך, at Deut. xii. 27.

[3] Compare, however, Ex. xii. 13, "*The plague shall not be upon you for a destruction.*"

[4] The verb *ὀλοθρεύεσθαι* is found in a scholion to *Odyss.* ii. 59 (ed. Dindorf, p. 82), and in those to *Il.* xxiv. 39, *Od.* xi. 128 (ed. Dindorf, p. 486). It is an Alexandrine word, but in this form only found with ο.

correct: "*that he that destroyed the first-born might not touch them.*"

The great paschal night[1] of the Old Testament, in the celebrations of which the faith of Moses roused and guided that of his people, is now followed by the great paschal deliverance, in which the faith of all Israel was manifested by their triumphant passage through the Red Sea.

Ver. 29. *By faith they passed through the Red Sea as through dry land; of which making essay, the Egyptians were swallowed up.*

"*Awake, awake, O arm of Jehovah,*" cries the prophet (Isa. li. 9, 10); "*awake, as in the ancient days, in the generations of old. Art thou not it that hath riven Rahab, and transfixed the dragon? Art thou not it that hath dried up the sea, the waters of the great deep; that hath turned the depths of the sea into a way for the redeemed to pass through?*" And again (xliii. 16, 17): "*Thus saith Jehovah, that maketh a way through the sea, a path through mighty waters; that bringeth forth chariot and horse, army, and mighty ones; they sink together, they shall rise no more; they are extinguished as the tow is quenched.*" It was, on the one hand, the omnipotence of Jehovah which, by means of an east and north-east wind, swept a furrow through the waves of the Red Sea; and, on the other hand, it was the faith of Israel which, trusting in that omnipotence, passed through the two-fold wall of waters, which at any moment might collapse upon them, *as if through dry land:* ὡς διὰ ξηρᾶς (γῆς). So we must probably read (adding γῆς), with Lachmann, Bleek, and Tischendorf, following A, D, E, the Itala, and

[1] [Delitzsch writes, *das alttest. Weihnachten*, which, if rendered literally—*the Old Testament Christmas*—would to an English reader be unintelligible or misleading. The "passover of Egypt" might indeed in one sense be called the Christmas of the Old Testament, as being the birth-night of the typical "Son of God" (Hos. xi. 1); but I rather think Delitzsch uses *Weihnachten* here, not so much in its ecclesiastical as in its etymological sense, so that the proper rendering of the words would be, *the Holy Night of the Old Testament;* but so rendered, the allusion to Christmas would be lost.—Tr.]

the Vulgate (*per aridam terram*), although the Septuagint reads, Ex. xiv. 29, διὰ ξηρᾶς (only). The sacred writer is contrasting the billowy sea and the dry land, and the additional γῆς enhances this contrast. The relative ἧς may be referred either to διὰ ξηρᾶς γῆς (with Böhme, Kühnoel, Klee) or to τὴν ἐρυθρὰν θάλασσαν. If it were quite certain that διὰ ξηρᾶς γῆς[1] was in the original text, the former would seem to me even the more probable. The phrase πεῖράν τινος λαμβάνειν may signify, (α) *passively*, "*to have experience of*," as at ver. 36; or (β) *actively*, "*to essay or attempt*," as here. The meaning, then, is: The redeemed of Jehovah passed through the sea as through dry land, being assured from the first of their safety. The Egyptians made the attempt, not knowing what the result would be: they tried what would come of this dry land, the bottom of the sea so wondrously dried up, and perished in the returning waters —κατεπόθησαν. So the word טָבְעוּ is rendered in the Septuagint (Cod. Vat.) at Ex. xv. 4, while Cod. Alexandr. has κατεπόντισε. Bleek, in our present passage, would fain read κατεποντίσθησαν, though on very slight MS. authority, out of deference to the Cod. Alexandr. of the LXX., which represents a recension of the Greek text of the Old Testament very closely related (it has been supposed) to that of our epistle. This relationship, however, is very doubtful.

The sacred writer now leaves the Thorah, rich as it is in examples of faith, to refer to others recorded in the book of Joshua, which rounds off the history of the exodus by that of the conquest of the land, the second half of the promised redemption.

Ver. 30. *By faith the walls of Jericho fell down, after they had been encompassed for seven days.*

Πίστει is here again, as in the preceding verse, to be understood of the faith of the whole people, sustained and stimulated by that of Joshua. With the ark of the covenant in their midst, while seven priests preceded bearing trumpets of rams' horns, they made procession in solemn silence round

[1] [Cod. Sin. has γῆς.]

the devoted city ἐπὶ ἑπτὰ ἡμέρας—for the space of seven days (for ἐπί, denoting a tract of time, see Luke iv. 25; Acts xiii. 31, and xix. 10; Winer, p. 363). When, on the seventh day, they had completed their circuit for the seventh time, the priests blew their rams' horns, and the people raised their war-cry, and the walls of Jericho fell down (unsmitten by "battering-rams or engines of war," 2 Macc. xii. 15), leaving the wealthy city an easy prey. Instead of the singular, which occurs twice in the book of Joshua (vi. 5, πεσεῖται (αὐτόματα) τὰ τείχη; and ver. 20, ἔπεσεν ἅπαν τὸ τεῖχος), our author uses the amplifying plural (Winer, § 58, 3), τὰ τείχη ἔπεσαν (for so we must read, with Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Bleek,[1] against the ἔπεσεν of the *textus receptus*). For Ἰεριχώ instead of τῆς Ἰερ., see note to ch. vii. 9. Faith is here said to be the power before which the walls of Jericho fell down, because it was not the arm of flesh, and still less the trumpet-blasts and war-cries of Israel, but divine omnipotence, and its correlative in man—confident trust in that almighty power by which the deed of wonder was accomplished. At the Red Sea, Israel by faith escaped destruction from the powers of nature, whereby their enemies perished; at Jericho, Israel by the same faith in the divine promises obtained a glorious victory. The conquest of Jericho reminds naturally of the deliverance of Rahab. The sacred writer subjoins, therefore, to these two acts of faith (vers. 29, 30) on the part of Israel, a third (ver. 31) performed by a Gentile woman who was received through her faith into Israel's fellowship.

Ver. 31. *By faith Rahab the harlot perished not with them that were disobedient, because she had received the spies with peace.*

Rahab, before "faith came," had been no better than Mary Magdalene, and is still surnamed ἡ πόρνη, to the glory of that grace by which she was redeemed, so as even to become an ancestress of the Lord and Saviour. (Πόρνη cannot, as even Valcken. endeavoured to persuade himself, mean *cauponaria*.) The other inhabitants of Jericho are called

[1] Following A, D, etc. [Cod. Sin. also reads ἔπεσαν.]

ἀπειθήσαντες, because, having heard of the miraculous dealings of God on behalf of Israel (Josh. ii. 10), they persisted in their defiance, and made no submission. They fell, therefore, under the curse of utter destruction (Josh. vi. 21), which Rahab escaped in virtue of her faith manifested in her receiving the spies with peace, μετ' εἰρήνης, with unreserved and open-hearted kindness. Her doing so was not the effect of a weak amiability, which would have made her a despicable traitress to her friends and country, but of an assumed belief that Jehovah was the God of heaven and earth, and that He had given the land to His people (Josh. ii. 9). Her faith had been awakened by what she in common with the rest of her countrymen had heard of the wonderful acts of the God of Israel: it displayed itself in her receiving and protecting the Israelitish emissaries, and found its reward in becoming her shield and preservation in the destruction of the city. So in her case the promise was fulfilled, ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται (ch. x. 38).[1]

The sacred writer, feeling how measureless would be the length of his exposition of the nature and operations of faith if he proceeded in detail to allege other examples from the rest of the Old Testament, now therefore suddenly interrupts himself.

[1] St. James likewise, in the well-known passage of his epistle (ii. 25), cites Rahab as an instance of justification, but ἐξ ἔργων, not ἐκ πίστεως. That there is absolutely no discrepancy between his ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη and the πίστει οὐ συναπώλετο of our epistle, and that St. James in his antitheses had no reference whatever to the formulas of the Pauline school, could only be maintained in the interests of a somewhat narrow-minded *Harmonistique*. In St. Paul's system πίστις and δικαίωσις precede ἔργα, while for St. James πίστις and ἔργα precede δικαίωσις. St. Paul knows of no works pleasing to God before justification; St. James makes justification depend on antecedent good works. With St. Paul, justification is the simple consequence of apprehending faith; with St. James, it presupposes other human performances as well. St. James regards works as the ground of justification; St. Paul neither as the whole ground nor any part of it. Faith, according to St. Paul, approves itself as a new divine life in the soul, fruitful in good works; but these works are fruits and consequences, not co-efficients of justification, which is simply the divine correlative of a living faith. But this is a subject which we must

Ver. 32. *And what shall I more say? For the time will fail me if I tell of Gideon, Barak, and Samson, of Jephthah, David, and Samuel, and of the prophets.*

Whether λέγω, in the question καὶ τί ἔτι λέγω, is indicative or subjunctive, cannot be positively decided. Compare, for instance, *Il.* xi. 837, τί ἠήξομεν, with Æschyl. *Eum.* 754, 785, τί ῥέξω (where it is a subjunctive: *I sigh—what else can I do?*); or Plato, *Menex.* p. 244 D, μηκύνειν τί δεῖ, with Eur. *Ion*, 758, εἴπωμεν ἢ σιγῶμεν ἢ τί δράσομεν; Soph. *Œd. Col.* τί λέξω, ποῖ φρενῶν ἔλθω; and Plat. *Legg.* p. 655 B, τί που ἂν οὖν λέγωμεν τὸ πεπλανηκὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι (comp. Rost, § 119, Anm. 2). Plato has interchangeably πῶς λέγωμεν—What should we say? and πῶς λέγομεν—What do we say? As in cases like the present, the *conjunctivus deliberativus s. dubitativus* is the most natural mood, I would take it so here: *And what shall I more say?* (καί in sense equivalent to καίτοι) *Et quid adhuc* (better, *amplius*) *dicam?* Vulg. This self-interruption on the writer's part is *rhetorical.* The answer, "I will rather break off at this point," lies in the very form of the question; and he can therefore at once proceed with his reason for so doing: ἐπιλείψει γάρ με διηγούμενον ὁ χρόνος

treat of elsewhere. St. James does not for all this stand on the same ground with the Judaizing opponents of the apostle of the Gentiles: he belongs rather to that noblest section of Jewish Christianity which admired the zeal and rejoiced in the success of the great apostle, which gladly welcomed and appropriated all it could of his teaching, but which could not rise at once to his level, and had not the spiritual energy and courage to give to faith in its Pauline sense, and in accordance with St. Paul's teaching, its true and exclusive validity. In comparing the doctrines of each with the other, we must not forget that St. James the Lord's brother was yet not an apostle, and acknowledge that his most precious epistle is on this doctrine of justification one-sided; and that if—nay, because—it is an integral portion of the canon, it must be interpreted in subordination to the statements of St. Paul, *i.e. ex analogia fidei.* Only do not let us maintain that such interpretation is a purely historical one. Even Clemens Romanus, though a disciple of St. Paul, remains far behind his master in his apprehension of this truth. His διὰ πίστιν καὶ φιλοξενίαν ἐσώθη Ῥαὰβ ἡ πόρνη is a combination of St. Paul and St. James, affording a melancholy omen of subsequent dogmatic developments in the Roman church.

περί, κ.τ.λ.,—a turn of expression borrowed from the Greek orators, as the examples collected by Wetstein and Bleek sufficiently prove. Compare especially Julian, *Orat.* i. p. 341 B, ἐπιλείψει με τἀκείνου διηγούμενον ὁ χρόνος.[1] He might also have written ἐπιλίποι ἄν με;[2] but the *ind. fut.* is more definite = *longum est dicere.* "Time" is here not time in general, but that particular portion now at the writer's disposal; though in phrases of this kind, which border on the hyperbolical, such distinctions can hardly be said to have been consciously present to the mind of the writer. The author's rhetorical power is also exhibited in the bold inversion of ὁ χρόνος, to avoid the hiatus με ὁ, and improve the rhythm.[3] The examples of heroic faith, which for want of time he can only enumerate (not speak of in detail), now follow at the *end* of the sentence, in order to be close to the relative descriptive sentences which succeed.

Lachmann's reading, περὶ Γεδεών, Βαρὰκ, Σαμψών, Ἰεφθάε, Δαυείδ, τε καὶ Σαμουὴλ, καὶ τῶν προφ., arranges the names in two groups—first rulers (the judges and King David), and then prophets (with Samuel at their head). But the reading of the *text. rec.* is much better attested: περὶ Γεδεών, Βαράκ τε καὶ Σαμψών, καὶ Ἰεφθάε, Δαβίδ τε καὶ Σαμουὴλ, καὶ τῶν προφητῶν. This reading makes three groups: (1.) Gideon, Barak, Sampson; (2.) Jephthah, David, Samuel; (3.) The prophets. And by this, notwith-

[1] So also Philo, i. 867, 19, ἐπιλείψει με ἡ ἡμέρα . . . διεξιόντα; ii. 593, 21, ἐὰν καταλέγωμαι . . . ἐπιλείψει με ἡ ἡμέρα; ii. 267, 24 ἐπιλείψει με ἡ ἡμέρα λέγοντα . . . ,—exactly the same turn of expression as is found in Demosthenes and Libanius. (For καὶ τί λέγω, above = καίτοι . . . might be compared Aristoph. *Eccl.* 298, καίτοι τί λέγω, though λέγω there is an indicative (Yet what am I saying ?). The question, indeed, is of a different kind from that in our text, and more like that of the sanhedrim at John xi. 47, τί ποιοῦμεν, which does not mean, *What shall we do?* but, *What are we about?*—implying a resolve to act at once energetically. See Winer, p. 254.)

[2] So, again, Philo, ii. 115, 3, ἐπιλίπω ἂν ὁ βίος τοῦ βουλομένου διηγεῖσθαι τὰ καθέκαστα. In Dion. Halic. is found, in the same sense, ἐπιλείποι ἄν (Winer, p. 250); and in Isocrates, ἐκλίποι ἄν.

[3] The inversion is still more elegant in Lachmann's reading (taken from A, D), ἐπιλειψει με γάρ. [Cod. Sin. has also ἐπιλ. με γάρ.]

standing Lünemann's objections, we may be content to abide. The names do not follow in chronological order. Gideon stands in the first group before Barak, as the greater name of the two. [These three names of judges of Israel, Gideon, Barak, Sampson, form a sort of rhetorical amphimacer (— ∪ —).] In the second group (Jephthah, David, Samuel), Jephthah comes first as the name of a judge; and Samuel follows David, as the name of the founder of the prophetic institute, in order to be near that of his spiritual children (comp. Acts iii. 24). Time failing the sacred writer to speak of all these in detail, he contents himself with a brief summary indication of some of the great achievements of their faith, as of that of others like them.

Ver. 33. *Who through faith subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, obtained promises, stopped the mouths of lions.*

Διὰ πίστεως belongs to the whole sentence, dependent on the relative οἱ, to the end of the following verse. What particular deeds of faith the author would himself attach to particular names of heroes, is difficult to divine; the names being given only as samples. But doubtless, in writing κατηγωνίσαντο βασιλείας, he would be thinking first of the judges: *e.g.* of Gideon, the hero of "the day of Midian" (Isa. ix. 3); of Barak (a name inseparably associated with those of Deborah and Jael), the victor in the conflict with the king of Hazor; of Sampson, the invincible avenger (so long as he remained faithful to his Nazarite's vow) of Israel on the Philistines, and the first leader in the war of liberation from the Philistine yoke (comp. Judg. xiii. 5 with 1 Sam. vii. 12 seq.); and finally, of Jephthah, the brave and eloquent maintainer of Israel's cause against the king of Ammon.[1] The verb καταγωνίζεσθαι belongs to the later

[1] Σαμψών, for the Hebrew שִׁמְשׁוֹן (Shimshon), is the same Doric-Macedonic-Alexandrine peculiarity as in λήμψεται ἀναλημφθῆναι and other like forms; the ε in Ἰεφθάε is the *Pathach furtivum* of the Masoretes, which is sometimes expressed in the LXX. by α, sometimes by ε, often omitted altogether.

Greek, and has two meanings—to fight against, and to fight down (subdue). Here it has the latter meaning (comp. Ælian, *v. h.* iv. 8, *σὺν ὀλίγοις παμπόλλους μυριάδας κατηγωνίσατο*). The clause *κατηγ. βασ.*, which applies to David and Samuel (as well as to the judges),—to David, who by his victories over heathen nations prepared a time of peace and glory under Solomon; and to Samuel, who completed the work of liberation commenced by Samson,—is followed by the clause *εἰργάσαντο δικαιοσύνην*, which is specially applicable to both David and Samuel. The phrase *ἐργάζεσθαι δικ.* (here and Acts x. 35; comp. Jas. i. 20) is the Hellenistic rendering of the Hebrew עשׂה צדקה and (*poet.*) פעל צדק, Ps. xv. 2. It has in itself the widest ethical sense, but takes a special colouring or *nuance* of meaning from the life and circumstances of those to whom it is applied. David is that king of Israel who, to the end of his life, received the testimony that he had exercised משפט וצדקה (judgment and justice) (2 Sam. viii. 15; 1 Chron. xviii. 14, etc.); as such, he was a type of צמח צדיק (the righteous Branch, Jer. xxiii. 5). Samuel in his old age receives from the assembled people this witness: *Thou hast not defrauded us, nor oppressed us, neither hast thou taken ought of any man's hand* (1 Sam. xii. 4, a passage which the sacred writer seems to have specially in view). David was a sample of one who, in the power of faith, was a just sovereign; Samuel, in the same power, of a just judge. Samuel's name, however, follows David's, not because a judge was inferior to a king, but simply to connect the mention of his name with that of the prophets of the monarchy, who traced back the spring of inspiration which they enjoyed to the spiritual pentecost of the time of Samuel. The third clause, *ἐπέτυχον ἐπαγγελιῶν*, applies especially, though of course not exclusively, to them. Here, as at vi. 15, it must not be understood of receiving divine *words of promise*, but of obtaining (drawing on) their fulfilment (by the magnetic power of a personal faith). The plural (*ἐπαγγελιῶν*) is purposely used, because it was not the one great final fulfilment of the promise which they were permitted to see (ver. 40), but only indi-

vidual or inchoate fulfilments. So Joel lived to see the removal of the drought and of the plague of locusts; Isaiah the wonderful deliverance of Jerusalem from Sennacherib; Jeremiah the fulfilment of the promises made to him at his prophetic vocation, and the preservation of Baruch and Ebedmelech; Daniel the end of the Babylonish captivity. These, and other prophets of the God of Israel, did not prophesy, like Balaam, against their own will, but with faithful submission to, and in communion with, the divine. They therefore, even in this life, had the reward of their faith, in seeing at least partial fulfilments of what they had foretold. That in these descriptive clauses the sacred writer mentally follows the course of sacred history, is evident from the next, the fourth clause, ἔφραξαν στόματα λεόντων (D has στόμα, but is unsupported by any other authority). It is indeed related, both of Sampson and of David, that they had fought with lions (Judg. xiv. 6; 1 Sam. xvii. 34–36); but the wording of the clause evidently points to the miraculous deliverance of Daniel, of which it is said in the LXX. version of the original narrative, that an angel "shut the mouths of the lions" (vi. 18 of LXX.[1]), "because" (is added in ver. 23) "he believed (ἐπίστευσεν) in his God." This angel was but the minister of God's mercy and of Daniel's faith. It was the prophet's faith in God which made him unapproachable by the beasts of prey. That Daniel's history is here especially in our author's mind, is evident from what immediately follows.

Ver. 34. *Quenched the power of fire, escaped the edge of the sword, became strong after weakness, waxed valiant in battle, turned to flight armies of aliens.*

Quenched the power of fire. In this, the fifth of these

[1] Theodotion has here ἔκλεισεν, but at ver. 22 ἐνέφραξε τὰ στόματα τῶν λεόντων, where the Sept. has καὶ σέσωκέ με ὁ Θεός ἀπὸ τῶν λεόντων. Comp. 1 Macc. ii. 60, Δανιὴλ ἐν τῇ ἁπλότητι αὐτοῦ ἐρρύσθη ἐκ στόματος λεόντων. [Is not Delitzsch in error here in referring to the Sept., as if the reading were ἔκλεισεν ὁ ἄγγελος, κ.τ.λ., at Dan. vi. 18, instead of ὁ Θεός?]

relative clauses (ἔσβεσαν δύναμιν πυρός), the sacred writer unquestionably alludes to the deliverance of the three confessors (Daniel's friends and companions) in the fiery furnace. Here again he passes by the angelic mediation, and refers the miracle to that faith of theirs, which in the utmost need had so mightily laid hold of divine omnipotence. He therefore says intentionally, as Theophylact observes, not φλόγα, but δύναμιν πυρός. It was not only the flame, but the very nature of the fire, which in the power of faith they quenched and overcame, when they walked in "the midst of the furnace" as in gentle soothing light and "a moist whistling wind."[1] In the four following clauses various allusions may be traced or imagined: *e.g.* in ἔφυγον στόματα μαχαίρας.[2] There may be allusion to David when pursued by Saul; to Elijah and Elisha when persecuted by the rulers of Israel, or beset by the armies of Syria; to Jeremiah, Baruch, Ebedmelech, Gedaliah, in their various deliverances in the terrible Chaldean time. In ἐδυναμώθησαν ἀπὸ ἀσθενείας we may find a reference to such cases as that of Sampson rising in his end out of utter weakness into new strength, and slaying more in his death than he had slain in his lifetime (Judg. xvi. 30); or of David closing so many a Psalm of lamentation with words of hope and joy; or of Hezekiah's recovery and prolonged life. In ἐγενήθησαν ἰσχυροὶ ἐν πολέμῳ we might find reminiscences of narratives in the book of Judges; or of David's exultant exclamation (Ps. xviii. 30), "*With Thee I break through armed hosts, and with my God leap over walls;*" or of heroic men and deeds of the times of the monarchy. And, finally, παρεμβολὰς ἔκλιναν

[1] Dan. iii. 50, LXX. It is related of one of the two Protestant martyrs at Brussels (Heinrich Voes and Johann Esche), that when the flames of the pile rose over his head, he cried out that "he felt as if they were strewing him with roses."—RUDELBACH, *Christliche Biographie*, p. 269.

[2] Lachmann reads μαχαίρης [so Cod. Sin.]. The expression is taken from the Old Testament, and is found in St. Luke xxi. 24. The form μαχαίρης instead of μαχαίρας, like σπείρης (Acts x. 1, etc.), συνειδυίης (Acts v. 2, Lachm. and Tisch.), is an Ionicism retained in the Macedonian-Alexandrine dialect of which St. Luke is evidently fond.

ἀλλοτρίων might take us back once more to the glorious foretime of Israel's history—the deeds of Gideon in the camps of the Midianites, or of Jonathan in the Philistine stronghold. But it seems to me more probable, that in these four last clauses (from ἔφυγον onwards), the sacred writer, without excluding these older deeds of faith, had more especially the Maccabean times in view: and may be particularly alluding to the happy escape of Mattathias and his sons into the mountains; the growing strength of their little troop, which at first seemed in its weakness so insignificant; the valiant deeds of Judas Maccabeus in conflict with Appollonius, Seron, and others; and finally, the victorious wars waged by the Asmonean heroes with the Syrian monarchy and the neighbouring nationalities. That he should regard these acts as triumphs of faith, need not surprise us. It has indeed been recently maintained, that the glowing enthusiasm of the Maccabean age was more human than divine in its character and origin, more patriotic and national than theocratic and religious; but the book of Daniel, in its prophetic pictures of that very time, portrays a holy people of the Most High at war with godless antichristian powers, and assigns to its conflicts the highest significance in the preparatory developments of the kingdom of God. I therefore hold that these last four relative clauses carry on the review of the ancestral achievements of Israel's faith beyond the times of the prophets and the book of Daniel, into those of the first book of Maccabees, which in the Septuagint Bible follows it; and this indeed is generally conceded with regard to the two last clauses, being rendered the more certain by the fact that παρεμβολή (מחנה),[1] in the double sense of camp and army, is a favourite word with the writer of the first of Maccabees, and that ἀλλότριοι (with ἀλλόφυλοι) repeatedly occurs there as the rendering of זרים or נכרים (i. 38, ii. 7, comp. xv. 33).

After thus showing what great things faith in God has in the heroic past been able to accomplish, the sacred writer goes on to show what great things it has also suffered.

[1] See Grimm on 1 Macc. iii. 3.

Ver. 35. *Women received their dead raised to life again; but others were tortured, not accepting deliverance, that they might obtain a better resurrection.*

It is *possible* that the future resurrection is here called "better" in comparison with the temporal "deliverance," which was rejected for its sake (Heinrichs, Lünemann, etc.); but the connection of the woman of Sarepta and the Shunammite with the Maccabean martyrs makes it far more natural to refer κρείττονος ἀναστάσεως in the latter half of the sentence to ἐξ ἀναστάσεως in the former. Those believing women received back their children in the way of resurrection (ἐξ ἀναστάσεως) to an earthly life; these blood-witnesses for God gave up their own lives to obtain a better resurrection to life eternal (so Chrysostom, Bengel, Schulz, Böhme, Bleek, and most moderns). This interpretation gives also a satisfactory explanation of the ἄλλοι δέ: the faith of those ancient women under the kingdom of the ten tribes, with its temporal reward, serves to enhance the far sublimer faith of the Maccabean martyrs. As γυναῖκες is the subject of the first clause, it is the faith of the Shunammite herself, and of the woman of Sarepta, not that of the wonder-working prophets, to which in the first instance the restoration of their children is referred. Both women showed their faith in the appeal which they made to God's servants to help them, as in their previous kindness to them as messengers of God. The verb λαβεῖν (alluding to the λάβε τὸν υἱόν σου of 2 Kings iv. 36; comp. 1 Kings xvii. 23) acquires here (like κομίζεσθαι, ver. 19), through the context, the meaning of *recipere, take back again*. And I see not why ἐξ ἀναστάσεως should be rendered *per resurrectionem* (as Böhme, Bleek, Schulz, De Wette, Lünemann, will have it) = through or by resurrection, and not rather (after the analogy of that κομίζεσθαι ἐκ νεκρῶν) be understood as describing the region, so to speak, *from which* the restored ones came: they received them back from resurrection, *i.e.* as those who had been raised to life again. But great as was the faith of these mothers, and glorious its reward even in this life, there have been other mothers nobler than they who have rather seen their chil-

dren die before their eyes than renounce their faith in God, and His promises for the life to come. To such an instance we now turn.

And others were tortured, not accepting deliverance. It is universally acknowledged that the sacred writer refers, with this ἄλλοι δέ, not only to the martyrdom of the aged Eleazar (2 Macc. vi. 18–31), but also to that of the heroic mother and her seven sons, related in the following chapter (2 Macc. vii.). The antithesis of γυναῖκες and ἄλλοι δέ, as well as the description, proves this reference. Both martyrdoms are related with yet fuller details in the so-called fourth book of Maccabees, falsely ascribed to Josephus. In that book, the instrument of torture on which Eleazar and the seven brethren suffer[1] is called τροχός; and from this the inference is correctly drawn, that τύμπανον was the name of an instrument of torture, on which the sufferers were stretched like the skin of a drum (*distenti sunt*, Vulgate), and then beaten or otherwise ill-treated, and so with various refinements of cruelty brought to submission or done to death. According to this, the meaning of τυμπανίζεσθαι here would be, first, to be stretched on the torture-wheel (κατατείνεσθαι περὶ τὸν τροχόν, or ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ[2]), and then (τύμπανον, from τύπτω, including the meanings "drum" and "drum-stick") to be thereon beaten or tortured to death; which latter meaning is more fully expressed by ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι.[3] So died Eleazar, and so in like manner the Maccabean mother and her seven sons, οὐ (not μή) προσδεξάμενοι τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν, contemning and rejecting the deliverance which the heathen offered them if they would but deny their faith; and that ἵνα κρείττονος ἀναστάσεως τύχωσιν—in order to obtain a better resurrection than that

[1] In 2 Macc. it is only Eleazar who dies on the τύμπανον: the seven brothers are variously tortured, mutilated, flayed, roasted; and the mother, according to 4 Macc., perishes in the fire.

[2] Elsewhere also ἐπὶ τοῦ τρ. στρεβλοῦσθαι, κατὰ τροχῶν λυγίζεσθαι.

[3] See Bleek, iii. 827; Grimm on 2 Macc. vi. 19 seq.; Passow, *s.v.* τύμπανον. Photius' interpretation is inexact: τὸ τοῦ δημίου (the executioner's) ξύλον, ᾧ τοὺς παραδιδομένους διεχειρίζετο, καὶ τὸ ἀποτυμπανίζειν ἐντεῦθεν. So Pollux, viii. 71; and the Schol. to Aristoph. *Plut.* 476.

of a mere return into the present life. "*The King of the world,*" cried the second of those sons, "*shall raise us up, who have died for His laws, unto life everlasting*" (εἰς αἰώνιον ἀναβίωσιν ζωῆς). The third, putting out his tongue, as required by his tormentors, and stretching forth his hands, exclaimed, "*These I had from heaven; and for His laws I despise them; and from Him I hope to receive them again*" (ταῦτα πάλιν ἐλπίζω κομίσασθαι). So, again, the mother to her youngest son: "*Fear not this tormentor; but, being worthy of thy brethren, take thy death, that I may receive thee again in mercy with thy brethren.*"

Thus, with mutual encouragements, and cheered by faith-inspired prospects of the life to come, they suffered for their faith. That the sacred writer here confounds the martyrdom of Eleazar with that of the mother and her seven sons, connot be justly said; but only that he takes from both accounts a general characteristic of the spiritual wonder-working power of faith. But further, when we observe that in the narrative of Eleazar's martyrdom the word μαστιγούμενος occurs, and in that of the seven brethren the terms μαστιξι αἰκιζόμενοι, ἐμπαιγμός, and ἐμπαίζεσθαι, and compare these with the terms employed in the following verse, we have additional evidence that he had here both ch. vi. and ch. vii. of 2 Macc. in mind.

Ver. 36. *Others, again, had experience of sportive cruelties and scourgings; yea, moreover, of bonds and imprisonment.*

As the change from ἄλλοι μέν to ἕτεροι δέ is quite common in Greek, there is no need to raise here the question as to a different meaning in the two words. The sacred writer makes a fresh start with ἕτεροι δέ—not, however, without being still influenced by the martyr-narratives of second Maccabees—and continues to describe the sufferings victoriously endured by faith,—his language becoming more and more condensed in expression, and passing over into the so-called λέξις εἰρομένη (*membratim s. incise dicere*). The classical πεῖραν λαμβάνειν is not here used actively (as ver.

29), "to try," "make trial of," but passively, "to be tried by," "have experience of." Ἐμπαιγμοί (= Hebr. תעלולים) are not mere "mockings," but cruel, sportive forms of ill-treatment of all kinds. The allusion is still to the narratives of the Maccabees, for no instance of ἐμπαιγμοὶ καὶ μάστιγες can be alleged from the canonical Scriptures of the Old Testament. Compared, however, with such momentary sufferings, "bonds and imprisonment" would seem a yet harder fate; ἔτι δέ, therefore, denotes here a climax, like *verum etiam* (comp. Luke xiv. 26; Acts ii. 26). One may think of Hanani's imprisonment by Asa (2 Chron. xvi. 10), of Micaiah's by Ahab (2 Kings xxi.), and especially of the long and cruel captivities of Jeremiah. From these he returns to other cruel modes of death.

Ver. 37. *They were stoned, sawn asunder, tortured, died by sword-slaughter; wandered about in sheepskins, in goat-skins, being destitute, afflicted, in misery.*

The aorist ἐλιθάσθησαν (describing a mode of punishment, or of judicial and extrajudicial murder, which was Jewish, not heathen) transports us back to the times of the Old Testament, and probably to the martyrdom of Zechariah son of Jehoiada, which, as being the last event of the kind mentioned in canonical Scripture (2 Chron. xxiv. 20–22), our Lord connects (Matt. xxiii. 35; Luke xi. 51[1]) with the proto-martyrdom of Abel. Our author very probably also refers to the fate of Jeremiah, who, according to a credible tradition, was stoned[2] to death at Daphne (Tahpanhes) in Egypt, by his fellow-countrymen, when he rebuked them there for their persistent idolatry in exchanging the worship of Astarte for that of Isis. Our Lord likewise speaks in

[1] The text of St. Matthew has erroneously "son of Barachias," which St. Luke omits. It is perhaps worth observing, that the fate of the priestly martyr was actually repeated in the case of another Zechariah (son of Baruch), who before the destruction of Jerusalem was cut down by two zealots in the temple, and stoned to death.—Jos. *Bell.* iv. 6. 4.

[2] See my *Diatribe de Pseudodorothei et Pseudepiphanii vitis prophetarum* (second half of *Comm. de Habacuci proph. vita atque ætate*, 1842), p. 60 s.

the Gospel of the stoning of prophets (Matt. xxi. 35 and xxiii. 37; comp. Luke xiii. 34). And yet more probable is the reference to Isaiah in *ἐπρίσθησαν*, whose murder by Manasseh is attested, according to Talm. Babli, *Jebamoth* 19*b*, in the *Megillath Jochasin* (an old Jerusalem chronicle and book of genealogies), and, according to *Sanhedrin* 103*b*, in the Palestinian Targum to 2 Kings xxi. 16.[1] That he was sawn asunder (Pseudepiph. *πρισθεὶς εἰς δύο*; Gemara, נסדוה) is a not improbable tradition, though it may have received legendary amplifications. Sawing asunder was a species of cruelty not unknown to the Jews (2 Sam. xii. 31, שׂום במגרה; 1 Chron. xx. 3, שׂור במגרה, Aram. נסר), and worthy of a tyrant like Manasseh, who filled up the measure of Judah's sins. The tradition is certainly older than the *Ἀναβατικὸν Ἡσαΐου*, through which it became known to the fathers since the times of Justin Martyr and Tertullian.[2]

Very puzzling, certainly, is the next term *ἐπειράσθησαν*, standing between *ἐπρίσθησαν* and *ἐν φόνῳ μαχαίρας ἀπέθανον*. Its use here would indeed be quite intelligible, could it with certainty be made out that *πειρᾶν* was ever used in the sense of putting to the question, *i.e.* inflicting torture; but if employed merely in its ordinary sense of *tentati sunt* (Ambr., Vulg.), "were put on trial," or "tempted to apostasy," *ἐπειράσθησαν* is a very feeble and unmeaning term in such a context. A twofold possibility must therefore be acknowledged: 1*st*, Another word may have stood in the

[1] This Targum has not been printed, but the passage referred to is given in Assemani's Catal. Bibl. Vat. MSS. tom. i. p. 452. It runs thus: "When Manasseh heard the words of his prophecy, he was filled with fury against him. His officers ran after the prophet, who fled from them. Whereupon a palm-tree cleft open, and concealed him; but carpenters came and sawed through the tree, and the blood of Isaiah streamed forth on the ground."

[2] Origenes in Matt. (iii. 465, ed. De la Rue): *εἰ δέ τις οὐ προσίεται τὴν ἱστορίαν διὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀποκρύφῳ Ἡσαΐα αὐτὴν φέρεσθαι, πιστευσάτω τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἑβραίοις οὕτω γεγραμμένοις· ἐλιθάσθησαν, ἐπρίσθησαν, ἐπειράσθησαν.* The *Ascensio Isaiæ*, with Laurence's Obss., are reprinted in Gfrörer's *Prophetæ Veteres Pseudepigraphi*, 1840; and a German translation was published in 1854, with illustrations from Jewish sources, by Jolowicz.

sacred author's autograph, which was early misread by copyists. Above a dozen attempts have been made to divine what such a word might be. Most of these, in form or meaning, are mere *monstra*.[1] Only two conjectures, so far as meaning is concerned, are (as Griesbach observed in the larger edition of 1803–6, and the smaller one of 1805) worth any consideration. These two conjectures are: (*a*) "*They were burned*," ἐπυράσθησαν (Fr. Junius, Piscator), ἐπυρώθησαν (Beza, edd. 3–5), ἐπρήσθησαν (Gataker, Colomes.), to which may be added ἐπυρίσθησαν (Sykes, Ebrard) and ἐνεπρήσθησαν or ἐνεπυρίσθησαν (Bleek); (*b*) "*They were mutilated*," ἐπηρώθησαν (Tanaquil Faber, J. M. Gesner). The best of these conjectures appears to me to be ἐπρήσθησαν, which might have been suggested by the martyrdom in the τήγανον of 2 Macc. vii., and in form is much to be preferred to those derived from πυράζειν, πυρίζειν, ἐμπυρίζειν, which in this connection would be somewhat pedantic. As the *Itacismus* in pronunciation certainly prevailed even before the commencement of our era, ἐπρήσθησαν might easily have been mistaken for a repetition of ἐπρίσθησαν, and consequently corrected (not very felicitously) into ἐπειράσθησαν. Either, therefore, we must read ἐπρίσθησαν ἐπρήσθησαν,[2] or suppose that, 2*dly*, ἐπειράσθησαν may be

[1] "Monsters" in form are: (*a*) ἐπειράθησαν, "*they were transfixed*" (Wakefield), better ἐπάρθησαν (Beza and others), according to which Luther since 1530 rendered *zerstochen* (the aor. pass. of πείρειν, however, is ἐπάρην, not ἐπάρθην); (*b*) ἐπέρθησαν, "*they were destroyed*," from πέρθειν (of which only the inf. aor. pass. πέρθαι is found, and in Homer, but not ἐπέρθην); (*c*) ἐπηρεάσθησαν (Reiske), "*they were slanderously accused*," etc., from an imaginary verb ἐπηρειάζειν (for ἐπηρεάζειν: this conjecture ought therefore to have been ἐπηρεάσθησαν). "Monsters" in signification are: (*α*) ἐπράθησαν (Le Moyne), "*they were sold*;" (*β*) ἐσπειράθησαν (Alberti), "*were rolled up*" or "*together*;" (*γ*) ἐσφαιρίσθησαν, "*were bowled to death*;" (*δ*) ἐταριχεύθησαν (Matthæi), "*were made mummies of*:" this last being a bad jest.

[2] How confusing the influence of this *Itacismus* was on the spelling of such Greek words by the copyists, may be seen in the readings ἐπιράσθησαν ἐπιράσθησαν (D; see Tischend., Cod. Clarom. pp. 523, 527) and ἐπρήσθησαν ἐπρήσθησαν (Codd. 110, 111). We find also in Cyril of Jerusalem, ἐπρήσθησαν for ἐπρίσθ.

an interpolation, introduced perhaps by an erroneous repetition of ἐπρίσθησαν in some very ancient MS., which, as an obvious blunder, subsequent copyists may have thought to correct by substituting ἐπειράσθησαν for the second ἐπρίσθησαν (Cod. 17 inverts the order: ἐπειράσθ. ἐπρίσθ.). It might also be that ἐπειράσθησαν came into the text as a gloss on the somewhat difficult word ἐπρίσθησαν. So Erasmus, who was followed by Calvin, and virtually also by Beza; so likewise Grotius, Calmet, Valckenaer (*sæpe evenit in talibus ut simul uno in loco legantur et vox emendata et vox eadem mendose scripta*); and so, among recent critics, Böhme. This conjecture is not slightly favoured by the fact that in the Peshito (and also in *Arabs Erpen.*) ἐπειράσθησαν is omitted; in the Æthiopic version of the Polyglott, both ἐπρίσθ. and ἐπειράσθ.; and in that edited for the Bible Society, ἐπειράσθ. only. St. Chrysostom leaves both words unexplained.[1] I should therefore be disposed to conclude that ἐπειράσθησαν is but an erroneous repetition of or gloss upon ἐπρίσθησαν. This would reduce the forms of death here mentioned to three: stoning, sawing asunder, and death by the sword—ἐν φόνῳ μαχαίρας ἀπέθανον.

The expression is taken from the Septuagint, where ἐν φόνῳ μαχαίρας (A, at Deut. xiii. 15, μαχαίρης) is at Ex. xvii. 13, Deut. xiii. 15, xx. 13, and φόνῳ μαχαίρας at Num. xxi. 24,[2] the rendering of לְפִי חָרֶב; the Hebrew phrase being taken in the sense of *vorante* = *necante ense*. In the kingdom of Judah only one such martyrdom by the sword is mentioned—that of the prophet Urijah, whom "*they fetched forth out of Egypt, and brought unto Jehoiakim, who slew him with the sword*" (Jer. xxvi. 23); but in the kingdom of Israel, during the persecutions by the house of Omri, it was quite usual (1 Kings xix. 10): "*They have*

[1] ἐπειράσθ. is also wanting in some (but those insignificant) MSS., in Eusebius (*Præp.* xii. 10), and in Theophylact. Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* iv. 16, 104) omits ἐπρίσθ. The Liturgy of St. Chrysostom (Cod. Erl. 96) has both.

[2] Elsewhere ἐν τῷ στόματι μαχαίρας (Gen. xxxiv. 26), or ἐν στόμ. μαχ. (Jer. xxi. 7; Ecclus. xxviii. 18) (Cod. Ephr. ῥομφαίας).

thrown down Thine altars, and slain Thy prophets with the sword."

That it is these prophets of the kingdom of Israel whom the sacred writer has here specially in view, is evident from the following sentence beginning with περιῆλθον. From the sharp brief conflicts of various kinds of death fought out courageously in the spirit of faith, he returns to the long and toilsome conflicts sustained in the same spirit through a wandering life of self-abnegation: περιῆλθον ἐν μηλωταῖς, κ.τ.λ. The reference seems, in the first place, to be to Elijah, the history of whose life so vividly represents the trials and sufferings of the genuine prophetic spirit, as that of Elisha his successor its consolations and its triumphs. Both prophets succeeded, by their prayers and strivings, in averting its immediate doom from the kingdom of Israel, and in procuring for it a long respite-time of grace and prosperity. But Elijah, in obtaining this, expended a whole life in uttering thunders of denunciation, and in sanguinary conflicts. His life was one of perpetual voluntary penance, restless wanderings, and lonely prayers, out of which from time to time he would suddenly emerge with renewed strength for some mighty act of faith. He was a man who would fain love, but was compelled to hate; would fain bless, but could only threaten or destroy; would fain have been but a happy unit in the mighty congregation of Jehovah's witnesses and worshippers, but found himself in his worship and his witness alone. He was an incarnation, as it were, of the curse of the divine law; and as such was hated, persecuted, and a burden to himself. His outward appearance was in accordance with this vocation. He is called, 2 Kings i. 8, אִישׁ בַּעַל שֵׂעָר (a man of hair), because his outer garment consisted of a rough skin, with the hair turned outwards, like that of his antitype St. John the Baptist, whose raiment was a covering of camel's hair fastened round his loins with a leathern girdle (Matt. iii. 4),—a mode of clothing which, we learn from Zech. xiii. 4, was adopted by the prophets as that best suited for their hermit life of penitence, and separation from a godless world (comp.

1 Kings xix. 13). Such a garment of hair was called μηλωτή when made from the skin of the μῆλον = אַיִל,[1]—a name applied to all small cattle, whether sheep or goat.[2] To ἐν μηλωταῖς here is added ἐν αἰγείοις δέρμασιν, not merely *per epexegesin*, but as a kind of climax, the (generally) dark goatskin having a yet more mournful and ascetic aspect than the generally lighter-coloured μηλωτή (sheepskin). Thus in word, deed, and appearance bearing witness against the world, these saints of the Most High went on their rounds of duty: ὑστερούμενοι (used here as absolutely as at Luke xv. 14, Phil. iv. 12, and elsewhere), θλιβόμενοι (as at 2 Cor. vii. 5), κακουχούμενοι (in our epistle only). Their life was one of perpetual want, oppression, misery, discomfort, and unease of every kind; but though despised and hated by the world, they were highly esteemed of God.

Ver. 38. *Of whom the world was not worthy: in desert places wandering, and mountains, and dens, and in the caves of the land.*

The relative ὧν refers to those described in the clause beginning with περιῆλθον. The world despised them, and thought them not worthy of its regards or society; but the reverse was the truth: the world was not worthy of them, and therefore God withdrew them from it. The world, in persecuting and driving them into the desert, witnessed against and punished itself. The participle πλανώμενοι is in apposition with the subject of περιῆλθον. The reading adopted by Lachmann, ἐπὶ ἐρημίαις,[3] is, according to Fritzsche's correct judgment, bad Greek, ἐπί being probably a gloss on ὄρεσι. The purpose of the article in ταῖς ὀπαῖς τῆς γῆς can hardly be to distinguish the caves with which

[1] The אדרת of Elijah is throughout in the Septuagint called μηλωτή. The word has hitherto been found only once in extra-biblical Greek, viz. in a fragment of Philemon, *ap. Poll.* x. 176. For the form, see Lobeck (on κηρωτή), *Pathol.* p. 393.

[2] Clem. Rom., c. 17, seems to take μηλωταί for sheepskins exclusively: ἐν δέρμασιν αἰγείοις καὶ μηλωταῖς. Comp. Hippocrates, *Opp.* ed. Littré, tom. vi. p. 356.

[3] [The Cod. Sin. has also ἐπὶ ἐρημίαις.]

the hill-country of the land of Israel abounded from all other caves in other parts of the world, though, as it is prophets of Israel who are here spoken of, τῆς γῆς must be understood of the Holy Land, and not of the world in general. Both articles, therefore, simply serve to universalize the statement: wherever in the land of Israel a cave was to be found, there these prophets of Israel sought a shelter. [Σπήλαιον is a cleft or opening in a rock which ends in a chamber; ὀπή, a cleft or opening of any kind.] The reference, again, might be to confessors of the Maccabean time, when every mountain, cave, and hollow of Judea was a refuge for the fugitive חסידים; but I think it more probable that the author has still the ancient prophets (subject of περιῆλθον) mainly in view, such as Elijah in the rock of Horeb, Elisha in the solitude of Carmel, and the hundred prophets concealed and nourished in two caves by Obadiah.

The author breaks off here his rapid summary of Old Testament history, which might be styled pre-eminently a history of faith, to take one last review of the whole.

Vers. 39, 40. *And these all, having obtained through faith a good witness, received not the promise; God having provided something better for us, that they without us should not be perfected.*

Οὗτοι πάντες refers to all the above (named and not named) back to Abel. Μαρτυρηθέντες is used in the same *sensus prægnans* as ἐμαρτυρήθησαν at ver. 2 (see note there). With διὰ τῆς πίστεως, faith is designated as the mediate cause by which the good witness had been procured. The *ordo verborum*, μαρτυρήθ. δ. τ. πίστ. (not δ. τ. πίστ. μαρτυρήθ.), is intentional, and indicates that the participial clause is not to be resolved by "because," but by "although." The meaning is, not that they received not the promise as a present blessing, *because* they had to earn their good report through faith in the future and invisible; but that *although* they had already obtained so good a name through faith, they had nevertheless still to wait for something

better. The singular *τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν* (not *τὰς ἐπαγγελίας*[1]) is also significant. Some promises believers under the Old Testament did receive (ver. 33), but not the promise *κατ' ἐξ.*, not the promise of final salvation, or (as our author himself calls it) *of the eternal inheritance* (ix. 15). Here, in accordance with the context, we might say that *ἡ ἐπαγγελία* is equivalent to the promised *τελείωσις*. But did we not read of Abraham at vi. 15, that he *has* obtained this?—*ἐπέτυχεν ἐπαγγελίας*. True, he has obtained it, but in that world of light where he is now living: he did not obtain it here on earth (see note on vi. 15). The final, universal blessing made known by the gospel has become the joy of all the patriarchs in the heavenly world, where they are now among the number of the blessed, to whom ch. xii. 23 refers as *πνεύματα δικαίων τετελειωμένων*. And yet another question. If it be said of believers under the Old Testament that they had died without having received the promise, is it not also implied at ch. x. 36 that for us likewise this *κομίζεσθαι τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν* is still future? Undoubtedly it is so; but with an important difference. For *them* final salvation was simply a future good; for us it is at once present and future: *present*, in that the whole blessing has been procured for us by the self-sacrifice of Christ once for all; *future*, in that the full development and apprehension of this blessing is not yet realized (comp. ch. ix. 28 with x. 14). After this solution of the two difficulties connected with ver. 39, we shall not miss the sense of ver. 40, *τοῦ Θεοῦ περὶ ἡμῶν*,[2] *κ.τ.λ.* Here, again, two questions may be asked. One is, What is the significance of *κρεῖττόν τι*? the other, What is the force of *ἵνα*? Is it *final*, or is it *explicative*? Sebastian Schmidt and Schlichting take it as explicative: *quia Deus melius quid circa nos providit, nimirum hoc, ne sine nobis illi consummarentur.* But if the sentence with *ἵνα* had been *so* meant, would it not rather have been expressed thus: *ἵνα ἡμεῖς ἅμα*

[1] So Lachmann, following A. [Cod. Sin. has *τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν.*]

[2] Clemens Alex., and also my manuscript of the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom, connect *τὴν ἐπαγγ.* with *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, making the following *προβλεψαμένου* appositional, and so disposing of the genitive absolute.

σὺν αὐτοῖς τελειωθῶμεν? Moreover, as προβλέπεσθαι denotes a providential prearrangement, we naturally expect a further statement of the purpose which such arrangement has in view; and προβλεψαμένου having already its special object in κρεῖττόν τι, ἵνα the more naturally retains its full signification of *eo consilio ut* (comp. Winer, § 44, 8). But what notion did the author himself connect with κρεῖττόν τι? Various replies are possible. 1*st*, We may interpret his meaning in accordance with ch. vi. 9, where κρείττονα signifies, "Better things than that you should so fall away." So here it may mean, "God having provided for us something better than that they should have carried off, or already enjoyed, the final blessing." This interpretation is the prevalent one among the fathers, who commonly expound ἐπαγγελία here as *perfectio in resurrectione corporum*, or (as they love to express it) the investment with the *stola corporis*[1] (Primasius), or (in more general terms) the final gathering, consummation, and coronation of the redeemed church.[2] As this will be the end of human history, after which, as the Lord said (Matt. xxi. 20), there will be neither marrying nor giving in marriage, we might understand the κρεῖττόν τι to consist in this, that the history of the race should not be so suddenly cut short as would have been the case had the fathers already obtained this final blessing. But so narrowly eschatological a conception of the ἐπαγγελία has not only against it the ἐπέτυχεν of vi. 15, but also the whole drift of this epistle, which regards the final salvation foretold by Jeremiah (comp. above, ch. viii. 6 seq., and x. 15–18, and notes there) as already accomplished in the atoning work of Christ, ending in His entrance into the

[1] On the difference between the *stola alba* (Rev. vii.) as *stola prima*, and the resurrection body as *stola secunda*, see my *Psychologie*, p. 374.

[2] *Intellige* (says St. Chrysostom) *quale et quantum est, Abraham sedere et Apostolum Paulum exspectantes, quando perficiaris, ut possint tunc mercedem* (viz. the eternal crown) *recipere.* Theophylact also, following Chrysostom, calls the τελείωσις "the time of the crowns." Schlichting, adopting the doctrine of the soul's sleep in the intermediate state, interprets τετελειωμένων of xii. 23 by *quos consummatio manet.*

sanctuary of heaven, and τὸ ἔσχατον τῶν ἡμερῶν as already inaugurated by His first coming into the world (ch. i. 1). This commencing fulfilment of the promise, fundamental and all-inclusive as it is, could not possibly be ignored by the sacred writer when speaking of a κρεῖττόν τι as distinctively belonging to believers under the New Testament. We would therefore, 2*dly*, understand by κρεῖττόν τι here, "something better than they (the old fathers) received," and interpret this "better thing" to be our receiving while here on earth the fulfilment of the promise, which they could not receive till after their departure hence, and not even then in the world of spirits till after (so we are justified in completing the author's thought) the descent of Christ into Hades and His ascension into heaven. This κρεῖττον, then, is that blessedness of which our Lord speaks, Matt. xiii. 17,—that final revelation of God through the Son, which puts an end to all His revelations of Himself through the prophets, and divides into two parts the whole history of the universe (ch. i. 1),—that divine evangelical σωτηρία, which the Lord and His apostles began to make known (ch. ii. 3 seq.) amid effulgurations of the glories of the coming Æon. God's purpose in providentially reserving this revelation for us (περὶ ἡμῶν, on our behalf, or in relation to us; comp. διὰ ὑμᾶς, 1 Pet. i. 20), was, ἵνα μὴ χωρὶς ἡμῶν τελειωθῶσιν—that the saints of the Old Testament might not anticipate us in the enjoyment of the blessing, but then only receive it when we received it too. As the sacred writer here denies that believers under the Old Testament were made perfect in this life, and yet speaks of them a little further on (ch. xii. 23) as "spirits perfected," he must have assumed that the manifestation and completed work of Christ had already wrought a change in their condition even beyond the tomb. Their spirits (πνεύματα) had, in the world of spirits (through Christ's descent into Hades, and His ascension above the heavens), already entered on the enjoyment of celestial blessedness; and they are now waiting (with all who follow the great High Priest through the opening made by the riven veil) for the redemption of the body and the regenera-

tion of the universe. On this point C. H. Riger and Ebrard seem to take the right view:[1] "Not without us could they be made perfect, and with us they have already been perfected. Christ went to them to open for them the gates of Death's kingdom, and thence to lead them forth with Himself. And now henceforward the souls of all who die in Christ go at once to Him, and enter heaven, there to await re-union with the body at His second coming." The saints, then, of the Old Testament march henceforth at equal pace with ourselves in the perfect way of salvation, now finally made known, of which τελειωθῶσι here denotes both beginning and end, both root and crown. And now, with the final end and its inauguration, the second coming of Christ once more fully in view, the sacred writer recommences the strain of exhortation which was broken off at the beginning of this chapter, and moulds it in accordance with what he has been saying of the powers and achievements of the heroes of faith.

CHAP. XII. 1–11. *Exhortation and encouragement, in view of such a cloud of witnesses, and of the leadership and example of the Lord Jesus Himself, who in the way of suffering has attained to glory, not to grow faint in the conflict with sin, and not to be unmindful of that fatherly*

[1] See my *Biblische Psychologie*, p. 353 seq. (*Das Jenseits und die Erlösung.*) Even Bleek and De Wette recognise the assumption here, that Christ's victory over death and Hades had been the turning-point in the (for the present only pneumatic) τελείωσις of Old Testament saints. Tholuck's error seems to be in maintaining the continued existence of Hades as an intermediate place of abode for all souls, even since Christ's descent there and ascension into heaven. M'Lean takes a more correct view, though his "*an alteration then took place in heaven*" is not an adequate statement of the truth. *Ascendit Christus* (says Thomas Aquinas on the passage before us) *pandens viam ante eos quam non habuerunt Sancti Vet. Testamenti.* He wavers, however, between referring their *perfectio* to the *beatitudo per Christum* and the *stola corporis.* Our older Protestant interpreters were hindered from taking a free view of this subject by their dread of the Roman "*limbus patrum.*"

love from which the discipline of suffering comes, nor of those peaceable fruits of righteousness which they will gather who submit themselves to it.

An exhortation to stedfastness of faith (ὑπομονή) as the one condition of salvation, in view of the near approach of the Lord's return, began at ch. x.; the nature and main characteristics of such faith were next exhibited both by definition and example in ch. xi.; and now the exhortation is resumed, with appeal to motives urged already, and superaddition of others.

Ch. xii. 1, 2. *Wherefore let us likewise, having gathered round us such a cloud of witnesses, laying aside every encumbering weight, and the sin which easily besetteth our way, run with endurance the race that is set before us, looking up to the captain and completer of our faith, even Jesus; who, for the joy that was set before him, endured a cross, despising shame, and is seated on the right hand of the throne of God.*

In other cases, where expositions have been followed by exhortations based upon them, these have been introduced by διὰ τοῦτο, ὅθεν, διό, and οὖν: here we have the grander-sounding τοιγαροῦν, which occurs but once more in the New Testament (1 Thess. iv. 8), and (like the more poetical τοίγαρ) always stands at the head of the sentence. It is, in fact, a little group of particles forming together an energetic *ergo*,[1] in which τοι is affirmative of the matter in hand, while γάρ introduces and οὖν proceeds to draw the conclusion. The

[1] Grammarians are divided on the etymology of this enclitic τοι. Some regard it as a *dativus ethicus* for σοι (Nägelsbach, Bäumlein, Rost on Passow's Lexicon); others as the ablative of the demonstrative τό (Buttmann, Thiersch); others as a *dativus localis* according to the form οἴκοι (Kühner); others as a similar formation to the Gothic *thauh*, German *doch* [English *though*] (Hartung); others as partly = τῷ *hac ratione, hac de causa*, partly = τῇ or τινί *aliquo modo* (Klotz). It is, however, generally allowed (even by Hartung, ii. 354), that τοι in τοίγαρ, τοιγαροῦν, and (the first τοι in) τοιγάρτοι, is equivalent to τῷ, and signifies "*therefore*," "*on that account*." See especially Klotz on Devarius, ii. 738.

exhortation takes its form here from a favourite Pauline figure derived from the Greek and Roman games;[1] one out of many instances of Christianity (as the world-religion) not fearing or disdaining to make use (for her own purposes, and in presenting herself to the world) of Hellenic materials, as well as of those derived from Hebrew Scripture or from the traditions and developments of the synagogue. "*So then let us run the race that is set before us with stedfast hardihood.*" The phrase is classical; τρέχειν (θεῖν) ἀγῶνα, *certamen currere* (Statius, *Theb.* iii. 116), being a common metaphor both in prose writers and poets for encountering danger. (See Bleek and Passow on τρέχειν.) Our author does not, however, use it as equivalent to τρέχειν κίνδυνον, but in its proper sense of running an actual race, though a spiritual one. Πρόκειται ἀγών (*propositum est certamen*) is the regular phrase in reference to a contest at the public games, of which the nature, rules, and prizes have been formally announced, and in which those competent are prepared to engage; *e.g.* Herod. ix. 60, ἀγῶνος μεγίστου προκειμένου; Eur. *Orest.* 847, and elsewhere.[2] The meaning of δι' ὑπομονῆς is not (any more than at Rom. viii. 25) "by means of endurance," but "through endurance," *i.e.* "with endurance all through," with endurance stedfastly maintained to the end. Compare 2 Cor. v. 7, διὰ πίστεως περιπατοῦμεν; Eur. *Orest.* 747, διὰ φόβου ἔρχεσθαι, "to be always in fear;" and Thuc. v. 59, διὰ φόβου εἶναι. Here δι' ὑπομονῆς refers us back to the close of ch. x.

In now turning our attention to the participial clauses which intervene between the beginning and end of the main sentence, we shall find ourselves justified in the expectation that the figure of a race or athletic contest will not be lost sight of. The first of these clauses sums up the contents of

[1] Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 24 seq.; and for τρέχειν, Gal. v. 7, ii. 2, Rom. ix. 16, Phil. ii. 16; for γυμνάζειν, 2 Tim. iv. 7.

[2] A scholion in the N. T. of Joannes Gregorius (Oxonii 1703) adds well: ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοθέτου. Comp. Philo, i. 317. 39, τὸν . . . προτεθέντα ἀγῶνα, where he also says, *The Olympian contest which alone is entitled to the epithet holy is not that of Elis, but ὁ περὶ κτήσεως τῶν θείων καὶ* Ὀλυμπίων ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρετῶν.

ch. xi., which it makes the motive for the present exhortation: *τοσοῦτον ἔχοντες περικείμενον ἡμῖν νέφος μαρτύρων.* As in the semicircle of the theatre spectators sit on crowded benches tier above tier, to watch the conflict, so have we gathered round about us a *νέφος μαρτύρων*,—a close-pressed, cloud-like multitude of spectators is seated and watching us on either side. Herodian speaks in a similar way of *περικείμενον πλῆθος*, *an encompassing multitude* (*Hist.* vii. 9. 3), for *νέφος* is only a poetic or pictorial term for *πλῆθος*: comp. *Il.* iv. 274, *ἅμα δὲ νέφος εἵπετο πεζῶν*, and Virgil's rendering (*Æn.* vii. 793), *in sequitur nimbus peditum*; comp. also Philo's *ἀκρίδων νέφος* (ii. 429. 11), and *ἡ τῶν Ἰουδαίων πληθὺς ὥσπερ νέφος ἐπιστᾶσα.* One might be tempted to regard *μάρτυρες* here as simply equivalent to *θεαταί* (*e.g.* Philo, i. 317. 40), but that would be to overlook the significant use of the word (*μαρτυρηθέντες διὰ τῆς πίστεως*) in the former chapter (ch. xi. 2, 4, 5, 39). At the same time I cannot agree with Lünemann in dropping the notion of "spectators" altogether, which is so strongly suggested by the word *περικείμενον*, transporting us into the midst of the theatre or the circus with its ring of eager lookers-on. These, then, are spectators, but also something more; not mere *θεαταί*, but also *μάρτυρες*, as those who themselves have borne witness for God when here below, and received His witness, and now act as judges and umpires for us. Once witnesses for God, they are now witnesses of us their brethren: the two notions are closely intertwined; and the sacred author (as Böhme elegantly observes) writes simply *μαρτύρων* (not *μαρτ. τῆς πίστεως*) in order not to disturb the significant ambiguity. Averse as we are in general to depart from the simple sense of the text of Scripture for the sake of making out a multitude of meanings, so that "the wood" at last "is hardly to be seen for trees," we feel that in the present case the double meaning unmistakeably obtrudes itself: those who were witnesses of faith in the former chapter, are turned by the word *περικείμενον* into witnesses of us in this, or rather, the two applications of the word *μάρτυρες* are, in the writer's thought and expression, inextricably combined. The eccle-

siastical use of the word *martyr* (blood-witness for God) prevented the fathers from discerning the application given to it by *προκείμενον νέφος* here. The clause must, however, be carefully interpreted with reference to the closing words of ch. xi. The heroes of faith whose conflicts are over, and who are living now in that heavenly world into which the blood of Jesus has admitted them, are not indifferent spectators of what goes on here; between the church above and the church below there is a real and living intercommunion (ch. xii. 22 sq.). With this connection of thought the word *νέφος*,[1] as here applied, gains greatly in significance. Multitudinous saints of departed generations, the spirits of the just made perfect, visibly overhang the now militant church, like a thick impenetrable cloud which we cannot reach to, but which encompasses us still.[2] How solemn is the warning, yet how gracious the encouragement, contained for us in the thought of the awful session of that august society, the perpetual contemplation of those invisible beholders! Our life here a contest, its theatre the universe, the seats of the spectators ranged through heaven!

The second participial clause, *ὄγκον ἀποθέμενοι πάντα καὶ τὴν εὐπερίστατον ἁμαρτίαν*, does not add a second motive to perseverance in Christian duty, but is part of the exhortation itself, expressing the necessary condition of our running well. Every encumbrance and impediment, everything likely to occasion a fall, must be carefully got rid of. The word *ὄγκος*[3] is here an *ἅπαξ λεγόμενον* so far as biblical

[1] This metaphor likewise is more Hellenic than scriptural; for the point of comparison in Isa. lx. 8, xix. 1, xli. 2, is the rapidity of approach, like that of clouds driven by the wind.

[2] The fathers think also of the grateful shade and the refreshing drops which such a cloud might distil. But this is too much of a good thing. [Perhaps the same might be said of Delitzsch's own words in the following sentence:—"*How solemn is the admonition, and yet also how full of comfort the encouragement, which is contained in the looks that we exchange with this invisible company of spectators!*" I have ventured slightly to alter them in the text.—Tr.]

[3] Buttmann, with great probability, connects it with ΕΝΚΩ, the root of *ἤνεγκον*. Griesbach notes as a conjecture *ὄκνον*: not bad, but

Greek is concerned; in classical, it signifies any superfluous weight or burden, *e.g.* of the body from stoutness or in pregnancy, and is then figuratively used of bombast in diction or overladen rhetorical ornament, of excess in apparel, etc., and in an ethical sense, of swelling pride or vanity. In this last ethical application the word is here interpreted by Bengel: "laying aside all boastfulness or pride;" but a warning of this kind, against spiritual high-mindedness, would come in too abruptly in the present context, and the first literal meaning of the word is far more natural. Hippocrates, Diodorus, Ælian, all three use ὄγκος in the sense of stoutness or obesity, with special reference to gymnastic exercises, as an approved method of counteracting it. Here, then, it is the slowness and dulness of his readers' minds (the νωθρότης of ch. v. 11, vi. 12), the encumbering weight of Judaic notions, rites, and observances, and all that is hindering their apprehension of the joyous liberty of the gospel, that he bids them lay aside. This narrow-hearted, double-minded, Judaizing tendency, this clinging or returning to a foreign yoke, is that which is denounced throughout our epistle as the chief peril of those to whom it is addressed, as the ἁμαρτία which they have most to dread. In accordance with which we may interpret εὐπερίστατον ἁμαρτίαν here as more precisely defining the vaguer ὄγκον πάντα. The adjective εὐπερίστατος being a real ἅπαξ λεγόμενον (occurring nowhere else except in a few passages of St. Chrysostom, in which there is a reference to our epistle), we are compelled to have recourse solely to etymology and context in endeavouring to ascertain its meaning. All the cognate adjectives have either a passive or a middle sense;[1] *e.g.* περίστατος, surrounding or surrounded; ἀπερί-

unnecessary and less significant. D writes ὄνκον, an Alexandrine form. See Tischend. *Cod. Claromont.* p. xviii.

[1] To derive εὐπερίστατος from the active περιίστημι would not furnish a suitable meaning here; for (1) "misleading," "destructive," is a sense which cannot anyhow be obtained from περιίστημι; (2) "changeable," "inconstant" (*mobile, leve, inconstans,* εὐμεταχίνητον, Matthæi), is one which does not suit the present context; (3) "putting" or

στατος, unsurrounded, *i.e.* lonely, deserted; comp. εὐκατάστατος, well-appointed, εὐμετάστατος, easily changed. Following these analogies, and assigning to εὐπερίστατος a middle sense, we may render it with the Vulgate, *circumstans nos peccatum*, or with the Peshito, *peccatum quod omni tempore paratum est nobis* (*matjebo*, from *tajjeb*, *parare*). This meaning of εὐπερίστατος is here so suitable, that the only difficulty is, which of its several *nuances* to prefer, or which of the various applications of the metaphor (τὴν εὐπ. ἁμαρτίαν) to regard as most appropriate. According to Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann, and some older commentators, sin is here regarded as a burdensome load or encumbering clinging garment which would impede the runner in his course. In view of περικεῖσθαι at ch. v. 2, περιελεῖν at x. 11, and ἀποθέμενοι here, this interpretation seems natural enough, but we must beware of forcibly making that of εὐπερίστατος to square with it; and περιϊστάναι is certainly neither a suitable nor a usual term for the close fitting of a garment. Castellio's version is elegant, but the figure is one quite beyond the present circle: *nos ambiens sicut arbores hedera*. Valckenaer's *quod ad cingendum* (*et irretiendum*) *promptum est* has much to recommend it, as περιϊστάναι in the sense of *cingere* is a common soldier's and hunter's word; and this interpretation has among moderns been adopted by Von Gerlach. But here we must have special regard to the main figure, that of running on the race-course; and with this in view, St. Anselm, or the nameless author of the excellent *Commentary on the Pauline Epistles*, gives the right interpretation of the Vulgate rendering, *circumstans: quod nos inique impetit et circumvallat*. Horneius' exposition is better still: *Peccata circumcingunt curren-*

" placing round," in a transitive sense, would suggest the inconvenient query: What, then, is it with which sin surrounds us? A derivation from the passive would also give a very unsuitable sense here: " sin that is easily avoided or escaped from." The *fragile* of the Itala (which seems to represent this derivation) is as bad a rendering as possible. Ernesti's is better: " sin that is much desired or sought after;" but still unsuitable here.

tem et implicant ac supplantant, ut prorsus a cursu impediatur vel in medio subsistat aut corruat. (In like manner Calvin, Grotius, Limborch, and others.) It is then "easily-besetting sin," *i.e.* sin which besets us on all sides, puts itself constantly in our way, and seeks to bring us to a dangerous fall.[1] It is true, indeed, that the other interpretation, *quod circumcingit et complectitur nos instar vestis*, may seem to fit better in with the meaning of ἀποθέμενοι, but the advantage is only apparent; and with our interpretation the whole utterance becomes yet more significant. We may compare Gen. iv. 7, where sin appears, on the one hand, as an inward power over which Cain is to get the mastery; on the other, as a beast of prey crouching at his door, and ready to spring upon him if that mastery is not gained. Here sin as inward inclination, which the free-will of man can strive against and subdue, is distinguished from sin as inward act or habit, the consequence of evil inclination yielded to, which

[1] It comes to much the same thing if we derive εὐπερίστατος (as a *denominativum*) from περίστασις = *facillime difficultates objiciens et in pericula conjiciens* (Bengel; and so also many other commentators after Kypke, but not the more recent). The adjective ἀπερίστατος in Polyb. vi. 44. 27 (*ed. Bekker*), appears to be really a *denominativum*, not a verbal adjective (ἀπερίστατοι ῥαστῶναι being opposed to μεγίσται καὶ δεινόταται περιστάσεις). But this going back to so technical a term as περίστασις (= συμφορά in Stoic phraseology: the word also seems to have been a favourite with Polybius) is quite unnecessary and useless. We abide, therefore, by the derivation from the verb περιϊστάναι.—The interpretation given to εὐπερίστατος by Salmasius, *quod nos variis molestiis occupat et turbas ciet*, is fundamentally the same with those based on its derivation from περίστασις. Böhme's is a failure: *quod bonis utitur rebus circumstantibus*;—it ought to have been: *quæ habet suisque affert bonam fortunam atque voluptates.* Chemnitz, Sebast. Schmidt, and others derive the word from περίστασις: *pessima* περίστασις *seu corruptio naturæ humanæ*, understanding by ἁμαρτία, so designated, original sin. (So Calvin, Pareus, etc.) Balduin has written on Heb. xii. 1, following this interpretation. Many have followed Luther's, sin which cleaves to us (*tenaciter adhæret*), without troubling themselves about the exact derivation. Bugenhagen, however, gave a better and freer interpretation: *semper oppugnans nos peccatum.* Œcolampad.: *pecc. quod nos proxime circumstat sive tenaciter nobis inhæret.* Grynæus: *peccatum ad nos circumcingendos proclive.*

only awaits the favourable moment to become outwardly manifest and complete man's ruin. The same meaning may be found in the clause before us. Our first duty is to cast off sin as an indwelling evil, a weight and burden, a cumbersome garment or tormenting chain, otherwise it will soon exhibit itself in a more dangerous form, as εὐπερίστατος ἁμαρτία, besetting and opposing us at every turn, and so ever ready to induce a fall. So St. Chrysostom (*Hom. II.* in 2 Cor.): εὐπερίστατον γὰρ ἡ ἁμαρτία, πάντοθεν ἱσταμένη, ἔμπροσθεν, ὄπισθεν καὶ οὕτως ἡμᾶς καταβάλλουσα.[1]

The author has now concluded the first part of the exhortation addressed to his Hebrew readers,—viz. to run the course of Christian duty set before them with stedfast endurance, as under the eyes of so many invisible witnesses that have accomplished the like course in days gone by, and, in order to do this, to cast off manfully every encumbrance, and break through the trammels and hindrances of sin. He now proceeds, in the second part of his admonition, to commend to them as the main condition of all success, as the chief source of inspiration for the true athlete-temper,[2] and as the mightiest stimulant to stedfastness of faith, an upward glance to Jesus and His glorious example: *looking up to faith's captain and completer Jesus.*

In order to apprehend the sense in which our Lord is here styled ὁ τῆς πίστεως ἀρχηγὸς καὶ τελειωτής, we must first dispose of an inadmissible conception of the meaning of ἀρχηγός, and then of an equally inadmissible conception of that of τελειωτής. It is quite impossible that ἀρχηγός should here signify the author, beginner, or first operator of faith in us (the last representative of which view is Lünemann): we have, indeed, already seen at ii. 10 (τὸν ἀρχηγ. τῆς σωτηρίας), that ἀρχηγός there is not an equivalent of αἴτιος, but rather of πρόδρομος or πρόμαχος, a forerunner or leader in the fray, one who is the first to do or accomplish anything,

[1] *Vid.* Bleek, iii. 858.

[2] *Vid.* Harless, *Predigt: Worin stehet der Muth eines wahren Christen?* (Sermon entitled: Wherein consists the Courage of the true Christian?) *Sonntagswcihe*, vol. iv. Sermon 5.

whether good or bad.[1] So again τελειωτής does not and cannot signify one who to the end has manifested faith (Rieger), nor one who has attained to perfection in faith (Bleek, De Wette), nor "one in whom faith appears in perfected glory" (Ebrard). Such an interpretation in all its *nuances* is quite wrong. The word has a transitive meaning: the perfecter or finisher of faith, He who by His work of redemption has given to the heroes and soldiers of faith the power and assurance of final victory. By "faith" the sacred writer understands here that which he has already described at ch. xi. 1 as a confident expectation of future good, and vivid realization of unseen verities in the midst of and against all appearances of a troubled and uncertain present. In such faith Jesus has led the way for all believers under the New Testament; none but He having endured such sufferings with the reward of such glory kept in view! In this way He is at once the captain or leader of the army of faith ("the blessed company of all believers"), and also the finisher or perfecter of faith itself, as having completed by those sufferings and His entrance on that glory the work of our salvation, which is (1 Pet. i. 9) τὸ τέλος τῆς πίστεως. He is the captain of faith, because He has trod the way of faith triumphantly before us, making a way for those who follow; and the finisher of faith, because having reached the goal Himself (an intermediate link of thought which is not expressed), He leads all who follow Him to the same goal.[2] This is the only place in the New Testament in which the expressions πιστεῦσαι and πίστις are applied to our Lord; but the thought is essentially the same at ch. ii. 13 of our epistle, where Christ at the head of His spiritual brethren is made to say, ἐγὼ ἔσομαι πεποιθὼς ἐπ' αὐτῷ, and ch. iii. 2, where He is spoken of as "*faithful to*

[1] Comp. Mic. i. 13 (Sept.), ἀρχηγὸς ἁμαρτίας; 1 Macc. ix. 13, τῶν ἀρχηγῶν τῆς κακίας.

[2] The notions of τελειωτής and βραβευτής (βραβεύς) border one on the other, but without coinciding (comp. Philo, i. 131. 38, ὅταν τελειωθῇς καὶ βραβείων καὶ στεφάνων ἀξιωθῇς); in τελειωτής lies simply the notion that He helps us to victory, not that He is the dispenser of the prize.

Him that made Him" (πιστόν, κ.τ.λ.). And why should not πίστις be predicated of the incarnate Jesus? seeing that in virtue of His self-exinanition (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, Phil. ii. 7; *semet ipsum exinanivit*, Vulg.), during His earthly course, the barrier of the present life was for a time interposed between His human consciousness and His divine eternal being, a barrier so condensed and darkened by the presence and workings in humanity at large of God's wrath and of our sin, that till it had been actually removed by death and resurrection it was only *non-existent*, even in Him, to the power of that faith which out of the lowest deep of derelic-tion called on the God that had seemed to have forsaken Him as "My God." When once the profound reality of that κένωσις is recognised, and of the agony of sorrow and death which it entailed upon the Holy One, it will excite no surprise that our author should here speak of faith as having been, while that κένωσις lasted, the bond of connection between Jesus and the Father.

In what sense and with what right he could thus speak, is exhibited in the relative sentence that follows: *who for the joy that lay before Him endured a cross, despising shame, and is seated on the right hand of the throne of God.* The first half of this sentence places Jesus before our eyes as τῆς πίστεως ἀρχηγόν, the second as τελευτήν of the same faith.

And, first, as to the ἀντὶ τῆς προκειμένης αὐτῷ χαρᾶς, it is now generally acknowledged that it cannot mean, "in-stead of the joy which He already possessed as His own" (Peshito),—*i.e.* the joy of His heavenly and divine life; for προκειμένης looks forward to the future, not backward to the past, whether a temporal past or that before all time. Compare τὸν προκείμενον ἡμῖν ἀγῶνα of the previous verse, and τῆς προκειμένης ἐλπίδος of ch. vi. 18. Calvin's inter-pretation—*significat, quam integrum esset Christo se eximere omni molestia vitamque felicem et bonis omnibus affluentem degere, ipsum tamen ultro subiisse mortem acerbam et plenam ignominia*—is unexceptionable from a grammatical point of view: comp., for example, Herod. ix. 82, ἐκπλαγεὶς τὰ προ-κείμενα ἀγαθά. Nor is it inadmissible historically. Our

Lord had really to withstand the temptation of Satan that He should choose the kingdoms of this world instead of the cross; and the sacred writer might here be drawing a parallel between Him and Moses in this respect (comp. ch. xi. 24 seq.), and presenting Him as Moses' antitype. St. Chrysostom puts it somewhat differently: "*He was free not to suffer unless He willed to suffer; for being free from all sin, the prince of this world had no claim upon Him.*" But this is not so good as Calvin's interpretation. Our Lord, though sinless, had voluntarily subjected Himself by His incarnation to the consequences and penalty of human sin. And there is a third interpretation better than either. Throughout our epistle the Lord's exaltation to the right hand of God is represented as the reward for His obedience to the suffering of His atoning death. (Comp. especially i. 3 sq., ii. 9, v. 4–10.) The interpretation, therefore, naturally suggests itself which makes the second half of the relative sentence explain the προκειμένη χαρά of the first, especially as χαρά is used repeatedly elsewhere to express the joy of the heavenly reward (Matt. xxv. 21; 1 Pet. i. 8). So Hunnius clearly and well: *Hic pro gaudio proposito pertulit crucem, id est sub certa spe subsecuturi lætissimi eventus, victoriæ et gaudii, in quod per mortem suam ingressurus esset, magno excelsoque animo tulit crucis supplicium, coram mundo quidem ignominiosissimum sed quod incorruptibili brabeo compensatum est Christo, ignominia in immensam et æternam gloriam versa et absorpta.* This προκειμένη χαρά is the same thing as that of which the apostle speaks at Phil. ii. 6 (ἴσα εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ), as the being in a like condition to God.[1] As it is there said that He who possessed in Himself the essential form of deity yet thought not the glory of deified existence, which

[1] For the right interpretation of this passage see Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* i. 130–133; 2d ed. pp. 148-151), and Thomasius (*Dogmatik* ii. 135–141). Strictly speaking, the Itala and Vulgate rendering (of οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο), *non rapinam arbitratus est*, is better than the *non rapiendum sibi duxit* of Thomasius; for, though ἁρπαγμός is properly the act of seizing (*das Rauben*), it is used *per metonymiam* for the thing seized, as δεσμός is for the instrument of binding.

stood before Him as the goal of His incarnate history, a thing to be seized or clutched at as a prey, but an honour to be earned in the way of obedience and suffering; so here He willingly endures a cross and shame in order to obtain the dignity of divine co-session as the promised reward. The choice of the term *προκειμένης* is determined by the previous figure of a race, and *ἀντί* is the preposition regularly used in speaking of a price, or of the thing for which a price is paid—here, the price or prize of victory. (Comp. the *ἀντὶ βρώσεως* of ch. v. 16: Esau sold his birthright for—the price at which he valued it was—a mess of pottage.) So most Roman Catholic interpreters; so also, with Hunnius, Sebast. Schmidt and other Protestants (who endeavour, however, to get rid of the notion of "merit" which unquestionably lies in the words); and so Tholuck, De Wette, Winer, and all recent interpreters. The article is purposely omitted before *σταυρόν* and before *αἰσχύνης* to generalize the notion attached to each word: *ὑπέμεινε σταυρόν*, He vouchsafed to undergo the most painful and ignominious of deaths, such a death as that of the cross,—*αἰσχύνης καταφρονήσας*, despising, disdaining to shrink from any kind of shame, even that of being treated as a slave, a rebel, a blasphemer!

Having thus described Jesus as the *ἀρχηγός* of faith, the sacred writer goes on to describe Him as faith's *τελευτής*, uniting both descriptions by the particle *τε* (*ἐν δεξιᾷ τε*), which is as great a favourite with St. Luke among writers of the New Testament, as it is with Thucydides among classical authors. Jesus is the perfecter (or finisher) of faith, inasmuch as, being Himself made perfect through faith, He henceforth reigns and rules in order to bring others to the same goal—*ἐν δεξιᾷ τε τοῦ θρόνου τοῦ Θεοῦ κεκάθικεν*. (The Rec. has *ἐκάθισεν* on poor MS. authority.) The meaning is not (any more than at ch. viii. 1) that our Lord's throne is placed at the right hand of the throne of God, but that He sits on the right hand (of God and with God) on the same throne. (Comp. Rev. iii. 21.) Having fought the good fight and gained the victory (as faith's

ἀρχηγός), He is now set down in endless rest and infinite glory, able (as faith's τελευτής) to save εἰς τὸ παντελές all who follow Him in the same way of faith. Thitherwards, then, to "*fulness of joy and pleasures for evermore*," "*at God's right hand*" (Ps. xvi. 11), our course is to be directed after Him. Participation in His χαρά is dependent as a necessary condition on previous participation in His παθήματα (1 Pet. iv. 13). In order not to faint under the one, and so lose the other, we must look stedfastly to Jesus (ἀφορῶντες εἰς . . . Ἰησοῦν).

Ebrard correctly explains the ἀπό in ἀφορᾶν (comp. ἀποβλέποντες, ch. xi. 26). The verb signifies a voluntary looking off from objects which involuntarily press themselves upon our view towards something else which we choose to make an object of contemplation. To say that it means here to turn our eyes away from the troubles and discomforts of the conflict, is putting too much into the word; but it certainly implies the concentration of looks in one direction. In the midst of our conflict we are to look up to Jesus, and the thought of His παθήματα and of His victory over them will give us patience and endurance under ours:

Ver. 3. *For take into consideration him that hath endured such contradiction from the sinners against himself, lest ye be wearied, fainting in your souls.*

The reason for the exhortation is given in the form of renewed *paræ*nesis. We should have expected ἀναλογισάμενοι γὰρ . . . οὐ καμούμεθα, or the like (*for if we consider Him, we shall not faint*); but the sacred writer continues in the imperative,[1] ἀναλογίσασθε, "*consider*," "*take into account*," "*weigh well.*" After such a verb, again, we might

[1] Lünemann would render γάρ here by an emphasizing "*yea;*" but the imperative is not so abruptly introduced that we really need such a *quidproquo*. Hermann's canon must be adhered to (see note on iii. 15, 16): γάρ *semper reddit rationem antecedentis sententiæ vel expressæ vel intellectæ.*

have expected an impersonal object—"weigh well the sufferings which your Lord endured;" but as the importance of the sufferings is here so greatly enhanced by the dignity of the Sufferer, he says, "Consider *Him*"—*ἀναλογίσασθε γὰρ τὸν τοιαύτην ὑπομεμενηκότα ὑπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν εἰς αὐτὸν* (Lachmann, following A, reads *ἑαυτόν*) *ἀντιλογίαν*. Lünemann maintains that *ἀντιλογία* can only mean strictly, verbal contradiction, the strife of words and arguments, and not opposition of any other kind; but the Greek interpreters (Chrysostom, Œcumenius, Theophylact), who spoke the language, felt differently. And when, indeed, will expositors learn to distinguish as they ought to do between *sensus* and *significatus*,—between that which a word means properly taken by itself, and the *nuances* of meaning it acquires in usage or from context? No one disputes that *ἀντιλογία* means properly no more than literal contradiction; but forasmuch as the contrary word commonly precedes and results in the contrary action, it comes to mean opposition of any kind or degree, even up to treason and rebellion: *He that maketh himself a king ἀντιλέγει τῷ Καίσαρι* (John xix. 12). So it is here. The Lord incarnate was destined to be from His earliest years among men a *σημεῖον ἀντιλεγόμενον* (Luke ii. 34), and that "contradiction of sinners" (*ἁμαρτωλοί*, as, for example, at Matt. xxvi. 45; compare the parallel at Luke xxiv. 7) brought Him at last to a shameful and bitter death on the accursed tree:[1] let this example, says the apostolic writer here, be the object of your contemplation, and weigh it well, *ἵνα μὴ κάμητε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν ἐκλυόμενοι*.

This ablative-like dative *ταῖς ψυχαῖς* may belong to either *κάμητε* or *ἐκλυόμενοι*. For the construction with *κάμητε* comp. Job x. 1, *κάμνων τῇ ψυχῇ μου*: for that with *ἐκλυόμενοι* comp. Deut. xx. 3, Judith xiv. 6, Pol. xx. 4, *extr.*, *οὐ μόνον τοῖς σώμασιν ἐξελύθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς*.

[1] The old *Spruchbuch* (*Book of Sentences*) of Vridrank (Freidank) says quaintly:

> "'Twas through slanders of the tongue
> Jesus on the cross they hung."

The latter construction is here demanded by the rhythm; it also makes the metaphor in ἐκλυόμενοι more clear, which still follows that of the race-course. As the knees are apt to grow faint with the runner in the stadium, so the soul in the case of the Christian athlete.[1] These Hebrew Christians must look up to the divine example of all patience in order not to faint or waver in their course, for[2] the hardest trials have not yet befallen them:

Ver. 4. *Not yet have ye resisted unto*[3] *blood in your conflict with sin.*

Bengel's remark, *a cursu venit ad pugilatum*, is called pedantic by De Wette: it is, however, correct. The metaphor is changed here precisely in the same way as at 1 Cor. ix. 24–27, where St. Paul makes the transition from τρέχειν to πυκτεύειν. In the words πρὸς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι (which are to be taken together as in the similar construction in the preceding verse, ταῖς ψυχ. ὑμ. ἐκλ.), sin is regarded as an opponent in pugilism: they are to resist till blood flows, and not give over then. The expression is not merely figurative that they have not yet resisted sin (with-

[1] The Cod. Claromont. (D) presents curious variations of reading in this ver. 3: ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΣΑΣΘΑΙ (without τον) τοιαυτην υπομεμενηκοτα ΑΠΟ των αμαρτωλων τις ΕΑΥΤΟΥΣ αντιλογιαν ινα μη καμητε ταις ψυχαις υμων ΕΚΛΕΛΥΜΕΝΟΙ. One would naturally reckon this εαυτους among the many peculiarities of this manuscript; but traces of the same error are found high up in the second century, viz. in Peshito and Itala, as well as later in Theodoret and in the Cod. Amiatinus of the Vulgate. Some of the strangest readings in D are found to have prevailed in very early authorities. See Lagarde, *De N. T. ad versionum orientalium fidem edendo*, Berlin 1857, 4to.

[2] The reading οὔπω γάρ, though not vouched by sufficient authority, accords well with the context.

[3] Instead of ἀντικατέστητε, Tischend. reads with reduplicated syllabic augment ἀντεκατέστητε. Instead of μέχρις, D has μέχρι, which is also found before a vowel at Luke xvi. 16. Μέχρις, indeed, is rare in the New Testament (only here and at Mark xiii. 30); ἄχρις is frequently met with, and in our epistle at iii. 13. Plato, according to Stallbaum, uses μέχρι always, even before a vowel.

out and within) to the utmost of their power: *μέχρις αἵματος* is to be taken literally (as all agree) in reference to the death of martyrdom. Their Christian profession has not yet cost them their lives. *Ἁμαρτία* is not here, as Lünemann supposes, inward temptations in men's own minds to apostasy, but personal wickedness in others, *i.e.* in the open enemies of Christianity, seeking by various kinds of violence or persuasion to turn away Christians from their faith. This *ἁμαρτία* these Hebrew Christians are to withstand *μέχρις θανάτου*, even as the Lord withstood the contradiction of *ἁμαρτωλοί* against Himself *μέχρι θανάτου, θανάτου δὲ σταυροῦ* (Phil. ii. 8). The words of comfort in the following verse show also that it is of some sharp outward trial that the sacred writer is here thinking. His assertion that those to whom he writes have not yet endured any bloody persecution is no argument, if rightly understood, against this epistle being addressed to Hebrew Christians in Jerusalem and Palestine. It is indeed implied (ch. xiii. 7) that departed members of their church had suffered martyrdom in days gone by; but those still living who are here appealed to, though not without experience of persecution in their own case, in the time of their first love, have now secured themselves against its utmost violence by a sinful conformity to the faithless world around them, and are living in a condition dangerously near to that of apostasy. They are refusing or fleeing from the cross, and seem quite to have forgotten that the afflictions which God sends to His people are a discipline of love.

Vers. 5, 6. *And have (ye) clean forgotten the exhortation which entereth into discourse with you as with sons: My son, despise not the Lord's chastening, neither faint when rebuked by him: for whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, yea, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth?*

Among more recent commentators, Tholuck, De Wette, Ebrard take *καὶ ἐκλέλησθε* as an affirmative proposition; Bleek, Bisping, and Lünemann (with Calvin), as an inter-

rogative. The rebuke implied in the strong term ἐκλέλησθε would be here so unexpectedly harsh, that we are inclined to prefer the latter alternative;[1] only we would not put the note of interrogation, with Lünemann, after διαλέγεται, but at the end of the quotation (after παραδέχεται). Perhaps it would be most correct to say that we have here an interjectional sentence in which affirmative and interrogative are combined. Two words, παράκλησις and διαλέγεται, remind us of St. Luke's use of them in the Acts. At Acts xiii. 15 and xv. 31, παράκλησις is used of the heart-touching words of apostolic exhortation (comp. 1 Tim. iv. 13), and διαλέγεσθαι is the standing term for St. Paul's "reasoning" or entering into a course of argument with, or of appeals to, his Jewish fellow-countrymen (Acts xvii. 2, 17, xviii. 4, etc.). Ἐκλέλησθε is a stronger term than the more usual ἐπιλέλησθε (have ye, or ye have quite forgotten, allowed to let slip quite out of your minds!). It was, perhaps, suggested here by the preceding ἐκλυόμενοι, as it is sometimes displaced in its turn by the erroneous reading ἐκλέλυσθε. The touching encouraging appeal of holy Scripture to the heart of man is here personified: it speaks to, enters into discourse with us, as with maternal tenderness and anxiety for our welfare. The quotation is from the book of Proverbs (iii. 11, 12), and the personification is no doubt connected with the way in which Wisdom is there, throughout the early chapters (Prov. i.–ix.), spoken of as a spiritual parent. The ancients were wont, in consequence, to call the whole book of Proverbs Σοφία (Melito *ap.* Eus. *H.E.* iv. 26), Πανάρετος Σοφία (Hegesippus, and Irenæus *ap.* Eus. *H.E.* iv. 22), Παιδαγωγικὴ Σοφία (St. Gregory Nazianzen); and our author, who has already spoken of the divine Word as a person (ch. iv. 12), here personifies not Wisdom herself, but the exhortation (ἡ παράκλησις[2]) which she gives. Comp. also Luke xi. 49, ἡ σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶπεν. The tender motherly appeal which

[1] The forward position of the verb in the sentence and the omission of ἤδη is also in favour of this view.

[2] If St. Barnabas were the author of this epistle, he might be supposed to be thinking of the interpretation of his own name, υἱὸς παρα-

is thus introduced has an evident reference to the book of Job, for which these words might serve as a motto,—Prov. iii. 11 stating the problem or enigma, of which Prov. iii. 12 furnishes the solution; the main purpose of the book of Job being to illustrate the truth that there is in the sharpest trials a divine providential discipline of love which does not exclude sonship. Such experience of suffering imposed by the wisdom of divine love is here called מוסר (*παιδεία*), a fatherly discipline or process of education, and תוכחת (*ἐλέγχεσθαι*), reproof, such as makes us conscious of our faults and errors, and so promotes our moral improvement. Instead of the *υἱέ* of the LXX. our author writes (according to the best MS. testimony) *υἱέ μου*, which is not only more tender and mother-like, but also corresponds more closely to the בני of the original. Instead of *μηδὲ ἐκλύου* (neither faint, or give up in despair), the original text has ואל־תקץ (murmur not, show no resentment at the divine rebuke): resentment and despondency have both, in times of suffering, the same mode of expression—murmuring. The clause *ὃν γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ Κύριος παιδεύει* follows the LXX. as represented by A; B reads *ἐλέγχει*; the Apocalypse, iii. 19, unites both: *ἐγὼ ὅσους ἂν φιλῶ ἐλέγχω καὶ παιδεύω*. For the clause which follows, *μαστιγοῖ δέ, κ.τ.λ.*, the reading of the LXX. is perhaps to be preferred even to that of the Masoretic text, which reads וּכְאָב אֶת־בֵּן יִרְצֶה, *i.e. and as a father with a son he taketh delight* (viz. *in correcting him*, or, *in him, after correction*). Instead of וּכְאָב the Sept. must have read וְכֶאָב (Bleek), or (the perfect being inappropriate here) יְכָאֵב, or, like Job v. 18 (cited by Clemens Romanus, c. 56), יְכָאִיב. The translation of ירצה could not be better: *ὃν παραδέχεται*, every son, whom He accepts and receives, He makes to feel His chastening rod.[1] The main purpose which the sacred writer has here in view

κλήσεως, which, however, is given (Acts iv. 36) not by himself, but by St. Luke.

[1] Philo also quotes this passage from the Book of Proverbs (i. 544), adding: "*What a glorious thing, then, is chastisement and reproof! since thereby our relationship of communion with God is elevated into kinships; for what can be nearer than a father is to a son, and a son to a father?*"

is to reconcile the minds of his readers to the sufferings entailed by their Christian profession, that is, the cross in the proper sense of the word. But all sufferings[1] imposed by God upon His children, whether for discipline, trial of faith, or witness for the truth, have this one feature in common, that they are all proofs of divine love, not signs of anger. Thought passes easily, therefore, from one kind to another. The Christian in every trial sees a proof of the Father's loving care for his good. "He must not murmur or withdraw himself from it.[2]

Ver. 7. *It is for chastisement ye are enduring: God dealeth with you as with children; for who is a son whom the father chasteneth not?*

The *textus receptus* reads εἰ παιδείαν ὑπομένετε. This reading was retained by Griesbach in the edition of 1803–6, without even noticing that there was any other found in MSS. Tischendorf has also returned to it since his edition of 1849. But it is a reading as ill supported as possible. It is found, according to Tischendorf, *in minuscc. sat multis*, —but he adds (somewhat significantly) *ut videtur*,—and in "Chrysostom, Theodoret, Theophylact." Estius, however, had long ago rightly observed that the assertion that εἰ παιδείαν is found in St. Chrysostom was a mistake, and Sebast. Schmidt's remark in answer was a very poor attempt at criticism: *bonus vir non inveniebat aliud Vulgato suo emplastrum*. It is also doubtful (see Bleek) whether Tischendorf is right in appealing to Theodoret. Theophylact remains, then, the only undoubted witness for εἰ παιδείαν; and he is not, from the lateness of his age, of much authority. All the uncials, on the other hand [including now the Cod. Sin.], all ancient versions, all citations and comments in the fathers (Chrysostom, Procopius, Damascenus, Œcumenius), read εἰς παιδείαν ὑπομένετε. This reading, which is borne witness to

[1] On these different kinds of suffering, see my article on Job (*Hiob*) in Herzog's *Real-Encyclopædie*, vol. vi. p. 113 seq.

[2] This is Elihu's position in the book of Job, though his arguments fail to solve the problem.

high up into the second century by Peshito and Itala, has been rightly adopted by Matthæi, Lachmann, Theile, and Buttmann, and ought not to be given up, unless it could be shown that Bleek, Tholuck, De Wette, Lünemann, and others are right in maintaining that it is quite inadmissible from being meaningless. And it must be allowed that the ancient versions appear not to have known what to make of it. The Peshito, leaving out the εἰς, translates *sustinete igitur castigationem.* The old Latin versions, giving an impossible sense to εἰς, render *in disciplina perseverate,* for which we sometimes read the more literal but unmeaning *in disciplinam* or *in doctrinam.* D reads ὃν παραδέχεται εἰς ΠΑΙΔΙΑΝ, taking the puzzling εἰς παιδ. into the quotation, and so spoiling its sense. One thing is evident, εἰς παιδείαν cannot be an ancient correction; had it been so, the ancients would have better known what to make of it; at the utmost it may have been a *lapsus calami* (Bengel, Kuinœl), like εἰς ἑαυτούς, in some MSS., at ver. 3 of this chapter. But is it, then, really so unintelligible as it has been made to appear? Matthæi's observation was quite correct, that εἰς παιδείαν is equivalent to ἕνεκεν παιδείας or εἰς τὸ παιδεύεσθαι. To which we may add, that εἰς is often used in a similar way to indicate purpose by our author: *e.g.* i. 14, εἰς διακονίαν; vi. 16, εἰς βεβαίωσιν; iii. 5, εἰς μαρτύριον; iv. 16, εἰς εὔκαιρον βοήθειαν; ix. 15, εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν: comp. also x. 19, παῤῥησία εἰς, and xi. 11, δύναμις εἰς. Ebrard accordingly renders it, *Be patient also for the sake of discipline;* let it have the effect upon you which is designed. But the sentence reads and fits into the context much better if we take ὑπομένετε as an indicative: *for chastisement* (or discipline) *you are enduring; i.e.* your heavenly Father's purpose in sending or permitting sufferings to befall you is to give you that discipline of love (מוסר) of which Scripture speaks. St. Chrysostom explains: εἰς παιδείαν ὑπομένετε, φησί, οὐκ εἰς κόλασιν, οὐδὲ εἰς τιμωρίαν, οὐδὲ εἰς τὸ κακῶς παθεῖν. I do not see what improvement could be suggested to this interpretation either in thought or expression. The other reading, εἰ παιδείαν ὑπομένετε, is certainly favoured by the

antithesis in ver. 8, εἰ δὲ χωρίς ἐστε παιδείας; but it has this also against it, that it requires us to take ὑπομένετε in a much feebler sense than it is elsewhere employed by our author—viz., "if ye have to suffer, *i.e.* passively undergo discipline,"—whereas παιδείαν ὑπομένειν can hardly mean less than "to endure discipline, bear up manfully under it." With the reading εἰς, on the other hand, not only does ὑπομένετε retain its full meaning of active endurance, but παιδεία also that of fatherly discipline, in which it was used at ver. 5; and εἰς παιδείαν stands as significantly at the head of this clause as ὡς υἱοῖς at the head of the following: "Like children under the discipline of a gracious father comport yourselves, for like children this Father is dealing with you:" εἰς παιδείαν ὑπομένετε, ὡς υἱοῖς ὑμῖν προσφέρεται ὁ Θεός. The Vulgate *tanquam filiis vobis offert se Deus* (followed by Luther) misses the sense of προσφέρεται here, which, with following dative of the person, always has the meaning of *dealing with, behaving towards,* in extra-biblical Greek.

In the question which follows, τίς γάρ ἐστιν υἱὸς ὃν οὐ παιδεύει πατήρ; τις is not an adjective (what son is there?) but a substantive pronoun (who is a son and exempt from such discipline?). Both υἱός and πατήρ are without the article to generalize the thought. The meaning is therefore, Educational discipline is the end of all suffering which God lays upon you; His doing so is proof of His fatherly love. The sentence is not put in a conditional form, but the sense is much the same as if it were, and so the writer continues with the contraposition in that form.

Ver. 8. *But if ye remain without chastisement, whereof all*[1] *have been made partakers, then are ye bastards, and not sons.*

The particle ἄρα introduces a natural inference or consequence, but does not in classical Greek stand at the head

[1] This πάντες is the last word in the Cod. Saugermanensis (E), which here ends abruptly. Sabatier from this point gives only the D (Cod. Claromontanus) form of the Itala.

of the sentence as here.[1] (Comp. Matt. xii. 28; Luke xi. 48; Gal. iii. 29.) He who lives without experience of this fatherly discipline is no genuine child, but a *νόθος* of doubtful parentage, of neglected education, left to himself. Phavorinus: *νόθος ὁ μὴ γνήσιος υἱὸς ἀλλ' ἐκ παλλακίδος.*[2] The original *ordo verborum* is probably that adopted by Lachmann (from A, D, Itala, and Vulgate): *ἄρα νόθοι καὶ οὐχ υἱοὶ ἐστε.* The inference drawn from the necessary reciprocity between sonship and discipline is further strengthened by a reference to the past history of all God's children; for *πάντες* here does not mean all children in the natural sense, but all who have ever stood in that spiritual relation to God: *μέτοχοι γεγόνασιν πάντες*, "all such have had their share of discipline." The special allusion is to the examples in ch. xi., and it is assumed that already under the Old Testament, before the grace of an all-embracing, all-renewing regeneration had been revealed in the second Adam, God vouchsafed to stand towards the faithful as His children in a relation of fatherly discipline and love. (See this stated with regard to Israel, Deut. xiv. 1; with regard to individual saints under the old covenant, Ps. lxxiii. 15, Prov. xiv. 26.) All these have felt, each in his own measure, the Lord's fatherly chastening, have been received into His school of affliction, and in the severest conflicts maintained their assurance of His fatherly love. To this consideration, that all afflictions which befall God's children have their origin in His fatherly love, a second and a third are now added (in vers. 9, 10) as additional motives to

[1] The example in Lucian's *Jup. tragœdus*, § 51, is well known: *εἰ εἰσὶ βωμοί, εἰσὶ καὶ θεοί· ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσὶ βωμοί, εἰσὶν ἄρα καὶ θεοί.* On the other hand, *Cogito ergo sum* would be expressed in later and in modern Greek, *στοχάζομαι ἄρα εἰμί* (*εἶμαι*). Klotz's notion, that *ἄρα* is not a proper syllogistic *therefore*, but expresses only *leviorem et liberiorem quandam ratiocinationem*, is certainly not justified by New Testament usage, nor indeed by classical, *e.g.* Plato, *Phæd.* c. 26, *οὐχ ὁρατόν· ἀειδὲς ἄρα.*

[2] We must not, of course, press the *ἐκ παλλακίδος*, which would lead to thoughts unmeet for the subject: the sacred writer himself probably connected with *νόθοι* a notion similar to that of Philo, when he says (i. 426. 29) of those who make the pleasures of this world their soul's chief good, that they in nothing differ from *τῶν ἐκ πόρνης ἀποκυηθέντων.*

stedfast cheerful endurance of the severest trials. The second is, that the loving correction of our heavenly Father is so much the more acceptable and beneficial, as He Himself is exalted above all earthly parents.

Ver. 9. *Furthermore: the fathers of our flesh we once had as chasteners, and we gave them reverence—shall we not much rather submit ourselves to the Father of spirits and live?*

Valckenaer and others would take the εἶτα here as introducing a question—*Have we then had the fathers of our flesh*, etc.?—a use of εἶτα (especially in queries of admiration or ridicule) which is not uncommon in ordinary Greek. (Comp. Plato, *Apol.* p. 28, εἶτ', οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὦ Σώκρατες; Furthermore, art thou not ashamed . . . or, Surely then thou art ashamed? Kühner, § 835, 6.) But the assumption is unnecessary, and such a construction here would be somewhat affected. Besides, as Kypke and Bleek have rightly observed, the following clause must, in that case, have commenced differently (καὶ οὐ πολὺ μᾶλλον, instead of οὐ πολὺ [*rec.* πολλῷ] μᾶλλον, as now). We construe εἶτα, then, as simply introducing a further consideration, the main proposition of a second argument which is a *conclusio a minori ad majus*. (Comp. ch. x. 28 seq., ii. 2 seq., ix. 13 seq., xii. 25.) We have already had chastisers in our natural parents, and showed them in that character due childlike reverence. The emphasis lies on ἐνετρεπόμεθα, which in the sense of "caring for," "showing respect to," is followed by τινα (as in Sept., Polybius, Dionysius, Diodorus, Plutarch) instead of τινος. The imperfects εἴχομεν and ἐνετρεπόμεθα (we once had—and were then accustomed so to act) refer back to the lengthened period of childhood and youth which both the writer and his readers had once passed through.

It is an important question, in what sense our earthly parents are here called τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν πατέρες, and contrasted with God as τῷ πατρὶ τῶν πνευμάτων. Quite wrong is it to give the antithesis of σάρξ and πνεῦμα here a merely ethical significance. So, for instance, and most decidedly, Ebrard: "σάρξ *designates here, as always, the purely natural*

life which is the product of purely natural powers, in contrast with the spiritual life which is the product of divine grace working in regeneration." Now, though it is true that the author of this epistle was no stranger to the Pauline antithesis of σάρξ and πνεῦμα, yet he nowhere gives it (not even at ix. 13 seq., where the antithesis of σάρξ is συνείδησις) a full Pauline expression; and, further, against such an ethical conception of the antithesis here, is, 1*st*, the very form of the expression, which, to convey Ebrard's meaning, ought to have been τοὺς μὲν ἡμῶν κατὰ σάρκα πατέρας . . . τῷ πατρὶ ἡμῶν κατὰ πνεῦμα (or even τῷ πνευματικῷ); and 2*dly*, the sense of the original Hebrew text referred to: אלהי הרוחות לכל בשר —*the God of the spirits of all flesh* (Num. xvi. 22, xxvii. 16). The force of this second consideration Ebrard acknowledges indirectly himself by arbitrarily denying that there is any such reference. The Septuagint rendering, Θεὸς τῶν πνευμάτων καὶ πάσης σαρκός (they read וכל instead of לכל), would certainly not have been suitable for our author's purpose; but then, as we have seen, he is by no means wholly dependent on the LXX., nor is it his meaning here that even the σάρξ itself (as all else that a man is or has) is not ultimately to be referred to God as the final cause. But while all corporeal existence comes into being through a natural process, the animation of the corporeity so produced is in each case an absolutely incomprehensible act of divine power, and is only to be accounted for by the hypothesis of divine concurrence with the processes of nature. In virtue of this, as the Author and Lord of all life, the Creator is entitled, "*the God of the spirits of all flesh.*"[1] It is in this (in the first place physical rather than ethical) sense that we are to understand τῷ πατρὶ τῶν πνευμάτων here: nor is it to be denied, with Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann, and others, including even the Roman Catholic commentator Bisping, that the present passage strongly favours the so-called theory of Creatianism.

[1] He is not called "the God of the souls (נפשות) of all flesh" (though such a designation would not be wrong; see Ezek. xviii. 4 and Jer xxxviii. 16), because it is the spirit rather than the soul which has its immediate origin in God.

Nota diligenter, says Hugo de Sancto Victore in his *Quæstiones*, *hanc authoritatem, per quam manifeste probatur, quod animæ non sunt ex traduce sicut caro.* Nor is the acknowledgment of this to be evaded by such a conception of the antithesis as that our earthly parents are the authors of our natural individual existence, while God is the final cause and Creator of all life;[1] for it is not corporeal life as such which is here contrasted with life in general, but the σάρξ, in itself only lifeless matter, with the πνεύματα as being sparks of life emitted from the divine and central fire. It cannot therefore be denied that, according to the statement here, we derive our σάρξ mediately from our parents, and our πνεῦμα immediately from God Himself. "Both views, however, Creatianism and Traducianism," as a profound inquirer on these subjects has observed,[2] "err in this, that they each insist on standing alone; whereas the philosophic inquirer must not either efface the difference between the Creator and the creature with Traducianism on the one hand, nor conceive of it in too abstract a form with Creatianism on the other. If we would not do this, we must begin with the assumption that the spiritual animation of every human creature requires a more immediate interposition of divine power than the production of the bodily part. So, as the poet sings,[3] the burning sun has more and closer influence in maturing the grape-juice into sweet and fiery wine than it had before the juice was formed. And this is the truth involved in the creatianist doctrine of holy Scripture." I cannot doubt, for my own part, that the sacred writer meant what he here says of God as "the Father of spirits" in a creatianist sense. The whole of Scripture, indeed, is full of the thought, that the human spirit is a breath from the Almighty (Job xxxiii. 4), and that we are all, in regard to our spiritual part, of divine

[1] See my *Biblische Psychologie*, p. 83.

[2] Göschel in his essay, "*Der Mensch nach Leib, Seele und Geist*," published with my *Psychologie*, Leipsic 1856, p. 13 seq.

[3] Dante, *Purgatorio* xxv. 77 seq. Göschel rightly finds here, in the profoundest of all poets, the first reconciliation between the theories of Creatianism and Traducianism.

parentage (Acts xvii. 28). And inasmuch as the spirit in us, in virtue of its divine kindred, has then only true life when conformed to its divine original, the Scriptures of the New Testament constantly speak of the ungodly man as one who has no πνεῦμα, and of the regenerate man as πνευματικός: the physical notion is, therefore, at the same time an ethical one; and even in the present passage the notion of the derivation of the human spirit from the divine is combined with that of its true life being dependent on a connection maintained with God its Father: *Shall not we submit ourselves to the Father . . . . and live?* If we observe that God is here called πατὴρ τῶν πνευμάτων, not ἡμῶν; nor τ. πν. τῆς σαρκός, the conclusion thus drawn *a minori ad majus* will be twofold: 1*st*, God as Father is as much exalted above all earthly fathers as the spirit is above the flesh, and a man's personal being above his natural existence; and 2*dly*, God is more to be honoured than any earthly parent, because the earthly father is such only to this or that individual child, whereas God is the Father of the whole universe of spirits: all living existence, all independent life, all personal life, whether that life have a bodily form of flesh and blood like men, or a bodiless one like the angels, draws its origin from Him, and in order to exist, or exist aright, must submit itself to His fatherly discipline. For the human spirit is not an absolute principle of life in man, but one dependent on God its source. It lives only from and with and in Him. To submit ourselves to the Father of spirits is an essential condition of our life—ὑποταγησόμεθα καὶ ζήσομεν: ζῆν here, as at x. 38, expresses true, abiding, not merely transient or apparent life, life in accordance with the true *idea* of humanity, *i.e.* likeness to God and communion with Him.

Now follows the third consideration which furnishes yet another motive for patient endurance of whatever trials God may send us.

Ver. 10. *For they indeed for a few days exercised discipline after their own liking, but he for men's benefit, in order that they may partake of his holiness.*

It is hard to find in the second of these sentences the proper antithesis to the πρὸς ὀλίγας ἡμέρας of the first. Most of the ancients, and, among moderns, Tholuck, Ebrard, Bisping, conceive it thus: "The discipline of earthly parents has respect only to the few days of our earthly life; God's discipline has all eternity in view, for to partake of His holiness is to live for ever." "The antithesis," says Bisping, "is very fine;" but, at any rate, it is not exegetically true, for there stands nothing about "eternity" or "eternal" in the text, nor is it suggested by τῆς ἁγιότητος, as it might have been by such a term as τῆς δόξης. Nor is it quite true that the discipline of earthly parents has respect in all instances only to the present life (as Calvin puts it—*hic de œconomia apostolus loquitur, quemadmodum de politia solemus vulgo loqui*). The discipline of the family has a religious as well as a political object, the father is at the same time priest; and to say that in the training of his children he has only the "few days" of earthly life in view, would be a very one-sided statement. Bleek and Lünemann therefore take another course, making πρὸς ὀλίγας ἡμέρας belong (in sense) to both sentences: The discipline of earthly parents lasts for a time, and is after their own liking; God's discipline, likewise, lasts only for a time, but is for the highest benefit of those who experience it (1 Pet. i. 6). But not to mention other objections, the imperfect ἐπαίδευον is against this view; for, like εἴχομεν (ver. 9), it evidently refers to the period of youthful training and education already past: the "few days" of parental discipline were the days of our childhood, and the discipline ceased when we reached years of discretion. De Wette accordingly would put the antithesis thus: "They disciplined us for the few days of childhood, God's discipline is lifelong." But there is nothing said about "lifelong discipline" here, any more than about "eternity." The author's true meaning appears to me to be as follows: His statement may be regarded as two pairs of antitheses arranged *chiastically*.[1] 1. We begin with the second pair,

[1] [*i.e.* "cross-wise" like the Greek letter X. The term is borrowed from the Greek grammarians.]

which consists of the two phrases (that occupy the interior of the twofold sentence regarded as a whole) *κατὰ τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτοῖς* and *ἐπὶ τὸ συμφέρον*. Earthly parents exercise discipline after their human, narrow-minded, often arbitrary liking, and are liable even in the best cases to errors and mistakes; but God the Father has no other end in view in His exercise of discipline than His children's benefit, and the means He employs are unfailingly the right ones to accomplish it. It is evident, of course, that the sacred writer is not here speaking of the *theory* of human education, but of its ordinary practical character; he is not contrasting good and bad modes of training, but that which is human, and at the best affected by human infirmity, with that which is divine, and therefore perfect. Compared with God's, the best human *παιδεία* is not so good as to have no shadow of that fallible *δοκοῦν* falling on it. 2. The other pair of antitheses (enclosing that we have just been considering) is *πρὸς ὀλίγας ἡμέρας* and *εἰς τὸ μεταλαβεῖν τῆς ἁγιότητος αὐτοῦ*. As in *πρός* the two notions are combined of purpose and duration of time, so in *εἰς* the notions of purpose and result: *πρός* is used here as at ver. 11, *πρὸς τὸ παρόν*, as at Luke viii. 13 and 1 Cor. vii. 7, *πρὸς καιρόν*, and as at 2 Cor. vii. 8, *πρὸς καιρὸν ὥρας*; *εἰς*, on the other hand, has a mixture of final and eventual meanings, such as we find at ch. ii. 17, ix. 14, xiii. 21 (see note on ch. xi. 3): we may say that *πρός* has here mainly reference to the time occupied, *εἰς* to the thing accomplished. Parental *παιδεία* lasts but for the years of youth, and then, whether successful or not, comes to an end; God's *παιδεία*, having for its object an infallibly recognised *συμφέρον*, has for its result nothing less than the making its subjects partakers of His holiness, and as such raised above the necessity of its further application. *Ἁγιότης* (found also at 2 Macc. xv. 2) is a more abstract term than *ἁγιωσύνη*, and *μεταλαβεῖν* is a term common to our epistle and the Acts for "partaking of" or "possessing." The result of parental training is uncertain, that of divine *παιδεία* is infallibly glorious. In reference to which latter the writer proceeds:

Ver. 11. *Now all chastisement for the present seemeth to be not a matter of joy, but of grief; yet afterwards it beareth peaceable fruit of righteousness unto such as are exercised by it.*

Almost all interpreters as with one mouth make *πᾶσα παιδεία* here to be every kind of discipline, human or divine. Only Kuinœl, Klee, and Stein interpret differently; and here for once I am agreed with them, for the sacred writer would surely be involving himself in self-contradiction if he meant to attribute thus promiscuously a happy result to both human and divine *παιδεία*. But as at vers. 7, 8, *παιδεία* is used simply for *divine* chastisement, so here *πᾶσα παιδεία* is every kind of chastening that comes from God; and all such providential chastening, it is said, appears at first to be a sad experience. *Πρὸς τὸ παρόν* is a classical phrase (Plato, Thucyd., Isocr.), whereas the combination of *εἶναι* with the *genitivus qualitatis* (*οὐ . . . χαρᾶς εἶναι ἀλλὰ λύπης*), especially in this naked form without even the addition of an adjective, belongs to a later phase of the language: comp. ch. x. 39; Acts ix. 2, *τῆς ὁδοῦ ὄντας*; and Thuc. iii. 70, *βουλῆς ὤν*, "being of the council," *i.e.* a member of council;—similar, but not precisely similar, examples. The phrase is short and expressive. The false appearance of misfortune and unhappiness is removed by a look to the end of this providential discipline, and from that end a conclusion may be drawn as to the motive of love in which it originates. The figure of fruit as yielded (*καρπὸν ἀποδιδόναι*, as at Rev. xxii. 2) by this *παιδεία* may be connected in thought with the previous *μεταλαβεῖν* (comp. 2 Tim. ii. 6, *τῶν καρπῶν μεταλαμβάνειν*). The fruit of what seemed so sad a tree is called *καρπὸς εἰρηνικὸς δικαιοσύνης*. The last interpreters who have taken this *δικαιοσύνης* for a *genitivus subjecti* (first borne by righteousness) were Heinrichs, Kuinœl, and Klee. They were wrong of course (as is now universally recognised); for the tree which bears this peaceable fruit is *παιδεία*, and therefore not *δικαιοσύνη*. The genitive, then, is a *genitivus appositionis:* this fruit of righteousness is a fruit consisting in righteousness,—*i.e.* righteousness of life.

springing out of righteousness by faith, a righteousness from which the grace working in the divine *παιδεία* has removed all the harshness and bitterness of sin. Such fruit this *παιδεία* yields *τοῖς δι' αὐτῆς γεγυμνασμένοις*. The image suggested by *γυμνάζεσθαι* is not so completely lost sight of here as it was at ch. v. 14. This is evident from the epithet *εἰρηνικός*, which implies a previous *ἀγών*, conflict. The athlete strives with naked body in the school or theatre, and is thereby trained for the sternest conflicts; for this training or exercise *γυμνάζεσθαι* is the technical term. The Christian, too, is exercised in the school of affliction for victory over evil. When the warfare is over, he reaps peaceable fruit. Castellio's rendering of *εἰρηνικός* by *salutaris* is inadmissible; for though שָׁלוֹם in Hebrew combines the notions of *pax* and *salus*, these are divided again in biblical Greek into *εἰρήνη* and *σωτηρία*. Primasius effaces the meaning yet more when he interprets the *pacatissimum* of the Vulgate by *gratissimum atque acceptissimum*. It is only a few interpreters who have discerned the antithesis between *εἰρηνικός* and *γεγυμνασμένοις*, suggesting that *παιδεία* is a *γυμνασία*, an *ἀγών*. So Gerlach, Ebrard, Bisping, and especially Tholuck: "Fruit of righteousness enjoyed after conflict in perfect peace." To which we would add: Fruit which consists in righteousness and whose taste is peace,—*i.e.* perfect satisfaction and rest after strife and labour. *Δικαιοσύνη* denotes the fruit as to its substance, *εἰρηνικόν* describes the sweetness of its taste.[1]

CHAP. XII. 12–17.—*Further exhortation to rouse themselves to courageous perseverance in their Christian course, and,*

[1] Jas. iii. 18, *καρπὸς δὲ δικαιοσύνης ἐν εἰρήνῃ σπείρεται τοῖς ποιοῦσιν εἰρήνην*, is a similar passage to ours, but in one main point different. The genitive is appositional as before, and *καρπ. δικαιοσ.* has the same meaning as in our passage; but *ἐν εἰρήνῃ* is not a closer definition of *δικαιοσύνη*. It must be explained by a reference to Ps. cxxvi. 6, *οἱ σπείροντες ἐν δάκρυσιν*: The fruit which is righteousness, perfect well-being, and acceptance with God, is sown in peace for the good of those who exercise peace; *i.e.* only peace-lovers and peace-makers will reap it.

following peace and holiness, not to suffer any impurity to spring up among them, lest any, like Esau, might discover, too late, how miserably they had forfeited the promised blessing.

After exhibiting (ver. 11) the happy consequences of trials patiently endured, the sacred writer renews his exhortation:

Ver. 12. *Therefore lift up the slackened hands and the loosened knees.*

The figures of a race and a conflict—the one requiring strong hands, the other strong knees—would seem to be still in the writer's mind. And if it be uncertain whether there be any conscious reference in ver. 11 to Isa. xxxii. 17 (*καὶ ἔσται τὰ ἔργα τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἰρήνη*), there can be no doubt that we have here an echo of the prophetic admonition (Isa. xxxv. 3), "*Strengthen the feeble hands, and make firm the wavering knees,*" which occurs in that section of the first part of Isaiah's prophecies (ch. xxxiv., xxxv.) which has most accord with that grand second part (ch. xl.–lxvi.), so nearly related in its inner spirit to our epistle. Our author reproduces here, in his own language, the original words of the prophet, as in such cases (where he does not merely cite, but makes the words of Scripture his own: comp. ver. 9 of this chapter and x. 37 seq.) he is wont to do, without slavishly binding himself to the Septuagint. *Παρειμένον* (*ἀνειμένον*) is that which hangs down slack and loosely; *παραλελυμένον*, that which has lost its central hold and vital strength, so as to be lame and motionless. Out of this condition of collapse and infirmity they are to rouse, lift up, stretch out again (?) the hands and knees of their inward man (1 Pet. i. 15): *ἀνορθοῦν* may signify either "lift up" or "lift up again," *ἀνά* frequently in such verbs uniting the meanings of *sursum* and *rursum*.[1] The duty to which the writer urges his readers

[1] See on this point Winer, *de verborum cum prepositionibus compositorum in N. T. usu*, part iii. p. 4: *cum supera ac summa etiam prima sint, consueverunt Græci ea, quæ primum vel prius facta essent, superis assimilare*, etc.

is courageous self-recovery in God's strength. The tone and language are elevated accordingly; and ver. 12 is like a trumpet blast. It need not surprise us, then, if our author here turns poet, and proceeds in heroic measures:

Ver. 13. *Yea, make straightforward paths for your feet; so that the lame be not turned from the way, but rather be healed.*

The first clause, *καὶ τροχιὰς ὀρθὰς ποιήσατε τοῖς ποσὶν ὑμῶν* (⏑–⏑–– | ––⏑–– ‖ ⏑–⏑––), is a good hexameter. The words are from Prov. iv. 26: *ὀρθὰς τροχιὰς ποίει σοῖς ποσίν.* The *τοῖς ποσὶν ὑμῶν* is not to be rendered "with your feet," as by Luther, Schulz, Tholuck, Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann, and others,—a rendering opposed both to the original text and that of the LXX. (*σοῖς ποσί*, not *ποσί σου*), and against the *ἵνα* of the following clause. The Peshito had already given the right rendering לרגליכן, "to" or "for your feet;" and so now Böhme and Ebrard, the latter imitating the hexameter of the Greek text: "*und für euere Füsse bereitet euch ebene Bahnen.*" The Hebrew words פלס מעגל רגלך are rendered by Bertheau: "Weigh well that thou get not into a perverted path." But פָּלֵס as *denominativum* (from פֶּלֶס) = to weigh, occurs only once, Ps. lviii. 3; in other cases (Prov. v. 6, 21; Ps. lxxviii. 50; Isa. xxvi. 7), and here (Prov. iv. 26), this *Piel* signifies to roll or level, or, as at Prov. v. 6, to open a way. The proper rendering would therefore be: *Make level or straight* (*i.e.* without ups and downs) *the path of thy foot*, or *for thy foot*, as the Sept. has it. *Τροχιά* corresponds exactly to the Hebrew מעגל (מעגלה), signifying first the rut or groove in which the wheel runs, and then a road or path generally, but not = foot-track or footstep. (Comp. Prov. iv. 27 in the Sept.: *αὐτὸς δὲ ὀρθὰς ποιήσει τὰς τροχιάς σου, He, i.e. God, shall make thy footpaths even.*) Accordingly *τοῖς ποσὶν ὑμῶν* is to be rendered here as a dative ("for thy feet"), and that is the only rendering suitable for the following *ἵνα*.

It is universally recognised that *τὸ χωλόν* is to be understood here (not like the *τὸ ἀμετάθετον* of vi. 17 = "the

unchangeableness," but) like the τὸ ἔλασσον ("the less" = that which is inferior) of vii. 7 (comp. Rev. iii. 2): the meaning therefore is, whatever is lame in the Christian community, *i.e.* the lame or halting members. The figure suggested in the first clause is evidently carried out further here. Many interpreters, following Grotius (and among the latest, Schulz, Heinrichs, Bleek, De Wette, Von Gerlach, Ebrard), have been misled by the antithetical ἰαθῇ to give ἐκτρέπεσθαι the sense of "put out of joint,"—a sense attributed to it as a medical term in the last edition of Passow's *Lexicon*, without any examples being alleged in proof.[1] But as ἐκτρέπεσθαι is used in the pastoral epistles, which have, in respect of diction, so much in common with this to the Hebrews, in the sense of "turning out of the right way" (1 Tim. i. 6, etc.), we need not go in search of any other, especially as that which is lame already does not need to be further "put out of joint" in order to stumble or make no progress. Feeling this, the interpreters referred to generally propose, by way of giving a sense to what would be otherwise unmeaning, to insert a "fully" or "completely" before the medical signification which they assign to ἐκτρέπεσθαι. But surely our rendering is intelligible enough: "*So that the lame be not turned from the way, but rather* (δέ = *imo* as at ii. 6, and here joined with μᾶλλον as at Luke x. 20, *text. rec.* = *imo potius*) *be healed.*"[2]

Had, indeed, the τοῖς ποσὶν ὑμῶν of the main sentence been an *ablativus instrumenti* ("make straight paths *with* your feet"), it would have been difficult to understand the ἵνα of the following clause, for the straightforward walking of one portion of the community could hardly be a cause of healing to the lameness of the other. But when smooth straight paths are made for the feet of all walkers (τοῖς ποσὶν taken as a *dative*), the lame are materially helped thereby, being saved the danger of stumbling through the

[1] [Written in 1857.]

[2] Philo also says (ii. 458. 40) that a man is to keep the straight path, God's way, ἀτραπόν, and (ii. 456. 43) μὴ παρ' ἑκάτερα ἐντραπόμενον.

roughness of the road, and of getting off the right way altogether; nay, it may even be hoped that, lured by the smoothness of the path opened for them, they may be induced to walk stedfastly along it, and so at length be quite cured of their lameness. The thought in the writer's mind in using the figure is first "the halting between two opinions," Judaism and Christianity (comp. χωλαίνειν, 1 Kings xviii. 21), in which so many of these Hebrew Christians were involved, and then the turning out of the Christian path altogether in sheer apostasy. Such apostasy on the part of the infirm and wavering members of the Hebrew church could be prevented, and their eventual healing rendered possible, only by the whole community determining to make their common course of Christian action a straight and level one, avoiding in future those sideward turnings and alternate ups and downs in favour of the synagogue to which they had been accustomed. Such a straightforward course on the part of the great body of the church would have a wholesome *orthopædic* effect on the weaker members who were marching with them.[1] These "lame ones" of the church of Palestine are related in character to the Judaizing ἀσθενεῖς of the Roman community. As St. Paul in his epistle to the latter, which is throughout irenic in its character, repeatedly urges mutual forbearance between "strong" and "weak," and endeavours after peace, so the apostolic writer here:

Ver. 14. *Peace pursue with all and sanctification, without which no one shall see the Lord.*

Böhme and Lünemann, etc., are quite wrong in extending μετὰ πάντων to all men in general, as at Rom. xii. 18, μετὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἰρηνεύοντες. Œcumenius and Theophylact, among patristic interpreters, make the same mistake. The real parallel (and a very good one it is) is Rom. xiv. 19, τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης διώκωμεν καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς

[1] The ancients were wont to allege this passage against the Novatians; but without much force of argument, inasmuch as *claudi* are not yet *lapsi*.

τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους. Individual believers are exhorted to cherish peaceful relations with all members of the community, even with the lame, sickly, and weak. The improvement of such is to be aimed at, not by carnal contention, harsh acts of judgment, or uncharitable avoidance of their society, nor yet by merely setting them a good example in the purity and decision of our own conduct, while coldly waiting for the first advance on their side towards mutual explanation or agreement, but by a διώκειν εἰρήνην on our own part, *i.e.* by earnest, active endeavours after a good understanding, a pursuing or hunting after peace as a noble prey or object of search. The καὶ τὸν ἁγιασμόν is added to the anarthrous εἰρήνην, like the καὶ ταῖς ὀπαῖς of ch. xi. 38, and the καὶ τὴν εὐπερίστατον ἁμαρτίαν of ch. xii. 1. Our author uses the article in this way when he adds the general to the particular. Εἰρήνη is a divine characteristic, a part of the divine ἁγιότης. We are to follow after peace because God is the God of peace, enjoying the infinite manifoldness of His divine plenitude in a sabbath-like εἰρήνη, of which the rainbow (ἶρις from εἴρειν) with its "oneness in the manifold" is the expressive symbol.[1] The church must endeavour all she can to reproduce in herself the image of that divine calm in particular, and of the divine holiness in general, which is itself the absolute unclouded light, and the absolute all-embracing, all-reconciling love. Ἁγιασμός (sanctification) is the appropriation by us of the divine ἁγιότης (ver. 10). The sentence concludes with a relative clause which in its rhythmical elevation almost becomes a trimeter: οὗ χωρὶς οὐδεὶς ὄψεται τὸν Κύριον.[2] Only holy beings can rise to the sight of the Holy One. Some (*e.g.* Bleek)[3] take τὸν Κύριον here to be Christ; others (*e.g.*

[1] See on this Rocholl, *Beiträge*, p. 57. Scarce anything has been said more beautifully on the subject of the divine life in modern times than there.

[2] χωρίς follows οὗ for the sake of the rhythm. Comp. Æsch. *Pers.* 321, ναῶν δ' ἑκὰς δ' ἦν τῶνδε χωρὶς ἔκκριτος. This position of χωρίς is much more common in poets, especially the tragedians, than in prose writers.

[3] De Wette even maintains that this passage has nothing to do with the divine (beatific) vision.

Tholuck, Lünemann) think that it cannot be decided whether Christ or God. The author uses ὁ Κύριος both of God (ch. viii. 2) and of Christ (ch. ii. 3). But it is to us more than probable that τὸν Κύριον is here meant of God (Vulg. *Deum*). The ὄψεται of ch. ix. 28 is not to the point, for the seeing of the Son of man at His second coming in the clouds of heaven will be common to all, good and bad: every eye shall see Him. Rev. i. 7. "The Lord" (ὁ Κύριος, יהוה) in Scripture is the God of the covenant of redemption, who reveals Himself here in grace, and will be manifested "as He is" hereafter. Whenever Scripture speaks of "a seeing" as the future reward of righteousness or sanctity, it is a seeing God that is meant or expressed (Matt. v. 8; 1 John iii. 2; comp. Ps. xvii. 15, xlii. 3); yet inasmuch as the throne of God and of the Lamb is one, the seeing God is at the same time a seeing of the Lamb (comp. ch. viii. 1, xii. 2 with Rev. xxii. 3 seq.).

The following participial sentence goes on to say how this so indispensable peace and holiness is to be striven after and secured.

Ver. 15. *Watching diligently lest any one falling short of the grace of God, lest any root of bitterness springing up give trouble, and thereby many be defiled.*

Mutual brotherly watchfulness and discipline are here enjoined, and there is no official or ministerial reference in ἐπισκοποῦντες. The parallel to the exhortation here is the κατανοῶμεν ἀλλήλους of ch. x. 24 (comp. iii. 12 and iv. 1). The question remains, whether the clause μή τις ὑστερῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χάριτος τοῦ Θεοῦ is (with the ancients, followed by Böhme, Tholuck, etc.) to be completed by ᾖ, so as to form a sentence by itself, or (with Heinrichs, Bleek, Lünemann, etc.) to be regarded as the subject of ἐνοχλῇ, in whose place then the quasi-appositional ῥίζα πικρίας is interposed. The construction μή τις ὑστερῶν ᾖ is by no means inadmissible, and is favoured strongly by the following ver. 16; but considering that the sacred writer was induced to proceed as he does, with resumption of the μή τις, by the passage in

Deut. xxix. 18 (*μή τις ἐστὶν ἐν ὑμῖν ῥίζα ἄνα φύουσα ἐν χολῇ καὶ πικρίᾳ*), it seems more natural to assume that for that very reason he breaks off the sentence begun with *μή τις ὑστερῶν* (without adding *ἐν ὑμῖν ᾖ*), in order to complete it with those words from the Thorah. The congregation of Israel are there warned of the danger of evil-disposed persons arising among them, whose sinful lusts would incline their hearts to apostasy from Jehovah ("*adding drunkenness to thirst*") after the idolatries of Canaan: "*lest there be among you a root bearing poison-fruit or wormwood.*" So we read in the original text, Deut. xxix. 18. The Septuagint, according to the Vatican text, renders it, *μή τις ἐστὶν ἐν ὑμῖν ῥίζα ἄνω φύουσα ἐν χολῇ καὶ πικρίᾳ*. Even with this recension of the Septuagint before him, our author might have been led by the *ἐν χολῇ* to choose the like-sounding verb *ἐνοχλῇ* for his twofold subject, *ὑστερῶν* (*τις*) and *ῥίζα*. Such alteration of passages thus made use of is no uncommon phenomenon in both Old and New Testament; *e.g.* the alterations made by Jeremiah in phrases borrowed from the Thorah, and the variations in the parallel passages in the second Epistle of St. Peter and in that of St. Jude.[1] But it is also quite possible that our author had before him the Alexandrine text of the Septuagint, in which case he would have read thus: *μή τις ἐστὶν ἐν ὑμῖν ῥίζα πικρίας ἄνω φύουσα ἐνοχλῇ καὶ πικρία*, and thus have found the *ἐνοχλῇ* ready to his hand. This is Bleek's view, who has shown (i. 369–375) that St. Paul, in his citations from the Old Testament, agrees for the most part with the Vatican MS. of the Septuagint, but the author of our epistle with the Alexandrine. The correctness of this view is to me, at least in the present instance, exceedingly doubtful. The awkward disconnected *καὶ πικρία* at the end of the sentence in the Alexandrine text, can only be explained by supposing it based on the text represented by the Vatican MS.; and the

[1] *e.g.* Jer. xlviii. 45, where the יקרקר of Num. xxiv. 17 is changed into יקדקד; and 2 Pet. ii. 13, where *ἐν ταῖς ἀπάταις ὑμῶν* answers to the *ἐν ταῖς ἀγάπαις ὑμῶν* of Jude 12. Comp. Delitzsch, Comm. on Habak. pp. 13, 79, 120.

conjecture is obvious, that (ῥίζα) πικρίας and ἐνοχλῇ are corrections foisted into the Alexandrine recension from the text of our epistle. Whence, indeed, could we suppose them else to have come, especially when we consider that the combination ῥίζα πικρίας and the verb ἐνοχλεῖν bear the stamp of a diction closely related, to say the least, to that of the Epistle to the Hebrews? (Comp. χολὴ πικρίας, Acts viii. 23; ἐνοχλεῖν, Luke vi. 18, in A, B, L, *al.*; ὀχλεῖν, Acts v. 16; and παρενοχλεῖν, Acts xv. 19.) We are, moreover, accustomed to similar free variations from the Septuagint in this epistle, not only in passages like ch. x. 30, nearly related to others in the writings of St. Paul, but elsewhere too (comp. ch. xii. 12, 13, x. 37).

The danger which the apostolic writer has here in view is that from a Judaizing tendency, a looking and harking back to the forms and modes of thought of the now Christ-hating synagogue, which he exhorts the Hebrew church, by earnest mutual watchfulness, not to suffer to spring up and take root among them. The motto or *signature* of the new era which had now commenced in Christ, was ἡ χάρις τοῦ Θεοῦ —grace without the works of the law,—grace, the mortal enemy of all self-righteousness, of all dead works. The construction ὑστερεῖν ἀπό expresses, at any rate, more decidedly than ὑστερεῖν *cum gen.* a loss incurred with conscious responsibility, by one's own fault (Böhme, Lünemann). Ὑστερῶν τῆς χάριτος τοῦ Θεοῦ might be one who falls short or loses divine grace from causes external to himself, or without special note of condemnation; ὑστερῶν ἀπὸ . . . is one who wilfully throws away the blessing, or puts himself at a distance from it. Comp. Ecclus. vii. 34, μὴ ὑστερει ἀπὸ κλαιόντων—*remove not thyself from those that weep.* Now follows (or, properly speaking, is substituted for the periphrasis ὑστερῶν, κ.τ.λ.) a second subject, the quasi-appositional ῥίζα πικρίας, "root" or plant "of bitterness," *i.e.* one bitterly opposing himself to the true Christian faith, and who is a leader astray of others from the sincerity and simplicity of their Christian profession. Thus Antiochus Epiphanes is called, 1 Macc. i. 10, ῥίζα ἁμαρτωλός, a sinful root, *i.e.* a

perverter of the people of God to the sin of apostasy. Such poison-plant *ἄνω φύουσα*, shooting up, and not eradicated in time, would disturb and trouble the Christian community—would "cumber" the sacred ground (*ἐνοχλεῖν = ὄχλον παρέχειν, e.g.* Dan. vi. 2, LXX., ὄχλος being taken in the sense of *turba, molestia*). The whole community is warned to be on their guard, that no such plant of evil shoot up among them to their serious injury, *καὶ διὰ ταύτης* (Lachm., Tisch., *δι' αὐτῆς*) *μιανθῶσιν πολλοί* (Lachm., Tisch., *οἱ πολλοί*)—and thereby (or, by such means, Böhme; *per talem turbulentum hominem*) many (or, the many, the larger number of the church) be involved in the like pollution: they must be on their guard, lest one like Esau, that alien offshoot of the patriarchal family, should be found in the midst of the household of faith.

Ver. 16. *Lest* [there be] *any fornicator or profane person like Esau, who for one* [little] *meal gave up his birthright.*

There is no need to take *πόρνος* in any other than its literal sense. The figurative, that of one who idolatrously breaks covenant with God (founded on Ex. xxxiv. 15 seq. and Deut. xxxi. 16, the two oldest passages in Hebrew scripture), is not met with in the New Testament, except in the Apocalypse.[1] And even taking *πόρνος* in its literal sense, we need not (with Bleek, De Wette, Bisping, Lünemann) deny its application along with *βέβηλος* to Esau. Had the sacred writer not so meant it, he must have written *μή τις πόρνος ἢ ἡ βέβηλος*. And, indeed, the tradition of the synagogue actually represented Esau as an unchaste person,[2]—

[1] Even "the wicked and adulterous generation" of Matt. xii. 39 is to be taken literally. Adultery was so common among the Jews in the primitive Christian era, that Johanan ben Zaccai abolished the ordeal of the "water of jealousy:" Talm. Babli. *Sota* 47*a*. Magdala was notorious for the prevalence of licentiousness: Talm. Jerus. *Taanith* 69*a*, *Echa rabbathi* 69*da*.

[2] See *Bereshith rabba*, c. 63, f. 70*d*, c. 65, f. 72*a*; *Shemoth rabba*, c. 1, f. 116*a*; and Rashi on Gen. xxvi. 34. The boar was the emblem of Esau as the vine was of Jacob (Ps. lxxx.). In Philo, Esau is the type

a view which would naturally result from his marriages with Canaanitish women; for such alliances even in the patriarchal time would be regarded as a sort of πορνεία (comp. Gen. xxiv. 37 with xxxiv.).[1] Bengel's remark, too, is good: *libido et intemperantia cibi affines;*—this alone is a strong argument for the literal acceptation of πόρνος. The Lord's church must be on her guard, lest any bitter shoot springing up in the spiritual garden disturb her sacred peace, and lest any faithless member, by indulging lusts of the flesh, have forfeited his own salvation, and so become like Esau, who was so profane (βέβηλος), so low-minded, so utterly lost to a sense of higher things, that for one poor dish he gave up or sold (ἀπέδοτο, for which Lachm. and Tisch., after A, C, ἀπέδετο[2]) τὰ πρωτοτόκια αὐτοῦ (Lachm. and Tischend. ἑαυτοῦ)—the rights of the first-born to a double portion of the inheritance of his father (Deut. xxi. 17), and what to the mind of faith was the most precious privilege of all, the continuation of that patriarchal line in which were enshrined the promises. For the inheritance and pastoral wealth of his father he cared not, being wildly devoted to the chase, and still less for the promise made to Abraham and Isaac, having no eye or heart but for the immediate present. But even in the case of Esau this contempt for the future and unseen good ended in despair:

Ver. 17. *For ye know that also afterwards, when desiring to inherit the blessing, he was rejected; for no place of repentance did he find, although with tears he sought it earnestly.*

of the worldly mind in general, and of sensuality in particular. See *in Gen.* xxvii. 11, "*pilosus*" *intemperatus libidinosusque.*

[1] Πορνεία at Acts xv. 29 is probably to be understood as including incestuous unions, the Hebr. גלוי עריות (Lev. xviii.), which again is used as equivalent to πορνεία in the widest sense.

[2] The form ἀπέδετο, which was still regarded by Fritzsche, Bleek, and Lünemann as a misspelling, has now received a wider recognition in the texts of Tischendorf and Alford, even than in that of Lachmann, as belonging to the diction of the New Testament. It is an early example of the transmutation of verbs in μι into barytones. See Alex. Buttm. *Gramm. des Neutest. Sprachgebrauchs*, p. 41, Mullach, p. 261.

Ἴστε is indicative, not imperative,—the appeal being to Hebrew readers perfectly familiar with the sacred history. In the dependent ὅτι clause καὶ μετέπειτα ἀπεδοκιμάσθη is to be taken together: "ye know how he was also subsequently rejected,"—the rejection from the blessing corresponding to and requiting his own previous rejection of the birthright, and καί thus connecting cause and effect. It was not till after he had seen his brother receive the blessing that he discerned the value of what he had so contemptuously forfeited: it became to him then an object of serious desire;[1] he willed then to receive as his birthright the paternal benediction, which, as part of his birthright, he had formerly thrown away. But how are we to interpret ἀπεδοκιμάσθη? By whom was Esau rejected? Böhme and Tholuck answer, "by his father;" De Wette, "by God;" Bleek and Lünemann, "by both—his father and God." This last answer is the right one. Isaac's words at Gen. xxvii. 33 show this: גם־ברוך יהיה, *he* (Jacob) *shall also remain blessed.* The aged patriarch sees a divine purpose fulfilled in the blessing of which he had been the blinded instrument, whereby the right of the first-born is taken from Esau, and he adds his own consent thereto: ὁ πατὴρ κατὰ Θεὸν ἀπεδοκίμασεν αὐτόν (Theophylact). It is further a question, whether μετανοίας τόπον οὐχ εὗρεν means that he found no place for change of mind on his father's part or for repentance on his own. The former is the view taken by Beza, Schlichting, Gerhard, Seb. Schmidt, Böhme, Tholuck, Von Gerlach, and Lünemann: the latter by the fathers, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Bengel, De Wette, Bleek, Hofmann; and for this we decide. The very fact that the other view never seems to have occurred to the fathers, though it would have served their purpose better in the Novatian controversy,[2] is a strong argument against it. Had the writer himself meant this, he must have written μετανοίας τοῦ πατρός to prevent being mistaken by his readers, who would naturally suppose that,

[1] See Note D at the end of vol. i. on the meaning of θέλειν and βούλεσθαι.

[2] See, for instance, Theodore of Mopsuestia, *ap.* Fritzsche, p. 171.

the sin of Esau being the only one mentioned before, the repentance must be that of Esau too. The very form of the phrase (*μετανοίας τόπον οὐχ εὗρεν*) suggests the same thing, if we compare the similar expression in St. Luke (Acts xxv. 16), *τόπον ἀπολογίας λαμβάνειν*; for the genitive *μετανοίας* is most naturally referred to the subject of the whole sentence, viz. Esau. To which we may add, that even if the term *μετάνοια* might be applied to a change of mind or regret on Isaac's part, that is not its regular meaning in such a connection, to express which *μεταμέλεια* would have been more suitable. *Μετάνοια* in such phrases as *διδόναι τόπον μετανοίας* (Wisd. xii. 10, and Clem. Rom. c. 7) and *ἔχειν τόπον μετανοίας* (Tatian, *Or. c. Græcos*, 15) is personal repentance, thorough conversion and change of life (תשובה); and in this profoundly ethical meaning, in contradistinction to the weaker *μεταμέλεια*, it is used throughout the New Testament.[1] But if *μετανοίας* is to be here interpreted of a repentance no longer possible on Esau's part, it follows of necessity that *αὐτήν* in "*although seeking it earnestly with tears*" (*καίπερ μετὰ δακρύων ἐκζητήσας αὐτήν*), is to be referred to *τὴν εὐλογίαν*, and not to *μεταν.*; for it is against the historical narrative to say that Esau sought repentance with tears, and to take *pœnitentia* in the sense of *venia per pœnitentiam* would be arbitrary. That there is some inconvenience in having to go so far back for the reference of *αὐτήν* is true; but that is mitigated by regarding *μετ. γὰρ τόπον οὐχ εὗρε* as a parenthesis, such construction being not alien from the style of our author (comp. vers. 20 seq. of this chapter and ch. vii. 11): "Although Esau wished to inherit the blessing, he was rejected (for repentance, *i.e.* real effectual repentance, such as would have reinstated him in his former position, was not vouchsafed him), although he

[1] Comp. Liv. xliv. 10, *pœnitentiæ relinquere locum*, and the *pœnitentiæ hæredi locus non est* of the Digests (*Pandect. Justinian.*), iv. 7. 3. Philo says of Cain that he was incapable of repentance—*οὐ δέχεσθαι μετάνοιαν*; and, in a passage already cited by Grotius (i. 129. 45), that many souls wishing to avail themselves of repentance (*μετανοίᾳ χρῆσθαι*) have not been suffered to do so by God.

prayed for it (the now forfeited blessing) with tears." Those tears expressed, indeed, sorrow for his forfeiture, but not for the sinful levity by which it had been incurred. They were ineffectual, because Esau was incapable of true repentance. The sacred writer contemplates Esau as a type of the hopelessly apostate, the unpardonable nature of whose sin he has already twice depicted. It is not meant that Esau had himself committed that sin, but his rights as first-born are compared to those of the Christian *υἱοθεσία*; and it is intimated that he who, Esau-like, throws these away for the sake of worldly ease, or even sensual indulgence, will find with sorrow and remorse in the end, that he has lost the blessing he once had a claim to, however earnestly he may now desire it, and that the door of repentance is closed upon him.[1]

CHAP. XII. 18–29. *Renewed warning against apostasy: By how much more glorious the revelation of the New Testament (which places us in living communion with the world to come) is than the revelation made to Israel on Mount Sinai, and by how much the kingdom which cannot be moved bestowed on us excels in glory the terrors of the shaken earth at the giving of the law, by so much greater will be our punishment if found unfaithful and disobedient; seeing that the God of the New Testament, as of the Old, is a consuming fire.*

The exhortation to stedfastness in faith, to peace and holiness, of the preceding paragraph (vers. 12–17), is now yet

[1] This passage, as is well known, was a great difficulty with Luther, and has been abused (*e.g.* in the so-called Terministic controversy) so as to limit grievously the grace of God. (See Greiff, *Disp. qua sistitur Paulus Heb.* xii. 15–17 *termino salutis humanæ peremtorio minime favens*, Jenæ 1734.) But before this, Sebastian Schmidt had already given the right solution of such a difficulty: *Est hic sermo de Esavo non quemvis hominem lapsum typice repræsentante, sed peccantem in Sp. S. a quo ad quemvis mortaliter lapsum negatur Novatianis consequentia.* And, we may add, the difference is heaven-wide between the assumption of the possibility in certain cases of a judicial hardening, and that of a *terminus salutis peremtorius* fixed by God for all men in the present life.

more tenderly enforced in another very skilfully constructed period (vers. 18–24), in which the Sinaitic revelation of the Old Testament is contrasted with the Sionitic revelation of the New: the one earthly, repelling, unapproachable; the other heavenly and gracious, full of attractive charm, and yet so high and glorious, that, as the sacred writer goes on to urge (vers. 25–29), its vindications will be the more terrible in the end to those by whom its invitations are neglected or despised.

Vers. 18, 19. *For ye have not drawn near to a mountain that may be touched, and to a kindled fire, and to cloud-gloom, and darkness, and storm, and trumpet-sound, and a voice of (spoken) words, which they that heard entreated that no more speech might be addressed to them.*

The word ὄρει was omitted by Lachmann (and formerly by Tischendorf), following the authority of MSS. of the first rank (A, C [and now Cod Sin.], 17, and 47), of the most ancient versions (Peshito, Itala in Cod. D, Coptic, Sahidic, Æthiopic, and the Vulgate in Cod. Amiat.), and of the texts of great patristic commentators (St. Chrysostom, Primasius, and Theophylact). Without it, the opening of the sentence runs thus, οὐ γὰρ προσεληλύθατε ψηλαφωμένῳ καὶ κεκαυμένῳ πυρί, which would have to be rendered (ψηλαφώμενον not being an appropriate epithet for the element of fire), "*For ye have not approached a tangible* (material) *and fire-kindled object.*" But as this could only mean Mount Sinai, one does not see why the author should have here omitted ὄρει, which stands conspicuously in the Σιὼν ὄρει of the antithesis. We must therefore regard the omission of ὄρει here as due to the mistake of a scribe so far back as the second century. One omission of this kind being admitted, the conjecture seems not unnatural, that another may have also been made in very early times, and that the sacred writer really wrote μὴ ψηλαφωμένῳ ὄρει—"a mountain that could *not* be touched"—with allusion to the prohibition in the Thorah cited below. This conjecture, if true, would also explain why he wrote ψηλαφωμένῳ instead of ψηλαφητῷ

ὄρει. But it must nevertheless be rejected. For, 1*st*, had the sacred writer intended a direct allusion to Ex. xix. 12 seq., he would not have made use of a different word from the θιγεῖν and ἅψασθαι employed there by the Sept.; and 2*dly*, as he goes on to speak, ver. 20, of the unapproachableness of the mountain, there was no necessity to mention it here likewise. He begins more naturally with the tangible and earthly character of Sinai as contrasted with the spiritual Sion, and uses ψηλαφωμένῳ instead of ψηλαφητῷ, with allusion to that prohibition to touch the mount which superabundantly proved its tangible and unspiritual character. In like manner, he writes (ver. 26) τὰ σαλευόμενα and τα μὴ σαλευόμενα instead of σαλευτά and ἀσαλευτά, with allusion to the future catastrophe that awaits the visible universe.[1] The description adheres closely even in diction to that of the Pentateuch. Most later commentators regard κεκαυμένῳ πυρί as an attributive of ὄρει (Deut. v. 23, ix. 15, iv. 11), "*to a mount that might be touched, and that burned with fire*" (Luther); but ὄρει is so placed as if carefully to guard against such a construction: the Thorah also mentions (Deut. iv. 36, and elsewhere) "the great fire" as a thing by itself. We therefore take κεκ. πυρί by itself here—"to a kindled fire," or "to a fire that might be kindled:" so the Vulg. *et accessibilem ignem;* and so Bengel, Kuinœl, and Bisping (the latter following the Vulgate). The author uses the perfect κεκαυμ. rather than the present καιομένῳ, "a kindled" instead of "a burning" fire, to note it as a thing belonging, like Mount Sinai, to the material world, or as being a merely transient phenomenon. The sacred writer proceeds, with allusion to Deut. iv. 11 (v. 22 in Sept., expansion of v. 19 in the Heb.), καὶ γνόφῳ, καὶ σκότῳ (*rec.*), καὶ θυέλλῃ. Γνόφος = נַעַם, cognate with νέφος, is *cloud-gloom*, or *a wrack of clouds*.

[1] It might be difficult to cite examples of the present participle used in this way for the verbal adjective in τος. There is, however, some resemblance to the way in which ψηλαφ. is used here in the use of ὁλόμιτος as equivalent to ὁλοός, in the Latin *tractandus* = *tractabilis*, and in *cedens*, used in the sense of *nachgiebig* (yielding). See Nägelsb. pp. 193–195.

Σκότος = חשך is elsewhere in the New Testament τὸ σκότος, but here masculine, σκότῳ, for σκότει. Lachm. and Tisch. read, for σκότῳ, following A, C, D*, and other authorities [including now the Cod. Sin.], the nearly synonymous but choicer word ζόφῳ. The top of the mountain, as gazed on by Israel at the giving of the Thorah, burned with fire; lower down it was girt with dark, impenetrable cloud, out of which came (according to the Sept. rendering of ערפל at Deut. iv. 11 and v. 22) mutterings and bursts of storm (θύελλα), like pre-announcements of divine wrath.

The description continues (ver. 19): καὶ σάλπιγγος ἤχῳ, καὶ φωνῇ ῥημάτων. The σαλπ. ἤχῳ refers to Ex. xix. 16, φωνῇ τῆς σάλπιγγος ἤχει μέγα; the φων. ῥημάτ. to Deut. iv. 12, φωνὴν ῥημάτων ὑμεῖς ἠκούσατε (ye heard a voice of words, but ye saw no shape, *i.e.* ye only heard the voice). This articulate voice (with its accompaniments), by which the ten commandments were delivered to Israel, was so awful, that in mortal terror the whole people entreated Moses to intervene (Ex. xx. 18 seq.). The relative sentence, ἧς οἱ ἀκούσαντες παρῃτήσαντο μὴ προστεθῆναι αὐτοῖς λόγον, resembles in expression Deut. v. 25 (22) and xviii. 16 (Sept.), *Why should we die? for this great fire will consume us:* ἐὰν προσθώμεθα ἡμεῖς ἀκοῦσαι τὴν φωνὴν Κυρίου τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν ἔτι. It is clear from this that αὐτοῖς in our text is not to be referred to ῥημάτων, but back to οἱ ἀκούσαντες. The active and too Hebraizing προσθεῖναι (προσθεσθαι) ἀκοῦσαι is turned into a passive, μὴ προστεθῆναι (αὐτοῖς λόγον, *accus. c. infin.* after μή, a genuine Greek construction; comp. Luke xx. 27), governed by παρῃτήσαντο, in the sense of imploring to be excused (comp. ver. 25 and Acts xxv. 11). A double parenthesis follows, setting forth, by means of two quotations from Scripture, the awful character of what Israel then heard and saw.

Vers. 20, 21. (*For they could not bear that ordaining (word), "And if so much as a beast touch the mountain, it shall be stoned." And so terrible was the sight, Moses said, I exceedingly fear and quake.*)

As διαστέλλεσθαι in the N. T. has always a middle sense (*e.g.* Acts xv. 24), and is very rarely used as a passive (= to be ordained or commanded) elsewhere (*e.g.* 2 Macc. xiv. 28, τὰ διεσταλμένα ἀθετήσει), we would apply it here (with Storr, Schulz, Heinrichs) to the divine word itself, personified as an adjective: *they could not bear the ordaining word, Let not a beast,* etc. This construction suits the context (ἔφερον) better. It was not so much the thing commanded, as the manner in which it uttered itself, that Israel shrank from. The ordinance that even a beast approaching the mount was to be stoned, as guilty of an act of sacrilege, made the whole prohibition, which was principally aimed at human presumption (Ex. xix. 12 seq.), the more terrible, and therefore is the only point mentioned here. After λιθοβοληθήσεται, Erasmus added in his text, ἢ βολίδι κατατοξευθήσεται; but this superfluous and disturbing addition being destitute of sufficient MS. authority, was properly removed by Griesbach and Scholz.

Now follows within the parenthesis another parenthetical citation: καὶ (οὕτω φοβερὸν ἦν τὸ φανταζόμενον) Μωυσῆς εἶπεν· Ἔκφοβος εἰμι καὶ ἔντρομος.

All translators and commentators, down to Luther and Calvin, take καὶ οὕτως together as beginning a new sentence. Beza was the first to translate and interpunctuate correctly: *et Moses, adeo terribile erat visum quod apparebat, dixit.* It also spoils the construction to take the καί (with Schulz and Kuinœl) as marking the climax—"yea further, so terrible:" there is indeed a climax in the thought, but not one outwardly expressed. Israel could not bear what they heard; and Moses too, the friend of God (so terrible was the manifestation), was likewise filled with fear (τὸ φανταζόμενον, *that which makes itself* φαντόν, *visible;* not simply τὸ φαινόμενον, *that which is manifest* or *appears*). The words ἔκφοβός (M ἔνφοβός) εἰμι καὶ ἔντρομος are not a literal citation from the Thorah, but it is not necessary to imagine (with Erasmus, Beza, Ch. F. Schmid, Heinrichs, and others) that the sacred writer is here quoting from an extra-canonical book. He is simply expanding Moses' word

ἔκφοβός εἰμι (Deut. ix. 19), spoken with reference indeed to a different occasion, the provocation of divine wrath by the sin of the calf, but here applied to the previous terrors of the law-giving. "He found" (says Stier) "in those later words of Moses a hint of what had been his feelings at an earlier period: if he so trembled at witnessing the first violation of the covenant, how must he have been filled with awe and trembling when he contemplated the terror-striking majesty of its first promulgation!" I am further convinced that it was our author himself who added the καὶ ἔντρομος here to the ἔκφοβός εἰμι of the Pentateuch, by the circumstance that ἔντρομος occurs elsewhere in the New Testament only at Acts vii. 32 and xvi. 29. At Ex. iii. 6 the Septuagint says of Moses at the burning bush, εὐλαβεῖτο καταβλέψαι ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ; which St. Stephen in the Acts expresses thus: ἔντρομος γενόμενος οὐκ ἐτόλμα κατανοῆσαι,—a similar use of ἔντρομος to that which we find here. The manifestations of God, both at the burning bush and at Mount Sinai, were manifestations by fire, of the fiery or wrathful side of His essential *doxa*, and the one was a prelude of the other. The fear which Moses speaks of at Deut. ix. 19 is a fear of the offended majesty of Jehovah—of that majesty which had been revealed on Sinai.

We have now been hearing what it was to which the forefathers of Israel drew nigh when they entered at Sinai into covenant with God. Their drawing nigh was at the same time a shrinking back, a remaining at a distance. The mount of divine revelation was to them unapproachable, the divine voice was full of nameless terror; and yet it was only the visible and tangible forms of nature through which God then manifested, and behind which He hid Himself. The true and inward communion with God had not yet been revealed: it was necessary that the law should first bring men to a painful consciousness of the hindrances opposed to such communion by sin, and their longing excited and intensified that such hindrances might be taken away. Under the new covenant we have no longer a tangible mountain as the place of divine revelation, and that made only from a

distance; but heaven itself, a divine and supersensual world, is now thrown open, and we are permitted ourselves to approach *there* the very throne of God: it is thrown open for us by the Mediator of the new covenant, and made approachable by us through His atoning blood.

Vers. 22–24. *But ye are come nigh unto Mount Sion, and unto the city of the living God, Jerusalem the heavenly,*[1] *and to myriads of angels, the festive assembly and the church of the First-born enrolled in the heavens, and to God the Judge of all, and to spirits of just ones made perfect, and to the new covenant's Mediator, Jesus, and to a blood of sprinkling speaking more mightily than Abel.*

The antithesis is, not that of a drawing near under one covenant, and a remaining afar off under the other (comp. against this the καὶ προσήλθετε of Deut. iv. 11); but that of the heaven-wide difference between the objects to which approach is made. Those objects were, on the one hand, things dark and terrible, to which those who drew nigh feared to come nearer; on the other, they are things glorious and lovely, with a gracious and attractive charm. There is, moreover, a clearly-marked correspondence between the processes by which either covenant is established and perfected: between the law-giving on Mount Sinai, and the constitution of Israel thereby to be the peculiar people of God, on the one hand; and, on the other, the entrance of Christ into the eternal sanctuary, and the consequent admission of the whole church of the redeemed into communion with the *heavenlies* (Eph. ii. 6). Bengel was the first to observe that these "*heavenlies*" (ἐπουράνια), as here enumerated, form a sevenfold antithesis to the seven "*earthlies*" (ἐπίγεια) to which ancient Israel drew nigh at Sinai. Those seven ἐπίγεια were: 1. A mountain that could be touched; 2. An enkindled fire; 3. A wrack of clouds; 4. Intense darkness; 5. A tempest or thunderstorm; 6. The sound of a trumpet; and, 7. A terrifying voice of words. We did not lay our-

[1] Ἰερουσαλὴμ ἐπουρανίῳ is, by an oversight, left untranslated in the original.—Tr.

selves out, in commenting on the previous verses (vers. 16–21), to establish this sevenfold enumeration; but we found other and sufficient grounds for recognising the *καὶ κεκαυμένῳ πυρί* as a separate clause, which, if so recognised, makes the *ἐπίγεια* as here enumerated to be precisely seven in number. Turning now to the *ἐπουράνια* of vers. 22–24, we find that in any case they are not more than eight; and if we may so far anticipate as to state here our conviction that *ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει* and *ἐκκλησίᾳ πρωτοτόκων* will be found to be subordinate notions under the general *μυριάσιν*, there are, in fact, only seven *ἐπουράνια*. These are: 1. Mount Sion; 2. The heavenly Jerusalem; 3. Myriads of angels and of the first-born; 4. God the Judge; 5. Spirits of just ones perfected; 6. Jesus the Mediator; and, 7. The blood of sprinkling, with its better voice than that of Abel. We are convinced that this sevenfold division is a real and sound one, the product of correct feeling and tact on the part of the sacred writer, though, it may be, with more or less unconsciousness in his own mind. Isaiah's enumeration of the seven spirits (ch. xi. 1) is evidently done with a purpose; his subsequent enumeration of the seven kinds of trees (ch. xli. 19) may not be made with such evident design: but in neither case is the septenary division a mere accident. Spiritual products follow inward and spiritual, but not always consciously-operating laws. And so it is here. If we compare these two groups of sevens, it is evident at first sight that the first and last members in the one correspond antithetically to the first and last in the other,—the spiritual Mount Sion to the material Mount Sinai, and the blood of sprinkling that speaketh better than that of Abel to the voice of words which men trembled to hear. The latter antithesis may indeed be denied, but only with the loss of the simplest answer to the question, Why this blood of sprinkling forms in the second group the last category? Bengel pursues the investigation of these correspondences yet further, but not without over-subtlety and fancifulness. We may be content with affirming the clearly antithetical relationship of the first and last members of each

group. Whether, however, the arrangement of the rest deserves no better commendation than that of Knapp—*ordo sæpe promiscuus est et arbitrarius, quanquam non prorsus fortuitus;* or whether, as Bleek and De Wette think, the arrangement would be logically better if *καὶ πνεύμασι* were attached to *καὶ ἐκκλησίᾳ*, so as to give the whole clause *καὶ μυριάσιν* three members instead of two, will be better seen hereafter.

In no other passage of our epistle do interpreters and commentators leave us so much in the dark as here. The more we consult them in the spirit of disciples anxious for enlightenment and instruction, the less we find to carry away. Take Knapp, for instance, who makes the first of these seven *ἐπουράνια*, Mount Sion, to be *œconomia nova in orbe terrarum a Christo instructa!* What does that mean? Or take Bengel, at whose feet with Menken we are glad to sit, on the same point: he makes Mount Sion to be *sedes œconomiæ Christi*, and the heavenly Jerusalem to be *sedes œconomiæ Dei*. What a strange distinction! As if Sion and Jerusalem could thus be separated, or as if the great King, of whom Jerusalem is the city, were a different One from Him whose throne is in Sion. Or turn from these to Steinhofer, what help do we find in him? He explains it thus in discourses otherwise so rich in exegetical pearls: "We are called by the gentle voice of the gospel and the grace of God to another mountain. That mountain is the hill of Sion, the great and high mountain, on which is reared the heavenly Jerusalem, the holy city of God and of the Lamb." But is that any real explanation? It is true that prophecy, both under the Old and New Testament, speaks of a future Jerusalem which is to rise high above all its surroundings, whereas the present Jerusalem is surrounded by hills higher than its own (comp. Zech. xiv. 10: *All the land shall be turned into a plain on the south of Jerusalem*); but that Jerusalem, though of heavenly origin, will still have an earthly site, and occupy the place of its fallen predecessor; the high mountain on which it will be built (Ezek. xl. 2; Rev. xxi. 10) is nowhere called Sion, nor is it

anyhow a scriptural mode of expression that Jerusalem stands on Mount Sion, for the simple reason that that would be true of a part only, the upper city. At Mic. iv. 8, "the stronghold of the daughter of Sion," *i.e.* the city of David, is said to rise above Jerusalem like a shepherd's tower, and at Ps. lxviii. 30 the temple likewise is said to be "over Jerusalem" (על ירושלים). Even C. H. Rieger, with his plain sense and deep insight, gives us but little help when he suggests that "Mount Sion" is to be here interpreted in accordance with Rev. xiv. 1, where it is said to be the place in which the redeemed are gathered about the Lamb. Still the question recurs: What are we, with this interpretation of *Σιὼν ὄρει*, to make of the following *Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἐπουρανίῳ*? Hofmann, indeed, maintains that the *Σιὼν ὄρος* of Rev. xiv. 1 is the church on earth, and that the meaning of the vision is, that notwithstanding the rage of the dragon and the two *θήρια*, there is still a holy place and a sacred company in the midst of which the Lamb vouchsafes to dwell;—an interpretation which destroys all connection between Rev. xiv. 1 and the present passage; in which Mount Sion is, as Hofmann himself recognises (*Schriftb.* ii. 2. 128), a heavenly not an earthly locality.

The question, therefore, seems hitherto to have remained unanswered—whether "Mount Sion" and "the heavenly Jerusalem" are mere emblematical names with no special difference of meaning, or are themselves expressive of two distinct heavenly realities? and if the latter, in what way we are to distinguish them? To this question we reply, that "Mount Sion" as the antithesis of the earthly Sinai, and "the heavenly Jerusalem" as antithesis and antitype of the earthly city lying below the royal palace and the temple on Moriah, are to be distinguished one from the other as *τὰ ἅγια* and *ἡ σκηνή* at viii. 1, 2, and ix. 11, 12 (see notes there), so that the heavenly Mount Sion with its celestial sanctuary, and the heavenly Jerusalem, the holy city, between which and the sanctuary there is no longer any wall of partition, are (though distinguishable in thought and expression, yet) practically and essentially one and the same. Sion is

throughout the Old Testament הר הקדש, the holy mountain, with which the rarely mentioned temple-mountain Moriah is regarded as identical, or included with it under the same designation; and in the heavenly antitype all difference and distinction between palace and temple have finally disappeared: Jehovah, who once vouchsafed to make His throne here below the mercy-seat of the earthly sanctuary, has now His throne of heavenly majesty in the eternal, supercelestial temple, and there the High Priest after the order of Melchizedek is seated in glory at His right hand. The place of the throne of the King of glory is at once temple and palace (comp. the היכל קדש of Ps. xi. 4); and, in brief, Mount Sion here is "the place of God" (מקום, Mic. i. 3, Isa. xxvi. 21), or, more strictly speaking, "the place of the divine doxa" (Ezek. iii. 12), of the *φῶς ἀπρόσιτον* in which "the blessed and only Potentate" (1 Tim. vi. 15) dwells in sacred seclusion from the world of His creatures. This "place" has no fixed sensible locality, but is the self-manifestation of the essential glory of the Godhead, and is here called *Σιών* because it is the antitype of the royal city of David under the old covenant, "the place" into which the Son of David, the Christ of God, the divine and human Object of all the promises, has entered for us, fulfilling by His session and co-session there the prophesied eternity of David's throne (comp. *e.g.* Isa. ix. 6 with Luke i. 32 seq.). It is likewise called *ὄρος*, not only to indicate its elevation above the created universe, but also above the heavenly Jerusalem, the sacred community of all the redeemed, as the bright and glorious hill rising in the midst of the holy city on which the blissful gaze of the inhabitants is fixed for ever. The city itself is called Jerusalem (*Ἱερουσαλήμ*, the form of the name in St. Luke, St. Paul, and the Apocalypse[1]) as the city of accomplished and assured peace, the object of desire to all saints under the Old Testament; and *πόλις Θεοῦ ζῶντος*, as being the city whose builder and

[1] The other evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and John, have everywhere (except Matt. xxiii. 37) the form Ἱεροσόλυμα. See Alex. Buttmann, *Gramm. des Neutest. Sprachgebrauchs*, p. 16.

maker is God, the city which has in her midst the Mount of Sion, and the glorious loving presence of the thrice-holy King, of God and of the Lamb, and of the seven Spirits which are before the throne. It is called ἐπουράνιος as being supersensuous and altogether heavenly, nay, exalted above all lower heavens, and therefore supra-celestial. The sacred writer is here thinking of the city, in the first place, apart from its inhabitants, which he goes on to enumerate.

The following verse (for ver. 23 ought to begin with the words καὶ μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων) admits of various modes of interpunctuation:

I. Καὶ μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει, καὶ . . .
(α) Καὶ μυριάσιν, ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει, καὶ . . .
(β) Καὶ μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων, πανηγύρει, καὶ . . .
II. Καὶ μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων, πανηγύρει καὶ . . .
III. Καὶ μυριάσιν, ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει καὶ . . .

The first interpunctuation (I. καὶ μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει, καὶ . . .) is that of Erasmus and of Tischendorf in the edition of 1849. It is inexact, and leaves the internal relations of the words to one another undetermined. It would require such a reading as that of D*, καὶ μυρίων, or καὶ μυριάδων. The ambiguity is removed by the two following, (α) and (β); the former of which makes ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει in apposition with μυριάσιν: *and to countless thousands, a festive gathering of angels.* (This interpunctuation is that of Griesbach and Kuinoel). The other mode (β), καὶ μυρ. ἀγγέλων, πανηγύρει, makes πανηγ. in apposition with μυρ. ἀγγ.: *and to myriads of angels, a festive gathering.* (This is in accordance with the interpretation of Œcumenius and Theophylact.) Very little objection can be made to (α), except that it makes καὶ μυριάσιν too isolated; but (β), which isolates πανηγύρει, is a very tasteless division. The second form of interpunctuation (II. καὶ μυριάσιν ἀγγέλων, πανηγύρει καὶ . . . = *and to myriads of angels, to the festive gathering and church of the first-born*, etc.) is that of the Elzevirs, Beza, Joannes Gregorius, and Matthæi; making a new member of the sentence begin with πανήγυρις. This

[which is also the punctuation followed by the English Authorized version] is likewise adopted by two modern commentators, Lünemann and Hofmann: the former remarking that *πανήγυρις* here denotes the totality of the redeemed as a festive gathering, while *ἐκκλησία* designates them as a united society. Hofmann observes (*Schriftb.* ii. 2. 129) that *πανήγυρις* is the equivalent of the Hebrew עֲצֶרֶת or עֲצָרָה ("solemn assembly"), *e.g.* Joel i. 14, and *ἐκκλησία* of קָהָל,—the one denoting an assembly for worship, the other a politically ordered community. But the combination עֲצָרָה וּקְהָל is nowhere met with in the Old Testament, and עֲצֶרֶת is only once rendered by *πανήγυρις* in the LXX.; and there is this further against thus connecting *πανήγυρις* with *ἐκκλησία*, that it disturbs the symmetry of the sentence, of which every other member begins with *καί*. It only remains, therefore, to take the third interpretation, which is that of Bengel, Lachmann, and Theile, viz. *καὶ μυριάσιν, ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει καὶ εκκ., κ.τ.λ.*: "*And to myriads, the festive assembly of the angels, and the church of the first-born.*" Bleek also decides in its favour with the pertinent remark, that this punctuation is the only one which assigns its proper significance to *μυριάσιν* placed thus in the foreground. The sacred writer first says, *Ye are come unto myriads*, and then defines of what those myriads consist, namely, of angels in the first place (comp. Deut. xxxiii. 2), and of the true Israel in the second (comp. Num. x. 36). *Πανήγυρις* is a solemn assembly of a whole people, especially on some festive occasion; and Ambrose renders accordingly, *et decem millibus lætantium angelorum* (Augustine, *exultantium*). The angelic life in the divine presence is a never-ceasing festival; the angel choirs are represented in Scripture as perpetually engaged in antiphonal songs of praise, or in movements of a sacred dance to heavenly music;[1] for, though incorporeal and without bodily organs, they are yet not formless nor incapable of expressing themselves in manifold ways towards God and one another.

With these myriads of angels the sacred writer associates other myriads, those of the church of the first-born—*ἐκκλησία*

[1] Cant. vii. 1 [A. V. vi. 13].

πρωτοτόκων ἀπογεγραμμένων ἐν οὐρανοῖς. The *ordo verborum* (ἀγγέλων πανηγύρει καὶ ἐκκλησίᾳ πρωτοτόκων) is *chiastic*. But who are these πρωτότοκοι? and why are they thus associated with the angels? And further, why is "God the Judge of all" named between "the church of the first-born" and "the spirits of just men made perfect?" These three closely connected questions form together one of the most difficult enigmas of our epistle. De Wette, regarding the πρωτότοκοι (like many other interpreters) as the first-fruits of Christianity (Rev. xiv. 4; 2 Thess. ii. 13), or of the whole creation (Jas. i. 18, comp. the context of Rom. viii. 23), defines them to be "the dead in Christ, especially those perhaps who have been glorified with the martyr's crown, and who are now associated as the first-born of the church with the other sons of God in blissful communion with God and His Christ (ch. xiii. 7, comp. x. 32)." This interpretation, so far as it identifies the πρωτότοκοι (followed by κριτῇ Θεῷ πάντων) with the martyrs, might be thought to find some support in Rev. vi. 9 seq., where the souls of them that have been slain διὰ τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἣν εἶχον appeal to the just judgment of God; but De Wette rightly abstains from such reference, as there is no such connection of ideas in the present passage. The interpretation is further rendered inadmissible by the ἀπογεγραμμένων ἐν οὐρανοῖς. It is those who are still living here on earth to whom our Lord says (Luke x. 20), χαίρετε ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα ὑμῶν ἐγράφη (Tisch. ἐγγέγραπται) ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. The first-born are here designated by a term familiar to St. Luke (comp. Luke ii. 1, iii. 5) as enrolled in the heavenly registers; but he whose name is entered in the book of life is not yet, according to the uniform usage of Scripture, in full possession, but still in the condition of one ordained εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, Acts xiii. 48 (comp. Isa. iv. 3): eternal blessedness is sealed to and entailed upon him. For this reason we cannot consider the πρωτότοκοι here as identical with the 144,000 gathered about the Lamb on the heavenly Sion in Rev. xiv.; the sacred name which they bear upon their foreheads belonging to their insignia of glory, and not merely constituting their

title to it. For the same reason it is equally, nay, still more inadmissible, to identify them with the patriarchs and saints of the Old Testament, as Lünemann does, making the "spirits of just men perfected" to designate the departed saints of the Christian dispensation. We conclude, therefore, that by *ἐκκλησία πρωτοτόκων* the present living church is meant. And this interpretation is further supported by the following considerations: (1) It accounts for the use of the term *ἐκκλησία*, which is always applied in Scripture to the religious community here on earth. (In Ps. lxxxix. 6, Sept., the *ἐκκλησία ἁγίων* are not angels, but men.) (2) It accounts for the use of the epithet *ἀπογεγραμμένων ἐν οὐρανοῖς*, designating that which is here the chief point, the invisible, heavenly character of the true church of the New Testament. (3) It accounts, further, for the use of the term *πρωτοτόκων* to designate Christians, a term suggested by the previous warning not to be like Esau who despised his *πρωτοτόκια*, or, as Kuinoel expresses it, *ut Christiani contra ἀπιστίαν muniantur et bona sua* (*τὰ πρωτοτόκια αὐτῶν*) *nosse discant*. The sacred writer is not here making a distinction between Christians of an earlier and a later generation, but he calls all Christians as such, and as heirs of the heavenly inheritance, *πρωτότοκοι*, not without a possible allusion to the ancient rights of the first-born to priesthood and royalty, so that the term itself may be a hint of what St. John expresses, Rev. i. 6, *ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς βασιλείαν, ἱερεῖς τῷ Θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ*. The spiritual right of primogeniture in Christians is here set in contrast to the right of the first-born in Israel, and the church of the New Testament is contrasted with that of the Old: all members of the one have those *πρωτοτόκια* as a personal and individual right which belong only to certain individuals in the other, and the first-born who compose the church are not enrolled, like those of Israel (Num. iii. 42), in an earthly register, but in heaven itself. (4) This interpretation will also account for the myriads of angels and the myriads of the first-born being thus classed together, the one being, according to ch. i. 14, *λειτουργικὰ πνεύματα* who minister to the other. The heavenly *πανήγυρις* and the

earthly ἐκκλησία are thus intimately combined. (5) Finally, this interpretation will account for the subsequent clause, καὶ κριτῇ Θεῷ πάντων, the key to which is found in the κύριος κρινεῖ τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ of ch. x. 30. The mention of the *ecclesia militans* suggests the thought of her enemies and persecutors, who by allurements and threatenings would make her untrue to her faith, and of the just Judge, who is God of all things and all creatures (πάντων is here to be taken as a neuter), to whom she may confidently commit her cause, because standing in so intimate and filial a relation to Him. He who is thus in communion with the Judge and God of all may expect from Him a righteous vindication against all wrong-doers and oppressors. The very word προσεληλύθατε implies indeed an entrance into intimate communion with the things and persons named. And how naturally follows the clause, καὶ πνεύμασι δικαίων τετελειωμένων! It is the spirits of the perfected righteous who are the chief witnesses to and partakers of the comfort derived from communion with the righteous Judge. The persons meant are neither exclusively the righteous of the new dispensation (Bengel, Rieger, Lünemann, etc.) nor (nay, still less) exclusively those of the old (Bleek, De Wette), but both together (Böhme, Kuinoel, Tholuck, Bisping), all the righteous, accounted such before God, from Abel (ch. xi. 4) onwards, but persecuted and treated as criminals by the world. They are now πνεύματα, spiritual beings freed from the assaults and defilements of the flesh, and τετελειωμένοι, "perfected ones," who have attained the end and purpose of their calling and of their endeavours, the way of suffering along which they marched to reach it now lying for evermore behind them. The meaning of δικαίων τετελειωμένων is not that their righteousness is now perfected (Luther), but that the divine purpose concerning them is now fully attained. And this their "perfection" is the work of Christ, obained by Him in the way of suffering and obedience for all who follow Him. He is the ἀρχηγός of σωτηρία and δόξα to them all (ch. ii. 10, v. 7–9, vii. 28). And this was the case even with the saints of the Old Testament. "With-

out us," as we read ch. xi. 4, "they could not be perfected." Their perfection was brought to them by the descending and ascending Jesus (Eph. iv. 10). This connection of thought is implied in the following clause: *καὶ διαθήκης νέας μεσίτῃ Ἰησοῦ.* As the thought of the militant and suffering church on earth led to that of the Judge, the God of all, by whom their wrongs would be one day avenged, so that of the spirits of the just made perfect in heaven to the thought of Him to whose redeeming saving work they owed their perfecting.

And to the Mediator of a new covenant, Jesus. Instead of the *καινῆς* of ch. ix. 15 we read here *νέας*, which is elsewhere used occasionally as the antithesis of *παλαιός* (comp. Luke v. 39; 1 Cor. v. 7; and especially Col. iii. 9 seq.). We have already remarked on ch. viii. 13 that *καινός* corresponds to the Latin *novus*, *νέος* to *recens*. The covenant is called *νέα* as of recent formation, and also as of ever fresh and vigorous youth in contrast to the old, which was now antiquated and about to disappear. The Mediator of this covenant is called "Jesus." The sacred writer loves that name, and by it designates the Lord both as the Perfected One (ch. ii. 9, 10) and the Perfecter (ch. xii. 2), and again (ch. vii. 22) as the *fidejussor* or Surety of the better covenant. The name *Jesus* is in itself more significant than that of *Christ*, containing as it does the divine name Jehovah, and designating the divine work accomplished by the incarnate Son as the work of salvation. The sacred writer, therefore, expressly calls the Mediator of the new covenant to which we belong by this His saving name, and lays especial emphasis upon it, as the highest pledge of the grace and glory of the covenant at the head of which He stands.

The mention of the covenant is naturally followed by that of the blood which sealed it.—*And to the blood of sprinkling speaking more mightily than Abel.* We read above (ch. ix. 18, 22) that no *διαθήκη* is inaugurated without blood, and no forgiveness of sin vouchsafed without bloodshedding. As Moses, the mediator of the Old Testament, finds an infinitely exalted antitype in Jesus, the Mediator of the New Testament, so the blood of sprinkling under the one, by

which the covenant was sealed at the foot of Sinai, finds its antitype in another sprinkling of blood sealing a new covenant under the other (ch. ix. 19). It is common to the blood-sprinkling under both Testaments that it is the medium whereby the apprehension of the promises proper to either covenant is realized. Both sprinklings (as is implied in the very word ῥαντισμός) subserve a gracious purpose on the part of the Maker of the covenant. The otherwise ill-supported reading of the *text. rec.* κρείττονα ("better things") is therefore unnecessary; and the meaning of κρεῖττον λαλοῦντι is simply that the gracious-speaking blood of Jesus is more powerful, more penetrating, more prevailing, than the voice of martyred Abel's blood calling for vengeance on his slayer (παρὰ τὸν Ἄβελ, or, according to another reading, παρὰ τὸ Ἄβελ = τὸ τοῦ Ἄβελ: comp. ch. ix. 4, xi. 30, etc.). The blood of Jesus is not merely the blood of a righteous man whom God does not forget even when dead, but the blood of One who has passed through death into the immediate presence of God, and is now seated on a mediatorial and high-priestly throne. The antithetic parallelisms in this passage began with the spiritual Mount Sion opposed to the tangible Mount Sinai; they now conclude with the blood of sprinkling speaking more mightily than Abel's, opposed to the φωνὴ ῥημάτων, ἧς οἱ ἀκούσαντες παρῃτήσαντο μὴ προστεθῆναι αὐτοῖς λόγον. That the sacred writer is fully conscious of this antithesis is evident from the following verse:

Ver. 25. *See that ye refuse not him that speaketh. For if they escaped not who refused him that spake on earth, much more shall not we escape, if we turn away from him that speaketh from heaven.*

The word βλέπετε is spoken, as it were, with the warning of an upraised finger, and is not only more energetic, but seems to be brought more closely home to the reader, than if οὖν, *igitur*, or some other inferential particle had been added (as to this, see notes on ch. iii. 12); for if it ran βλέπετε οὖν, it might be imagined that the warning was

connected with *οὐ γὰρ προσεληλύθατε . . . ἀλλὰ προσεληλύθατε*,—that which is general in the antithesis thus taking precedence of mere details. But as *βλέπετε* stands alone, it is evident that the author looks upon "him that speaketh," whom he warns his readers not to refuse, as standing in the closest connection with the blood that speaketh, the blood of the Mediator of the new covenant, mentioned in the verse preceding. But that which follows, giving the grounds for this warning, appears to oppose any such connection. For (1) although some might imagine that it was Moses who, as *ὁ ἐπὶ γῆς χρηματίζων*, is contrasted with Jesus (*e.g.* Chrys.: *τίνα λέγει; ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ Μωυσῆν*), this view must at once appear to be untenable; for the hypothetical antecedent, *εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἔφυγον* (Recept., Griesb., Kn., Theile; on the contrary, Lachm., Tischend., according to A, C, . . . *ἐξέφυγον*) *τὸν ἐπὶ* (*τῆς*, Recept., expunged by Griesb.) *γῆς παραιτησάμενοι χρηματίζοντα*; or, as with Lachm., Tischend., according to A, C, D, M, the words are to be placed, *ἐπὶ γῆς παραιτησάμενοι τὸν χρηματίζοντα* (a favourite *hyperbaton* with our author; see note on ch. ix. 15);—this hypothetical antecedent, I say, refers most unquestionably to ver. 19 (*b*), in which God and not Moses is the object of the *παραιτεῖσθαι*; for the people, on the contrary, entreated to have Moses as *χρηματίζων*, declining to hear directly the divine and too terrible *φωνὴ ῥημάτων*. The sense of the *ἔφυγον* or *ἐξέφυγον* is, that in spite of their refusal they were not able to escape, but had to meet, as best they could, the divine voice. But even if we allow that *ἐκφεύγειν* (*φεύγειν*) means the same as in ch. ii. 3 (if they did not escape punishment), inasmuch as the author, looking at the fact that they desired to have nothing to do with the divine voice, finds prefigured therein their subsequent refractoriness against the revealed will of God (Bl.),—still this freer interpretation of the reference to ver. 19 makes God Himself, and none other, "Him that spake upon earth." On the other hand, (2) it appears to be no less untenable to understand Jesus as the *λαλῶν*. For the *λαλῶν* is unquestionably the same person who is afterwards called *ὁ ἀπ' οὐρανῶν, sc. χρη-*

ματίζων. But how can Jesus be the speaker from heaven, to whom the shaking of the earth at the giving of the law is ascribed in ver. 26? There is, indeed, a pre-existence of Jesus in Old Testament history, but latent as regards any manifested presence. But placing the giving of the law and the terrible phenomena of nature which accompanied it in connection with the pre-existence of Jesus would be a most confused idea, and the context in which the author expressed it would render the confusion still worse. Also, if Jesus is to be looked upon as *λαλῶν*, how unseemly the climax would be: *πολλῷ* (Lachm., Tisch., *πολὺ*) *μᾶλλον ἡμεῖς, sc. οὐκ ἐκφεύξομεθα*, how much more shall we not escape! equivalent to: how much less shall we escape! (Winer, p. 557.) That the speaking of Jesus should be less to be refused than the speaking of God, or that the opposition to Jesus' speaking should be followed by more unavoidable punishment than the opposition to God's speaking, would be a fundamentally mistaken proposition, based on an entirely unscriptural view of the mutual relations between Jesus and God. How then are we to understand it? If *ὁ ἐπὶ γῆς χρηματίζων* cannot be Moses, and also *ὁ λαλῶν* and consequently *ὁ ἀπ' οὐρανῶν χρηματίζων* cannot be Jesus; and if, on the other hand, *τὸν λαλοῦντα* must stand in connection with *αἵματι ῥαντ. κρ. λαλοῦντι παρὰ τὸν Ἄ.*—what are the antitheses intended by the author? Grotius affords us the correct hint as to where we are to look for them: "*Non distinguit eum cui parendum sit, sed modum quo is se revelavit.*" "He that spake on earth" is God on Sinai, and He that speaketh from heaven is God in Christ. This is the view of most modern expositors; but the question why God in Christ is styled *ὁ ἀπ' οὐρανῶν* is answered in various ways. By no means is it, because Christ came down from heaven, *i.e.* did not enter humanity in the natural human mode (Thol.); or, because the interpreter whom God sent us was the Son of God, and not a mere man like Moses on Sinai (Lünem.); for, since the Son of God appeared *ἐπὶ γῆς*, but God spake on Sinai,[1]

[1] Hence the words התורה מן השמים, proverbial in the language of the synagogue, that the Thorah is of heavenly origin.

ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (Ex. xx. 22; Deut. iv. 36; Neh. ix. 13), without coming down into the midst of Israel, the conception of the contrast would be a wrong one. De Wette also is of opinion that the construction of the contrast is not quite suitable on account of Christ having actually appeared upon earth.[1] The contrast is, however, in fact, as suitable as possible, if only it be rightly understood. "The author intends to say"—this is Bleek's final conclusion—"that God manifested Himself to the people of Israel on earth by causing His law to be announced to them by angels on Sinai, but now speaks to us continually from heaven through the Saviour exalted to His right hand." This is at least an intimation of the true view. We are not now considering the earthly ministry of Christ in the days of His flesh, the ἀρχὴ of the history of salvation, which is spoken of in ch. i. 2, ii. 1–4. The Sinaitic manifestation of God belonging to past times, and the revelation of God continually made to Christ's church, are here contrasted with one another. In the former case, it was He who had come to earth who spake to Israel: but, He through whom God speaks to *us*, is He that has ascended up to heaven, who, after His ministry on earth had ceased, was exalted to heaven above all (Hofm. *Entst.* p. 347). In the former case, having come down

[1] Also in John iii. 31, De Wette considers the antithesis inaccurate, but in this case, as in the one we are considering, from not understanding it. All that John says in this passage about himself as being different from Jesus the Son of God, applies in the strictest sense to John as a prophet. A prophet does not come down from heaven, but is raised from the earth to the position which he fills without being removed from the earth. He brings with him no knowledge of heavenly things, but this knowledge comes down to him from above; and, inasmuch as he does not receive these heavenly things without a certain refraction of the earthly atmosphere, and his apprehension of the Infinite is only its reflection in the finite, his prophesying still remains a λαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς γῆς. But, contrary to this, the testimony of Jesus is that of a heavenly person, who has not merely had the heavenly things made visible and audible to Him, but has Himself seen and heard them ere He came down to earth. If, in the passage we are considering, Moses and Jesus were contrasted with each other, the antithesis would be of a similar kind.

upon the summit of the material mount, God employed the darkness, the fire, and the storm, both to manifest and also to veil Himself, and made Himself audible in the fearful roar of the φωνὴ ῥημάτων which could not be escaped from. But in the latter case, heaven itself, which has been disclosed and made attainable to us by Jesus, the Mediator of the new covenant, and consequently the kingdom of light, love, and peace now opened to us, is the place from which God speaks to us in the αἷμα ῥαντισμοῦ which speaks powerfully, but with the power of love,—in the blood which has opened for our High Priest, and for us through Him, a way into the heavenly holiest of holies (ch. ix. 12, x. 19),—in the blood which He shed for us here below as if in the temple-porch, still, however, again assuming it with the aim of offering the sacrifice of Himself in the sanctuary (ch. viii. 3, ix. 25),—in the blood which is sprinkled from heaven on our hearts (ch. x. 22; 1 Pet. i. 2), and purifies our consciences (ch. ix. 14). Now if the Israelites, although they refused Him that was audible on earth, were nevertheless, after Moses' intervention as mediator, compelled to remain on Sinai and to meet the fearful phenomena which accompanied the divine speaking: how much less shall we escape, if we turn away from Him that makes Himself audible from heaven! (ἀποστρέφεσθαί τινα, as if ἀποτρεπεσθαι, *aversari aliquem;* v. Kühner, § 551, note 3.[1]) The question now arises, what the terrible things will be, which we also shall not escape, but shall be compelled against our will to endure, if we refuse to hear the voice of God the Saviour in the same way as the Israelites refused the voice of God the Lawgiver. This question is answered in vers. 26–29. Just as the Old Testament manifestation of God was accompanied by a shaking of the earth, so also is the New Testament revelation; but it will be of a different and more comprehensive character, and by it the heavenly kingdom will be brought into realization, and all those to whom God's heavenly voice in the gospel is repugnant will be buried under the ruins of the old world.

[1] Theile's interpretation incorrectly places a note of interrogation after ἀποστρεφόμενοι, as if it had been πίσῳ and not πολλῷ.

Ver. 26. *Whose voice then shook the earth: but now he hath promised, saying, Yet once more I shake not the earth only, but also the heaven.*

On the occasion of the lawgiving from Sinai, which was only an earthly, temporal self-attestation, and a preparatory representation of the salvation of the future in the new birth of Israel as a national community, God spake ἐπὶ γῆς and shook τὴν γῆν. The sentence takes the form of a pentameter: οὗ ἡ φωνὴ τὴν γῆν ἐσάλευσε τότε. In the Sept. account of the giving of the law this shaking of the earth is not mentioned; for at Ex. xix. 18 ("*the whole mount quaked greatly*") the LXX. rendering has λαός instead of ὄρος. But the sacred writer's knowledge of Holy Scripture was not (as we have seen) derived exclusively from the LXX.; and, moreover, the fact that in the giving of the law on Sinai the earth shook at the presence of Jehovah is elsewhere attested. The word chosen to describe the shaking (ἐσάλευσε) points us to Deborah's song (Judg. v. 4, 5: γῆ ἐσείσθη . . . ὄρη ἐσαλεύθησαν; נָזְלוּ = נָזַל from זָלַל). The τότε is contrasted with the νῦν. Instead, however, of going on with νῦν δὲ ἔτι ἅπαξ σείσει, κ.τ.λ., the author prefers to continue with the prophetic words (Hagg. ii. 6) which give assurance of this event of the last times, introducing them with νῦν, as he is able to do, because they not only promise something which applied to New Testament times and was then valid, but also were issued in the times of the second temple, and therefore on the threshold, as it were, of both the Old and New Testament æons. Ἐπήγγελται — that is, God, who once made Himself heard on earth, but now from heaven—is *perf. pass.*, in a medial signification, as in Rom. iv. 21; λεγῶν = לֵאמֹר, as Luke i. 63, and frequently in the New Testament, especially in Luke. The divine promise thus introduced was given through Haggai in sorrowful times. A new temple had arisen out of the ruins of the old, but those who had beheld the temple of Solomon were compelled to mourn; the house of David had again come out of their prison, but had only attained to a dominion in subordination to the Persian empire. At a time like this,

which seemed to frustrate the highly-raised hopes of the returned captives, Haggai predicted, in regard to this poor temple, that it was destined to be the place of Jehovah's final manifestation; and, in regard to the fallen house of David, that, whilst the thrones of the Gentiles should be overthrown, this house should, as Jehovah's signet, outlast them all. In the development of the plan of salvation, it was Haggai's special vocation to predict that the great consummation was to be attached to the second temple, and the world-wide rule of the house of David to be realized in the line of Zerubbabel. But when the prophets prophesy of the last times, they all agree in representing the final manifestation of God's power as the transcendent antitype of that which once took place during the period of the Mosaical deliverance (Mic. vii. 15). As, according to Hab. iii., when Jehovah shakes the kingdoms of the world, the earth is shaken as it was when He advanced towards His people coming out of Egypt and met them on Sinai; so also Haggai (ch. ii. 6 f.) predicts a shaking of the whole creation and of the world of nations, by which the house of God shall become an assembling-place for the nations and their noblest possession, and the house of David shall be God's signet, which is henceforth inseparably borne by Him, and with which He henceforth seals inviolably all that He ordains in the world.[1] "*Yet once, it is a little while, and I will shake* (σείσω, for which in our passage, rightly, σείω) *the heavens, and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land; and I will shake all nations.*" The time mentioned, עוֹד אַחַת מְעַט הִיא, is amplified from עוֹד מְעַט (Hos. i. 4), and declares, as Hitzig and Hofmann (*Weiss.* i. 330) rightly understand it, two different points: (1) That the period between the *now* and the predicted great change of the world will be only *one* period—that is, one uniform epoch—which will not be again divided into several others; and (2) that this epoch will be a short one. Our author omits "the sea" and "the dry land," and lays an emphasis on the word "heaven" by add-

[1] Similarly, but somewhat differently, in Hofmann (*Schriftb.* ii. 2. 550 f.).

ing οὐ μόνον . . . ἀλλὰ, in order to place the great final event in a position of superiority in the contrast with the former event on Sinai. In his rendering of the words עוד אחת מעט היא, he follows the LXX., the ἔτι ἅπαξ of which (אחת as *e.g.* Ex. xxx. 10) has against it the מעט היא, which is perhaps on this account left untranslated: he does not, however, refuse to make use of it; for the event which the prophet predicts is, in fact, that in which the commencement on Sinai—the theocratical national relation which then began (expressed for the first time, Ex. xv. 17, 18, cf. xix. 5) —was finally consummated. Added to this, the catastrophe which Haggai predicts is predicted by other prophets not only as the destruction of the former heavens and the former earth and the creation of new (Isa. lxv. 17, cf. xix. 5), but also as the repetition on a grander scale of the event on Sinai; for, *e.g.*, according to Zech. xiv., it will come to pass, that Jehovah will be King of all the earth (ver. 9), when He appears, and all the saints with Him (ver. 5), as He had appeared on Sinai with ten thousands of saints (Deut. xxxiii. 2). We need not (with Hengst.[1]) assume to the credit of our author that he does not notice further the ἔτι ἅπαξ of the prophecy, but only reverts to it in ver. 27 by quoting its accidental commencement; but, on the other hand, we willingly allow that his allegation of proofs does not entirely stand or fall with the ἔτι ἅπαξ of the LXX. For Haggai, at all events, says that the kingdom of God, in its New Testament, world-embracing glory, will proceed from an universal shaking of the world. And if the prophet's words, אני מרעיש את־השמים ואת־הארץ, are compared with the אֶרֶץ רָעָשָׁה of Deborah's song, it is evident that this shaking of the earth at the time of Moses was only a limited prefigurative commencement, in comparison with the much mightier one which will take place at the end of time. The, as it were, polar relation of the final consummation of the kingdom to the foundation of the kingdom on Sinai is a matter of fact. The author now hails the ἔτι ἅπαξ as an

[1] *Christology* (edit. 1), iii. 351, after an unprejudiced explanation of Haggai's words in their own connection.

appropriate expression to describe the mutual relation of the two homogeneous events. In this sense he continues:

Ver. 27. *And this word, Yet once more, signifieth the removing of those things that are shaken, as of things that are made, that those things which cannot be shaken may remain.* (Or) *And the word, "Yet once more," signifieth the change of those things which may be shaken, as made in order that those things which cannot further be shaken may remain.*

When God yet once more shakes not the earth only, but also heaven,—yet once more, and consequently not again, so that this shaking, as a conclusive event, makes a separation between the things which can, and the things which cannot, be shaken,—this will be the final change of the world, pointed to in the ἔτι ἅπαξ, the unavoidable, certain, and now impending change of the variable into the invariable, which was aimed at in the creation (Hofmann, *Entst.* 347). The article τὴν in τῶν σαλ. τὴν μετάθεσιν (instead of which, Lach., according to A, C, τὴν τῶν σαλ. μετάθ.), which is wanting in D*, is indispensable. And it can be convincingly proved that the motive clause beginning with ἵνα does not belong to μετάθεσιν (Bl., De W., Lünem., and among the ancients, Theodor., Oekum., and many others), but to πεποιημένων. For (1) by joining the ἵνα with μετάθεσιν, ὡς πεποιημένων would stand by itself as nothing but an explanatory addition to τῶν σαλευομένων, stating why that which is subject to the shaking can thus be shaken and will be changed. But even the new heavens and new earth are creature-like, created (הִנְנִי בוֹרֵא, Isa. lxv. 17) and made (אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי עֹשֶׂה, Isa. lxvi. 22), new creations moulded on the base of the old (2 Pet. iii. 7); πεποιημένων, therefore, does not include in itself the characteristics of that which is perishable, and consequently does not afford by itself any sufficient statement of cause. (2) If, therefore, it is explained "as made in order that those things which cannot further be shaken may remain" (Gr., Bg., Thol., etc.), we by no means obtain, as Lünem. asserts, an obscure idea. For the end of the six days' work of creation is, as the author himself teaches in

ch. iv., the beginning of a (now introduced) historical progress of that which is created: this progress has, as the aim and end of its course, a final sabbath, and henceforth immutable eternal rest. Moreover, as the whole of the apostolic preaching teaches, all things both on heaven and earth were created ἐν Χριστῷ and εἰς Χριστόν, that is, with the aim that in Him all things should be gathered together into one blessed and glorious kingdom of God (Col. i. 16; Eph. i. 10). There can therefore, we think, be no clearer and truer idea than this, that God from the very first created that which is changeable with the purpose of establishing the continuance of that which is immutable by setting it free from the changeable elements: this is equally clear and true as that the law from Sinai (to which many expositors erroneously refer the μετάθεσις), the old covenant, and the Israelitish national form of salvation, are divine transitional constitutions which aimed from the very first at spiritual freedom, an antitypical consummation, an abolition of human limitations; in short, that the provisional should be replaced by the complete, the temporal by the eternal. It is not the case, as Bl. is of opinion, that this view places ὡς πεποιημένων . . . μὴ σαλευόμενα outside the scriptural argument of the author; the statement that ἔτι ἅπαξ points to τῶν σαλ. τὴν μετάθεσιν, needed, in order to describe this μετάθεσις as the final one, the supplementary addition which is afforded in ὡς πεποιημένων, κ.τ.λ.: this points to the change of the σαλευόμενα which was intended in the creation, and therefore follows from their very nature. The neuter plural of the subj., τὰ μὴ σαλευόμενα, is joined with the singular of the pred., μείνῃ, as in Acts i. 18, xvi. 24 (v. Winer, § 58. 3); also the perf. follows the *conj. aor.*, as *e.g.* in Acts ix. 17 (v. Winer, § 41. *b.* 1). It cannot be denied that there is something stiff and inapposite in the motive clause, because the σαλευόμενα and not the μὴ σαλευόμ. are not placed in any internal causal relation to each other. On this account there is much in favour of understanding μένειν as *manere aliquem* (*aliquid*), a signification which does not indeed occur in our epistle, but is found in Acts xx. 5, 23, and frequently in the LXX.: "In

order that they (the mutable things) may await the immutable things" (Paul Bauldry, 1699, Böhme, Kühnoel, Klee, etc.). That the present incessant alternation of arising and passing away, coming and going, meeting and parting, should create and intensify a longing after that which is immutable and everlasting, is an idea that is perfectly true; and all that Paul teaches (Rom. viii. 18–25) as to even the unconscious creation being subjected to vanity ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, would here be brought to a brief and general proposition which extends back beyond the fall of man to the creation itself. But in a connection where the mutable and immutable are contrasted with one another, it is, nevertheless, far more probable that μένειν, as in Acts xxvii. 41, ἔμεινεν ἀσάλευτος, should express the idea of remaining instead of that of awaiting. And in Isa. lxvi. 22 it is said of the new heaven and the new earth, עֹמְדִים, μένει, they remain. Because the mode of the creation was determined through the counsel of redemption with a foresight of the fall, the mutable things were first brought into existence in order that, at the end of time, the immutable things may remain. These immutable things are the basis and essence of the mutable, and are thus purified and cleared of their husk and dross. This final revolution is pointed to in the ἔτι ἅπαξ. Heaven and earth shall be shaken so that they tremble, σαλευθήσονται (Luke xxi. 26), the thrones of the kingdoms of the world fall, and the power of the world is destroyed. And on these ruins, from their hitherto hidden interior, there arises a βασιλεία ἀσάλευτος—a both fearful as well as beneficial end of the present course of the world—which is closely impending enough to be ready, as promised, for those who even now have their home in the yet invisible immutable kingdom, and, in the obedience of faith, mark the words of Him that speaketh from heaven.

Ver. 28. *Wherefore, we receiving a kingdom which cannot be moved, let us have grace* (thankfulness) *whereby we may serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear.*

The ideas, that the immutable things which remain con-

stitute a *βασιλεία*, namely, the heavenly kingdom now made manifest in its pure nature, and as having attained to a victorious and sole rule, and that the church of Christ now living and moving amid heavenly things will be the heir of this *βασιλεία*,—these secondary ideas are connected by the author with *ἵνα μείνῃ*, so that, without particularly expressing them, his exhortation to a thankful and reverent conduct is grounded partly thereon with *διό*, and partly therefrom with *βασιλείαν ἀσάλευτον παραλαμβάνοντες*. Luther correctly translates, "Darum, dieweil wir empfahen ein unbeweglich Reich," just as in the English version; but Calvin and others, on the contrary, incorrectly understand it in the sense of *fide apprehendentes*, so that the participial sentence does not give the motive for the exhortation, but belongs to it. This interpretation is incorrect, because *παραλαμβάνειν βασιλείαν* (*ἀρχήν*) is the usual RA for *regnum capessere*; and, added to this, the explanation must here be guided by the passage in Dan. vii. 18, where it is said that, after the removal of the four kingdoms of this world, the saints of the Most High shall possess the kingdom: *καὶ παραλήψονται τὴν βασιλείαν* (וְיִקְבְּלוּן מַלְכוּתָא) *ἅγιοι ὑψίστου*.[1] The term *βασιλεία*, like *regnum*, signifies both the commonwealth united under the unity of a kingly sway, and also the kingly sway itself with the commonwealth under it; here it has the latter signification, and the *βασιλεία* is understood as not merely the kingdom of which we are destined to become citizens, but as the regal glory in which we are to share. Because, therefore, this kingly exaltation of the church of Christ will result from the universal and final shaking of the world which is impending, we should, exhorts the author, entertain and show thankfulness whereby we may serve. We must read *ἔχωμεν* and *λατρεύωμεν*, as also in ch. iii. 7, vi. 1, xii. 12, where *διό* is followed by an exhortation: the LA *ἔχομεν* (thus, It., Vulg., Luther, Calvin, and others) and *λατρεύομεν* (Complut., Plant., Bg., Matth. with M.) are objectionable on account of the inferiority of their outward declaration. Chrys., and following him Oek.,

[1] The translation of the LXX. and of Theodotion is here identical.

Theophyl., rightly give it: "Habeamus gratiam, hoc est, gratias agamus Deo; sic quippe placenter Deo servitur, cum ei per omnia gratiæ deferuntur."[1] For it must not be translated: let us hold fast the grace (as *e.g.* Peschito and Beza)—a rendering which would at least require *τὴν χ.*, although not perhaps *κατέχωμεν* (cf. 2 Tim. i. 13); but *ἔχειν χάριν* signifies, as in Luke xvii. 9, 1 Tim. i. 12, 2 Tim. ii. 3, to entertain and show thankfulness. The words *ἔχωμεν χάριν*, which taken by themselves are inadequate, attain their proper fulness and completeness by the likewise hortatory sentence, *δι' ἧς λατρεύωμεν εὐαρέστως τῷ Θεῷ*. Thankfulness is the alpha and omega of all true service of God. "Whoso offereth thanks," we read in Ps. l. 23, "glorifieth me, and follows a path in which I will show him the salvation of Elohim." In this sense *εὐαρέστως* refers back. It is incorrect to say that *μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ εὐλαβείας* are an explanation of *εὐαρέστως* (Lünem.). They belong, of course, to the relative sentence, but as more accurate definitions of the nature of the service of God, which first and foremost consists in thankfulness for the glory which we have in view. Accordingly, with the thankfulness must be combined *αἰδώς*, *shame*, like that felt by the seraphim when they veil their countenances and their feet with their wings, and also *εὐλάβεια*, personal circumspection and attention which avoids carefully anything unseemly or offensive (*v.* vol. i. pp. 246-7).[2] Instead of *μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ εὐλαβείας* (D***, I, K, Pesch.), there are also RA *μετὰ εὐλαβείας καὶ αἰδοῦς* (M. It.: *cum metu et verecundia*, cf. ch. v. 7, *exauditus a metu*), *μετὰ δέους καὶ εὐλαβείας* (from which, perhaps, Vulg.: *cum metu et reverentia*, cf. ch. v. 7, *exauditus est pro sua reverentia*), and, by far the best attested, *μετὰ εὐλαβείας καὶ δέους* (A, C, D*, 17, 71, 73, 80,

[1] The text of Chrys. in Mutian has *habemus* and *servimus*; but the comment shows that Chrys., as M, read *ἔχωμεν* and *λατρεύομεν*.

[2] Hengstenberg must also be reckoned among the expositors who understand *εὐλάβεια* in Heb. v. 7 as *fear of death*. "If the punishment lay upon Him, so that we might have peace, the whole fear of death must have been concentrated in Him, and therefore, in Heb. v. 7, fear is described as that which burdened Christ with an oppressive weight" (*Vorwort der E. Kz.* 1857, No. 7).

137). The *rec.* has in its favour the usage of the union of *αἰδὼς καὶ εὐλάβεια* (in Philo, ii. 597. 33; Dionys. Hal. vi. 72, and elsewhere). That *δέος* is a word which does not occur elsewhere either in the New Testament or the LXX. (except 2 Macc.), is, as it appears to me, rather in its favour than against it. But if *μετὰ δέους* had been miswritten for *μετ' αἰδοῦς*, it would be likely that the more forcible word would be placed after *εὐλαβείας* for the sake of the climax. I am therefore inclined, in opposition to Lach., Tischd., with Griesb., Kn., Theile, to give the preference to the reading of the *rec.*, which is besides full of meaning. If we compare Hab. ii. 20, *εὐλαβείσθω ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτοῦ πᾶσα ἡ γῆ*, and other passages, *μετὰ αἰδοῦς καὶ εὐλαβείας* will not be found too weak for the cause given in the following verse.

Ver. 29. *For our God is a consuming fire.*

As the words *καὶ γάρ*, as we decided in commentary on ch. iv. 2 (vol. i. p. 187), and on ch. v. 12 (*ib.* p. 259), combine the two meanings of *etenim* and *nam etiam*, the question now arises, which signification they are to bear in this passage? It is impossible that the author intends to say that our God, the God of the New Testament as well as the Old, is also a consuming fire (Bl., De W., Thol., Bisp.); but this must be the meaning of *καὶ γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ Θεός*, if generally any such anti-Marcionite idea could have occurred to the mind of the author. And that the God who has given the promise of such a blessed and glorious consummation should be also a consuming fire (Lünem.), cannot be the intention of the words, because they would then be arranged *καὶ γὰρ πῦρ καταναλίσκον* . . . (cf. Luke vi. 32–34, vii. 8, xi. 4, xxii. 59; Acts xix. 40). Therefore we take the words *καὶ γάρ* in the signification *etenim*, as in Luke i. 66, xxii. 37, to be looked upon as only a more closely applied "for," or, more emphatically, as "for indeed." The Thorah says (Deut. iv. 24, ix. 3), just as our author, not only that God is also אֵשׁ אֹכְלָה, but that He is this absolutely. The Scriptures, which elsewhere state that God is *ἀγάπη*, but not that He is *ὀργή*, would scarcely express themselves in this way, if it

were not that fire is so far a two-sided idea that it may be said to be the separation between darkness and light; so that, as *e.g.* the twofold idea of קִנְאָה, ζῆλος (v. x. 27), shows, fire includes both holy wrath and also holy love; He that is both light and love becomes, by directing the potency of His holy wrath against all that is unholy, a consuming fire (Isa. x. 17, cf. xxxiii. 14). God is in Himself the blessed and eternal triumph of light. And this triumph of light is also the end of the history of the creature, inasmuch as all who love darkness rather than light will be consumed by the fire of His wrath, and all who aspire to the heavenly love which has been made manifest in Jesus Christ will be glorified by the light.

The author having thus, looking at the fearful and also hopeful termination of the present course of the world now coming to an end, exhorted the Hebrew Christians to a right behaviour in general, now continues with more special injunctions.

CHAP. XIII. 1–17. *Divers admonitions to Christian virtues, especially to an imitation of the faith of their departed leaders; and also, in contrast to the Levitical legal prescriptions and the Levitical divine service, both now done away with, exhortations to a faithful holding fast to Jesus Christ eternally the same; who offered Himself up without the gate of Jerusalem in order to direct our views away from the earthly Jerusalem to the heavenly and abiding city.*

The first admonition is, as might be expected, to charity: Ver. 1. *Let brotherly love continue.*

Φιλαδελφία in the New Testament is not the mutual love of natural brothers and sisters, but of those who, as regards their spiritual life, spring ἐξ ἑνός (ch. ii. 11), and acknowledge themselves to be as children of one Father, and as brethren of Christ and in Christ, the incarnate Son of God:

it forms, indeed, a narrower sphere within the wider sphere of ἀγάπη (2 Pet. ii. 7). This love had been formerly shown by the Hebrews by their sympathy with suffering brethren (ch. x. 32 f.); and even at the then present time it was not completely extinct (ch. vi. 10), so that the author is enabled to say μενέτω. This admonition had already been prepared for in many ways in the preceding portion of the epistle (ch. iii. 12 f., x. 24 f., xii. 12 ff.), and now takes the lead, because brotherly love is the first of all the fruits of faith, and the first requisite for the continuance and confirmation of the Christian social life. The general exhortation to φιλαδελφία is divided (in vers. 2 and 3) into two different sides, those brethren who do not belong to the same home as the persons exhorted being first considered.

Ver. 2. *Be not forgetful of hospitality to strangers; for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.*

The connection and unity of feeling between churches in all places were maintained by mutual visiting, or by involuntary peregrinations induced by various causes; and therefore φιλαδελφία must show itself in φιλοξενία—that is, love to those who come as strangers or guests. This hospitality is not to be forgotten by them,—that is, they are to be mindful of it among the virtues which they must exercise,—for by it they have obtained many a wondrous mercy and great blessing. The genuinely Greek construction ἔλαθον ξενίσαντες,[1] which does not occur anywhere else in the New Testament, appears to have been prompted by the words μὴ ἐπιλανθάνεσθε. There can be no question as to any intentional play upon words, for it would be entirely without point (cf. vol. i. p. 239). The intention, doubtless, is to remind the readers of Abraham and Lot (Gen. xviii., xix.). Lot, who addressed the two men as אֲדֹנָי, had no presentiment that they were angels; but Abraham meets the three strangers with the address אֲדֹנָי, springing from the deeply-penetrating glance

[1] Vulg. incorrectly (as is acknowledged even by Beelen in his Lat. revision of Winer's *Gramm. für Katholiken*, Lovanii 1857, p. 184): "latuerunt quidam angelis receptis."

of his faith, without, however, being able completely to decipher the appearance of his sublime guests, whom he looked upon as wanderers in want of human refreshment.[1] The hospitality of both availed for those who were in need of it, and was rewarded—in the one case by the blessing on his before unfruitful marriage, and in the other by rescue from destruction. The author was perhaps aware of other instances derived from unrecorded history; and, in fact, any man whom we entertain without knowing any details as to him, may be even for us a very angel of God. The exhortation to φιλαδελφία presents also another side—the kindness shown to those in captivity and suffering.

Ver. 3. *Remember them that are in bonds, as bound with them; (and) them which suffer adversity, as being yourselves also in the body.*

In both places ὡς implies the motive; but this does not require that συνδεδεμένοι should be understood as referring to the σύνδεσμος of love (Col. iii. 14), or σώματι to the body of the community (*e.g.* Calvin). The motives given for helpful remembrance of those in captivity and of those in

[1] Philo, ii. 17. 1: θεασάμενος τρεῖς ὡς ἄνδρας ὁδοιπυροῦντας, οἱ δὲ θειοτέρας ὄντες φύσεως ἐλελήθησαν; *ibid.* 17. 23, to the effect that the foreboding as to the higher nature of the guests first came to Sarah in the words recorded Gen. xviii. 13 f., qu. in Gen. xviii. 4: "Hoc rursum juxta alteram apparitionem dicitur, quatenus peregrinos eos putat, non habita certa notitia, sed iterum illuc violenter attractus de optima divinaque facie." Jos. *Ant.* i. 11. 2: νομίσας εἶναι ξένους, ἠσπάσατο τε ἀναστὰς καὶ παρ' αὑτῷ καταχθέντας παρεκάλει ξενίων μεταλαβεῖν. August. *Civ.* xvi. 29: "Sic eos susceperunt (Abr. et Loth), ut tamquam mortalibus et humana refectione indigentibus ministrarent, sed erat profecto aliquid, quo ita excellebant, licet tanquam homines, ut in eis esse Dominum, sicut esse assolet in prophetis, hi qui hospitalitatem iis exhibebant dubitare non possent." Augustine contends, from the passage we are considering (which he correctly translates: "Per illam etiam quidam nescientes hospitio receparunt Angelos"), that one of the three was the future Christ; cf. also my *Genesis*, i. 333. I should now prefer to express myself less precisely: for Hengstenberg is right in the idea, that among the ἀγγέλους the Angel of the Lord might be included as an appearance of the Lord Himself; for מַלְאָךְ, ἄγγελος, is not the description of the nature of the being, but of the work.

affliction are derived from the feeling of community in suffering: in the former case spiritual, and in the latter case bodily. We are to be mindful of those in bonds, inasmuch as by means of the *συμπάθεια* of the members (ch. x. 34; 1 Cor. xii. 26) we should look upon ourselves as bound with them; and of those in affliction, because we ourselves also are in a body susceptible of suffering, and subject to similar trials: *σῶμα* as Rom. vii. 24, and *εἶναι ἐν σώματι* as *ἐνδημεῖν ἐν τῷ σώματι* (2 Cor. v. 6). After his exhortation to the brotherly fellowship of Christians, the author[1] goes on to speak of two important relations of earthly life—marriage and pecuniary dealings; just as elsewhere in Paul's epistles the warnings against unchastity and covetousness are placed side by side (Eph. v. 5; Col. iii. 5). The sententious and, as it were, sketch-like form of the admonitions is essentially Pauline in its character.

Ver. 4. *Marriage is honourable in all (things), and the bed undefiled; but whoremongers and adulterers God will judge.*

The passage Rom. xii. 4–13 is at once called to mind, in which Paul, in equally brief and pregnant nominal and participial sentences, throws off a model of the proper state of a Christian community. The composition of the propositions is throughout simply declaratory; but the apostle points as if with the finger to the model, and a "So shall it be" runs through the whole. In this passage, also, it is not inadmissible to supply an *ἔστω* (cf. Luke xii. 35) to *τίμιος ὁ γάμος . . .*; but this ellipse of an *ἔστω* or *εἴη*, in a simple and independent sentence consisting of a subject, præd., and resulting copula, is unusual; and the two propositions

[1] Lucian (*de morte peregrini*, § 13): "Their (the Christians') most distinguished lawgiver (Paul? *vid.* vol. i. p. 282, note) has imparted to them the opinion, that they all became brethren one of another so soon as they changed; that is, denied the Greek gods, and acknowledged by adoration the crucified sophist." All that Lucian (§ 12) says of the sympathy of Christians, with their *δέσμιοι*, and also (§ 16) of their *φιλοξενία*, tends to show, in spite of the scorn manifested, what a notorious new phenomenon this mutual love of Christians was.

τίμιος . . . ἀμίαντος are more correctly looked upon as declaratory sentences, intended to be expressed in the tone of an hortatory exclamation.[1] Marriage (γάμος, elsewhere in the New Testament "wedding" or nuptials, here as in ἄγαμος[2]) is to be highly esteemed and held in honour ἐν πᾶσιν. This does not mean, among all individuals, or among all classes (= παρὰ πᾶσιν); but is, as in ver. 18, and in some of the Pauline epistles written in captivity, which can most justly be compared with the Epistle to the Hebrews, as Col. i. 18, Tit. ii. 9, 1 Tim. iii. 11, 2 Tim. iv. 5 (but not Eph. i. 23; cf. Col. iii. 11, where it speaks of the indwelling; and also not 1 Pet. iv. 11, where δοξάζεσθαι ἐν is connected), equivalent to ἐν παντί (Eph. v. 24; Phil. iv. 6; 1 Thess. v. 18: cf. Phil. iv. 12, ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν, in every respect and in all respects). Marriage has from God its Founder a τιμή, and this τιμή is to be maintained. The divinely-ordained relation of natural association is not to be in any way, either in teaching or action, degraded in favour of any unmarried position. On this point, we must call to mind the false gnosis which was spreading at the date of our epistle (1 Tim. iv. 3). And where Christians have entered into the state of marriage, the bed must be undefiled (τὴν κοιτήν, or σρωμνὴν μαίνειν, Gen. xlix. 4); that is, should not be defiled either by adulterous intercourse, or by lascivious sensuality on the part of the married themselves. But (δέ) those who do not hold marriage in honour, showing it by indulging in the lusts of the flesh outside the proper matri-

[1] The instances brought forward in favour of the addition of an ἔστω by Bernhardy, Kühner, Kruger, Rost, and others (also by Philippi on Rom. xii. 9)—αἰδώς, Ἀργεῖοι, ii. 13. 95; ἵλαος, ὦ δαίμων, Soph. Œd. C. 1480; τοῖς θεοῖς χάρις, Xen. *Anab.* iii. 3. 14—are all not elliptical, but exclamatory. And in such analogous sentences as בָּרוּךְ ה׳ (εὐλογητὸς ὁ Θεός), ἐστί, according to the Semitic mode of thought, is to be supplied rather than ἔστω (1 Pet. iv. 11); but, in truth, nothing should be added.

[2] Also in the Latin, and even in legal language, the word *nuptiæ* signifies marriage; and therefore, whilst It. and Vulg. translate *connubium*, Philastrius (*de hær.* c. 120) correctly renders it, *honorandæ nuptiæ;* Mutianus, *honorabiles nuptiæ.*

monial restrictions (πόρνους), and those who defile the marriage-bed (μοιχούς), will be judged by God, the holy and also omniscient, the righteous and also omnipotent One. Ὁ Θεός is emphatically placed as the last word in the sentence. And there is at least no internal evidence for exchanging the reading δέ (Tischd., according to C, D***, I, K, the Syrians, Greeks, and Ambr.) for γάρ (Lachm., according to A, D*, M, It., Vulg., Copt.). Γάρ has the appearance of an alteration intended to make the sentence plainer. After chastity comes contentedness, which is so often in other apostolic exhortations placed side by side with the former.

Vers. 5, 6. (*Let your*) *conversation* (*be*) *without covetousness; and be content with such things as ye have: for he hath said, I will never leave thee, nor forsake thee. So that we may boldly say, The Lord is my helper, and I will not* (or, *I have not to*) *fear what man shall* (or *can*) *do unto me.*

The author goes on to tell us what the essential nature of true Christians is, and how they are to behave; a mode of thought and action which is free from the love of money and worldly possessions generally (ἀφιλάργυρος, as 1 Tim. iii. 3), and contenting themselves (ἀρκοῦμαι τινι[1] = ἀρκεῖ μοί τι) with the things which are present, that is, being satisfied for the present time: thus must their conduct be, and thus must they be. In a similar anacoluthon in Rom. xii. 9, ἀποστυγοῦντες τὸ πονηρόν is connected with ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκριτος. The author sketches out an idea; and if it avails for his readers, everything else is left as a matter of course. But how becoming this contentedness is to the Christian — a contentedness which, without anxiously and greedily looking forward to the future, is satisfied with the things which are present—is an idea which is founded on words spoken by God; for αὐτός (הוּא), He, is God, as the subject which to the consciousness of the believer is absolute

[1] Thus in M. Antonin. τῶν εἰς ἑαυτόν, x. 1: When, O soul, ἀρκεσθήσῃ τῇ παρούσῃ καταστάσει καὶ ἡσθήσῃ τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ συμπείσεις σεαυτὴν ὅτι πάντα σοι πάρεστι. Ἀρκεῖσθαι παρεοῦσι is also one of the first rules of Phocylides.

and ever present.[1] But whence are these words of God—*οὐ μή σε ἀνῶ, οὐδ' οὐ μή σε ἐγκαταλίπω* (A, C, D***, I, K, M, *ἐγκαταλείπω*; *vid.* Winer, p. 450)—derived? Passages such as Josh. i. 5, *οὐκ ἐγκαταλείψω σε οὐδ' ὑπερόψομαί σε*; Gen. xxviii. 15, *οὐ μή σε ἐγκαταλίπω*; Isa. xli. 17, *οὐκ ἐγκαταλείψω αὐτούς*, only give us one-half of the quotation; but, on the contrary, in Deut. xxxi. 6, cf. 8, 1 Chron. xxviii. 20, *οὔτε μή σε ἀνῇ, οὔτε μή σε ἐγκαταλίπῃ* (A, *al.*, *οὐ μή σε ἀνῇ οὐδ' οὐ μή σε ἐγκαταλείπῃ*), both the divisions of the sentence occur, only they are not words spoken by God Himself. That our author was not the first who has taken this promise as God's own words, is evident from Philo, i. 430. 26, where this promise is quoted literally as it runs in our passage, as "a benevolent expression of a merciful God, which prefigures pleasant hopes to those who love what is right." This is a coincidence which cannot be accidental, although it is not probable that our author took the quotation in this form from Philo (Bl., De W., Lünem.); we may rather conclude that, in the liturgical or homiletical usage of the Hellenistic synagogues, the passage Deut. xxxi. 6 assumed this shape, owing to recollections of other similar passages of the Old Testament being mixed up with it.[2] On the ground of promises so loving, emphatic, and so full of comfort — rendered more emphatic by the threefold negative *οὐδ' οὐ μή* (*vid.* Winer, § 55. 9)—we are able to take courage, and say with the Psalmist (Ps. cxviii. 6), "The Lord is my helper (Hebr. only לִי יְהוָה), and I will not fear (Hebr. without 'and'); what can man do unto me?" It is an expression of faith from the beautiful Confitemini (Hodu),[3] concluding the Hallel of the feasts of passover and taber-

[1] In the post-biblical Hebrew, הוּא and אֲנִי occur as mystical names of God.

[2] In a survey of all the passages in which this expression is repeated with more or less of the same tenor, Bengel says: "Est igitur instar adagii divini."

[3] This beautiful Confitemini was the name given by Luther to this his favourite psalm, the exposition of which was his comfort in his Patmos (Coburg).

nacles, taken from that of the Hosanna festal-cry. The tenor of Ps. lvi. 10, 12, 5, is similar. It is not difficult to understand the train of thought which now leads the author to point to the type of the former leaders of the community. I was formerly of opinion, but incorrectly, that the quotation of the words of Scripture led him on to speak of the preachers of God's word. In opposition to the view which Theophyl. puts before us, that μνημονεύετε is meant for a calling to remembrance of the thankfulness which is joyful to distribute, and consequently suitably follows on to the warning against covetousness, Bl. has remarked that the leaders were no longer among those living in this world. It may better be imagined that the author, speaking of contentedness, calls to remembrance the unselfishness and contempt for worldly things wherein the now perfected leaders so exemplarily excelled his readers. But in ch. x. 34 it was vouched for that these very readers had accepted joyfully the spoiling of their goods. In the words of the psalm he had just quoted, the author had therefore in view this persecution of the synagogues, which, however, had not touched the lives of the younger members of the church (ch. xii. 4), and calls to remembrance the leaders (as is also assumed by Hofmann, *Entst.* 347) to whom the Hebrew Christians are indebted for the preaching of salvation, and by whom what they preached was sealed by their conduct, stedfast even unto death.

Ver. 7. *Remember them which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God: whose faith follow, considering the end of their conversation.*

The way in which this exhortation is framed is again essentially in Luke's style. For ἡγούμενοι is the appellation used by Luke for the leaders of the church (Acts xv. 22; cf. Luke xxii. 26): it does not occur elsewhere, except in Heb. v. 17, 24. In a similar case Paul says προϊστάμενοι (1 Thess. v. 12). Again, λαλεῖν τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ is Luke's usual expression for the preaching of the gospel (Acts iv. 31, viii. 25, xiii. 46, etc.). The verb ἀναθεωρεῖν

is used for abiding, penetrating contemplation (not found in the LXX.), and occurs elsewhere only in Acts xvii. 23.[1] And for ἔκβασις (1 Cor. x. 13) as the end of life, or, as it here purposely says, of conduct, Luke uses at least the synonymous expressions ἔξοδος (Luke ix. 31) and ἄφιξις (Acts xx. 29). From the words μνημονεύετε and ἐλάλησαν, we may conclude that τὴν ἔκβασιν τῆς ἀναστροφῆς is to be understood neither as a heavenly reward (something like τὸ τέλος τῆς πίστεως, 1 Pet. i. 9), nor as the result of Christian conduct following in another world, but as the end of life. The author does not say τὴν ἐκβ. τοῦ βίου, or even τῆς ζωῆς (τοῦ ζῆν), because it was repugnant to the Christian consciousness to represent death as nothing more than the end of life; moreover, the expression τῆς ἀναστροφῆς is pregnant with meaning. They were to contemplate attentively what an end their conduct (ἀναστροφή, often used by James, Paul, and Peter; cf. ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ch. x. 33) had attained to, and what a (spiritually considered) blessed and glorious end it had brought with it for them (ἔκβασις, as Wisd. ii. 17). But a Christian course of conduct, which up to the last breath of even a natural death is a confirmation and reflection of a life of faith, attains an end well worthy of imitation, and therefore the words of the author do not plainly point to a martyr's death; in fact, at the date of the composition of our epistle, the mother-church of Palestine, although Paul (1 Thess. ii. 14–16) in the year 52 or 53 holds it out to the Gentile Christians as a model of a confessing church, did not as yet number many martyrs properly so called. It is a matter of course that the author chiefly alluded to martyrs,—namely, the proto-martyr Stephen the deacon (d. *cir.* 37 *ær. Dion.*); James the apostle, the son of Zebedee, who, according to Acts xii., was slain by the sword (at the end of the year 43 or the beginning of the year 44) by Herod Agrippa (d. after the passover of the year 44);

[1] Winer (*De verborum cum præpp. compos. in N. T. usu*), p. iii., explains ἀναθεωρεῖν as thoroughly to examine along anything, *h. e.* aliquam rerum seriem ita oculis perlustrare, ut ab imo ad summum, ab extremo ad principium pergas. Similarly the ἀνα in ἀναζητεῖν.

perhaps also James the brother of the Lord; the bishop of the church at Jerusalem. But as to this, looking at the contradictory accounts of the time of his martyrdom, nothing can be conclusively asserted.[1] It is possible that Peter is also to be included, to whom was specially confided τὸ εὐαγ-

[1] According to Josephus (*Ant.* xx. 9. 1), Ananus the younger, high priest for only three months (to be distinguished from the older Ananias, son of Nebedæus, high priest in the procuratorship of Cumanus, and according to history, of Felix also), during the interval when Festus had left Judea, and Albinus the new procurator had not yet arrived, summoned a synedrium with reassumed capital jurisdiction: καὶ προσαγαγὼν εἰς αὐτὸ (τὸ συνέδριον) τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰησοῦ τοῦ λεγομένου Χριστοῦ, Ἰάκωβος ὄνομα αὐτῷ, καί τινας ἑτέρους, ὡς παρανομησάντων κατηγορίαν ποιησάμενος παρέδωκε λευσθησομένους (*lapidandos*). Ὅσοι δὲ ἐδόκουν ἐπιεικέστατοι τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς νόμους ἀκριβεῖς, βαρέως ἤνεγκαν ἐπὶ τούτῳ. This passage of Josephus—which is not to be confused with another passage which, although it is quoted both by Eusebius (*H. E.* ii. 23) and also previously by Origen (*in Matth.*, and *c. Cels.* i. 47, ii. 13), is no longer to be found in Josephus, and is doubtless supposititious: it described the destruction of the Jewish state as ἐκδίκησις Ἰακώβου τοῦ δικαίου—runs as credibly as possible (cf. Grätz, *Gesch. der Juden.* iii. 360; Jost, *Gesch. des Judenth. u. seiner Sekten*, i. 432), and places the date of James' martyrdom in the year 62. On the other hand, Hegesippus, in an extract of his *Hypomnema*, in Euseb. ii. 23, relates as follows:—"James the brother of the Lord (whom he evidently looks upon as not an apostle, and consequently as a different person from James the son of Alphæus, which is really the practical question) was universally called δίκαιος, and on account of his love for his nation, and his prayers for them, was named Ὠβλίας, *i.e.* περιοχή of the people (perhaps corrupted from חומה לעם or חיל עם). He was holy from his mother's womb (that is, he was dedicated as a Nazarite by his mother during her pregnancy). Wine and strong drink he drank not, neither did he eat of anything that had lived (animal food); no razor ever touched his head, and he neither anointed himself with oil nor made use of the bath. He alone was permitted to enter the holy place of the temple, εἰς τὰ ἅγια εἰσιέναι (although he was not a Cohen, or even a Levite). Also he wore no woollen garments, but linen only (just as the priests). And going alone into the temple, he was found there prostrate on his knees, and imploring forgiveness for the people. The rulers were afraid of his influence, for there was danger that the whole nation should be made Christians, Ἰησοῦν τὸν Χριστὸν προσδοκᾶν. In order to intimidate him, they placed him on one of the pinnacles of the temple, and called out to him: 'O righteous man! whom we all ought to obey, as the people

γέλιον τῆς περιτομῆς; for his martyrdom, if it occurred in the year 67, may have been previous to the composition of our epistle. The idea of ἡγούμενοι does not go so far as that of the ἀκούσαντες, who had handed down to the existing church the message of salvation which they had received directly from the Lord (ch. ii. 3); but still it goes far enough to embrace the apostle who had founded the earliest church at Jerusalem. But other presbyters and deacons unknown to us are also intended, who, as witnesses for the faith, if not as martyrs, had done with this present life. After the author had thus held up the past as a mirror to the present, and had called to remembrance the gaps which death had made in the church of the Hebrews, what could be more appropriate than to raise his thoughts to the immutable Lord, exalted high above all change?—that Lord in whom the church above and the church below find their indissoluble bond of unity; and in whom the church below,

have all gone astray after Jesus the crucified, now tell us, what is the door to Jesus (that is, by what door can we attain to Him? or if, as is more probable to me, the question ran, לישו מה פתחן פה, how does Jesus vindicate Himself)?' Then answered James with a loud voice: 'Why do you ask me about Jesus the Son of man? He is in heaven, sitting on the right hand of Omnipotence, and will come again in the clouds of heaven.' In consequence of this joyful confession, which produced an effect in many, James was cast down from the pinnacle of the temple; and as he was not killed by the fall, but turning round and kneeling down prayed for his murderers, a fuller (כּוֹבֵס) took his fulling-stick and struck him on the head, so that he died outright: οὕτως ἐμαρτύρησεν . . . καὶ εὐθὺς Οὐεσπασιανὸς πολιορκεῖ αὐτούς." Thus writes Hegesippus. His account of James' martyrdom, even apart from the circumstances attending it, is irreconcilably inconsistent with that of Josephus in a chronological point of view. For although the εὐθύς may not be entirely accurate, still its meaning cannot be extended so far as to agree with Josephus; and as the whole of the pseudo-Clementine literature presupposes that James was still alive at the time when Peter had suffered martyrdom, the testimony of Josephus, that James died shortly before the year 70, receives an important confirmation: for, according to the unexceptionable evidence of Dionys. Cor. in Euseb. ii. 25, Peter died κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρόν with Paul, therefore in the year 67 (*vid.* Niedner, *KGS.* 107). We see, therefore, that, on the one hand, the testimony of Hegesippus is commended to our belief

amid all the vicissitudes of persons and things, has the unchangeable ground of its being, and a sure holdfast against every fluctuation.

Ver. 8. *Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever.*

This watchword of salvation forms the basis for the exhortation just given to imitate the faith of the departed leaders, and also a preparation for the warning which follows in ver. 9, that the readers should not be carried about with divers and strange doctrines. The three definitions of time belong together; and they all apply to ὁ αὐτός, which is the predicate to Ἰησοῦς Χριστός. Jesus Christ is one and the same, yesterday (χθές, for which Lachm., Tischd., according to A, C*, D*, ἐχθές, the ordinary and also Attic form; the former being epic, Ionic, and Attic: *vid.* Buttmann, *Ausf. Sprachl.* § 117, A, *g*), to-day, and for ever. It must be re-

by the details which, although accurately described, are somewhat traditional in their character, and is also supported by the Clementine literature; and that, on the other hand, the testimony of Josephus bears the stamp of historical truth; and even if, as Credner is of opinion (*Einl.* pp. 571–582), it should have been interpolated by some Christian hand, cannot have been altogether without some traditional support. It must therefore remain undecided, whether at the date of our epistle James the brother of our Lord formed one of the departed ἡγούμενοι (ch. xiii. 7), or of the ἡγούμενοι (ch. xiii. 17) who were still indefatigably watching for the salvation of the souls of the Hebrew Christians. From this passage Lünem. comes to the conclusion that James was no longer alive at the date when the passage was written, and that the epistle could not therefore have been written before the year 63. But this is a very uncritical conclusion: for (1) the death of James is not a necessary inference from our passage; and (2) it is not certain, but rather very questionable, whether the year 63 was the date of James' death. Nothing, however, is proved by the assertion that it would be generally scarcely imaginable that, as long as James was alive, his ministry would be interfered with by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, by means of a letter conveying such a tone and purport: for the whole of the apostolic epistles are addressed to the various churches, without giving any particular prominence to their bishops and deacons, although both are included; and also because the exhortation to obey the ἡγουμενοι (ch. xiii. 17) applies especially to James, if he were still alive.

marked that Jesus Christ is the subject, consequently the incarnate God. Χθές, therefore, must be dated back not to eternity, nor even to Old Testament times; it is, indeed, incorrect if we take the incarnation as the extreme point to which we may look back as the χθές. If such an extreme point is to be fixed, it is the ascension, and not the conception, of Jesus Christ; for not until He sat down on the right hand of God, and this world's history had passed into eternal rest, could He be ὁ αὐτός, not only in the principle, but in the totality of His person. These expressions, always and everywhere applicable, are, however, here more closely defined by the context. For σήμερον is the time in which the writer and readers lived; χθές is the time in which the ἡγούμενοι preached God's word to the latter, and ended their faithful course of conduct here below in a way so blessed and glorious, and so calculated to excite emulation. As then, so to-day, and also in all the inconceivable remoteness of the future, Jesus Christ is unchangeably the same. The question, to what this identity is here intended to refer, cannot be a doubtful one. Ver. 7 points to Jesus Christ in two relations: He was the central substance of the word of God, which the now departed leaders thus preached in order that it might be faithfully accepted; He was also the Author and Finisher of the faith which they confirmed to the end. In both respects He is the same to-day,—both in the objectivity in which the word presents Him to faith, and also in the self-manifestation of His divine life dedicated to the care of His people. He is the same as the object of faith, and as the subject of the grace from which this faith springs, and ripens, and finally brings the fruit of beholding. Just as Moses, in Ps. xc. 2–4, says of Jehovah that He, the Lord, was God ere the world was, and that His divine being extends from an illimitable past to an illimitable future; that His omnipotence rules over all the coming into being and passing away in this world below; and that to His eternity the changeful course of a thousand years are but as a passing moment: so now our author says of Jesus Christ, that amidst all the coming and going of generations in the church on earth, He ever re-

mains the same; and neither as regards His people's relation to Him, nor His relation to His people, is subject to any change. What a grave warning is thus conveyed, that the one pure word we have received—God's word as to Christ—should not be confounded with "divers and strange doctrines;" and that the grace of Christ, which can alone establish the heart, should not be mixed up with legal precepts as to meats, which are profitless as means of salvation!

Ver. 9. *Be not carried away with divers and strange doctrines. For it is a good thing that the heart be established with grace; not with meats, in which they who walked were not profited.*

The first question here is, to what the sacred writer is referring by the use of the term *βρώμασιν*. The answer to this question will determine our view of various particulars in the whole passage. A reference to the following paragraph (vers. 10–16) would suggest that he has here especially in view the sacrificial feasts of the law, and perhaps more particularly that of the passover; and we might be tempted, consequently, to find the same reference in the *βρώμασιν* of ch. ix. 10. But we adhere to the view taken in our comment on that text, that such is not the case; or, at any rate, that such is not the first reference in the mind of the apostolic writer. And mature reflection leads to the same conclusion here, for the reasons following: 1*st*, *βρώματα* is a term unknown to the sacrificial Thorah, while it is the ordinary term in the precepts referring to clean and unclean meats, *e.g.* Lev. xi. 34, 1 Macc. i. 16 (in later Hebrew, מאכלות). 2*dly*, *βρῶμα* is the term used in other similar passages of the New Testament in reference to what was allowed or disallowed in the matter of food (אסור ומותר). See 1 Cor. vi. 13, viii. 8, 13; Rom. xiv. 15, 20. And 3*dly*, the first clause of the present verse, *διδαχαῖς ποικίλαις καὶ ξέναις μὴ παραφέρεσθε*, is against such an interpretation of *βρώμασιν*. (*a*) The epithet *ποικίλαι*, implying a complex of precepts and doctrines leading away from the plain and simple truth, refers evidently to the subtle casuistry of the Jewish doctors, which, as we know,

found a congenial sphere in discussions concerning lawful and unlawful meats, but less so in respect to the simple precepts of the Thorah concerning sacrificial food; and (*b*) the term διδαχαὶ ποικίλαι καὶ ξέναι would hardly be applied by the sacred writer to laws or commandments which he recognised as of divine origin. It is therefore misleading and self-willed speculations and interpretations of divine precepts to which he is here referring. Now we know that Jewish asceticism in the apostolic age dealt largely in precepts and injunctions concerning the use of, or abstinence from, various kinds of food, but not in those concerning sacrificial feasts. The stricter Judaizing Christians in the Roman church were, we know, scrupulous in distinguishing between clean and unclean in the matter of food (Rom. xiv. 14), and even abstained from the use of wine and flesh-meat (xiv. 2, 21); and such scrupulosity the apostle regarded at the time as a pardonable weakness, which those stronger in the faith were to bear with. In the Epistle to the Colossians (ch. ii. 16–23) this self-willed asceticism has taken a more speculative character, and has developed into schismatical separation from the body of Christ; while in the pastoral epistles the ἀπέχεσθαι βρωμάτων is denounced among the gravest and most deadly errors, as διδασκαλίαι δαιμονίων (1 Tim. iv. 3). Now the Epistle to the Hebrews, whatever we may think of its authorship, stands unquestionably in close relationship to the later epistles of St. Paul, those especially written in the later years of his captivity. And if at that period the pernicious Judaizing gnosis, fruits of which are found in the pseudo-Clementines, was already in the course of development, it seems very unlikely that the Hebrew communities of Palestine should have remained unaffected by it. When St. Paul, writing to the Roman church, urges that the kingdom of heaven is not βρῶσις καὶ πόσις, but righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost, he is saying essentially the same thing as the apostolic writer here: καλὸν γὰρ χάριτι βεβαιοῦσθαι τὴν καρδίαν, οὐ βρώμασιν—*It is well that the heart be established by grace, not by meats:* χάριτι being here opposed as a divine operation on the soul to the outward and life-

less *ἐθελοθρησκεία* and *δόγματα* of the Judaizing teachers (Col. ii. 20-23), and *βεβαιοῦσθαι*, as the being rooted and grounded in Christ (Col. ii. 7), to the *παραφέρεσθαι*, the being borne or carried away by such erroneous teachings from the true path and goal. [The *textus receptus* has here *μὴ περιφέρεσθε*, *be not carried about*, or moved hither and thither as a reed shaken by the wind; an interpolation probably from Eph. iv. 14, for which Griesbach and all subsequent editors have rightly substituted *μὴ παραφέρεσθε*.] That *βρώματα* is here used by synecdoche for the whole ritual law cannot be asserted by the commentator, who has to do with what the writer says, not with what he might say or think otherwise. That this choice or rejection of particular kinds of food does not strengthen the heart, is further proved by the relative clause, *ἐν οἷς οὐκ ὠφελήθησαν οἱ περιπατήσαντες* (Lachmann, following A, D, reads *περιπατοῦντες* = *qui ambulabant*, which comes to the same thing): *ἐν οἷς* is to be connected with *οἱ περιπατ.*, *περιπατεῖν ἔν τινι* being a Pauline phrase (Eph. ii. 2, 10; Col. iii. 7: comp. *δουλεύειν ἔν τινι*, Rom. xiv. 18, and *τοῖς ἔθεσιν περιπατεῖν*, Acts xxi. 21), and not with *οὐκ ὠφελήθησαν*. Those who exercised themselves in (busied themselves about) different kinds of food, regarding some as lawful, others as unlawful, derived no profit from their useless speculations, the whole ceremonial law being *ἀνωφελές* (ch. vii. 18). The whole of the Old Testament affords proof that true strengthening of the heart, true inward blessing, is not to be found in meats and regulations concerning them. But how are we to understand the connection of that which follows ver. 10? Understanding *οὐ βρώμασιν* in the sense given above, is there not a want of connection in the argument? By no means. The laws concerning clean and unclean meats stand in close connection with those concerning sacrifice; and so they follow naturally, at Lev. xi., the precepts concerning the consecration of the sanctuary and of the priests. Their ground is given in the sentence that Israel is to be a "holy people," even as Jehovah Himself is holy (קדוֹשׁ). The observance of them is one condition on which Israel retains her rights to the communion

of the sanctuary. But for all this they are but *δικαιώματα σαρκός*. If, even when in full force under the Old Testament, they had no salutary spiritual influence on heart and mind, no real profit, how much less must this now be the case, when doctrines and speculations based upon them are leading away from Christ! They therefore stand in direct contrast here with the grace of Christ. Judaizing doctrines and precepts about meats and the grace of the new covenant mutually exclude one another.

Ver. 10. *We have an altar of sacrifice, of which they have no right to eat who serve the tabernacle.*

The one altar of sacrifice (*θυσιαστήριον*), around which the church of the New Testament is gathered, and where she knows all her grace and acceptance to have been procured, is unquestionably the place where Christ offered Himself in sacrifice (*διὰ θυσίας*, ch. ix. 26)—*ἀνήνεγκε*, ch. vii. 27 (comp. Jas. ii. 21; 1 Pet. ii. 24); or *προσήνεγκε*, ch. ix. 14; or (as might also be said) where He was offered—*προσηνέχθη*, ch. ix. 28. The place of this altar, therefore, is not a heavenly one (Bretschneider), the golden altar of incense alone having an heavenly antitype (Rev. viii. 3); neither can it be the Lord's table (Böhme, Bähr, Ebrard, Bisping), though, as we see from 1 Cor. x. 18, this interpretation is not without its truth; but it can only be the cross on Golgotha (*τὸ ξύλον*), the sacred writer himself going on immediately to speak of the place of the passion "without the camp." This is the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas, Bengel, Ernesti, Bleek, De Wette, Steugel, Lünemann, and indeed of the majority of commentators. The assumption (generally resorted to from fear of Roman Catholic consequences) that the altar is the Lord Himself (Bugenhagen and others, and more recently Biesenthal) is a *quid pro quo*; and the refusal of some interpreters to find any definite idea connected with the term (Michaëlis, Stier, Tholuck, Hofmann) is a whim. Why, then, should not the words *ἔχομεν θυσιαστήριον* express the truth that we are possessed, as Christians, of a place of atonement, seeing that the cross

of Golgotha was from all eternity the predestined place of offering for the greatest of all sacrifices, and that as now for the faith of the church of all times it has possessed, so for all eternity it will retain, this high, unique, mysterious dignity? The altar of the church of the redeemed is, then, her Redeemer's cross. It is a point, however, on which the sacred writer is not here insisting with any emphasis. He neither says *θυσιαστήριον ἔχομεν, an altar is ours*, nor *καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν θυσ., we also have an altar*. The point emphasized is this, that those who minister to the tabernacle (*οἱ τῇ σκηνῇ λατρεύοντες*) cannot partake of this our altar. Some have maintained that by this designation Christians are meant as the priests of the New Testament. So Schlichting: *Hæc verba nihil aliud sibi volunt quam Christianos non aliud habere sacrificium, quam ex quo vescendi facultatem nullam habent.* Comparing with this the connection in which St. Paul speaks of the partaking by Christians of the body and blood of Christ at 1 Cor. x. 14–22, we cannot but wonder at so audacious an interpolation of a thought so alien to the whole spirit of New Testament Scripture. Hofmann likewise (*Schriftb.* ii. 1. 322) regards *θυσιαστήριον* as a figurative term for the atonement, and *οἱ τῇ σκ. λατρ.* as a designation of Christians, finding in the whole sentence this meaning: that, having obtained through the one sacrifice forgiveness of sins, we need no further atonement. The connection of thought in the following vers. 11–13 might be brought under this as a general proposition; but surely this other is more simple, natural, and significant: Place not your hopes of salvation in legal observances in respect to food; we Christians have an altar, of which those who serve the legal tabernacle have no right to eat at all: our Redeemer suffered for our redemption outside the legal camp of Judaism; let us, deserting it, go and join Him there, bearing His reproach. The construction *οἱ τῇ σκηνῇ λατρεύοντες* is somewhat peculiar. The Septuagint occasionally combines *λειτουργεῖν* in this way with the dative of the sanctuary and altar, but only when the Hebrew *status constructus* מְשָׁרְתֵי has to be expressed, and the Greek translator

felt himself at a loss how otherwise to do so. Otherwise, while λατρεύειν τῷ Θεῷ or θεοῖς ἑτέροις is frequently met with, λατρεύειν τῇ σκηνῇ does not occur. *Est aculeus*, says Bengel, with delicate criticism, *quod dicit τῇ σκηνῇ non ἐν τῇ σκηνῇ*. Nor can it well be doubted that λατρεύοντες is purposely used instead of λειτουργοῦντες. The whole expression seems purposely to have an idolatrous air about it, and somewhat of the contemptuous or depreciating tone which we found at ch. viii. 5. A comparison with that passage shows that here the priests devoted to the service of the sanctuary, not the Jewish people generally, are the persons meant. We (believers under the N. T.) have an altar of whose sacrifice the church of the Old Testament—nay, even its most privileged class, its ministering priesthood—has no right to eat. The positive truth indirectly implied in this negative sentence is, that the sacrifice once offered on the altar of the cross is one of which, as Christians, we are permitted to partake, and that it far excels in virtue all other βρώματα. The thought, indeed, would be an obvious one to every reader. "*Seeing that*," says Rückert, "*there is a something in the Lord's Supper of which only Christians may partake, and that something the body of Christ, or, in the language of our epistle, the body of our atoning sacrifice, the readers could hardly fail in these words to find a reference to that holy sacrament.*" If the apostolic writer had really meant to say, what Hofmann supposes, that we, the priests of the new covenant, have no right to eat of our sacrifice, he would have been saying what is directly untrue; for Christ is our passover or paschal lamb (1 Cor. v. 7), and it is a fundamental thought of the Gospel of St. John, that this passover slain for us, and offered on the cross of Calvary, now gives us thence, in truth and reality, His flesh and blood as our "*meat and drink* (βρῶσις καὶ πόσις) *indeed*." Of the legal sacrifices, the Levitical priests obtained as their portion and food—(1) of the sin-offering of the prince or of a private individual, the whole flesh except the fat pieces which were consumed on the altar (Lev. iv. 26, 31, 35, compared with vi. 19, 22); (2) of the sin-offering of a poor man (a pigeon

or turtle-dove), the blood of which alone was given to the altar, the priest received the whole flesh (Lev. v. 9); (3) of the trespass-offering he likewise received the whole flesh, except the fat pieces as before (Lev. vii. 7); (4) of the burnt-offerings, which were wholly consumed on the altar, the priests received the skin only; (5) of the peace-offerings of individuals, the priests received breast and thighs, while the fat pieces were placed on the altar, and the rest of the flesh was given back to the worshipper (Lev. vii. 34), the consecrated loaves being divided between the offerer and the priest; (6) of the peace-offerings of the congregation at pentecost, the priests received the whole flesh, with all the loaves (Lev. xxiii. 20). The share of the priest in other vegetable offerings we leave here unnoticed. It is, however, with our author a point of importance that there were sin-offerings of which the Levitical priests received no part whatsoever, not even, as in the case of the burnt-offering, the skin of the victim. On this he founds typologically their total exclusion from participation of the sin-offering of the New Testament:

Vers. 11, 12. *For the bodies of those beasts, whose blood is brought into the sanctuary by the high priest for sin, are burned outside the camp. Wherefore Jesus also, that he might sanctify the people through his own blood, suffered outside the gate.*

The connection of thought is clear as day. The priests of the law, representing the people of the law, have no right to partake of our altar; for as the bodies of those legal victims, whose blood the high priest brought into the sanctuary for atonement, were, without the priests enjoying any portion of them, burned without the camp, even so was Christ, their antitype, corporeally destroyed outside the gate of Jerusalem, the priesthood and people of the Jews having no participation in His sacrifice, inasmuch as they had wilfully rejected Him. [The words *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* are rejected by Tischendorf after A, but are found in D, K, M, and Chrysostom, and also in C*, after *ἅγια* (Lachmann).] Of

the following sin-offerings the blood was brought within the tabernacle: (1) The sin-offering of the high priest for himself. In this case the blood of the bullock was partly sprinkled on that side of the veil which fronted the holy place, partly applied to the altar of incense, and the rest of it poured out at the foot of the altar of burnt-offering (Lev. iv. 5–7). (2) The sin-offering of the congregation in certain cases of aggravated transgression. In these the blood of the victims was treated precisely as in the former instance (see Lev. iv. 16–18, and comp. Num. xv. 24). (3) The two combined sin-offerings for high priest and congregation on the great day of atonement. In this case the blood was not only carried into the holy place, but beyond it into the holy of holies, and sprinkled on the mercy-seat (Lev. xvi.). In all these three sin-offerings the fat pieces were consumed on the altar, and the rest of the flesh burnt outside the camp. The sacred writer has here doubtless the sin-offerings on the day of atonement specially in view, which were offered on behalf of the whole congregation, the high priest and his family, and the whole priesthood; *τὰ ἅγια* being here, as at ix. 8, the sanctuary *par excellence*—the holy of holies. In accordance with the ordinance that the bodies of such sacrifices should be burnt outside the camp of Israel—an ordinance, as intimated by the *διό* in the following sentence, of typico-prophetic meaning—the Lord Jesus, as the antitypical sin-offering, suffered without the gate of Jerusalem, *i.e.* beyond the precincts of the holy city. The question may be asked, Why and with what right the sacred writer here singles out a less significant part of the sacrificial action for comparison with the passion of Christ? To answer this question, we must bear in mind that the Lord's self-offering, *προσφορά*, is in our author's view a two-fold action, having both an earthly and a heavenly side, and that the typical sacrifice separates and transposes acts which in the antitypical fulfilment are closely combined, or follow one another in a different order. For instance, the sprinkling of the blood before the mercy-seat is typical of our Lord's heavenly *προσφορά*; while the slaying of the victim

in the outer court, the offering of the fat upon the altar, and the burning of the flesh without the camp, are all typical of the one transaction on Mount Calvary. It is quite unnecessary, with Bähr and Lünemann, to restrict the parallelism to ἔξω τῆς παρεμβολῆς = ἔξω τῆς πύλης, and thrust, on the other hand, that between τούτων τὰ σώματα κατακαίεται and Ἰησοῦς ἔπαθεν into the background. Yet we allow that it is only in one particular that the Lord's passion corresponds antitypically to this κατακαίεσθαι,—namely, as Hofmann truly observes, that in both cases the atoning victim is annihilated in accordance with the will of God. The resemblance goes no further than this. The destruction by fire of the type is prescribed by the Levitical law, the slaying of the divine antitype is an act of human enmity. To which we may add (against Hofmann), that as the priests of the law were debarred from partaking of the sin-offering of the day of atonement, the holiest of all the sacrifices (all sin-offerings being, as such, קדשי קדשים), so also they have no right to partake of the antitypical sin-offering of our altar, viz. the cross; that we as Christians have that privilege, but that we debar ourselves from it when we go back to seek salvation in the observances of the law, and put ourselves once more among those who rejected the Redeemer and cast Him out as evil, so unconsciously making Him the antitype in that particular of the holiest of all their legal sacrifices.

Ver. 13. *Therefore let us go forth unto him outside the camp, bearing his reproach.*

The particle τοίνυν commonly occupies the second place in the sentence (Luke xx. 25; 1 Cor. ix. 26), or even one yet further advanced. Here, as in later authors, and as occasionally in the Septuagint (Isa. iii. 10, v. 13, xxvii. 4, xxxiii. 23), it stands first. The meaning is: Therefore let us no longer continue in their society who have rejected the Lord Jesus, but go forth to Him outside the camp, ἔξω τῆς παρεμβολῆς,—*i.e.*, as Theodoret well interprets it, ἔξω τῆς κατὰ νόμον πολιτείας (comp. Tertullian—*extra civitatem crucifixus* —*adv. Jud.* c. 14),—inasmuch as to belong to their society is

to reject Christ, and to return to it is to deny Him, a sin for which there is no forgiveness. On the other hand, to forsake their company and communion for His sake is to involve ourselves not merely in future but in present shame or reproach (this is the force of the present participle φέροντες); but this reproach is the reproach of Christ, a shame which we share with Him, and in bearing which we are made like Him. Thiersch's view, that the purpose of our epistle was to comfort the Hebrew Christians under a sentence of excommunication from the synagogue, is unsupported by any historical evidence, or by the tone of the epistle itself. The sacred writer does not say, Let us joyfully bear a rejection like that of our Master, but, Let us willingly join Him of our own accord. And such a resolution cannot, he thinks, cost them much. Why should the earthly Jerusalem have for us any attraction? Our franchise and our home is above.

Ver. 14. *For here we have no continuing city, but we seek that to come.*

Here (ὧδε[1]), that is, in this world generally, and consequently even in Jerusalem, we have no continuing city, none which is able to afford us an established residence and citizenship; but our aspirations are directed (ἐπιζητεῖν as xi. 14) to the city which is to come. We are only pilgrims, like the faithful believers of every age (ch. xi.), who look for the city which has sure foundations (xi. 10). We are, on the one hand, already come to the heavenly Jerusalem, inasmuch as it is present to the eye of faith (xii. 22); but, on the other hand, as we still look forward to its manifestation, and to our translation into it, it is the aim of our longing hope. The home present to our faith and hope is, therefore, a different place from the camp of the Jews. Whether the author, by saying ἔξω τῆς παρεμβολῆς instead of ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, intends to point to the possibility of the breaking

[1] Böhme remarks on ὧδε in a signification of locality: "Vix Græca est particula;" but, in spite of Aristarchus, it is Homeric, and was always good Greek, at least in the vulgar tongue: *v.* Buttmann, *Ausführl. Sprachl.* ii. 362.

up of the latter, I must leave undecided; at all events, his utterance, *οὐκ ἔχομεν ὧδε μένουσαν πόλιν*, attained a fearful confirmation in the destruction of Jerusalem, which followed soon after the composition of the epistle; and his summons, *τοίνυν ἐξερχώμεθα*, was placed, as regarded his readers, in a hitherto unforeboded connection with the prophecies and warnings of the Lord, recorded in Luke xvii. 28–32, xxi. 21–24. The destruction of Jerusalem did not, indeed, forthwith render the sacrificial service absolutely impossible,[1] but yet such an alteration took place that the Jewish nation renounced the idea of the restoration of it, especially since the possibility became more and more doubtful, and external difficulties arose which could not well be obviated. After the Servant of God had suffered "without" on Golgotha, and had been consumed in the fire of which Isaiah speaks (ch. l. 11), God withdrew His will and His favour from the legal sacrificial cultus: there are still, indeed, sacrifices which are well-pleasing to God, but only the sacrifices of a thankful confession and of a love active in good works, offered up

[1] It was not forthwith absolutely impossible, inasmuch as, according to the universal Jewish maxim, the locality of the temple retained its sanctity even after the destruction of the latter: אף על פי שחרב בקדושתו עמד; so that, as a matter of principle, only pure priests of genuine descent were needed in order to restore the sacrificial service, which, according to the evidence of the Talmud, was offered for a long time after the destruction of the temple, at least with a view to the feast of the passover. Holdheim therefore says, in his *Ceremonialgesetz im Messiasreich*, p. 79: "If it be true that the idea of atonement is, even now, absolutely bound up with a sacrifice, and that only in cases where the latter is impossible God is temporarily content with the reading of the sacrificial chapters, it must be confessed that the Jews are guilty as regards the want of atonement, as it is simply owing to their want of energy that they are unable to erect an altar and sacrifice in the holy places of the temple." This learned representative of reformed Judaism looks upon the sacrificial service as condemned for ever; sin is henceforth atoned for by repentance and faith in God's mercy. As if the sacrifice was merely a disused symbol and not also a fulfilled prophecy! During the Babylonian captivity, God prepared His people for the fulfilment of this prophecy in His Servant (Isa. liii.), and their present exile will continue until Israel renounces self-atonement, and prefers the blood of God's Servant to the litany of the sacrificial chapters.

on the foundation of the one all-sufficient atonement which we owe to Him, the Father of Jesus Christ.

Ver. 15. *By him, therefore, let us offer a sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is, the fruit of lips, confessing thankfully to his name.*

Θυσία αἰνέσεως is, in the Old Testament sacrificial ritual, the name given to the voluntary peace-offering עַל־תּוֹדָה (Lev. vii. 12–25), which is offered in consequence of any event imposing the duty of special thanks and praise, and is distinguished from other peace-offerings by an addition of cakes, in conformity with its joyful occasion and aim, and also by a shorter interval of time being allowed for the eating of it, in conformity with its greater sanctity. In the Psalms this Thoda-offering was a symbol of the thanks of the heart and lips (Ps. cxvi. 17, l. 14, 23); and a well-known utterance of the ancient synagogue (*Levit. Rabba*, c. 27 f. 197*d*, *Tanchuma* 55*b*) says: "In the future all sacrifices will cease, but the thank-offering (קרבן התודה) ceases not." The author of the epistle explains what *θυσία αἰνέσεως* is by *καρπὸν χείλεων ὁμολογούντων τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ*, and evidently refers to Hos. xiv. 2, where the LXX. renders *καὶ ἀνταποδώσομεν καρπὸν χειλέων ἡμῶν* (פרי שפתינו), while in the Masoretic text the humbly supplicating and adoring lips are called "calves" or "bullocks" (פָּרִים). "Fruit of the lips" is a biblical image: according to a favourite Old Testament idea, thoughts are the branches and twigs, and words the flowers and fruit which, rooted in the mind and heart, and springing up thence, shoot forth and ripen from mouth and lips.[1] The lips, the fruit of which we are to bring to God's altar, are those which laud and praise God's name, that is Him, so far as He has allowed Himself to be named, to be discerned, and to be known. *Ὁμολογεῖν* with God or His name in the dative means more than *to confess;* it is equivalent to *ἐξομολογεῖσθαι τῷ . . .* by which the LXX. renders (לְשֵׁם ה׳) הוֹדָה לַה׳; Philo interprets this (not correctly lexicographically speaking), *τὴν ἐκτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ὁμολογίαν*, *i.e.* the confession of the human

[1] On this point, *vid.* my *Bibl. Psychologie*, p. 142.

spirit going out of itself and offering itself up to God (i. 60. 13). The pronoun *αὐτοῦ* refers back to God, *τῷ Θεῷ*; *δι' αὐτοῦ*, on the contrary, points to Jesus our sin-offering, and at the same time our high priest, just as *δι' αὐτοῦ*, vii. 25. Clement of Rome comments on this *δι' αὐτοῦ*, connecting it with Ps. l. 23 (LXX.), and goes on to say (c. xxxvi.), "This is the way, beloved, in which we found our salvation, Jesus Christ, the High Priest of our offerings, the Mediator for, and helper of, our weakness: through Him, we turn our glance to the highest heaven; through Him, we see as in a mirror His (God's) most pure and most sublime countenance; through Him, the eyes of our hearts have been opened, and our undiscerning and darkened intelligence grows up into His wonderful light; through Him, according to the Lord's will, we shall get to taste of immortal knowledge."[1] In addition to the sacrifice of a thankful confession which we are to offer to God on the foundation of our one sin-offering and through the mediation of our High Priest, there are also other sacrifices pleasing to God, which we must be diligent in offering.

Ver. 16. *But to do good and to communicate forget not; for with such sacrifices God is well pleased.*

Both psalms and prophets teach that תּוֹדָה, Ps. l. 14, and חֶסֶד (in the post-biblical language גְּמִילוּת חֲסָדִים), Hos. vi. 8, are the offerings most acceptable to God. The noun *εὐποιΐα* is a late formation from *εὖ ποιεῖν*, Mark xiv. 7, which also occurs in Lucian (*imag.* 21), Marc. Aurel.,[2] and elsewhere; *κοινωνία* is used to denote fellowship and practical fellowship in possessions, as in the Pauline epistles (2 Cor. ix. 13; Rom. xv. 26) it means plainly the assistance rendered by charitable contributions. The confirmatory words, *τοιαύταις γάρ*, refer

[1] By its analytical, oratorical, second-rate, and developed method, as compared with the simplicity, original force, and pithiness of the Epistle to the Hebrews, this one passage proves that Clement of Rome could have had no share in its composition.

[2] viii. 23: *Πράσσω τι; ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων εὐποιΐαν ἀναφέρων· συμβαίνει τί μοι; δέχομαι, ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀναφέρων.*

to such sacrifices of beneficent, communicating love. By these God is rendered well pleased, εὐαρεστεῖται,—a use of the passive which the author shares with Diod., Diog. Laert., and Polyb.[1]

In his inculcation of the special duties of life, the author in ver. 7 proceeded to speak of the rulers of the church, those, indeed, who had departed this life — for the dissimilarity between the present and former condition of the church had gone to his heart;—and, on the ground of the eternal sameness of Jesus Christ, he exhorted his readers not to allow themselves to be led away, by a Judaizing conformity to the law, from our one most holy sin-offering and the fellowship with His altar. He now again turns to the leaders of the church, and to the obligations due to them while still living.

Ver. 17. *Obey those who preside among you, and submit yourselves; for they watch for your souls as they that must give account, that they may do it with joy and not with grief; for that is unprofitable for you.*

From this exhortation, we see that the rulers of the church were firmly established, and had perhaps complained to the author of the epistle of the apostasy which was springing up in the community; for it must have been the case, that those who were sound in faith among the Hebrew Christians felt themselves increasingly drawn towards St. Paul and his fellow-labourers, the more clearly they perceived the perilous character of the mode of life and thought produced by that middle course between Judaism and Christianity pursued by the majority. Although the author makes trusting obedience (πείθεσθαι) and yielding compliance (ὑπείκειν, only occurring here in biblical Greek = *obsecundare* or *obtemperare*) towards their rulers an obligation on his readers, we are not compelled to assume that their standpoint was in all points that of St. Paul; sufficient that they were as sincerely, decidedly, completely, and fully in earnest about Christianity, as we know was the case with, for instance, St. James. By his exhortation to the members of the church in the first place, the author

[1] M inconsistently gives: τοιαῦται γὰρ θυσίαι εὐεργετεῖται ὁ Θεός.

warns also the rulers of the same, although only indirectly and in the most delicate manner, of the heavy responsibility resting on them; for *αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀγρυπνοῦσιν . . .* is not merely a statement of fact, but is also an enunciation of the obligation involved in their office. They, *αὐτοί*, whose office brings this with it as a right and a duty, watch over the salvation of your souls without allowing any intermission through the sleep of indolence and false security, *ὡς λόγον ἀποδώσοντες*, that is, when the Chief Shepherd shall appear (1 Pet. v. 4).[1] Therefore obey them and comply with their directions, so that they may carry out this *ἀγρυπνεῖν* with joy, and not with grief at the fruitlessness of their labour; for this is unprofitable for you, that is—if the milder negative expression is changed into a positive one—will bring harm to you, viz. the loss of salvation. The adjective *ἀλυσιτελές* does not occur elsewhere in the New Testament; perhaps, however, *λυσιτελεῖ*, in Luke xvii. 2. The exhortation is Pauline in its spirit (1 Thess. v. 12, 13); its wording is, however, more in St. Luke's style; but expressions peculiar to both Paul and Luke are intermixed in it.

After alluding to the rulers of the Hebrew-Christian church, the author goes on to speak of himself in the first place, but also including his colleagues.

Ver. 18. *Pray for us, for we are convinced that we have a good conscience, in all things striving to live honestly.*

Bl., Lünem., and others maintain, indeed, that in *περὶ ἡμῶν* the author refers to himself exclusively; but passages such as 1 Thess. v. 25, 2 Thess. iii. 1, Col. iv. 3, are not, looking at the preamble of these three epistles, favourable to this view, and it seems to me that it would be hardly becoming in the author to begin to speak of himself in the plural, just after he had mentioned the *ἡγούμενοι*. He intends to refer to himself and his fellow-labourers, who with him are preaching the gospel in the Gentile world, far distant from the Hebrew Christians. A distinctive *ἐγὼ* was not required

[1] Ὁ *φόβος ταύτης τῆς ἀπειλῆς*, says Chrys. (*de sacerd.* l. vi. *init.* § 497, ed. Bengel), *συνεχῶς κατασείει μου τὴν ψυχήν.*

in ver. 19, for in περὶ ἡμῶν the author included and especially pointed to himself. His asking for their prayers is grounded on the joyfulness of conscience which pervaded himself and those of a like spirit with him. Instead of (*rec.*) πεποίθαμεν γάρ, *we trust, we are confident*, according to A, C*, D*, M, It., and other testimony, it should be read πειθόμεθα γάρ, *we are persuaded, are convinced;* the former expression is more in Paul's (Phil. ii. 24), the latter more in Luke's style (Acts xxvi. 26). A good conscience (καλή, in other places ἀγαθή, Acts xxiii. 1, and elsewhere[1]) is one which testifies to the agreement of our moral conduct with God's law written in our hearts, and with His revealed will,—a conscience which, so far from accusing us, bids us take comfort, as regards God, on the ground of His mercy, and as regards human judgment, on the ground of our just conduct (1 Cor. iv. 3 f.); but the idea that we are in possession of a good conscience of this kind may be a delusion and untruth caused by blinding and deafening ourselves, and the author therefore says that this was his conviction, that is, his conviction founded on God's word, and confirmed by, and resting on, the Lord. The participial sentence might belong to πειθόμεθα, as a statement of the actual condition from which this conviction results; but it is better to connect it with ἔχομεν as showing what the consciences of him and his colleagues testified to them, being for this very reason *good* consciences. It testifies to them that, ἐν πᾶσιν, in all points (as ver. 4), they strive to behave in that way which is right and seemly. Θέλοντες involves more than their merely wishing this: it is the fervent striving which is evident to themselves. From this self-vindication we may gather that the teaching or life of the author, or both together, had been a subject of mistrust and suspicion among the Hebrews. It is the old and still undestroyed opposition, and the old evil repute with which the Pauline *kerygma* and those who held it had even now to contend. The enfeebling or disquiet of their intercessory

[1] On this point, *vid.* my *Biblische Psychologie*, p. 103, in which the biblical predicates referring to the so-called following and preceding conscience are collected.

prayer for him and his colleagues, which might possibly arise from these causes, is thus anticipated by the writer; he himself in particular needed these prayers, the hearing of which would prove beneficial not only to him, but also to those who prayed.

Ver. 19. *But I beseech you the more earnestly to do this, that I may be restored to you the sooner.*

The intensive περισσοτέρως (*vid.* on ii. 1) belongs, in the author's intention, as much, perhaps, to τοῦτο ποιῆσαι (that is, προσεύχεσθαι περὶ ἡμῶν) as to παρακαλῶ. He entreats them all the more urgently to pray for him, so that his wish to be of service to them still longer, and indeed by his personal presence, may be the sooner fulfilled. We are reminded of the passage, Philem. 22, ἐλπίζω γὰρ ὅτι διὰ τῶν προσευχῶν ὑμῶν χαρισθήσομαι ὑμῖν; but the expression here is in other ways worthy of remark. The verb ἀποκαθιστάναι signifies *to restore* (Luke vi. 10, as Mark iii. 5; Acts i. 6); but also, *to present again*, *to again give one something for his own*, as Polyb. iii. 98, ἐὰν ἐξαγαγὼν τοὺς ὁμήρους ἀποκαταστήσῃ τοῖς γονεῦσι καὶ ταῖς πόλεσιν; or, *to remove back somewhere*, as Polyb. iii. 5, εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν (γῆν). The comparative form τάχιον is the only one usual in the New Testament; the older Attic form θᾶσσον is not met with even as a various reading. From the ἵνα τάχιον ἀποκατασταθῶ ὑμῖν, we may conclude, (1) that the author had stood in some personal relation to his readers which had been beneficial to them, just as St. Paul, as we know, was moved to the heart for the mother-church at Jerusalem, and sought to excite everywhere an active, loving sympathy for it, and in the year 58 visited it personally for the fifth time; (2) that this union had now suffered some interruption, he being at that time kept at a distance from them by certain circumstances. More than this we are unable to conclude. It does not necessarily follow that, at the then present time, the author was in captivity; and the intention expressed in ver. 23 to come to them shortly with Timothy stands in the way of the idea, although indeed it does not unanswerably

show (Lünem., as also Beza) that, at the place from which he writes, he had the free disposal of his person; for the promise might have been made on the grounds of a confident expectation of a speedy release. It must honestly be confessed that we know little or nothing about the matter. For, on the other hand, the supposition, that nothing less than bonds and danger of death could have detained the author at that time, is supported by the mode in which the concluding benedictory prayer is framed.

The author, before adding a few postscripts and his final salutation, sums up all that he implores for his readers in a comprehensive benedictory prayer, which may be compared with those in 1 Thess. v. 23 and 1 Pet. v. 10 f.

Vers. 20, 21. *Now the God of peace, that brought again from the dead the great Shepherd of the sheep, in virtue of the blood of an everlasting covenant, our Lord Jesus, make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well-pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.*

The choice of the designations given to God and to the Lord Jesus may be explained by reference to the matter which precedes: (1.) The church is threatened by the danger of dissension, by the propagation in it of a Judaizing tendency, from which the worst results were to be feared, by alienating the members from their rulers, and especially from the author of this epistle; God is therefore called here the "God of peace,"—the God who loves peace,—and, having given to us the King of peace, is the Author and Dispenser of peace (vii. 2). (2.) Obedience to the elders of the church, and intercession for those holding the apostolical office, had just before been the subject in question; and in respect to both points, Jesus is called, in a connection similar to that in 1 Pet. v. 2–4, "the great Shepherd of the sheep." (3.) The author, by some kind of restraint which he would fain be free from, is detained far away from his readers; and this, as it appears, induced him to designate God as "He who had brought again from the dead the Lord Jesus,"

and had consequently loosed the firmest fetters—those of the kingdom of the dead (Acts ii. 24). This is the only passage in which the author mentions the resurrection. In other places his glance, passing over all the intervening stages, turns forthwith from the depth of our Lord's humiliation to the highest pinnacle of His exaltation. He is here induced to make mention of the event intermediate between Golgotha and God's throne, between the altar of the cross and the holiest of holies—the resurrection of Him who died as a sin-offering for us. He mentions it, however, in a way which is in harmony with the anagogical tendency of his epistle, that is, combining with it the heavenly exaltation. For although *ἀναγαγών* does not precisely include the ascension (Bl., Bisp.), still it is a word which points upward (*ἀνα*, *sursum*, and secondly *rursum*). The passage Isa. lxiii. 11 ("Where is He that brought them up out of the sea with the shepherd of His flock?" *i.e.* with him at the head) must have had some share in suggesting the mode of expression. In this passage the LXX. translates, *ποῦ ὁ ἀναβιβάσας ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης τὸν ποιμένα τῶν προβάτων*. The author of the epistle has in ch. ii. compared Moses and Christ: Moses is a shepherd of the sheep (that is, of God's flock), and Christ is *ὁ ποιμὴν τῶν πρωβάτων ὁ μέγας*, just as in relation to Aaron He is *ἱερεὺς μέγας* (x. 21); the former, the Old Testament mediator, is raised up by God *ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης*, and the latter, the New Testament Mediator, *ἐκ νεκρῶν*,—both for the fulfilment of their respective vocations.[1] It is less certain whether the author had in view the passage Zech. ix. 11, where it says: "Thou also . . . by the blood of thy covenant, *ἐν αἵματι διαθήκης σου* (that is, in virtue of the covenant previously concluded and consecrated by blood), I have sent

[1] Instead of *ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης*, A, X, E, F, Chryst., Rufin. read *ἐκ (τῆς) γῆς*,—A, in addition, omits *ποῦ*,—evidently with a view of making the reference to the resurrection of Christ more suitable. That this was done with reference to Heb. xiii. 20, is confirmed by Chrysostom, Didym., Cyril of Jer., who in this passage read *ἐκ (τῆς) γῆς*. Mutian translates: "qui eduxit de terra pastorem magnum pecorum." Among the New Testament codd., 46* has it thus.

forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water." Of course, the *διαθήκη*, which Christ has brought about and consecrated by His own blood, is called *αἰώνιος* in contrast to the temporary and insufficient *διαθήκη* of which Moses was the mediator, consecrating it with the blood of calves and goats (ix. 18 ff.). Of course, also, the above Old Testament passage shows what is the most appropriate meaning of *ἐν*. If it was the ascent to God and not the resurrection which is the matter in question here, the *ἐν* might be understood, as in ix. 25, cf. 12, in the sense of *being accompanied by* (Calv., von Gerl., Bisp., following Bl.).[1] As, however, it is the resurrection which is spoken of, the signification of agency, and indeed of an acting cause (by means of, in the virtue of, by the power of), is incomparably more suitable. But the question arises, whether the words *ἐν αἵματι διαθ. αἰων.* are to be, in this sense, connected with *ἀναγαγών* (Oek., Theophyl., Anselm, Aq., Lth., Seb. Schmidt, Beng., Mich., M'Lean, Hofm., and others), or with *τὸν ποιμένα τῶν πρ. τὸν μέγαν* (Hunn., Gerh., Grot., Calov., Braun., Ernesti, Dindorf, Schultz, Böhme, Lünemann, and others), or merely with *τὸν μέγαν* (Baumg., Ebr., and a few others); De Wette and Tholuck are in doubt on the point. In point of fact, the connection with *ἀναγαγών*, and that with the whole of the idea, *τὸν ποιμένα . . . μέγαν*, in which *μέγαν* has the principal emphasis, are equally permissible. For the resurrection of Jesus, which, in the first place, set *Him* forth as the person vindicated, took place through the blood which atoned for the sins of man (ix. 28), which burdened Him in His death; and this blood also extinguished God's wrath, set free God's love, and founded an altered relation between God and man—a relation of eternal fellowship of love. And, on the other hand, in virtue of this blood, He is the great Shepherd of the sheep; this He is, because this blood is the blood of an everlasting covenant by which He has sealed

[1] Thus also Kahnis, *Abendm.* p. 70: "The blood is understood as that which the Son took with Him into the life of the resurrection, consequently the power of His sacrifice, eternally present, eternally saving, eternally uniting God and man.

His claim to the sheep, has proved His faithfulness and acquired for them God's eternal love. We, however, must decide for the connection with *ἀναγαγών*, because the ideas which the other connections express are included therein. "Virtute ac merito sanguinis ipsius in morte effusi" (Aq.). God has brought up out of the province or kingdom of the dead, Him who, as the eternal One, is the great Shepherd of the sheep. "'Shepherd,'" says Rieger on this passage, "was always a beautiful name for the office of the Lord Jesus; but at first a heavy charge attached to this name: now, however, this is surmounted; now, by faithfulness to Him who gave the command and by love to the sheep, all has been done and suffered; now is He called the great Shepherd of the sheep who can give effect to His words, 'I give my sheep eternal life, they shall never perish, and no one shall pluck them out of my hand.' All His greatness and glory are now applied by Him for the pasture and eternal exaltation of His flock." For this very reason, the author calls Him in addition *τὸν Κυριον ἡμῶν*, and also gives Him the beloved and highly-esteemed name of *Ἰησοῦς*, which is, as it were, an emblem and anagram of the whole. For this very reason, in the prayer which follows this grand preamble, *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, the risen and consequently living One, is pointed out as He through whom God works in us *τὸ εὐάρεστον ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* (cf. Ps. cxiv. 9, LXX.), inasmuch as we attain to all the effects of mercy, all God's gifts of grace, only through Him, the exalted Mediator. It is possible, but in my view not probable, that the words *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (the complete name) are placed at the end, in order to connect therewith the doxology, which is not intended to apply directly to God, but to Him who, in consequence of His surrender of Himself, is crowned with honour and glory. Schmid, the follower of C. A. Crusius,[1] remarks more correctly, "*scil. Deus; summa enim est patris gloria e præstita per Jesum redemptione.*" God, indeed, is the chief subject of the sentence, He is the *ἀναγαγών*,

[1] A celebrated theologian of the 18th century, professor at Leipsic 1744-75, opponent of the Wolfian philosophy and of Ernesti. See Herzog's *Real-Encyclopädie*, art. *Crusius*, vol. iii. pp. 192, 193.

He is *ποιῶν* in us, His good pleasure is the ultimate aim, and to Him, according to all that precedes, is the honour due. It is quite unmistakeable that, in this passage, there is much that is entirely Pauline in its character. *Ὁ Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης* is one of Paul's favourite designations for God, which is made use of, 2 Cor. xiii. 11, Rom. xvi. 20 (cf. Phil. iv. 9, 2 Thess. iii. 16), in reference to a position of the church similar to the present case. And *ἀναγαγεῖν ἐκ νεκρῶν* occurs Rom. x. 7, at least with reference to the fact of the resurrection. The shaping of the prayer reminds us of Phil. i. 6 and other passages; the doxology with its confirmatory "Amen" calls to remembrance Gal. i. 5, Rom. xvi. 27,[1] and other passages. The phrase *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*, which is to be retained here in opposition to Tischendorf, according to A, C*, K, M, and also *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, are frequently used by the apostle. On the other hand, the phrase *ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ* is far more a favourite expression with Luke than with Paul, and there is no more suitable parallel to the preamble of the prayer than Acts xx. 28, in which, as here, the church of the Lord is described as a *flock* which He hath purchased with His own blood.

Although this work is distinguished from all the New Testament epistles, not excluding even the first Epistle of John, by its commencement being devoid of any epistolary form, still it might now be concluded, after the line taken since xiii. 1, without our needing any further confirmation, that we have before us an epistle in all due form. But the addition now made by the author completely removes all doubt on the point.

[1] Even in this passage *ᾧ* (instead of which *αὐτῷ* might have been expected, Eph. iii. 21) is not to be referred (as by Philippi) to *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χρ.*, but to God, as carrying out all that takes place, by means of a wise plan, to a glorious termination. In this doxology the apostle intends to concentrate the whole purport of his epistle, but the great and irrepressible thoughts which burst from his heart interrupt the scheme of the clause; on reaching the end of it, he appears to have forgotten the grammatical form of its commencement. Where, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, do we find anything which can be compared to these breaks in connection so peculiar to the Pauline style?

Ver. 22. *And I beseech you, brethren, suffer the word of exhortation; for I have written a letter unto you in few words.*

This is the first time in the epistle in which the author speaks of himself in the singular. A supplementary παρακαλῶ of this kind occurs in Rom. xvi. 17, 1 Cor. xvi. 15, and a similar remark on the part of the writer as to his work in Rom. xv. 15. All the rest of the verse is, however, in Luke's style of phraseology: ἀνέχεσθαι, *to give a patient, willing audience* (Acts xviii. 14, cf. 1 Cor. xi. 4); λόγος παρακλήσεως (Acts xiii. 15); ἐπιστέλλειν (as *mittere*), *to write a letter, to send information in an epistolary form*, only in Acts xv. 20, xxi. 25. The reading ἀνέχεσθαι (Lachm.) must, on account of its slight attestation, give way to the more urgent ἀνέχεσθε (A, C, D***, K, M). The author most appropriately describes his epistle as a λόγος παρακλήσεως; for the whole purport of it tends to exhort the readers to constancy in the faith, and to guard them from apostasy and departure from the cross. Perhaps, also, it was not without influence on his choice of the term, that only towards the end he turns from the form of a treatise and discourse into that of an epistle. The supplicatory word ἀνέχεσθε is explained by the fact that the author does not stand in any very close official relation to his readers, and generally does not assert the authority of his office with respect to them, and yet that he had not spared them some severe censures, and, in ch. vi. and x., had set before them the danger of apostasy in a way that was certainly calculated to excite dislike. But all that he had to say to them is abridged as briefly as possible, so as to lighten the burden to them, if his epistle is found burdensome, and at all events to trouble them for as short a time as possible. In this sense the ἀνέχεσθε is grounded on the words καὶ γὰρ διὰ βραχέων (as δι' ὀλίγου, 1 Pet. v. 12) ἐπέστειλα ὑμῖν.[1] Probably the meaning of καὶ γάρ in this passage is *etenim*, and not *num*

[1] D gives a remarkable variation here: καὶ γὰρ διὰ τραχέων ἀπέστειλα ὑμῖν. Unfortunately the conclusion of the Latin translation (D. Lat., quoted by us as "*It.*"), from διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χρ. (ver. 21), is wanting.

etiam; it is, however, possible that the meaning of "also" is attached to *καί*, that is, an "also" referring to the whole sentence, so that the brevity of the epistle is put forward as a reason for their *ἀνέχεσθαι*, which is to be added to the other reasons (chiefly the salvation of their souls). With regard to the question, how far the author was justified in calling his somewhat lengthy epistle a brief one, that is, as compared with other apostolic epistles, Theophylact has forcibly remarked, that he styles it brief *ὅσον πρὸς ἃ ἐπεθύμει λέγειν.* His alleging the brevity of his admonitory addresses to them as a reason why they should bear with them, is, however, a delicately refined turn of expression. He deals gently with them in order to win their love, or rather their souls for the Lord.

The promise of an early visit now follows:

Ver. 23. *Know ye that our brother Timothy is set at liberty; with whom, if he come shortly, I shall see you.*

"There are no definite grounds for deciding," says Tholuck, "whether *γινώσκετε* is to be understood as an imperative or indicative." Certainly *γινώσκετε* occurs both in the sense of *scitis*—*e.g.* Phil. ii. 22 (of Timothy); 2 Cor. viii. 9,—and also for *scitote*, *e.g.* Gal. iii. 7; 2 Tim. iii. 1. But must not the feeling have been a correct one which led all translators, from the Peshito down to Luther, Beza, and Bengel (except only Erasm., *vers.*, but not *paraphr.*), to take it as an imperative? The reason which induced Bl., contrary to his former opinion, to decide in favour of the indicative, is a futile one, viz. that, in the announcement of something that was unknown to the readers, more definite information might be expected; for the imperative presupposes that the readers were aware of Timothy's fate, but not of its issue. Lünemann, on the contrary, justly remarks, that this notice, if understood as an indicative, would be superfluous; moreover, in this case, as it appears to me, we should have expected to find *οἴδατε* or *ἠκούσατε*. We must, consequently, understand it as *scitote*, on which Bengel, with his usual delicacy of perception, remarks, "cum gaudio." The construc-

tion is purely Greek, as *e.g.* in Xen. *Anab.* v. 5. 7: ἤκουσε τὴν χώραν δηουμένην; Thuc. iv. 50: πυθόμενοι βασιλέα τεθνηκότα; *ibid.* vii. 77: γνῶτε ἀναγκαῖον ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι,—the verb is joined with an accusative of the object and also of the predicate. Instead of τὸν ἀδελφὸν Τιμ., τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἡμῶν Τιμ. (with Lachm., according to A, C, D*, all translations and other testimony) is to be read, as in 1 Thess. iii. 2, Τιμ. τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἡμῶν; but on this we may remark, that everywhere else Paul places the apposition after the proper name. It is still more worthy of remark that the word ἀπολύειν, not occurring in Paul's writings, is a usual one in Luke's style, in the sense both of release from prison or captivity (besides Luke xxii. 68, xxiii. 16 ff., *e.g.* Acts iii. 13, iv. 21) and also of official deputation (Acts xiii. 3, xv. 30), for which Paul uses πέμπειν (*e.g.* 2 Thess. iii. 2), solemn dismissal (Acts xv. 33), and of dismissal generally (Acts xix. 41, xxiii. 22). Consequently ἀπολελ. (*Pesh.* ראשתרי; *Vulg. dimissum*) may equally well express that Timothy was engaged on some official mission as that he was again set at liberty, although—and this we concede to Bleek—in the latter sense, any further precise definition of the circumstances might be better dispensed with than if it were taken in the former meaning.[1] It is, however, true that this twenty-third verse exactly harmonizes with the idea that Paul was the author of the epistle; for no one stood in closer relation to Timothy than Paul, and this relation became more and more intimate towards the end of the apostle's life (Phil. ii. 19–24). But that this verse necessarily leads us to infer the apostle's authorship is not true. For it cannot be read in the text that Timothy appears here as subordinate to the author of the epistle, or as freely subordinating himself. The journey together to the Hebrew church might well have been planned in concert. All the

[1] Theodoret interprets it, "as sent away in order to convey the letter." Hence the διὰ Τιμοθέου in several minusc. and ancient translations—a notice without either support or value. Euthalius better interprets: ἀπέλυσεν εἰς διακονίαν. In Chrys., Oek., Theophyl., we find both interpretations; the latter and ἐκ δισμωτηρίου.

author says is, that as soon as Timothy comes, he will set out to visit them: we translate, *as soon as*, for ἐὰν τάχιον is probably used in the same sense as ἐὰν (ἢν) θᾶττον, frequently occurring in Xenoph. and Plato, which signifies *simul atque*. If, however, the force of the comparative is insisted on, the sense would be, "if he come sooner than the date at which I purposed to set out;" but this appears to me less probable, both circumstantially and grammatically speaking.

The author now goes on to give his final salutation:

Ver. 24. *Salute all them that have the rule over you, and all the saints. They of Italy salute you.*

The rulers of the church receive a special salutation. Πάντας τοὺς ἁγίους includes also those Christians with whom the readers might come in contact, although they might not be members of the same church. Along with the author, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας also send a salutation. From this expression, some have come to the conclusion, that at the time of the composition of the epistle the author could not have been in Italy, but in some other locality where he was surrounded with probably fugitive Italian Christians (Semler, Nösselt, Schulz, Böhme, Bl., De Wette, Lünemann); but this idea is incorrect. It is not even necessary, although it is possible, by means of a frequent mode of slurring over of the idea of locality,[1] and according to Luke xi. 13, xvi. 26, to interpret οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰτ. as οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰτ. (formerly Winer); for οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλ. is, as a matter of course, equivalent to "Italians," and it is, moreover, according to Luke's linguistic usage in Acts x. 23, τῶν ἀπὸ Ἰόππης; x. 38, Ἰησοῦν τὸν ἀπὸ Ναζαρέτ; xii. 1, τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας; xvii. 13, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης; xxi. 27, οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἰουδαῖοι; and especially in xvii. 13, where οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Θεσσ., without reference to the absence of those referred to from the place named, means the Jews who had been born in Thessalonica and were present there. Certainly the latter point is not intimated by the expression we are considering, but at the same time it is not excluded: οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἰτ. are

[1] On this point, *vid.* Anger, *Laodicenerbrief*, pp. 23–25.

those who are in Italy, and *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰτ.* are those who are natives of Italy.[1] It is by no means implied by the words that the latter were at the time in their native country; on the contrary, if the author was then in Italy, and at the same time was not a native of Italy, he could not have selected any more appropriate designation for the Italian Christians properly so called. Likewise, we are not at liberty to conclude from the words used that the epistle could not have been written in *Rome* (Ebr., and also Tholuck). For if, as it appears, there is no question of any personal relations of individual Christians of Rome and Italy generally, the author could not do better, when writing to the Asiatic Hebrews, than comprehend both Romans and Italians[2] in a designation of this kind common to all [cf. Acts xviii. 2: *ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλ.*, and then more precisely, *ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης*]. We should, however, be just as unwilling to conclude, with Theodoret, from this *ἀσπάζονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰτ.*, that the epistle must have been written in Italy, and still more, with Primasius, that it must have been written in Rome. The words in the postscript implying that the epistle was written from Rome (A, απο ρωμης) or Italy (K, απο της ιταλιας) do not depend upon traditions, but upon uncertain conclusions derived from the words *ἀσπάζονται* . . . Winer now justly says [p. 554], "no critical argument as to the locality where the epistle was written ought to be deduced from these words."

The opinion which, in the course of our commentary, has more and more approved itself to our mind, is simply this, that the epistle is not written by the hand of Paul, and bears the stamp of Luke's more than of Paul's style. It breathes Paul's spirit, but it does not speak Paul's words. From ver. 18 to the conclusion he quite inclines towards Paul's method. And be it directly or indirectly, it is Paul's own peculiar apostolic parting blessing and salutation (*e.g.* Titus iii. 15), with which, in ver. 25, his doctrinal parentage in Paul is finally sealed. This "grace" is that which justifies, frees,

[1] *Vid.* Wieseler, *Apost. Synops.* p. 516.

[2] Not, as Tholuck says, "provincials," for *Italia* and *provincia* are certainly contrasted ideas. A native of Italy could not be a provincial.

establishes us, and makes us joyful; which sanctifies, saves, and glorifies us; which begins, brings about, and completes our salvation; in which our spiritual life is rooted, and out of which it grows;—"grace," that is the absolutely undeserved and free result of the divine love, which, through our Lord Jesus Christ, has been purchased for us sinners, and has come down upon us in all the fulness of its riches. Therefore to all the readers of this epistle is addressed the benediction which says so much in a few words:

GRACE BE WITH YOU ALL! AMEN.

FIRST DISSERTATION.

AS TO THE AUTHOR OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

TO any one who thoroughly studies the preceding Commentary, and is not content with a mere hasty perusal, it must appear more than probable that Luke had some kind of share in the composition of the Epistle to the Hebrews. In his Gospel, and also in the Acts, he adheres to the style of historical writing peculiar to the Old Testament, and especially to the Pentateuch,—a style which, as I believe I have elsewhere shown, Matthew, the originator of the type of the Synoptical Gospels, first gave to their historical matter. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the contrary, he proceeds as independently as in the preamble to his Gospel, and in the second part of the Acts (from ch. xvi. 10), where he appears speaking in person as the companion of Paul, more at least than in the first part. If due allowance be made for the fundamental difference in his mode of statement, which difference is the necessary result of the diversity of theme presented to him, and also for his dependence on older types and models, the surprising points of similarity between our epistle and Luke's writings, not only in wording and construction, but also in characteristic points of doctrine, will be rendered all the more conspicuous; also, the hypothesis on which we have proceeded—that the Gospel and the Acts form parts, as πρῶτος and δεύτερος λόγος, of one work by one author—will be the more completely vindicated. The testimony of Clement of Alex., the oldest and most important of all, is

altogether confirmed in our view. Among the ancients, also, it met with the exclusive assent of many. "Dignum enim sic erat," says Luculentius, "ut ea, quam (quæ) in propria lingua scribebat, plus luculento sermone componeret et veteri novoque testamento fulciret. Cujus sensum et ordinem tenens Evangelista Lucas post excessum Apostoli Pauli Græco sermone composuit." In the same way Primasius (sixth century): "Post discessum vero Apostoli Lucas Evangelista Græco sermone eam comprehendit." And Haymo (d. 853), in his *Breviarium Hist. Ecc.* iii. 3, writes: "Sciendum, quod a Paulo scripta est in Hebræo sermone tanquam Hebræis, a Luca vero, ejus discipulo, interpretata in Græcum." Likewise also Rhabanus Maurus.

St. Paul is in no case the writer of our epistle. We miss, as Origen expresses it, τὸ ἐν λόγῳ ἰδιωτικὸν τοῦ ἀποστόλου. The delicately fine colouring, the ingenious and elaborate construction, and the musical rhythm of this epistle, form a sharp contrast to the energetic, forcible controversial strivings of St. Paul, which occasion so many anacolutha, so many parentheses and lengthened periods. But if St. Paul did not write the epistle, it is equally certain that it is not, properly speaking, a translation. It might, indeed, be imagined that an Epistle to the Hebrews, *i.e.* the Jewish Christians, those even of Palestine, should have been written in Hebrew. The mother-church of Jerusalem consisted, however, of Hebrews in the more precise sense, and Hellenists (Acts vi. 1). Now the Hellenists did not understand Hebrew; whilst, on the other hand, a knowledge of Greek may be assumed at least among the better educated of the Hebrews. It may therefore be easily explained why the author did not write his Epistle to the Hebrews in Hebrew, but, in order that it might be intelligible to the church as a body, preferred to employ the Greek language. If this point is satisfactorily explained, the internal evidence against the idea of an Hebrew original seems to press all the heavier. We cannot fail to see that the quotations of Scripture in the epistle are taken neither from the Hebrew text nor from that of

the Targums: all the proofs derived from Scripture are based on the way in which the words run in the Greek of the Septuagint, which at that time was still acknowledged by the Jews (cf. especially ch. x. 5–10). Also the train of thought which is made to depend on the twofold sense of the word διαθήκη (ch. ix. 15–18), may be better understood as thought out and written in Greek, although דיתיקי (*diathiki*) in the Talmud signifies "testament," and in the Peschito "covenant" (=בְּרִית). The inferences as to the tenor of the Hebrew original which Biesenthal has recently drawn from the Greek text, do not, moreover, approve themselves to our view. In addition to this, if the epistle were a regular translation of a Pauline original, the main points of the Pauline type of doctrine would be brought more prominently forward. It is true, indeed, that in many points the further development of Christian doctrine is carried out in the epistle in a Pauline spirit, and from Pauline hypotheses.[1] Let us take, for example, the words as to Christ's exaltation above the heavens (Eph. iv. 10), and what is said as to His intercession in heaven for believers (Rom. viii. 34). In these passages we have the germ which might develope into the doctrine laid down in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as to the high-priesthood of Christ in the holiest of holies in heaven. The Pauline view of the ceremonial law of the Old Testament as the "weak and beggarly" στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου (Gal. iv.), includes everything which is stated in the Epistle to the Hebrews as to the insufficiency of the law to make perfect, and as to Christ as the truly perfecting sacrifice and high priest. Also, the way in which the Epistle to the Hebrews deals with the Old Testament Scriptures is identical with Paul's typico-

[1] Ritschl is, however, of opinion (*Entst. der altkath. Kirche*, edit. 2, 1857, p. 160 ff.) that the Epistle to the Hebrews did not originate from the Pauline school, but that it represents an advanced standpoint of primitively apostolic Jewish Christianity, and only here and there shows some traces of Pauline influence. So also K. Köstlin (*Theolog. Jahrb.* 1854, 452 ff.), against whom, however, Ritschl justly maintains the idea that the readers of the epistle belonged to Palestine

allegorical interpretation of them, although the latter treats of them from a wider view (Gal. iv. 21–31; Rom. v. 14; 1 Cor. x. 1–6). But it always seems strange that we do not anywhere meet with those particular ideas which form, so to speak, the arteries of Paul's doctrinal system. The apostle of the Gentiles, who through the law was dead to the law, lives in the contrast of the righteousness which is by faith and that which is by works; he whom the Lord had called to be an apostle during the time of His heavenly life of glory, and not in the days of His flesh, lives and moves in the resurrection of Jesus Christ; he who by his call was directed to the Gentile world, and was destined to bring about the severance between synagogue and church, lives and moves in the call of the Gentiles to a fellowship in Christ's salvation. Of these three fundamental points of doctrine, one only—the resurrection—is casually alluded to (ch. xiii. 20). This may, of course, be accounted for to some extent by the prompting cause and aim of the epistle. Justification by faith alone is not the subject in question, because the Hebrews at that time required to be warned against utter apostasy more than against a righteousness of works. Neither is the resurrection dealt with, because, omitting all the intervening events, the highest stage of Christ's exaltation is placed directly in contrast with His self-humiliation, so as to fix the eye on His heavenly ministry. The calling of the Gentiles is not mentioned, because the community for whom the epistle was destined was of an exclusively Jewish-Christian character, and did not possess the composite nature of the foreign churches.

It cannot, however, well be imagined, especially looking at St. Paul's other epistles written in captivity, that an epistle from his hand to the Jewish Christians of Palestine would have received exactly this shape and stamp. If the Eastern tradition of St. Paul's authorship is still to be adhered to, we must assume, either that the epistle as we have it is a free remodelling in Greek of the apostle's Hebrew (Aram.) original, which is perhaps what Clement of Alex. intends; or—and Origen's opinion may be thus modified—

that it was from the very first written in St. Paul's name by some other person, who, adopting the thoughts communicated to him by the apostle, remodelled them independently, yet in that way that St. Paul, although under his hand the ideas might have assumed another shape, was nevertheless able to acknowledge the work as a whole, and appropriate it to himself. The unfettered course of procedure resulting from the individuality of the secondary author is more intelligible in the latter case than in the former, and the second opinion is therefore to be preferred. In the case of a highly-gifted disciple, a few hints from his master are sufficient to produce a fruitful result. His work is original, but original in that way that the master can recognise therein his own influence. A thing which occurs even in the present day, must not be set down as impossible. A talented mind generally derives its suggestions from without; but the suggestions thus supplied set in motion almost mechanically the peculiar gifts and intuitive power of the mind in question. Thus Luke wrote at the suggestion and in the name of Paul, and the mental product which was the result is identical with the spirit of his master, although bearing the writer's own peculiar stamp. The words in ch. ii. 3 do not stand in the way of this view of the origin of the epistle; for although St. Paul would not have written thus,[1] he might, nevertheless have left the passage *ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκουσάντων εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐβεβαιώθη* unaltered, especially in an epistle which differed even in the preamble from his usual method, because the wisdom and love were given him which induced him to let the Hebrews feel the authority of his apostleship as little as possible, and to place himself willingly in the background as regarded the original apostles.[2]

[1] A point which should never be denied. "Paulum non scripsisse hanc ep., vel ex secundo cap. palam est, ubi dicit se didicisse ex prædicatione aliorum, id quod fortiter de se negat Gal. i." Thus does Bugenhagen begin his exposition of the epistle, and this is an unprejudiced, temperate opinion.

[2] *Vid. Zeitschr. für Protest. u. Kirche*, 1856, p. 349: "The Epistle to the Hebrews fulfils in all points its task of confirming the Jewish Chris-

If the Epistle to the Hebrews be indirectly the work of Paul, it doubtless forms one among the last of his epistles written in captivity, for he glances back over a somewhat long period of the history of the church which he addresses. But, on the other hand, there are not a few indications which will compel us, in fixing the date of the authorship, not to go beyond the year 66, in which the war between the Jews and Romans broke out. It is unnecessary here to go into the question whether two captivities at Rome are to be assumed, or only one. It is sufficient for our purpose that the second Epistle to Timothy represents the apostle in a position which would be perfectly compatible with the composition of the Epistle to the Hebrews by means of St. Luke's agency. Timothy, to whom the apostle is writing, is asked (ch. iv. 9), *σπούδασον ἐλθεῖν πρός με ταχέως*. At this time Luke, St. Paul's faithful companion, was with him, and indeed alone with him (ch. iv. 11, *Λουκᾶς ἐστὶ μόνος μετ' ἐμοῦ*). Luke, who had assisted the apostle to carry the gospel from Asia over into Europe (Acts xvi. 10), was also with the latter when he visited Jerusalem for the last time. *Γενομένων ἡμῶν εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα*, he relates in Acts xxi. 17, *ἀσμένως ἐδέξαντο ἡμᾶς οἱ ἀδελφοί*. All the more readily might St. Paul charge him with the composition of a letter thither. It is one of the most beautiful features in the character of the apostle of the Gentiles, that his longing for Jerusalem, which the prospect of bonds could not restrain, still remained unweakened in the captivity which originated in that city. Jerusalem, the scene both

tians against the doubts which were presented to them by the apparent contradiction shown by the then present aspect of Christianity to the Old Testament promises, and the scruples which were caused by their bitterly felt alienation from the people of the Old Testament law. And if the apostle to the Gentiles composed it, he has fulfilled his task in a way which was necessitated by his position in respect to Jewish Christianity, by employing therein only the holy Scriptures, and a conception founded on them of the history of Jesus and of Christian salvation, and by avoiding everything which might have the appearance of exhorting, warning, and chiding in virtue of the apostolic calling which was peculiar to him alone.

of the beginning and also of the completion of salvation, is ever the Alpha and Omega in his thoughts. Thither also is addressed the Epistle to the Hebrews, perhaps the last of his letters to the churches. If Luke, as tradition tells us (Eus. iii. 4, § 3), was of Antioch, he was not, as a half countryman, very far removed from the Christians of Palestine: Palestine and Syria had nearly the same dialect, the סורסי. Moreover, the inference which is wont to be drawn from Col. iv. 14, cf. 11, that Luke was a Gentile Christian, is by no means a certain one. On the other hand, the fact that in his worldly calling he was a physician, harmonizes surprisingly with the form of the epistle. For the latter contains, so to speak, an anatomical (ch. iv. 12 f.), a dietetical (ch. v. 12–14), and a therapeutic passage (ch. xii. 12 f.). There are also many phrases in the epistle which *per se* might not lead to the presumption that the author was a physician; but yet, if Luke's share in the authorship appears evident both from external and internal evidence, these expressions, as very appropriate to the pen of a physician, would help to favour the idea.[1] It is also permissible at least to ask, Is it accidental, that the most ancient position of the Epistle to the Hebrews makes it follow the Epistle to Philemon, among the closing words of which we find the name of Luke? Also is it accidental, that the account of Timothy's association with Paul just precedes the passage (ch. xvi. 10) where the author of the Acts of the Apostles begins to narrate personally with the word "we?" Finally, is it accidental that the Epistle to the Hebrews begins in a way so signally alliterative to the name *ΠΑΥΛΟΣ*?

Grotius was the first who endeavoured to prove, from a certain colouring of the language peculiar to St. Luke, that the latter was the author, and indeed the independent author, of the Epistle to the Hebrews; but he only did it in a very

[1] *e.g.* the use of the word *νωθρός* (ch. v. 11, vi. 12), *βρώματα καὶ πόματα* (as in Hippocrates, ed. Littré, i. 622, iv. 380); perhaps also we may be permitted to remark that *ἐπιχειρεῖν*, so used as in Luke i. 1, is a favourite word of Hippocrates.

insufficient way.[1] Stein, in his *Comm. on Luke*, 1830, went more closely into this affinity of linguistic style, and in his *Comm. on the Epistle to the Hebrews* stated that, in respect of style, the latter epistle was more allied to the two works written by Luke than to any other of the New Testament books; nevertheless he finally decides for the direct authorship of Paul. Joh. Fried. Köhler (*Versuch über d. Abfassungszeit der epist. Schriften*, 1830) and Hug (*Einl.* edit. 3, 1826) have also expressed themselves in favour of the assumption of Luke's agency. Ebrard, in his *Comm.* 1850, has endeavoured to prove it at great length, without, however, having been acquainted with my treatise of the year 1849. He maintains that Luke wrote ch. i. 1–xiii. 21, in the name of Paul, and in ch. xiii. 22–25 added something in his own name; but the latter passage has not the nature of a postscript. We must leave to its own merits his endeavour to fit the Epistle to the Hebrews—as a work of Paul through Luke's agency—into the historical framework of the circumstances of the apostle's life, which are to be gathered from the epistles written in captivity, especially that to the Philippians.

That St. Paul was not the direct author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, we hold to be incontestably certain. Taking into account the observations made in the course of the exposition from the beginning to the end, we consider it in the highest degree probable that Luke composed the epistle from statements made to him by the apostle, being commissioned by the latter thereto. We esteem it possible that Luke was the independent author of it; but that any other

[1] Also Sam. Crell, in his work *Initiam Evangelii S. Johannis Apostoli ex antiquitate ecclesiastica restitutum indidemque nova ratione illustratum* (Londini), 1726, p. 98: "Atque ita et Paulus Ap. hoc loco (Phil. ii. 5), et Lucas (ut cum Elia Boherello sentio) ejus discipulus in Ep. ad Hebr. Christum effulgentiam aut splendorem a gloria Dei procedentem vocans," etc. Sam. Crell lived at that time in London under the name of Chr. Crell. I saw in Frankfort-on-the-Maine the author's own copy, with the *Corrigenda* and *Addenda* written in; among them, *e.g.* in Heb. xii. 23, the words κριτῇ Θεῷ πάντων are interpreted, with reference to Acts x. 35, *ad judicem qui est Deus omnium.*

than Luke was the indirect, or even the independent author, appears to us to be a possibility which cannot indeed be absolutely denied. It is, however, at the same time, an idea which floats in vague uncertainty, and is entirely removed from the sphere of scientific cognition. The result of our investigation is based upon the solid ground of the most ancient church testimony, and the confirmation of it which presents itself to us in the form of language and purport of the epistle. Nevertheless, we only claim for our opinion a high degree of probability. Here and there in our Commentary we have purposely called the author an *apostle*, because he might share this name with Paul, at all events with as much right as Barnabas (Acts xiv. 14).[1] The apostles themselves were not sparing of the title of apostle (Rom. xvi. 7; cf. Gal. i. 19). Any one, however, who, like the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is able to enter so fully into the spirit of an apostle, and to continue so fruitfully the course of apostolic teaching,—this man must possess the apostolic spirit, although the official authority of an apostle may be wanting in his case.

[1] Likewise Beza, on ch. xiii. 24, after pronouncing that, in all probability, a disciple of Paul was the author after the apostle's death, says: "Non dubitavimus tamen passim eum Apostolum vocare, quod spiritu vere apostolico præditus fuerit." On the other hand, Flacius says (*Clavis*, ed. 1674, t. ii. col. 518), in bringing forward the evidence in favour of the direct Pauline authorship of the epistle: "Tertio omnes fatentur, eam esse in hac ep. rerum sublimitatem, tam etiam præclaram illarum explicationem aut tractationem, ut nonnisi summum aliquem Apostolum deceant. Huc accedat, quod omnia ea scripta, quæ mox post Apostolos scripta dicuntur, sive sint Ignatii epp., sive fragmenta Ep. Clementis, aut Egesippi, nihil plane eximium contineant, ut non sit verisimile, aliquem ex discipulis Apostolorum tam divinum scriptum componere potuisse." This is plausible and beguiling, but only so long as we omit to recollect that Luke is the author of the Gospel and of the Acts of the Apostles, forming together one work, and stands consequently in a position far above Clement.

SECOND DISSERTATION.[1]

ON THE SURE SCRIPTURAL BASIS OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS SATISFACTION.

WE have, says v. Hofmann (*Schriftb.* ii. 1. 320), after commenting on the principal passages of the Epistle to the Hebrews, which treat of the sufferings and death of Jesus, fully examined that portion of the New Testament Scriptures which pre-eminently represent the death of Christ as a high-priestly action, and the suffering as of a sacrificial victim; but we have been unable to find therein that which is peculiar to the usual view entertained since Anselm, as distinguished from our historical discussion of the question. According to the Epistle to the Hebrews, the death of Jesus is not the punishment for, although the result of, the sin of man; satisfaction was thereby made not to the wrath, but to the gracious will of God, though in such a way to the latter as must needs be, after sin and death were in the world; Christ suffered, not in the place of man, but for their good, that which befell Him being the action of the agent of salvation; and the essence of our reconciliation with God is not constituted either by the fact that sin is now correspondingly punished, or that it is atoned for by Jesus' ethical action in His sufferings, but by

[1] In adding to my Commentary a dissertation of this kind, I have in my favour the example of Gottlob Christian Storr (1789), with whom, in the essence of the matter, I fully agree, and also, generally speaking, with the Würtemburg school (Bengel, Oetinger, and Roos, down to Beck and Ch. F. Schmid in his *Bibl. Theol. of the N. T.*), which, looking at the direct character of its investigation of the Scriptures, cannot be reproached with any dogmatical bias.

that fellowship between God and Jesus Christ which had for its end the salvation of man, being approved under endurance of the whole extreme consequences of sin.

We will first put together the points which are *affirmed* by these resultant inferences: 1. Jesus' death was the consequence of the sin of man; 2. Satisfaction is thus made to the gracious will of God, in such way as must needs be the case when sin and death are in the world; 3. He suffered for the good of man, that which befell Him being the action of the agent of salvation; 4. He has reconciled us with God by approving, under the extreme consequences of sin, His fellowship with God, both as God and man, that fellowship having for its aim our salvation. All these points are nothing but truth, and are clearly taught in the epistle we are considering.

We will, in the second place, put together the points which are *negatived* by these resultant inferences: 1. The death of Jesus was not the punishment of the sin of man; 2. Satisfaction is not made thereby to the wrath of God; 3. Christ did not suffer in the place of man; 4. Our reconciliation with God does not consist in the fact, either that our sin was correspondingly punished in Jesus' death, or that it was atoned for by Jesus' ethical action in His sufferings. I am convinced that all these negations would be condemned by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as inferences very incorrectly drawn from his writings.[1]

[1] We extend this opinion to both the divisions of the fourth negation. The second division is directed against an older treatise of Thomasius (1850), in which he draws a parallel between the propitiatory sufferings of the Lord as the cause of our obtaining forgiveness of our sins, and the penance of the sinner as the *conditio sine qua non* of the reception of the forgiveness of sins. This parallel, however, views the propitiatory sufferings of the Lord as a self-judgment and a self-submission to God's sentence, and, if consistently carried out, prevents the objectivity of the execution of the judgment and the penal sufferings from having their full weight. But Hofmann, in the above-mentioned proposition, denies both the objective execution of judgment, and also the inward experience of it, with which is bound up the ready acknowledgment of one's own burden of guilt, and of the divine right to punish,

For, 1. If death is confessedly the penal recompense of sin, and if the Son of God assumed flesh and blood in order to be able to experience the death which prevailed among mankind; and if, according to Heb. ii. 9, He tasted it for every man, then His death, notwithstanding all that logic may urge, is a penal recompense of sin, assuredly not a punishment incurred by His own guilt, but taken upon Himself for the salvation of all of us. Therefore in a certain sense that must be true which v. Hofmann absolutely denies, that His death was a punishment of the sin of man. 2. If death, taken in its ultimate causality, is a decree of God's wrath, and if Christ surrendered Himself up to death in order to overcome the prince of death, and to deliver us from death and the fear of death (Heb. ii. 14, 15), then must we be able to say, in a certain sense, what v. Hofmann absolutely denies, that Christ made Himself the object of the divine wrath, and that He, by His death becoming the death of death, satisfied the divine wrath. But instead of the words, "that He satisfied the divine wrath," I would venture to modify the expression by saying, that He satisfied the divine penal righteousness; for as love is the root of mercy, so is wrath the root of punitive justice. And if, as is said in ch. ii. 10, the work of redemption could not be perfected without the sufferings of the Redeemer, if this work was to be carried out in a way befitting the God who was merciful in holiness, then is the suffering of the Redeemer an arrange-

which, too, at all events in this point, may be compared to penitence. We, on the contrary, believe that we ought to affirm both these points as factors in the action of atonement. Moreover, even after the second apologetic work of my dear colleague and friend, I cannot pronounce otherwise than that the Confession of the church is not only opposed to the negative propositions in his doctrine of the atonement in their inward sense, but that it also contradicts the tenor of their words. For the articles in the Confession run: "Christus subiit pœnam peccati; Christus sua morte pro peccatis nostris satisfecit; Christus nostram culpam, qua nobis luenda fuerat, persolvit; Christi obedientiâ (vitâ et morte) æternæ et immutabili justitiæ divinæ, quæ in lege revelata est, satis est factum;"—and all this is entirely different from the above-mentioned four negative propositions.

ment on the part of God, who satisfies the penal justice of His wrath on the One, so that He may be able to pour out the gracious fulness of His love to mankind, who had become subject to this wrath. Again, the suffering of the Redeemer is a satisfaction of the penal justice of the divine wrath, in that He has submitted Himself to the penal powers of the latter, set in action both by man and Satan, extending indeed even to the feeling of abandonment by God; and all this is done in order to procure for us all the merciful fulness of divine love, or, as is stated ch. ix. 15, to release for us the inheritance destined for us by God, which, however, without the death of the Mediator, could not have been made over to us. 3. However certain it may be that Christ died for our salvation, no less certain is it that He died in our stead. For we were subject to death, and to the fear of death. He, however, has submitted Himself to death, and to the horrors of death, in order to deliver us from both. Consequently He has suffered death in our stead, as being the satanically procured punishment of sin, and as having the guilt of sin for its sting (ch. ii. 9, 14 f., v. 7). Further, according to ch. ix. 23, cf. 1 Pet. ii. 24, He has taken upon Himself, and atoned for, the sins of many (both which points, as we showed in the notes on ch. ix. 27, 28, are included in the word *ἀνενεγκεῖν*); on which account these sins can no longer rest as penal guilt on the many. We may therefore venture to say, what v. Hofmann absolutely negatives, namely, that He suffered that which we should have been compelled to suffer if He had not suffered it; and His sufferings may therefore be pronounced to be of a vicarious character,—an idea which is so probable, that the *ὑπέρ* (ch. ii. 9) in the Oriental translations is rendered by the particle of substitution. 4. According to all this, the essence of the atonement consists not merely in the agent of salvation approving himself on all sides under all the consequences of sin, by which, as I look upon it, no real atonement results, but in the vicarious abrogation of the divine wrath, the vicarious expiation of our guilt, and in the vicarious quittance of our bond, by means of a vicarious redemption of the

penalty brought upon us by our sin. And thus it can and may, indeed must, be stated; even if we allow—which, however, as it will be shown, must not be allowed—that the death of Jesus was only permitted, and not decreed by God, and that it is to be looked upon as a punishment in fact only, and not in the divine intention,—only indirectly, and not directly.[1]

A materially better understanding seems to me to have been now arrived at, as to one of the two contested main points—the satisfaction made to the divine wrath or penal justice. For, in the first edit. of the *Schriftbeweis*, and in the *Abweisung* (*Zeitschr. für Prot. u. Kirche*, 1856, p. 175 ff.), directed against Philippi, the sufferings of Jesus are represented almost everywhere as nothing but the result of the requisite condition of His nature imposed on Him by the sin of man, and as events befalling Him owing to the human and Satanic will, both hostile to God; but now we see that Hofmann, in characterizing the sufferings of Jesus, brings prominently forward the wrath of God as the ultimate cause, and as going far beyond the merely secondary means—the natural state of things, the assaults of Satan, and the hatred of the unrighteous.[2] Even in the reply to Philippi (p. 8)

[1] I mean by this, that Hofmann's negations—namely, the above-mentioned so little limited denials—go further than the consequences of his own hypotheses. Let the reader note the following remarkable passage in Schmid's work, p. 34: "Hofmann says expressly that God, in virtue of His holiness, cannot leave sin unpunished, unless it be previously atoned for. This is involved in the words, 'He has reconciled the world with Himself, so as not to be compelled to punish it.' If, now, Christ has been compelled to suffer in order that we should be released from the punishment of sin, and if Christ in His suffering has submitted to the consequences of sin, then it was its punishment which He bore; for what are the consequences of sin except its punishment? Thus Hofmann must be compelled also to say that God's penal justice was manifested by His forgiving only under the condition of a certain suffering, in which Christ took upon Himself the consequences of sin. I wish that Hofmann had brought these propositions more prominently forward in his *Schriftbeweis*." Yes, assuredly; but instead of this we find nothing in the *Schriftbeweis* but absolute denials of them.

[2] We purposely express ourselves thus, for we already find passages

we read: "The eternal Son, by virtue of the divine will of love to sinful man, has exchanged His divine freedom for the position of obedience to the Father, and His divine blessedness for a submission to the wrath of God against man, and to the power of Satan over the latter." In conformity with this, in the revised treatise (*Schriftb.* i. p. 48 of edit. 2) the passage in question has experienced an alteration which may be considered as an essential step in advance, as compared with the insufficient and external earlier view. But, comparatively speaking, the mode of expression is still more satisfactory which is assumed in his present view with regard to the sufferings and death of Jesus, as exhibited in the reply to Thomasius and Harnack. For there we read (p. 95), that the Lord, from His conception down to His death, experienced the wrath of God against man, in proportion, indeed, to the progress of His history. "If all the evil in the world is the effect of the wrath of God against sinful man, all experience of the former must be also an experience of the latter. And if it is God's wrath against sinful man which causes Satan to tempt and attack us, Christ must have experienced this wrath in all the temptations and hostility of Satan. God's wrath against sin placed Israel under the law of commandments and prohibitions; Christ, being made under this law, is also subject to the wrath without which the law would not have existed. God's wrath against Israel's transgression of the law brought this nation into misery; thus Jesus also experienced this wrath, for He

of the following kind—that Christ, "by His priestly self-sacrifice, made satisfaction to God's will of salvation, which, however, could not exist without wrath against sin." Indeed, in the *Abweisung*, he goes so far as to say: "At all times three sides of the work of atonement have been set forth: that it atones for sin, and makes satisfaction to the anger of God against sinful man; that it renders sinful man an object well-pleasing to God; that it deprives Satan of the right which he possessed over sinful man;—all these points are combined in my view of the question." But for my part, I cannot understand how the first side can be contained in the *Schriftbeweis*; for in the latter it is over and over again asserted, that the work of atonement does *not* consist in satisfaction being made to the wrath or penal justice of God.

shared in the misery of Israel and of the house of David. Finally, it is God's wrath against sin which gives up the righteous as a prey to the wicked, in order that the latter may complete the measure of his sins, and may become liable to judgment; the same wrath likewise gives up Christ to His enemies and as a prey to Satan, in order that the enmity against God and that which is of God may complete its judgment. For the wrath of God manifests itself against sin in two points: first, that it does not forgive it without Christ, and such a redeeming work as that of Christ; and secondly, that through the same Christ, in whom sin is atoned for to the advantage of the penitent, it is increased in the impenitent up to that point where, as perfected enmity against Him, it becomes subjected to the final judgment." Where should we be able to find a passage like this in the *Schriftbeweis*, in which almost everywhere the only thing spoken of is the operation of a will at enmity with God, which was resisted by Jesus? The assertion being made (p. 102), that the wrath of God the Father against sinful humanity embraced the everlasting Son who had entered into that humanity, it might amaze a youthful reader of Hofmann's dialectics, when, on the other side of the page (p. 103), he finds it denied that the Son is in any way the object of God's wrath. And it may appear utterly incomprehensible, that in the end of the life into which the eternal Son entered at His conception—that in His blood, He not dying generally, but dying this particular death, the wrath of God against sinful men, He being subject to it as their Saviour, was finally satisfied and exhausted (p. 104); and yet, as we find expressed above as the conclusion derived from the Epistle to the Hebrews, the sufferings and death of Jesus are said to make satisfaction, not to the wrath, but to the gracious will of God. In fact, according to all this, Hofmann must have been able to say in a certain sense that Jesus became the object, indeed the target, of the divine wrath, and that He suffered it to the end, absorbing and satisfying it until it was exhausted and changed into love. May he not, however, so speak, and why not? Because,

1. he views the wrath which Jesus experienced only as a cosmical after-operation exterior to God, and not as the energy of the divine holiness, which (energy) operated continuously on account of the nature of the case; so that although the extremity of the wrath came upon Jesus, He did not become the object of that wrath. 2. Because he makes Jesus to have been affected by this wrath only as regards the natural side of His person, and not in respect to His inward personality; so that He experienced it without feeling it to be such.[1] 3. Because he looks upon the wrath which affected Jesus only as the result of His incorporation into sinful humanity, and not as the consequence of His taking upon Himself all the sins of man; so that the only aim of the pressure of the wrath upon Jesus was, that He might approve Himself as the Holy One, and not that He should endure it as the Guiltless One who appeared for the guilty. In all three points Hofmann denies those conclusions, into which the apostolic consciousness willingly entered, and to which the apostolic utterances urge us. For, I. St. Paul expressly states (Gal. iii. 13) that Christ was made a curse for us. The patriarchal promise implies a blessing (*εὐλογία*); but the law which intervened impends with its curse (*κατάρα*) over those whom it binds. The dam of this curse must be broken through in order that the stream of the blessing may flow forth. This "breaking through" —which, except God had not intervened with His own law, could not have taken place without the full execution of the curse—is brought about by Christ, who has ransomed Israel, the nation called to convey the blessing, from the curse of the Sinaitic law.[2] What the ransom consisted of is fully expressed in the participial sentence: He submits to come

[1] Or, as Hofmann might also say: He feels indeed the wrath of God, but it is the wrath of God against man; He feels it as a wrath directed against mankind, and not against Him. He feels it only as sharing in the sin of the humanity into which He had entered, in order that, by submitting Himself to the wrath of God against mankind, and yet, even under this experience of wrath, remaining the object of God's love, mankind might also be made the object of the divine love.

[2] Hofmann, on the contrary (ii. 1. 224), says: "His enemies, and

under the curse; indeed, He so takes it upon Him, that He in person represents the executed curse, by hanging on the cross as an ignominious criminal, whose body, that it might not pollute the land, had to be buried the selfsame day. "*Quis auderet*," remarks Bengel here, "*sine blasphemiæ metu sic loqui, nisi apostolus præiret?*" The apostle, however, intends it in good earnest. In the legally stigmatized mode of Jesus' death he sees only the self-manifestation to the outward senses of something taking place inwardly. It was necessary for the curse of the law to be abolished ere the blessing of Abraham could reach the Gentiles; and it is abolished by Christ taking it upon Himself, ay, taking it *into* Himself, and thus opening out a free course for the blessing. II. If the Lord has become like us in all things except in sin—a point often insisted on by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews—it must be assumed beforehand that He will also have experienced God's wrath which weighed upon humanity, into which He had entered. And He must have felt it, because He, although sinless, had made Himself the bearer of, and atoner for, the sins of man: that He did feel it, is shown by mental conflicts in Gethsemane and on the cross. In Gethsemane He recoiled from the cup of death only because it was to Him a cup of wrath (*vid.* on v. 7), and on the cross He felt that He was forsaken by His God; but the feeling of being forsaken by God, that is, by God's love, is the full savour of wrath, indeed of hell.[1] Or is it that, as Hofmann says (*Schutzbr.* ii. 74), God only so far forsook Him, by leaving Him to carry on alone His conflict with Satan, without affording Him comfort

not God, have realized on Him the curse which applies to those who are disobedient to the law."

[1] In the *Abweisung* (p. 186) Hofmann thus expresses himself: "But that Christ suffered that which we should have suffered, *appears* quite undemonstrable. The beneficial impression made upon me by this 'appears,' although done away with by later works, still dwells in my memory. To what purpose is the controversy carried on since the first apology with so much predilection, and directed against the idea that the Lord suffered the punishment of hell? It is not the question whether He suffered in our stead that damnation which will ensue

and help? Was, then, the sting of the serpent all that the crucified One had to suffer? Did He not bear the burden of all our sins? Was not the matter in hand, to struggle through God's wrath so as to obtain God's love for us, the enemies of God, all of whose guilt He had taken upon His guiltless soul? III. The sin of man which Christ took upon Him is held in the apostolic consciousness to be so much His own sin, that is, appropriated by Him, that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews says of Him, on the one hand, that He was χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας (ch. iv. 15), and, on the other hand, that He will one day appear χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας (ch. ix. 28); as much as to say that at His first appearance He was, in a certain sense, not without sin. The sins of many—that is, of mankind—lay upon Him, and were the cause of the sufferings and death which were ordained for Him. In the same sense, Paul says (2 Cor. v. 21), that although He knew no sin as His own personal action, God made Him sin (ἁμαρτίαν) for us. On this Hofmann remarks: "Since sin is not in this passage brought, as a matter of experience, against Him who is placed in relation with it, it cannot be said that the punishment of sin—that is, punishment properly speaking—was laid upon Him." The logic of the Scriptures is something different. They do not hesitate to say: מוּסַר שְׁלוֹמֵנוּ עָלָיו, the punishment which was for our salvation was to be upon Him (Isa. liii. 5). Certainly, in Hofmann's view, no more is said here than this, that He experienced "an actual chastisement" which convicted those (who there acknowledge their former misconception of the sufferer) of their sin, and of the severity of the divine holiness, and thus availed for their salvation. But why all this

at the last day, but whether He was subject to bodily death in all the depth of its penal consequences,—in one word, the death of being abandoned by God. The being abandoned by God, or being forsaken by God's love, is as assuredly wrath as the loss of life is death; and wrath is the essence of hell, just as love is the essence of heaven. This essence of hell was tested by the crucified One: God hid בְּשִׁצְפָּף קָצֶף His countenance from Him, in order to have pity on His, and in Him our בְּחֶסֶד עוֹלָם (Isa. liv. 8).

circumlocution? Merely that it may not be said that He was chastised in our stead. But מוּסָר is the usual word both for the chastisement of love (Prov. iii. 11) and also for penal chastisement (Jer. xxx. 14), and the sufferings of Job are thus called (Job v. 17). And he on whom מוסר lies, is to a simple understanding not one on whom that lies which chastises another, but one who himself has to bear and suffer the chastisement. The idea of *pœna vicaria* cannot be more exactly expressed in Hebrew than is the case in the above-named word. It cannot even be said that מוּסָר is used in order to describe the sufferings of the servant of God as a chastisement proceeding from love, although of course love was the alpha and omega. For, besides מוּסָר and תּוֹכַחַת, the Hebrew language has no word of its own for *κόλασις* or *τιμωρία*. Also, when David implores God that He will not chasten him in His wrath and fury (Ps. vi. 2), he has no other expressions to use but these. But also in Rom. viii. 3 Paul says expressly, that Christ in His sufferings became an object of the execution of the divine judgment for the sake of our salvation; for we read there: "What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh" (that is, through the flesh working against it, could not come to full realization), God has done in another way, and by "sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and as a sacrifice for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit." There is something almost too audacious in Hofmann maintaining (*Schriftb.* ii. 1. 239) that this passage has in no way to do with the death, but only with the sending, of the Son of God; as if one point excluded the other. The whole course of the history of Him that was sent, from the beginning down to its final climax, is taken into consideration. But we are assured by the words *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* that the apostle had, in fact, the death in view. These words are applied in Hellenistic Greek (Heb. x. 6) to the sin-offering. Even supposing that they were translated differently from the way in which we have rendered them—if *περὶ ἁμαρτίας* is to be so taken, that

the aim of His sending only concerned sin, and that sin is the matter in question; still it is scarcely possible that the sacrificial idea should not have floated before the apostle's mind. But this we will not insist upon. At all events, *κατέκρινε* points us to Golgotha. Then how finely drawn, how much too finely drawn, is Hofmann's interpretation: "In the flesh, in human nature, from Adam downwards destined to sin, where sin had hitherto exercised a right of domination, there God has abrogated this right, by sending for the sake of sin Him who was like to sinful humanity, who also proceeded not from mankind propagated by Adam, but coming from God has entered into humanity!" This train of thought is as unintelligible to me as to Keil, and perhaps every one else. Moreover, I do not understand how sin before Christ can be adjudged to have had a "right" of domination: death had a right of domination, but not sin, to which no such privilege is anywhere or ever given. And does *κατακρίνειν* merely mean *to abrogate a right?* Whoever is judged is condemned: a punishment is adjudged to him, and not merely a right taken away from him. The idea expressed by the apostle is as simple as it is clear: What the law, in consequence of the guilt of human flesh, could not accomplish—that is, the carrying out of its promise of righteousness and life—this God has performed, by executing in the person of His Son a judgment upon sin; in consequence of which, the promise which the law affords to the fulfillers of it is realized, or (if *δικαίωμα* is taken not for the favourable sentence, but for the sum-total of the prerogative of the law, and in conformity with this, *πληροῦν* also) we are restored to a right position, in which the law is fulfilled. For the sake of the antithesis, I prefer the former idea. On sin God has passed a penal sentence, by which the *κατάκριμα* of the law is removed for us, and now its *δικαίωμα* is fulfilled. But whoever is condemned is henceforth debarred from the activity by which he incurred guilt. If, therefore, sin has once for all met with its penal sentence, its ruling and death-producing action towards men has also come to an end. Now, where has God executed this act of judgment? *Ἐν*

τῇ σαρκί. This is not, however, to be considered equivalent, as a matter of course, to ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ αὐτοῦ. The sense in the first place only is, that the penal sentence on sin has been executed on that very flesh which frustrated the fulfilment of the law, or of God's will revealed on Sinai. But in whose flesh, except in that of the Son of God, whose personality is so absolute a one, that it might be executed in His flesh once for all—in Him the one for the sake of all? And where should it be executed, except upon the cross? The flesh of Jesus destroyed upon the cross is here held by the apostle as the removed partition wall of sin and the guilt of sin; so also in Col. ii. 14 (because vicariously for our *corpus delicti*) as the bond (*chirographum*, in the legal phraseology of Rome) testifying to our indebtedness, now nailed to the cross, and thus pierced through and obliterated; and also in Heb. x. 20, in another connection of thought, as the rent and consequently removed veil of the holiest of holies. This idea is also fundamentally the same as that expressed in Gal. iii. 13 f. The Son of God, by taking upon Him our flesh, with all the consequences of sin, and in this flesh suffering death, has become for us both ἁμαρτία and κατάρα.

It may therefore be well said, that in what Jesus suffered, or rather by suffering accomplished, in devoting Himself, through His own eternal Spirit (Heb. ix. 14), freely and willingly thereto, satisfaction was made to the wrath of God, or, as Hofmann in his *Abweisung* does not hesitate to write, to God in wrath against sinful man. But yet more correct would it be to say—what Hofmann absolutely denies—that Jesus satisfied God's penal justice, in which His wrath was manifested, and to which it was made proportionate.[1] Here also the form of expression adopted by the church has apostolic language in its favour. In Rom. iii. 21, after the apostle has shown that the Jewish and Gentile

[1] The question why the Scriptures do not express themselves to the effect that Christ had reconciled God, does not come into the controversy, as even Hofmann has no scruple in speaking of a reconciliation of God. We have endeavoured to answer the question in our commentary on

world were in an equally lost condition, and that a righteous position of any avail in God's sight cannot be brought about either by the natural or by the positive laws, he reverts to the great theme of the gospel expressed in ch. i. 17, by setting forth, that in Jesus Christ's work of redemption, in which God shows Himself to be the Righteous One, and Him who mercifully justifies, a righteousness of God is manifested, which had been previously testified to by the law; and that this righteousness will become ours by means of faith, to the exclusion of all self-glorification, and will embrace without distinction both Jew and Gentile. God has now opened another way for us to become partakers of the divine righteousness, inasmuch as sinners, whose sins were only made manifest by the law, are justified as a free gift by His grace, by virtue of the redemption in Jesus Christ, *ὃν προέθετο ὁ Θεὸς ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι.* As above, with regard to *περὶ ἁμαρτίας*, I, with Philippi, Keil, and now also Tholuck, think it in the highest degree improbable that the apostle should have understood the word *ἱλαστήριον* in any other than the usual Hellenistic sense. On the *Capporeth* Jehovah was enthroned in the cloud: the sprinkling of the blood of the sin-offering on the *Capporeth* was the culminating point of all the acts of expiation; from thence, too, the high priest brought back the forgiveness of sins, not merely for individuals, but, as the Epistle to the Hebrews often says, for the λαός, that is, the whole community. In an antitypically similar way has God openly set forth Jesus as an *ἱλαστήριον*, a mercy-seat: He becomes this for us "through faith;" He is this in Himself, "in His own blood." The apostle now goes on to state the aim of this provision on the part of God: *εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ.* Where there is a shedding of blood, and consequently of life, there is violent death; and where such a death is decreed, it is a

ch. ii. 17. It should be well considered, that the mode of expression, "that the death of Christ satisfied the divine justice," would be allowed even by Hofmann, but not that it satisfied the divine penal justice.

manifestation of penal justice; and such was needed, because the sins of the pre-Christian world had been passed over—passed over without judicial interference through the divine forbearance. How this forbearance is to be explained is stated by the words *πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ*, closely (with Hofmann) to be connected with *ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ*. If God allowed the affronts to His majesty to go so long unpunished, it was because His view was directed to the one signal demonstration of His own righteousness reserved for the present time. He exercised forbearance as regards these affronts, because His aim was, in this demonstration of righteousness, to manifest at the same time both justice and mercy: *εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ*. A twofold aim is here involved: (1) God willed to be righteous, inasmuch as He required an atonement of blood, namely *ἱλάσκεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἵματι Ἰησ. Χρ.*; (2) to be also a Justifier, inasmuch as He set forth this fulfiller of the atonement of blood as *ἱλαστήριον* for mankind. The outbreak of His punitive justice was to be at the same time the introduction of His redeeming mercy, and the manifestation of His mercy was to be also a manifestation of His righteousness, which condemns sin and spares mankind. And thus it has come to pass. Satisfaction is made to God's righteousness by an atonement of blood having been made; also His justifying mercy has free course, for the sinner is not pronounced righteous without its being shown how deep an abhorrence He has of sin, and how severely He condemns it: he that is in himself unrighteous is pronounced righteous, in that he no longer derives his righteousness from individual actions in conformity with the law, but from faith in Jesus Christ the Atoner. Up to the time of Christ, God suspended His penal justice, in order that, when He manifested Himself as the Righteous One, He might also manifest Himself as the Justifier, without any detriment to His righteousness. The New Testament *ἱλασμός* is the solution of the counsel of the pre-Christian history of the world, and of the divine disposition evident in it. "The righteousness of God," says

Hofmann (*Schriftb.* ii. 1. 229), "is not exhausted in the narrow idea of penal justice. It is the same righteousness of God which was demonstrated both in condemning the world on account of its sin, and also now in helping it to obtain righteousness. But it is not that He now, in the person of Christ, punished sin. It was not by punishing it, but by atoning for it, that He helped us to attain our righteousness. And it is not of the mode in which He atoned for it that it is said He thereby showed forth His righteousness; but the very fact that He atones for sin, and thus helps us to righteousness, is the demonstration of His righteousness. That He might not be compelled to punish the world, He has reconciled it with Himself." He speaks as if atonement (כִּפֻּרִים) and punishment were contrasted with each other! This can only be the case in Hofmann's view, who makes out that atonement is constituted by God allowing the Mediator of salvation, and the Mediator Himself submitting Himself, to suffer the utmost extremity of all that the enemy could do against the work of salvation. How atonement could proceed from this I would willingly understand, but it does not lie in my power. It is a fundamental idea in the Scriptures, that sin is atoned for by punishment. For instance, murder is atoned for (יְכֻפַּר) by the death of the murderer (Num. xxxv. 33); and the guilt of Israel's sin is only atoned for by means of judgment, that is, by Israel being penally sifted, and being led by God's judgment into the self-judgment of an honest repentance, manifesting itself in action (Isa. xxvii. 7–9). If, in addition, we consider the ritual of expiation (Deut. xxi. 1–9), of which we shall subsequently speak further, it will be evident that neither atonement and punishment, nor atonement and the vicarious suffering of punishment, are so separated from each other as Hofmann (*Schutzschr.* ii. 96) asserts. It is true that by δικαιοσύνη we must understand neither God's penal justice exclusively, nor yet a righteousness of God which excludes the execution of the punishment threatened to sinners; for δικαιοσύνη is the harmony of God's actions with His law, and consequently includes the realization both of the κατάκριμα on those who

transgress the law, and also of the δικαίωμα on those who fulfil it. And in both aspects is the work of atonement a manifestation of the divine righteousness: for on one side it is shown forth as judging the unrighteousness of man by requiring an atonement—indeed, an atonement of blood; and on the other as helping on to righteousness, by opening out, by means of this atonement of blood, to all who have faith in it, the way to a righteousness by which the previous unrighteousness becomes imputative, and is then effectively abolished. "Evidently," says one of the latest expositors (Matthias), in his admirable translation and commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (ch. iii.), "God acts in the most perfect harmony with His laws, in requiring for sin a corresponding atonement; and the atonement required is this, that Christ should give an all-sufficient λύτρον in His blood, which λύτρον God looks upon as given by us, if we by faith are in fellowship of life with Christ, so that Christ lives in us, and we in Christ." In our view it amounts only to this, that the sufferings of Christ as a divine decree in the last resort, and the whole guilt of mankind which Christ took upon Himself with the aim of atonement, should be placed in causative connection, and that they should not be degraded to a means of approving the Mediator of salvation, necessitated merely by the enmity of the world and its prince. The whole of the New Testament Scriptures strive and contend against this view, and throughout (*e.g.* Heb. ix. 15) make the death of Christ, on the side of God as well as men, a *conditio sine qua non* of the redemption. God could not look upon our guilt as blotted out until Christ had previously expiated it by His sufferings, and atoned for it by His blood. This is what was required by His righteousness —His righteousness, indeed, influenced by love; for it was love which dealt with the claims of His righteousness on all of us, by concentrating them on what was done by the One for the sake of all. It was His קִנְאָה (cf. Deut. iv. 24, ix. 3), from which Isaiah derives the sending of Christ—the zeal of His wrath, which was pervaded, mitigated, and deadened by the zeal of His love: for what is the wrath of God, but His

fiery zeal on account of the refusal of His love? and what is the zeal of His love, but the power of love, which, by overcoming all hindrances, wins back that which was refused? And Jehovah, we read in Isa. liii. 10, was pleased to bruise Him, and He hath afflicted (Him) with great woe. It pleased Him to do it; for that which, considered in itself, constituted not only the shape, but also the essence of His wrath, was His merciful will, as a motive and as an aim. He thus for a time designedly afflicts the One, His own (in Himself) guiltless Servant, in order to render it possible to be able to bring everlasting mercy instead of penal justice on the whole of a guilt-burdened people. Those who despised the Servant of Jehovah on account of His affliction, and held the sufferings which He endured to be the punishment of His own especially heinous sin, will one day be compelled to confess that His sufferings stood in an entirely different position, and that "Jehovah laid upon Him the iniquities of us all." Stier here interprets: He caused the iniquities of us all to strike or break on Him. Hofmann very justly does not agree with this misinterpretation of Stier, induced by the latter's aversion to the *pœna vicaria*. "As the blood of the victim falls upon the head of the murderer," he remarks (*Schriftb.* ii. 1. 133) with perfect justice, "since the deed of blood which is committed reverts upon him as vengeance-bringing guilt, so comes the sin upon the sinner—reaches him and affects him. Just as it proceeded from him as an act of self-determination, so it returns upon him as an act of condemnation. In this case, however, God does not allow those who have sinned to be affected by that to which their sin condemns them, but causes it to strike His Servant, the Righteous One." Were we now to ask what it is that strikes Him, Hofmann would be compelled to answer (p. 137) that Jehovah's Servant has to expiate the sins of His people, although in another place (p. 321) he asserts that sin was not atoned for by Jesus' ethical action in His sufferings. The sufferings of Jesus are therefore regarded by him as an expiation, and yet *not* so regarded. His suffering is neither a penal suffering nor an expiation which may be

compared to the *contritio* of the penitent sinner, but it is an atonement, as if making good our guilt. But how does He make it good, except by paying the punishment due to our guilt which He took upon Himself? The name of sin in the Hebrew undeniably signifies both the guilt thereby incurred and the punishment resulting therefrom (*vid. e.g.* Lam. iv. 6; Zech. xiv. 19): the text, indeed, says expressly, "The chastisement for our salvation was upon Him." The cardinal question with which we have to do, viz. whether God acts in respect to the sufferings of Jesus as with the evil which He allows to take place without Himself doing it, or whether He acts as when punishing the wicked by intervention of the wicked, thus Himself executing the punishment, cannot be answered in the latter sense more clearly than by the prophet Isaiah. Even if we allow that מוּסָר does not signify punishment—which, however, it does signify—how can Jehovah cause the guilt of many to fall upon the One, except by visiting the guilt of the many on the One, and making the One suffer, thus executing on Him the judgment incurred? These are unavoidable inferences, which Hofmann, not without now and then being caught by them,[1] finally evades; only, however, by looking upon the Servant of Jehovah as a mere prophet, and by degrading to mere points of His prophetic vocation the antitypical feature of the self-sacrifice (*i.e.* of sacrifice and priest combined), which is here first adopted into the prophetic figure (at least fundamentally) of the future Mediator of salvation. Certainly a prophet cannot endure the suffering due to the guilt of his people as a judgment falling on him instead of his people. By this obliteration of the grand course of the announcement of salvation, which is presented to us in Isa. xl.-lxvi., both *satisfactio vicaria* and *pœna vicaria* are set aside.

It would be absurd to suppose that God punished His Servant because He took upon Himself the sins of men; for this was the eternal counsel of mercy of the Father, indeed of the Triune God, now actually realized. Neither may it

[1] *Vid.* Keil (*Luth. Zeitschrift*, 1857, 3, p. 443 ff.). Compare notes on ch. ix. 27, 28.

be assumed that God punished His Son as He punishes sinners; for the Son was no sinner, although the bearer of sins. Being in Himself absolutely sinless, He willingly submitted Himself, with the guilt of man's sin which He had taken upon Him, to the judgment of God; and this free act of love on the part of the sinless One was exactly that which was willed by the love of the Father Himself. But the love of the Father to sinful men would not have been holy, if He had allowed the burden of guilt, which the sinless One had taken upon Him, to be considered as obliterated, without causing Him to pay the penalty incurred by mankind. He must satisfy His righteousness ere He can satisfy His love, unless He were to renounce the holiness of His love. He *must*, we say, for it is a necessity grounded in His nature. Over this necessity, however, impends in the work of atonement the absolute power of His freedom, which realizes the necessity, but not otherwise than according to the plan laid down, and His freely stipulating will. That which takes place is necessary, but it takes place according to the will of His love. By submitting His Son even to a sense of divine abandonment in a violent death for the sake of that guilt of sin which He had willed to blot out, He obtains for Himself a valid satisfaction; and the Son, by willingly meeting the divine justice, and in the midst of God's wrath retaining His love, makes a sufficient satisfaction. It is sufficient; for the sufferings of Christ are actually the equivalent of the punishment incurred by us. But an equivalent it assuredly is not in the outward sense, by which a thousand dollars in gold are equivalent to the same sum in paper money: it is not so exact an equivalent as the opponents of the *satisfactio vicaria* desire in order to be disarmed. It was not so plainly exact an equivalent; and yet we cannot but believe that, in accordance with the words of our church Confession, we are compelled to assert, "*Dominum nostrum J. Chr. in sese suscepisse maledictionem legis ferendam et omnia peccata nostra plenissima satisfactione expiasse*," that is, through a perfectly sufficient expiation. Indeed, what we, if unredeemed, must have suffered for ever, was suffered by Christ temporally; and all

that we in various degrees and ways deserved to suffer, was suffered by Christ in His course from the manger to the cross, and although suffered in manifold ways, yet always in a mode conformable to human life and history. But by means of the *πνεῦμα αἰώνιον*, through whom the incarnate One offered Himself up for man, this His suffering obtains an absolute value; also through the pure, tender, and inwardly divine innocence, on which these torments of His love and of His soul were inflicted, and thus brought about a tension of His relation to His Father which verged on disruption, His suffering attains an infinite intensity; and this divine and eternal, this spotless and untroubled background, renders His free surrender of Himself, even up to His last breath, a preponderating equivalent, in the judgment of the righteous and merciful God, for the whole of the sins of man.

Moreover, in respect to the result of that which came to pass between God and the Son of God, which St. Paul specifies by saying that God is both *δίκαιος* and *δικαιῶν*, why should it not be called a reconciliation of the divine love with the divine righteousness? "If it is said," argues Hofmann (*Schutzschr.* ii. 97), "that sin, as an infinite offence to God, could not have remained unpunished, and that He had punished it, only not in our persons, but in that of Christ; also that He had forgiven it on the ground of this reconciliation of His love and holiness,—I must in the first place reply that God's love is not an attribute which has to be reconciled with His holiness as another attribute, but a disposition of mind whose character is determined by the nature of Him who loves." This distinction is not to the point; for love and righteousness are here taken into consideration as modes of conduct to the creature, both equally essential to God. On the one hand, God cannot forbear from still loving the creature as such, even in the state of self-incurred ruin; and, on the other hand, He cannot forbear from executing on him the punishment due to his sins. The sin of the creature frustrates the divine love, in the rejection of which, indeed, sin consists, by laying upon God the necessity of confirming and asserting His holiness by penal justice. If now it comes

to pass that this demonstration of His righteousness by God Himself is made the means of again turning His love to the creature, we should call this a reconciliation of love with righteousness. We should justly thus designate the *ἀποκατάστασις* of the damned, if the Scriptures taught any such idea, since the age-long damnation would only be the means by which the manifestation of love to them would be possible. The Scriptures, however, place before us another pattern of this reconciliation of the divine love as the justice which proceeds from its holiness. If we take a glance at the history of Israel which is sketched out in Moses' prophetic song (Deut. xxxii.), what is it, taken as a whole, but a conclusive reconciliation of God's love with His righteousness? The immutable ground of God's relation to Israel is asserted in the fact that God always inflicted on Israel that which His righteousness required, but always with the view that this manifestation of His righteousness might again confirm His love. This reconciliation of the love and righteousness of God, in virtue of which He judged Israel by sifting but not destroying it, delivering those that were sifted out, and again favouring them, is celebrated in the last words of the above-named great song as the atonement (וְכִפֶּר) for the land and God's people. The fundamental idea is the same as in Isa. i. 27, where we read, "Zion shall be redeemed with judgment, and they that return of her with righteousness." Judgment and righteousness (מִשְׁפָּט וּצְדָקָה) are here (cf. ch. iv. 4, v. 16, xxviii. 17) intended in their (in the first place) judicial fulfilment. A judgment of God the righteous will be the means whereby Zion will be redeemed; a judgment on sinners and sin, whereby the power will be broken which held in bondage those of Zion who were well-affected towards God, so far as any were yet existing. In consequence of this, those who turned to Jehovah are made members of His true church. By no other means, therefore, than by manifesting His penal justice, does God acquire a righteousness which is conferred as a gift of mercy on those who escape the former. The result of the manifestation of judgment proceeding from God's merciful will as the ultimate motive, is that which

Hosea (ch. ii. 19, 20) comprises in the profound words, "And I will betroth thee unto me for ever; yea, I will betroth thee unto me in righteousness, and in judgment, and in loving-kindness, and in mercies: I will even betroth thee unto me in faithfulness; and thou shalt know the Lord." The wrath is now past and over: love has become reconciled with the obligation to punish incumbent on His holiness; and the fruits of this reconciliation are, that Jehovah for ever and without hesitation gives Himself to His people to be their own, justifying and sanctifying them by His grace. In this behaviour of Jehovah towards Israel, we may observe a representation of His conduct to man, and to His incarnate Son. God loved man, even fallen man; but His love would not have been in harmony with His holiness, if He had made His righteousness, which required his punishment, subordinate to His love. His aim was, assuredly, not so much the satisfaction of the punishment as the making good of the guilt; but as the merciful and at the same time the righteous God, He could not do the one thing if He renounced the other. The object, therefore, was to satisfy His righteousness in such a way as would be also a satisfaction to His love. And this marvellous plan constitutes the eternal counsel of redemption, and its historical development; in which the Triune God took upon Himself the atonement for sin, but only by the Son submitting Himself not only to evil, but also to the judgment of righteousness and the curse of the law against its transgressors, and by the Father devoting Him thereto: so that God's wrath against sinful man, manifesting itself in judgment, was executed within the divine inbeing itself; inasmuch as love, in order that this wrath may not pass upon mankind, caused it to pass instead upon the One who was both God and man, and thus withdrew it into itself.

"In the second place," Hofmann goes on to say (*ut supr.*), "it is not correct to say of sin in general, that it is an infinite wrong to the holy God. For history, attested by holy Scripture, teaches us to distinguish between human and Satanic sin; and this distinction will require to be taken into account

when the atonement of human sin comes in question." We do not deny this distinction: it is, indeed, that which renders reconciliation possible; for the case of Satan and the sin of men who reject redeeming love exclude any such reconciliation. But where the Scriptures speak of our redemption, they do not insist upon it; nor do they anywhere indicate the measure of human guilt to be atoned for as being less than that of Satan, but rather, on the very ground of the greatness of our depravity and enmity against God, do they extol the freedom of divine mercy and the plenteousness of divine love. Our sin was of that kind that it allowed of a manifestation of God's righteousness overruled by love. But although men had not all become like devils, and there was a distinction between even the unnatural sins in men (Rom. i. 26 f.) and the similar sins in demons (Jude 3), still the Gentiles are said to be children of wrath (Eph. ii. 3), and Israel is under the curse of the law (Gal. iii. 13). All were subject to the divine justice, ὑπόδικοι (Rom. iii. 13), and were liable to death in all the terrible intensity in which it forms the background of spiritual death (Eph. ii. 1)—the death which is both bodily and eternal; but Christ, for all of us, submitted Himself to penal justice, and for all of us He drained the cup of death to the last dregs, and was baptized with the baptism of suffering (Mark x. 38), of which He says, "How grievous is it to me until it be accomplished!" (Luke xii. 50.) The church has at all times looked upon the bitter sufferings and the death of the Son of God as the true mirror of our sins. It is a mirror of the superabundant merciful love of God which did not spare His own Son; but it is also a mirror of the greatness, and the depth, and the multitude of our sins, for the sake of which He was given up to death.[1]

If we keep rightly in view the damnable nature of human guilt, and do not fritter away by over-subtle interpretations the three great verities in relation to God's plan of salvation

[1] "*Quæ magis severa et horrenda significatio atque concio iræ divinæ adversus peccata est, quam illa ipsa passio et mors Jesu Christi, filii Dei?*" —*Formula Concordiæ Sol. Decl.* v.

testified to in Scripture,—(1) that God made Him who knew no sin to be sin for us, *i.e.* imputed our sin to Jesus Christ; (2) that Christ, the sinless One, taking the burden of our guilt, became a curse for us, *i.e.* endured the lightning of God's wrath which should have fallen upon us; or, as the Scripture also says, that God executed the judgment upon sin in the person of His Son, who took upon Himself our flesh and blood, and offered Himself up for us as a sin-offering or atonement for our sins; (3) that, in order that we may be able to stand before God, His righteousness is by faith so imputed to us, even as He allowed our sins to be imputed to Him in order to His making atonement for them,—it is evident, so long as these three antecedent propositions are maintained, that Christ must be allowed to have suffered and died *as our representative* and in our stead, in order that we might not have to suffer that to which we were liable, and that instead of our dying we should have life in the life to which He attained through His vicarious death. Even Hofmann himself, in spite of his dissent from the first and second of our propositions, must consistently speak of a vicarious action on the part of our Lord,[1] unless he proceeds upon an idea of vicarious representation which, as he limits it, is foreign both to the language of everyday life and also to legal terminology. But this idea must be maintained in that strict sense which it assumes in the ecclesiastical doctrine of the atonement; nor can Hofmann's objections deter us from so doing. He professes to refrain from using the traditional term "vicarious representation," on account of a twofold unfitness.[2] "In the first place, it suggests," he

[1] *Vid.* Schmid, p. 22: "It must be looked upon as vicarious representation, whenever any one accomplishes an action which I am thereby spared from accomplishing, or when any one bears patiently some evil which I should otherwise have had to bear. I may therefore be confident of showing that Hofmann in this sense teaches a vicarious representation, although he does not go so far as employ the very expression itself." Because, indeed, he rejects it absolutely and without any restriction, the actual points of the matter in question have been so lamentably complicated.

[2] The expression is customary, since it has been usual to add the ad-

says, "the idea that Christ did not merely appear for us in order to bring about the forgiveness of our sins which we could not ourselves effect, but now have without our own assistance, but that all that He did was done, and all that He suffered was suffered, in the sense of doing and suffering instead of mankind; and that He did that which we ought to have done, and suffered that which we ought to have suffered. . . . For atonement, as I say with Stahl, is in its nature the making good of sin, and not the penal reparation; and Christ made satisfaction for our sin, and not for our punishment." But from the very same treatise of Stahl to which Hofmann refers—namely, the section on the atonement, in his *Foundations of a Christian Philosophy*—we can derive the materials for a refutation. For there not only is the fact of the vicarious satisfaction most decidedly acknowledged, but also the characteristic of the penal compensation as being necessarily included in the much broader, deeper, and nobler idea of atonement. "The vicarious satisfaction of Christ," writes Stahl, "which the church justly maintains to be the centre-point of the Christian faith, is a satisfaction made not by punishment, but by atonement taken in its specific idea. The very aim of it is to avert punishment, and in it the nature of the atonement is shown forth absolutely and clearly. This is punishment submitted to by Him who was pure from all sin. It is submitted to not merely as the necessary result of moral fulfilment, but directly, in order that through it atonement may be made. It is absolute suffering undergone, not merely death in general, but all suffering which can be morally assented to; that is, the infinite variety of temporal sufferings,—anguish, affliction, disgrace, death, and even in the highest stage,

jective *vicaria* to *satisfactio*. In my opinion, Thomasius has proved (and Hofmann has not confuted him) that all that this adjective expresses exists in Luther and Melanchthon, our creeds and our oldest theologians, just as the Roman law recognised free representation in many legal matters without having any special term to express it. The word *vicarius* does not occur in any legal connection.

abandonment by God, all fully felt without any hardening against them. There is no imaginable suffering beyond this, except the eternal abandoning by God. But to the latter man is not permitted to assent, nor can it form the subject of the atoning sufferings; for the very idea of the latter is to avert eternal suffering by that which is temporal. Finally, the atonement was accomplished by Him who not only bore some kind of relation to, but was absolutely one with, the human race, of whom it is said that we are made in Him, and through Him, and after His image." As Stahl acknowledges here the fact of the vicarious representation, it cannot be his intention to deny, in Hofmann's sense, that Christ's atonement has the character of penal suffering. "If by the atonement," says Stahl further on, "justice is fulfilled in the same way as by punishment, it by no means follows therefrom that the former is the same or of the same nature as the punishment, and nothing but the punishment which—the subject being altered—is executed on the guiltless instead of on the guilty, that is, a 'vicarious' punishment. But the atonement is entirely specific in its nature, and as such is rather contrasted with punishment than identical with it. Certainly the suffering which the Atoner underwent is doubtless a suffering for guilt and for the guilty—a penal suffering (Isa. liii.; 2 Cor. v. 21). But not only did the atonement embrace features which were essential to and inseparable from it,—which, however, are foreign, and indeed opposed to, punishment,—as, for instance, the activity of the sufferer and the self-submission to the suffering; but—and this is the decisive point—the power of the atonement which makes satisfaction to justice does not depend, as in the case of punishment, on the mere sufferings, but on the action itself, and on the obedience and sacrifice involved it it." Although we cannot agree with Stahl in saying that Christ in His sufferings was not the object of God's execution of punishment,—for, as we have shown, the Scriptures do not scruple to express this,—still he not only allows the fact of penal suffering, but acknowledges that it is necessarily contained in the idea of atonement itself. The point in dispute, indeed,

appears to me[1] to be merely this, that the sufferings of Christ were like the penal execution of a malefactor, from which they are essentially distinguished, inasmuch as Christ, as regards that point, was not only the suffering object, but also the acting subject; that that which makes satisfaction to the divine penal justice consists not merely in the being decreed, but first of all in the willing acknowledgment and acceptance of the claim of justice; and that this appearance of the guiltless for the guilty has God's good pleasure in its favour, although the guiltless cannot be excused from suffering the punishment for that which He had undertaken to atone for. Moreover, we find in Stahl's view of the atonement the correct answer to the doubts which Hofmann over and over again opposes to the proposition, that Christ did that which we ought to have done, and suffered that which we ought to have suffered. Christ's action and suffering, in which our old [Lutheran] divines, *e.g.* Flacius,[2] see two elements which from His birth to His last breath were inseparably interwoven and mutually pervading one another, are to be measured dynamically, and not merely externally with what we had to do and to suffer; and if a "debit and credit" account is thus arranged, there is no fear that the conscience will not

[1] I have good reasons for assuming that I am not wrong in this. Ebrard is essentially of this opinion, when he calls the decreed sufferings of Christ a judgment and a curse, but not a punishment. Limborch, however, says: "Potest tamen certo sensu pro nobis dici punitas."

[2] *Vid.* Thomasius, *Versöhnungslehre*, p. 166:—"*Scriptura justificationem nostri tum obedientiæ, tum passioni tribuit. Possunt vero hæc duo, passio et obedientia Christi, per totam ejus vitam extendi inde a primo illo exinanitionis momento, cum se patri submittens novam quandam, ut ita dicam, inchoavit vivendi rationem, longe infra divinam majestatem. Nam et illa primaria exinanitio genus passionis est et perpessionum omnium initium, et tota ejus deinde vita usque ad resurrectionem perpetua passio fuit, cujus tamen passionis, quia præcipua et atrocissima pars in cruce peracta est, hæc ideo synecdochice pro omnibus ejus passionibus ponitur. Eodem modo et obedientiæ nomine tota vita Christi notari potest. Nam Paulus inquit eum se humiliasse factum obedientem usque ad mortem, et at Hebr. v. eum didicisse obedientiam ex iis quæ passus est. Tota ergo vita filii Dei tum obedientiæ tum passionis nomine comprehendi potest. Nam et obedientia fuit perpetua quædam passio, et passio perpetua obedientia.*"

be satisfied. The Saviour approves Himself by perfect obedience, which inseparably includes both the general duty of man and the special vocation of the agent of salvation, to be the Holy One under the conditions which God has laid down, and submits Himself to the decreed sufferings framed according to these conditions, even to the death upon the cross; and this His suffering becomes an equivalent, a sufficient payment of that for which we were liable, by adding His holy innocence, his willingness manifested even up to His last breath, and His love to men stedfast to the extremest point,—a love which coincided with the love of the Father, and firmly retaining it, opens a way to it, through the wrath for men. But both His suffering in action and His action in suffering are vicarious. The Son of man represents mankind before the Father, and by His life, absolutely sinless amid all the temptations and assaults of Satan and sin, satisfies vicariously the demand on man which remained unsatisfied, and by His suffering vicariously gives an acquittance for the guilt of sin; so that within mankind and for mankind a righteousness of God is constituted, in which there is absolutely nothing sinful nor liable to condemnation. It must, however, be acknowledged, that the significance of Christ for mankind is not exhausted in the idea of vicarious representation, but that it has a far wider bearing, as we shall see in what follows.

"I do not," Hofmann goes on to say, "call Christ's action a vicarious satisfaction, because, in the second place, the expression 'vicarious representation' does not seem to me a fitting description of Christ's relation to man. It is not one alien from man who has accomplished that which man ought to have accomplished, but could not: we must not regard Him in an aspect so apart from man, but as One in whom man was created, who also in this world has united Himself to humanity. As the eternal Son, He is not 'Another' as regards mankind, any more than it would be right so to speak of Him as regards the Father; neither as the man Jesus is He 'Another' in respect to mankind, but that Son of man in whom humanity finds its second Adam. The

action by which He has reconciled us to God is not therefore of a merely vicarious nature, and we are reconciled not only through Him, but in Him."

But the Lord Himself says (Matt. xx. 28) that He had come to give His life as a ransom *ἀντὶ πολλῶν*. He thus describes His giving Himself up to death as an act of a vicarious character. It is true that the mere ransoming of one that is liable to death does not *per se* come under the idea of a vicarious representation. But as the *λύτρον* (*ἀντίλυτρον*, 1 Tim. ii. 6) which the Redeemer offered was His own life and His own person, His death was unquestionably a vicarious action in the most precise and strict sense of the words.[1] And in describing this self-surrender of Himself as vicarious in its nature, He so expresses Himself, that as regards the many among mankind He appears as Another; just in the same way as He does not hesitate to call Himself Another in respect to His disciples (John iv. 37 f.), and even in respect to the Father and the Holy Spirit (John v. 32, xiv. 16). If holy Scripture desires to avoid representing the Lord as separate from humanity, they could not have called Him *μεσίτης* and *ἔγγυος*; for He, as a representative of men, had them as it were behind Him, proceeding from and acting for them. And in the same way He stands forth as a Mediator between them and God, and in His exalted state guarantees the continuance and carrying out of the covenant thus accomplished between God and man. But the fact that He is not Another, and alien from

[1] Hofmann says, on the contrary, ii. 1. 197: "Jesus did not give up His life in the place of many who must have surrendered their lives for the sake of remission, either by dying in their stead, or by dying in order that they should not die; but He gives His life as a recompense for the release of many, and His death is to be the action by which they are freed from their liability." It is certainly correct that the Lord did not give up His life in the stead of many who must have given up their lives for the sake of remission; for never since the fall of man has impossibility been required of him, that by his own operation he should atone for his sins. But the denial is in other ways incorrect. The obligation of sin is, indeed, the obligation of death. His death is כִּפֶּר נַפְשֵׁנוּ, *i.e.* He died for us in our stead.

mankind, but, on the contrary, He in whom mankind was created, who also took upon Himself the nature of a man, is, as Stahl justly observes, exactly that which enables Him to make a vicarious atonement; or, as we should say, the fact from which the representative relation between Him and man proceeds, and on which the validity and effect of His vicarious action are based. It is, on the other hand, assuredly true, that in Christ a new humanity is established instead of the former one, which was disturbed by sin; but this truth is put to an improper use if it is asserted in such a way that the idea of the atonement is made void, and the idea of vicarious representation is suppressed. The idea of the atonement is made void when it is reduced to this, that the new commencement of humanity constituted in Christ cannot fully develope itself without being compelled to struggle through all the extreme pangs which would be the result of the old commencement being subject to the divine wrath. For by Christ approving Himself to be the Holy One amid all these ordained sufferings even unto death, we obtain indeed a second Adam, but not an Atoner. But Christ is in fact both. And the real state of the case is, that He is not our Atoner because He is the second Adam, but that He has become the second Adam by the completion of the atonement, having not only offered Himself up for our transgressions, but also having risen again for our justification (1 Cor. xv. 47; and comp. Rom. v. 18, 19, with Rom. iv. 25, John xii. 24, etc.). By the above-mentioned transposition of the matter, the vicarious representation must consistently fall to the ground. For the new commencement constituted in Christ is certainly in itself not of a vicarious character, but has been planted by God among mankind, and has grown within it, and out of it. But the vicarious satisfaction was the cause on which its possibility was made conditional. The Son of man could not found a new humanity without at the same time bringing the history of the former humanity to a conclusion; and this He could not do without atoning for the guilt of sin. He could not, however, atone for the guilt of the sin of former humanity

without coming forward in a vicarious character; but this was impossible if He did not enter into humanity, and become like to it, and at the same time, as sinless and divine, become and remain a different One as regards man. The unity with man into which Christ entered, so far from excluding the vicarious representation, is, on the contrary, the fundamental hypothesis for it; and the new commencement of humanity in Christ, so far from excluding the vicarious satisfaction made to God's righteousness, is, on the contrary, its fundamental condition. The new creative life and rule of Christ after the resurrection, rest upon His vicarious action and suffering even unto death. The life which proceeds from the second Adam is the negation of the death which proceeded from the first Adam, without the idea of vicarious representation being applicable; but the middle term between man dead in his sins and man resuscitated in and with Christ, and arisen in His power, is the vicarious atonement of the Son of God and man, who was to be, and intended to be, the second Adam.[1]

We have hitherto purposely abstained from speaking of

[1] Baumgarten has also come forward as an opponent, in a certain sense, of vicarious substitution (*Nachtgesichte Sacharias*, ii. 309): "The power of consummated sin is of course broken once for all by the love and obedience of Jesus Christ, manifested even unto death; but this is not to be looked upon in the convenient and carnal sense which makes the result a weakening of the wicked power itself, or an altered position of its force as regards the world. This is the false, carnal idea of vicarious representation, according to which Christ appeared outwardly in our stead; so that we had, as it were, only to remain quiescent and gaze from afar, as if it was a question of something to be done which was quite independent of us. Away with this pillow for moral cowardice and sloth to rest on! The prince of darkness, after the death of Christ, is the same in malice and power as he was previously; and the tempting power of sin, after the atonement made by the blood of Christ, is as great as it was previously. But by means of the Spirit of Jesus Christ, room is made on earth for us to attain, by a faithful union with Jesus' death and resurrection, to the power of overcoming the evil one, just as Jesus overcame him, and of opposing sin, just as Jesus did even unto blood." This passage depreciates the work of atonement, by not giving due prominence, as regards the continuous power of sin and Satan, to

Sacrifice. The atonement of the New Testament is the key to the sacrifices of the Old Testament, not the reverse. We must first seek to understand by themselves New Testament facts, and New Testament statements as to these facts, or we shall incur the danger which Hofmann has not been fortunate enough to avoid, of introducing into the New Testament the interpretation which the sacrificial Thorah gives us of itself, in accordance with the then existing stage of soteriological development, and which would prove for us an insufficient and therefore misleading guide. If it is a misuse of the progressive historical method to employ the prepentecostal facts of the gospel history, and the statements connected with them, in order to curtail the full purport of the post-pentecostal apostolical developments, how much greater is the misuse in the present case, looking at the incomparably greater difference in the subjects, the right relation of which we have now to determine! For the Old Testament sacrifices were among the "weak and beggarly elements" mentioned in Gal. iv. 9; and, as the Epistle to the Hebrews shows, the need for salvation found in them no real satisfaction. And up to the great prophecy of the self-

the blotting out of guilt accomplished by the atonement, and the judgment executed by it on the prince of this world, *i.e.* the snatching away from him of the claim he had on man; and it might appear therefrom that Baumgarten was generally opposed to the idea of vicarious representation. Nevertheless, although my ways and those of the above-named divine have for so long a period been widely divided, I have not been disappointed in the hope which I added to the passage of his sermon given in my Commentary. In the second part of his *Protestantischen Warnung und Lehre*, p. 32, he has decidedly pronounced that "our Saviour Jesus took upon Himself, expiated, and atoned for the sins of the world, by submitting to the punishment due to them without abatement or mitigation; for His death was the death of being forsaken by God, the death without God (χωρὶς Θεοῦ, Heb. ii. 9, according to an ancient reading), the very death indeed which God had threatened from the beginning." He also says that, in the passion of Jesus, man "sees his sin, which is evident to him from the thousandfold testimony of his conscience and of the divine law, given up to the divine wrath and judgment, to the inexorable curse of, and to the abandonment by God, without any restriction or abatement."

sacrifice of Jehovah's Servant (Isa. liii.), to which perhaps may be added Ps. xl., it remained but a dumb type. The enigmatical obscurity of the shadow was not fully solved until the historical fulfilment took place. We should therefore apply the historical fulfilment to the obscurity of the shadow, and not the shadowy type to the now revealed mystery.[1]

The giving of the law did not commence with the institution of sacrificial worship; and therefore Jehovah says through Jeremiah (ch. vii. 22), I did not give commandment to your fathers, at the exodus from Egypt, על־דברי עולה וזבח, but enjoined on them obedience. Sacrificial worship was not, therefore, the first and main point. It was in existence, as prescribed by custom, before the giving of the law; and when the latter purified and regulated it, while at the same time limiting and rendering it more onerous, this procedure was only a concession made to the need for sacrificial worship as felt by man. The sacrificial rites were no real satisfaction of this need; and the Lawgiver well knew what enlightened eyes were required to understand their typical import, and how likely they were to degenerate into a mere heartless *opus operatum*. The great danger of the sacrificial cultus was this, that the delusion might be established, that the gift *per se* compensated for sin,—a delusion which was opposed in prophecy by such incisive utterances as that recorded Mic. vi. 7 f. The sacrificial Thorah itself opposes this notion, by making a strict separation between the atonement and the offering. Whatever is placed upon the altar is not atoning in itself, but is acceptable to God only under the supposition that it is the gift of a man who is atoned for. In the vegetable sacrifices this atonement is not represented—it is the presupposition of a well-pleased acceptance; but in animal sacrifices it is represented, and is indeed

[1] "Let it be supposed," says Ebrard very justly in his *Unters.*, "that it might be strictly proved that the point of vicarious penal suffering was entirely foreign to the sacrificial cultus, and that the sacrifices were only compensatory; even in this case the idea would not be shut out, that the sacrifice of Christ might have had the quality of a vicarious suffering of punishment."

strictly separated from, and precedes, the offering up on the altar. By means of the laying on of hands, he that is offering appropriates the victim to the special end to which he intends to apply it, and at the same time transfers to it the substance of all that is within him. If it is an expiatory offering, *i.e.* a sin or guilt-offering, he thus lays his sins upon the victim, so that the latter bears them, and takes them away from the offerer.[1] This is accomplished (*a*) by the blood, which makes atonement for the offerer, being placed upon the altar, or in some way brought before God; (*b*) by the gift which is placed upon the altar being accepted by God as well-pleasing to Him, on account of the atonement which is made by the blood. Therefore the bringing in of the blood which is caught, or the sprinkling of it on the place of sacrifice, always precedes the sacrifice itself. For the atonement is the basis of the sacrificial action, and the latter is always the offering of a gift. According as the aim at atonement, or at an overt expression of reverence for God, prevailed in the sacrifice, the preponderance is given in it either to the significance of the blood, or to the significance of the gift on the altar, and the fire which consumed the gift.

The chief error in the sacrificial theories both of Bähr and Kurtz is, that they make the atonement the main idea presiding over the whole act of sacrifice, and accordingly look upon all animal offerings as being of the nature of sin-offerings, and vegetable offerings as a dependent addition to the former. This inclusion of all sacrifices in the idea of atonement is foreign to the ancients, and is justly rejected as erroneous and misleading by Thalhofer in his

[1] In opposition to this, Hofmann, ii. 1. 156: "The sense of the laying on of hands is, that man intends to make use of his absolute power for disposing of the life of the beast, and consequently devotes the beast to the death with which he desires to make payment to God." Whilst Hofmann derives from Lev. xvi. 16 the comprehensive conclusion that all placing of the blood upon the altar had as its aim the atonement for the altar, in another passage of the same ritual (Lev. xvi. 21) he allows no result at all of the laying on of hands.

prize essay *On the Unbloody Sacrifices of the Mosaical Cultus* (1848); also by Hengstenberg in his *Vorträge über das Opfer* (*Ev. KZ.* 1852), by Hofmann in his *Schriftbeweis*, and by Keil in his *Abh. über die Opfer des A. B.* (*Luther. Zeitschr.* 1856–57). On the other hand, however, all striving after holiness which finds in sacrifice its overt expression, rests upon the forgiveness of sins, which cannot take place without the shedding of blood, and the blood is so far the central point of the whole sacrificial ritual; and the whole comprehension of the sacrifice is comprised in the question, Why and in what sense did blood, and consequently the violent shedding forth of the life, constitute the Old Testament means of atonement?

In answering this question, the views of modern inquirers diverge respectively as follows:—1. *Bähr.*—According to his fundamental principle, the sacrifice of a beast is the surrender of the life of the beast with its blood to God, as a type of the surrender of the sinful soul of man himself to God, with the aim of attaining life from and in God: it typifies, therefore, the circumstance of man's self-sacrifice, which begins in repentance, and by means of justification is perfected in sanctification. 2. *Kurtz.*—The animal and its sinless life stand instead of man: instead of him it suffers the punishment of death, and makes atonement for him with its blood poured out in death, thus making void the guilt imputed to it. This is the so-called juridical view, because it looks upon the slaying of the beast as an act of punishment, and upon that which the beast effects by suffering for man as a *satisfactio vicaria.* 3. *V. Hofmann.*—The sacrifice of the beast is a payment to or reckoning with God, which makes compensation for sin, for the accomplishment of which God has empowered man to employ the life of the beast. And He has given him this power, inasmuch as He Himself has slain beasts in order to cover the sinful nakedness of man. This view has the peculiarity about it of doing away with any substitutive connection between sacrificer and sacrifice, and of looking upon the sacrifice as a means of atonement suggested to man, by which it is intended he should recog-

nise that God will not forgive sin as a matter of course, without anything being done as a compensation for it. 4. *Keil.*—The slaying of the beast is not satisfactory *per se*, although the sinner may of course recognise what he would have merited if God had dealt with him according to His divine justice. The atonement does not consist in the slaying of the beast laden with the sins of the sacrificer, but in the presentation of the blood upon the altar, which presentation typifies the acceptance of the sacrificer into a participation of God's mercy. This surrender to Jehovah, the Holy One, is a death which in this way becomes life. The burning on the altar typifies the effect of the mercy, which consumes that which is sinful, and transforms the sinner.

In glancing over these four opinions, of which we have given but a mere sketch, it cannot be denied that the so-called juridical view put forward by Kurtz is not only the most simple and intelligible, but also the idea which harmonizes best with the New Testament antitype. Bähr's symbolical view has fallen into the background, because it makes the animal sacrificed nothing but the shadow accompanying man's personal action: man attains—this is what the sacrifice typifies—to mercy and life from God by mortifying himself. Moreover, the expressions, "to die to one's self," or "to give one's self up to God by death," convey an idea which is foreign to the Old Testament; and it remains unexplained why the slaying of the victim, which in this interpretation of the sacrificial ritual is so deeply significant, as Bähr himself allows, and brings forward against the juridical view, seems to be of such subordinate importance; also why the beast is slaughtered away from the altar, and not on it; and why the victim was not necessarily killed by its owner (at least according to the traditionally recorded practice), but by any one else who pleased to do so.[1] And even Keil's symbolically vicarious view is inferior to that of Kurtz,

[1] Bähr's sacrificial theory is nevertheless, in its main idea, identical with the Jewish view which has prevailed since the middle ages—its practical conclusion that fasting (self-mortification) was the true propiatory altar, התענית מוכח כפרה ממש.

because it is generally a πρῶτον ψεῦδος of these sacrificial theories that the life and flesh of the victim are a symbol of man; the blood is a means of atonement as a third term between God and man; and the sacrifice as a gift is no more the symbol of man, than the gold, frankincense, and myrrh which were offered to the Saviour were a symbol of the Magi, or than a hymn of praise which is dedicated to God is a symbol of him who dedicates it. Even the prayer is, indeed, no symbol of the man himself; but, as if severed from the person of the man, it appears—as תפלה, according to its right origin, proves—as something mediatorial and intercessory between him and God. The sacrifice, when offered up with the right feeling, has the self-surrender of man as its background, and his prayer as its accompaniment (Job xlii. 8; 1 Sam. vii. 9; 1 Chron. xxi. 26; 2 Chron. xxix. 26–30); but neither self-surrender nor prayer is thereby symbolized. The sacrificial gift is something different from him that offers it; it is what it is, and does not signify what it is not.

But all three opinions which oppose that of Kurtz have this against them, that they mistake the nature of the atonement expressed in the sacrifice. The verb כִּפֶּר, according to its proper origin, signifies *to cover*. The atonement is a covering, as is shown by the name given to the covering of the ark, כַּפֹּרֶת, with which in early times the idea of ἱλαστήριον was combined. To atone is to cover, but not in the sense adopted and consistently carried out by Hofmann, in which we speak of the "covering," that is, "the payment," of a debt. This metaphor is entirely foreign to the Hebrew language. It is true that כֹּפֶר signifies the λύτρον; but whilst in our linguistic usage it is the requisite sum which is covered, in the Hebrew idiom it is he who pays, or he for whom the amount is paid, who is covered by the payment. Thus the ideas of כֹּפֶר, λύτρον, and כִּפֻּרִים, ἱλασμός, are connected; and on this point we must remark that the Thorah, from the first sacrifice to the last, discovers nothing whatever of any intention with regard to the animal's skin, and also that כֹּפֶר is nowhere placed in relation to the sacrifice: so that mak-

ing the idea of payment the centre-point of the sacrifice, as being of an atoning nature, is a fundamental idea which is foreign to the law.[1] The verb כִּפֶּר signifies to cover, and the closest construction is that with עַל, of the sin and impurity, or of him laden therewith. But that which covers the sin or impurity, or him that is laden with them, cannot be (a point which may be urged against Bähr and Keil) a symbol of man: it must supply his place actually (as a representative in a juristic sense), and not in a merely symbolical way (as a substitute). And from whom is it that sin and that which is sinful, impurity and that which is impure, are covered? The answer is, From God the Holy One, to whom sin and impurity are an intolerable spectacle; or, which amounts to the same thing, from God's wrath, which is kindled against all that is sinful and impure, and consumes it. The atonement, ἐξιλασμός, is the removal of the ὀργή (Jes. Sir. xvi. 11). When the people, after the punishment of the 250 rebels, murmured against Moses and Aaron, and Jehovah intended to destroy those who took the part of the rebels, then spake Moses to Aaron (Num. xvi. 46): "Take a censer, and put fire therein from off the altar, and put on incense, and go quickly to the congregation, and make an atonement for them: for there is wrath gone out from the Lord; the plague is begun." The כִּפֶּרֶת here evidently intervenes between the wrath and the sin. And although it may be said that murder could only be atoned for by the death of the murderer (Num. xxxv. 33), or that Phinehas by his relentless zeal atoned for, that is, covered Israel (Num. xxv. 13), yet in both cases it is God's wrath excited by sin which is propitiated, that is, appeased. Thus in the sacrifice sinful man is atoned for, that is, covered, by the blood which intervenes as a third element between man and God, and is brought to the place of God's presence. It appears for man; and since it appears for man, whose sin, although perhaps according to God's ordinance of mercy it is

[1] Hofmann goes entirely against the linguistic usage in saying (ii. 1. 197) that כִּפֶּר בְּעַד and δίδωμι λύτρον ἀντί are synonymous phrases. The LXX. does not anywhere translate the former by the latter.

a *peccatum veniale*, is nevertheless as sin liable to death, the fact cannot be evaded that it appears vicariously for man.[1]

It is thus taught in the Thorah (Lev. xvii. 11); for we there read that the blood of the beast atones for the soul of the offerer (עַל־נַפְשׁ), by virtue of the life contained in it (בַּנֶּפֶשׁ).[2] Evidently, therefore, the life of the beast stands in the place of the soul of the man, by the life which is shed out in the blood (דם החיים) covering from an angry God the soul of man, which was worthy of death. The vicarious representation is certainly an incongruous one, for man and beast are infinitely different; and therefore Jehovah says, נְתַתִּיו, I have given you the blood of the beast as a means of atonement. Given? Yes, given surely with a view to

[1] This is also the prevailing opinion of the ancient Synagogue, as Einhorn acknowledges (*Princip. des Mosaismus*, p. 195), although his rationalistic work aims at its refutation. There is a fact which goes to prove that the ancient Synagogue looked upon the offering of blood in the light of a transfer of guilt, and of a vicarious satisfaction: this is, that among the European Jews the sacrifice of a cock is still customary (תרנגול לכפרה). See, on this point, Brück (*Rabbinische Ceremonial-Gebrauche*, 1837, p. 25 ff.). And that the idea of vicarious representation is blended in the linguistic conception with כפרה, is shown by the very usual phrase הריני כפרתו (*e.g. Negaim Pen.* ii.; *Jebamoth* 70*a*, etc.), "I will be his atonement," *i.e.* Let all the evil which would have come upon him, come upon me in his stead. Even now a son, when speaking of a recently deceased father, is wont to say, הריני כפרת מיטתבו, "I will be the atonement of his departure," *i.e.* May that come upon me which, in the other world, is awarded to him as the sufferings of purification (*vid. Kidduschin* 31*b*; *Tur Joreh Deah*, § 240). Aruch (under כר) explains exactly: הריני במקומו, I will supply his place, and suffer in his stead. This combination of the two ideas — of atonement and of vicarious representation — is also evident from the fact that, according to the Mishna (*Maccoth* 11*b*), the unintentional man-slayer, whose sentence was pronounced, need not fly to a city of refuge if the high priest died immediately afterwards, and that, according to the Gemara, the reason was, that the death of the high priest, and not the exile of the fugitive, constituted the atonement (מיתת כהן הוא דמכפרה).

[2] Hofmann, ii. 1. 151, is of opinion that the translation "through the life" is incorrect; but the rendering which he substitutes, "as the life in its nature," is impossible as regards syntax: the word united with the so-called *Beth essentiæ* cannot have the article.

that life-blood of love, not of beasts, but of man, ay, of God made man, which in the fulness of time was to cover men, and to make them the beloved ones of God, but to God was eternally present. The Thorah is, however, dumb as to this mystery of the sacrifice, although it seems to have a foreboding of it. After the people, by their calf-worship, had brought upon themselves the judgment of destruction, Moses says (Ex. xxxii. 30): "And now I will go up unto Jehovah; peradventure I shall make an atonement for your sin." In this case it is not a beast, and neither Aaron nor an Aaronite priest, but it is Moses who undertakes the כִּפֻּרָה. And how does he attempt it? He offers to the angry Jehovah to have his name blotted out of the book of life. The *satisfactio vicaria*, or, as it may also be called, the *pœna vicaria*, is not therefore something foreign to the Thorah; but yet the slaying of the beast had, as Kurtz assumes, the character of a penal execution. The sacrifice of the beast does not represent in a type the event on Golgotha, because the sacrificial institution is an institution of mercy, in which it is mercy which pardons, and not justice which punishes. Just as the altar sacrament of the New Testament presupposes the event on Golgotha, but does not repeat it, so the latter is the mysterious background from which the divine permission for animal sacrifice proceeded, although the sacrifice does not in the intention of the ritual portray the event on Golgotha. The slaying of the victim is therefore called שָׁחַט, and never הֵמִית, just as (a point which may be urged against Keil) the consuming in the fire on the altar is always called הִקְטִיר, and never שָׂרַף. The slaying is only the means for obtaining the blood of atonement, and for making the beast an offering on the altar; and the consuming the gift in the fire is only the means for its surrender to God, and for its acceptance by God. The gift does not atone: it is the blood, and indeed not merely the blood which is shed, but that which is placed upon the altar (Lev. xvii. 11, עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ), which is the temporary typical representative of the blood of Jesus' self-sacrifice, and brings about the כפרה, *i.e.* covers the offerer so far as he is the object of the divine wrath, so that his gift, as

the gift of one atoned for, can be accepted by God as well-pleasing to Him.[1]

In the course of our commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews we often had occasion to show how the various acts of the sacrificial ritual vary from the facts of the antitype, both as regards locality and consecutive order. Thus, for instance, the presentation of the blood in the holiest of holies, which in the ritual of the day of atonement, and in harmony with the general ritual, took place between the slaying and offering on the altar; but in the heavenly and final act these points differ from the earthly. For the slaying and the offering on the altar are coincident—because, by the Lord giving Himself up to death, He also offered Himself—and the locality of the two coincident acts is one, the cross-altar of Golgotha; whilst in the sacrificial ritual the place of slaying and the altar were far apart. We have, besides, shown, as opportunity offered, that in the death of the Lord all the different acts of the sacrificial ritual found their antitype: the burning of the body of the sin-offering without the camp, and also the shedding of its blood in the slaying, the sprinkling of its blood, and the presentation of its fat upon the altar. It has been also remarked that the sacrifice of Christ is the fulfilment of all sacrifices of blood;

[1] There is, however, a sacrificial ritual (Deut. xxi. 1–9) in which the slaying is more noticed than the blood. The blood of a murdered man cannot be expiated except בְּדַם שֹׁפְכוֹ (Num. xxxv. 33). This is, however, impossible if the person of the murderer is unknown; and therefore that which the murderer should have suffered is done to the beast. But it is not the murderer who is thus atoned for; for the latter, if detected, would still be destroyed: it is the community which is atoned for by slaying a beast as their representative, and calling upon Jehovah to allow this to be effectual as the expiation for the undiscovered blood-guiltiness which lay upon all. The young, and as yet unused heifer, which is slain by cutting off the neck, represents the blood-stained community, and not the murderer. The idea of vicarious representation is therefore evident here. In the sacrifice the vicarious representation depended on the blood, and the slaying had nothing to do with it; but here it is made to depend on the slaying itself, which is here called עֲרִיפָה, and not either שְׁחִיטָה or זְבִיחָה; and it must be specially noticed that no mention is made of the flowing blood of the beast.

and it is therefore a one-sided view if we look at it in the light of a sacrifice of one kind only, to the exclusion of all others. The fundamental idea of the sin-offering is *expiatio*, or atonement; of the trespass-offering, *mulcta*, or indemnification; of the burnt-offering, *oblatio*, or adoration; of the peace-offering, *conciliatio*, or bringing into fellowship; —all these fundamental ideas, and not merely that of the making good of our sins in so far as they are a profanation and defrauding of the Holy One (Isa. liii. 10, "si obtulisset anima ejus mulctam"), are combined in the one all-embracing antitype. And the sacrifice of Christ is also an antitype of the covenant offering (Ex. xxiv.), by which Israel, being once for all sprinkled with the atoning blood, was dedicated to be God's covenant people, and to a performance of divine worship well-pleasing to Him. It was also the antitype of the installation sacrifice (Lev. viii.); for His blood which washed us from our sins has also dedicated us as priests to God His Father (Rev. i. 5 f.). Pre-eminently, too, is it the antitype of the passover, for His blood is our protection from perdition, and our redemption from bondage. We also have a Paschal Lamb, which is given to us to partake of, *καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάσχα ἡμῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐτύθη Χριστός* (1 Cor. v. 7).

The antitypical sacrifice is therefore not to be measured by the prefigurative sacrifices: it goes far beyond them, and is indeed their eternal cause, and the actually fulfilled aim of all of them. The death of the victim is, in the intention of the ritual, not of an atoning character: the victim, in being put to death, is not, in the intention of the ritual, of a prefigurative character; for the owner of the victim, or some one else, would thus kill Christ in the figure, which is inconsistent. The slaying is only the means for obtaining the blood, and for performing the sacrifice; and it is therefore called slaying, and not putting to death. The blood only of the victim is of an atoning and prefigurative character: it is atoning in virtue of its antitype, and not of the death inflicted on the victim, and points forwards to the blood of Christ which was one day to be shed, just as the sacramental cup points backwards to the blood of Christ which has been shed. The slaying of

the victim has therefore not at all the character of a penal death; but it is equally wrong, either from the event on Golgotha to press upon the slaying in the sacrificial cultus the character of penal death, or from the slaying in the sacrificial cultus to deny to the event on Golgotha the character of penal suffering, and of the execution of a sentence, or, as Paul does not hesitate to say, of the κατάρα. The whole of the sacrificial cultus, so far as it was adopted into the divine service of the people through whom salvation was to be brought about, depends, indeed, upon the eternal hypothesis of Christ's sacrifice of Himself, and is not in the most exact parallel a type of this New Testament fact; but, as the chief element of the divine service of Israel dedicated on Mount Sinai by the blood of a sacrificed beast, it may be compared to the divine service of Christianity founded on Golgotha by the blood of Christ. But as the divine service of the latter is imbued with after-ideas founded on the event on Golgotha and its heavenly results, so the divine service of Israel was pervaded by types founded on this future model; and the New Testament Scriptures are fully justified in looking upon the sacrificial law as the hieroglyphical representation of the New Testament, and when deciphering it, in going beyond the intention of the ritual, which had its ultimate cause far removed from itself. We must make a proper distinction between the then existing intention of the sacrificial law, and the sense which was a type of the future. The bond of union between the two is the blood, which both in the type and antitype is vicarious in its character. In the shadow the blood exclusively constituted the atonement, but in the antitype it was not exclusively Christ's blood: it was also Christ's sacrifice of Himself as προσφορὰ τοῦ σώματος (Heb. x. 10; Eph. v. 2), and consequently in the totality of all its points, indeed the whole life, sufferings, and death of Christ; and this our atonement is at the same time our sanctification, and the two together our perfecting.

In the preceding remarks, I believe that I have shown, as far as I could in the space at my disposal, that the obliteration of the ideas of penal suffering and vicarious representa-

tion leads to a view of the work of atonement which runs counter to the New Testament Scriptures; also that this view is opposed by the Old Testament sacrifice, if rightly understood; for so far as the latter is atoning, it also asserts itself to be vicarious. Also, that the penal suffering is in the latter not represented ritually, the atonement being made conditional on the blood alone, not on the violent death; but that the atonement of blood, understood typically, as it is intended to be understood, and is in fact so deciphered by Isaiah in his prophecy, ch. liii., also points to a vicarious satisfaction to be made to the penal justice of God. With regard to this point, we have not omitted to show that the idea of atonement has the narrower idea of penal compensation as its inalienable characteristic, but that it is by no means exhausted in the latter; also that that which was done and suffered actively and passively by Christ does not stand, in respect to that which we had to do and must have suffered, in the relation of an external well-balanced payment, although it does stand in the relation of a well-to-be-understood essential equivalent. And that, finally, the love of the Father to fallen man is the Alpha and Omega of the work of atonement, by which also penal suffering, judgment, and curse are overruled among them. That, however, on which we insist remains this, that the severity even unto death of the divine justice, which severity is evident amid the work of atonement, is not to be frittered away in the idea of the divine love which in this work of atonement mediates with the divine justice, and only in this way obtains the mastery. Although I do not fail to recognise how many beneficial results may and will flow from Hofmann's new work on the Scripture doctrine of sacrifice and atonement, yet I cannot say any more than all those have said who have taken upon themselves to speak[1] on this matter, which touches the innermost sanctuary of the faith, viz. that they cannot recognise that any true progress has been made in the reconciliation of God's love with God's justice by setting aside

[1] Seibert also included, in his work *Schleiermacher's Lehre von der Versöhnung* (1855), written without reference to v. Hofmann.

the vicarious substitution or the penal and judicial sufferings. The ecclesiastical, and especially the Lutheran perception of faith, will never cease to protest against this abrogation; and my good friend and colleague, especially if he takes into consideration the exceeding difficulty in understanding and ease in misunderstanding his doctrine of the atonement, cannot but acknowledge still more readily than before the justice of this protest, and the simple view of Scripture truth and childlike faith on which it depends.

FIRST APPENDIX.

THE RITUAL OF THE DAY OF ATONEMENT.

[From Maimuni's *Hajad hachazaka.*]

First Section.

Halacha (precept of the law) 1. On the day of the fast[1] the morning and evening sacrifice is offered just as on any other day, and also the oblation[2] of the day,—a bull, a ram, and seven lambs, all of them burnt-offerings, and a he-goat as a sin-offering, the blood of which was sprinkled in the outer place (of the sanctuary), the flesh being eaten in the evening.

But in addition to these (regular) sacrifices, there were also offered a young bull as a sin-offering, which was consumed, and a ram as a burnt-offering, both of which the high priest had to provide out of his own means. But the ram, which was provided out of the public means, and is described in the Parasha *Achare moth*, is that which is reckoned in *Numbers*[3] among the sacrifices of the feast, and is called the ram of the people. Lastly, two he-goats were

[1] Briefly for יום צום הכפרים.

[2] "Oblation" or "feast-offering" is throughout the translation of מוסף: the sacrifices are intended which were added to the obligatory daily sacrifices, and expressed the special character of the holy day. It is sometimes translated "supplementary sacrifices," which perhaps corresponds better with the word, but suggests the incorrect idea that these sacrifices were only an addition to the special sacrifices of the holy day.

[3] *Vid.* the Comment. *Lechem Mishneh* on this passage.

provided by the public means; one of which was offered as a sin-offering, and consumed by fire, and the other was to be driven away as the scapegoat.

The whole number of the sacrificial victims for this day was therefore fifteen: two daily sacrifices, one bull, two rams, and seven lambs, all burnt-offerings: in addition to these, two goats as sin-offerings, one of which was eaten in the evening, the blood being sprinkled without; the other, the blood of which was sprinkled within, was burnt: lastly, the high priest's bull as a sin-offering, which was burnt.

Halacha 2. The service as regards all the fifteen victims on this day was performed by the high priest alone, either by him who was anointed with the anointing oil,[1] or by him who was (merely) distinguished for the occasion by wearing the official garments.[2] And if it was a Sabbath, no one but the high priest offered the Sabbath oblation. Likewise, in respect of the other ministries of this day—such as the daily fumigation and cleaning of the lamps—all was done by the high priest, who was a married man, as it is written (Lev. xvi. 6), "And he shall make an atonement for himself and for his house," that is, for his wife.

Halacha 3. Seven days before the day of atonement, the high priest is removed from his own house to his chamber in the sanctuary: this is handed down from Moses our teacher. He must also for these seven days keep away from his wife; for it might happen unto her according to the custom of women, and he might then become unclean and unfit for the divine service for seven days. A deputy high priest is also to be previously appointed; so that, in case any legal hindrance set the high priest aside from the ministry, the other might act in his stead. Should any hindrance prevent the high priest from ministering before the daily morning sacrifice, or even after he had offered his own sacrifice, he that officiates in his place needs no special consecration; but his ministerial action supplies the consecration, and he begins with that act of the service at which the other left off.

[1] At the time of the first temple.

[2] At the time of the second temple.

When the day of atonement is over, the first returns to his ministry, and the second leaves it.[1] All the precepts of the law regarding the high priest apply to him, but he does not perform the ministry of the high priest for him, although in case of necessity it is valid; and if the first high priest is removed by death, the second is instituted in his place.

Halacha 4. During these seven days he is sprinkled with the ashes of a heifer,—on the third day after his separation, and on the seventh, that is, on the day of preparation for the feast of atonement; for he might unwittingly have made himself unclean. If either of these days falls upon a Sabbath, the sprinkling is omitted.

Halacha 5. During these seven days he is to exercise himself in all the performances of the service: he sprinkles the blood, takes care of the fumigation, cleanses the lamps, and brings the pieces of the daily sacrifice to the altar-fire, so that he may be accustomed to the service on the day of atonement. He has associated with him elders of the high court, who read to him, and instruct him in the ritual and ordinances of worship of the day, and address him: "My lord! high priest! Read thou with thy mouth; perhaps thou hast forgotten or never learnt this point." And on the day of preparation for the day of atonement, early in the morning, he is made to take his stand in the eastern gates; and bulls, rams, and lambs were led by in front of him, so that he might become experienced and versed in the service.

Halacha 6. During the whole of the seven days meat and drink were not withheld from him; but after nightfall, on the day of preparation for the day of atonement, he was not permitted to eat much, because food tends to make one drowsy; and he was not allowed to sleep, lest any impurity might affect him. Of course he was not allowed to eat things which might cause pollution, such as eggs, warm milk, etc.

Halacha 7. In the days of the second temple a free-thinking spirit flourished in Israel; and the Sadducees arose —may they soon disappear!—who do not believe oral teaching. They said that, on the day of atonement, the incense

[1] עובר. Some editions read עובד, which affords no suitable sense.

was to be lighted in the temple outside the veil, and that when the smoke ascended therefrom it was to be carried inside into the holiest of holies. The reason for this is, that they explain the words of Scripture (Lev. xvi. 2, "For I will appear in the cloud on the mercy-seat") as referring to the clouds proceeding from the incense.[1] But sages have learnt by tradition that the frankincense was first lighted in the holy of holies facing the ark, as it is written (Lev. xvi. 13), "And he shall put the incense upon the fire before Jehovah." Now, because in the second temple they entertained the apprehension that the then existing high priest might incline to the free-thinking party, they therefore, on the preparation day for the day of atonement, conjured him, saying: "My lord! high priest! We are delegates of the high court, but thou art delegate both for us and the high court; we conjure thee by Him who causes His name to rest upon this house, we conjure thee to make no change in anything that we have said to thee." Thereupon he goes away and weeps because they had suspected him of free-thinking, and they go away and weep because they had entertained a suspicion against a person whose conduct was unknown to them; for perhaps he had nothing of the kind in his thoughts.

Halacha 8. The whole night before the day of atonement the priest sits and gives didactic expositions, that is, if he be a sage; if he be only a disciple, doctrinal expositions are addressed to him. If he be practised in reading, he reads out; if not, some one reads out to him, lest he should fall asleep. And what is it that is read from? From the holy Scriptures. If he is disposed to fall into a slumber, the Levitical youths suddenly touch him with the middle finger,[2] and say to him, "My lord! high priest! Stand up, and refresh thyself a little by walking on the floor, lest thou sleepest." And thus employment was found for him until the hour for slaying the victims drew near; but they did not slay them until they were certainly convinced that morning twilight had broken, lest they should slay them by night.

[1] *Vid.* Grätz, *Gesch. der Juden.* iii. 515; and *vid.* above, on ch. ix. 5.

[2] לפניו, which is the reading in the Talmud; another reading is אותו.

Second Section.

Halacha 1. All sacrificial actions, as regards both the daily offerings and also the oblations, are performed by the high priest on the same day, clothed in the golden robes. The ritual peculiar to the day is, however, performed in the white robes. The service peculiar to the day consists in the dealings with the bull of the high priest and the two goats, one of which was to be the scapegoat, and in the fumigation with frankincense in the holy of holies; and all these matters were performed in the white clothing.

Halacha 2. As often as he changes his clothes, taking some off and putting others on, he must bathe himself; for it is written (Lev. xvi. 23, 24), "He shall put off the linen garments . . . and he shall wash his flesh with water in the holy place, and put on his garments."

The priest is to undergo five baths and ten washings of consecration on the same day. And how does this take place? Firstly, he takes off his ordinary clothes which he had on, and then, having bathed himself, stands up and dries himself; he then puts on the golden robes, and having consecrated his hands and feet, slays the daily sacrifice, performs the daily morning fumigation, cleanses the lamps, brings the pieces of the daily sacrifice to the fire on the altar, together with the meat-offering and the drink-offering, and offers the bull and the seven lambs for the feast-offering of the day. After this he consecrates his hands and his feet, puts off the golden robes, and having bathed, stands up and dries himself; he then puts on the white robes, consecrates his hands and feet, and performs the service of the day—the collective confession of sins, the drawing lots, the sprinkling of the blood of the sacrifice in the inner places, and the fumigating with frankincense in the holy of holies. He then gives up the goat to him who is to lead it away to Azazel,[1] and severing the sacrificial portions from the bull and goat which were to be burnt, delivers up the rest of them to be con-

[1] It is acknowledged that tradition takes עזאזל to be the name of the place to which the goat was driven away.

sumed. After this he consecrates his hands and his feet, and takes off the white robes; and after bathing, he stands up and dries himself, and puts on the golden robes. He next consecrates his hands and feet, and offers the atonement-goat, which formed a part of the oblation of the day, his own ram and the ram of the people, which are burnt-offerings; and placing on the altar-fire the sacrificial portions of the bull and goat which were to be burnt, he offers the daily evening sacrifice. After that he consecrates his hands and feet, and takes off the golden robes; and after bathing, he stands up and dries himself, and puts on the white robes. He consecrates his hands and feet, and entering the holiest of holies, takes therefrom the spoon and the censer. Next he consecrates his hands and feet, and takes off the white robes; and after bathing, he stands up and dries himself, and puts on the golden robes: he consecrates his hands and feet, and performs the daily evening fumigation; and after seeing to the care of the evening lights, consecrates his hands and feet; then, taking off the golden robes, he puts on his ordinary clothes, and goes out.

Halacha 3. These baths and consecrating washings were all performed in the sanctuary; for it is written, "And he shall wash his flesh with water in the holy place." The first bathing was an exception to this rule, and might be performed in any ordinary place, inasmuch as its aim was only to increase his attention; so that if he recollected any former impurity which still clung to him, he might in his thoughts give to this bathing the special purpose of cleansing himself from it.[1] If a priest omitted the bathing on the occasion of the change of clothing, or the consecrating washing between the various clothings and acts of service, his ministry is nevertheless legally valid.

Halacha 4. If the high priest was old or sickly, some red-hot iron plates were prepared on the day of preparation, which on the morrow were thrown into the water to take away the cold (as in the sanctuary none of the rabbinical

[1] Fundamentally different from Raschi's view of the passage in the Talmud on the point (*Joma* 30*a*).

prohibitions from work held good), or some hot water was mingled with the water of the bath of purification until the cold was taken from it.

Halacha 5. On any other day the high priest performed the consecrating washing of his hands and feet in the same basin as the other priests; but on this day, in conformity with his dignity, he washes them in a golden cup.[1] On any other day the priests ascend on the eastern edge, and descend on the western edge, of the altar-stage; but on this day they go along in the middle, before the priest, both in ascending and descending, for his glorification. On any other day, he to whom the censer was entrusted shovelled up the glowing embers with a silver pan, and then poured them into a golden pan; but on this day the high priest shovelled them up with a golden pan (מַחְתָּה שֶׁל־זָהָב), and went with them into the temple: this was done so as not to fatigue him with an accumulation of acts of service. In the same way, the pan used every day held four *kab*, but that employed on this day held only three *kab*; and on every other day it was heavy, but to-day it was light; on every other day the handle of it was short, but to-day long, in order to make it lighter for the high priest, lest he might be wearied. On every other day there were three layers of fire placed on the altar, but to-day there were four, in order to adorn and crown the altar.

Halacha 6. In the Thorah it says (Lev. xvi. 17), "And he makes atonement for himself, and for his household, and for all the congregation of Israel." By this—thus have they learnt from tradition—oral confession of sins is to be understood; thou learnest accordingly from this, that on this day he makes three confessions of sins. First one for his own person, a second for his own person in connection with the rest of the priests; both are made over the bull of the atonement which is for him. And the third confession of sin for the whole of Israel is made over the goat which is to be driven away. He utters the name (of God) three times in each of these confessions.

What, then, is the tenor of his words? "O Jehovah!

[1] קיתן, the Greek κύαθος (not κήθιον).

I have sinned, have failed in my duty, and committed wickedness before Thee. O Jehovah! Be propitiated for the sins, failings, and wickedness whereby I and my house have sinned, failed in duties, and committed wickedness before Thee; as it is written (Lev. xvi. 30), 'For on that day he shall make an atonement for you to cleanse you, that ye may be clean from all your sins before Jehovah.'" Consequently he uttered three times the name of God, and the same in the other two confessions; and when he casts the lot for the atoning goat, he says, "A sin-offering to Jehovah." Thus on this day he utters the name of God ten times, and utters it every time as it is written, that is, the full name of God. In earlier times he raised his voice at the name of God; but an abuse of this practice crept in, and he spake it in a subdued voice, and allowed it to die away into a kind of singing, so that it was not audible even to his fellow-priests.

Halacha 7. All, both priests and people, who stood in the fore-court, so soon as they heard the full name of God proceed from the high priest in holiness and purity, knelt down, and, casting themselves prostrate on their faces, called out, "Praised be the name of the glory of His kingdom for all eternity!" for it is written (Deut. xxxii. 3), "Because I utter the name of the Lord, ascribe ye honour to our God." In all three confessions he endeavoured to finish speaking the name of God simultaneously with the words of praise, and then he spake to them, "Be ye purified." The whole day is valid according to the law for the confession of sins for the day of atonement, and also for the confession of sins over the bulls which were to be burnt.[1]

Third Section.

Halacha 1. On one of the two lots was written, "For Jehovah;" and on the other, "For Azazel." It was permissible to use any material for them, either wood, stone, or metal. It was not, however, allowed for one to be large and the other small, one of silver and another of gold; but they

[1] *Vid. Megilla* 20*b*.

must be both alike: they used to be of wood, and in the second temple they were made of gold. The two lots were to be thrown into one and the same vessel, in which there was room for both hands; yet so that the two hands were pressed together, so that he could not choose one of the two lots. This vessel possessed no sacred attribute; it was made of wood, and was called קלפי.[1]

Halacha 2. Where is the lot cast? On the eastern side of the fore-court, on the north of the altar, the urn was put down, and the two goats were placed by it, with their faces turned to the west, and their backs to the east. The high priest now approaches, having the consecrating priest on his right, and the chief of the ministering priestly family on his left; and the two goats stand before his face, the one on his right, the other on his left.

Halacha 3. He now dips his hands hastily into the urn, and draws out the lots, one in each hand, in the name of the two goats, and then opens his hands. If that for Jehovah has been brought out in the right hand, the consecrating priest says: "My lord! high priest! Elevate thy right hand!" If, however, it is brought out in the left hand, the chief of the ministering priestly family says to him: "My lord! high-priest! Elevate thy left hand!" He now places the two lots on the goats, that in his right hand on the goat on his right, and that in his left hand on the goat on his left; nevertheless, if he does not lay the lots upon them, the whole matter is not prejudiced, only he has not so fully completed the prescribed action. For the laying on is a command which is not a necessary condition; but the drawing of the lots is, on the contrary, a necessary condition, although it is not an act of divine service. Therefore this laying on is valid, if done by one not a priest; but the drawing the lots out of the urn would be invalid if thus performed.

Halacha 4. And he ties a scarlet stripe, two *selas* in weight, on the head of the goat which is to be driven away, and places it opposite to the door at which it is to go out;

[1] Representing the Greek word κάλπις or κάλπη (pitcher, urn, box).

but on the goat which is to be slain (he binds a stripe) round its neck, and then slays the "bull of atonement which is for him," and (after that) the goat on which the lot has fallen "for Jehovah."

Halacha 5. And he brings their blood into the temple, and from the blood of the two he makes forty-three sprinklings; the blood of the bull he sprinkles eight times in the holiest of holies, between the poles of the ark, within a hand's-breadth of the mercy-seat. For it is written, "He shall sprinkle it before the mercy-seat," etc.: he sprinkles it, therefore, once above, and seven times beneath. They have learned by tradition that in the Scripture term "seven times" the first sprinkling was not to be included; and therefore he reckons, "once and one, once and two, once and three, once and four, once and five, once and six, once and seven."

And why does he reckon thus? Lest by error the first sprinkling should be reckoned among the seven. Then he sprinkles the blood of the goat between the poles of the ark, once above, and seven times below, and reckons in the same way as with the blood of the bull. Next he sprinkles the blood of the bull eight times in the temple on the veil, once above, and seven times below: for it is written with regard to the blood of the bull,[1] "On the mercy-seat, and before the mercy-seat;" and he reckons in the same way as he did inside. Then he sprinkles again the blood of the goat eight times on the veil, once above, and seven times below: for it is said with regard to the blood of the goat, "He shall do with its blood as he did with the blood of the bull;" and he reckons in the same way as he did within. In all these sprinklings he endeavours not to sprinkle above or below, but does it like one who is in the act of scourging. Next he mixes the two bloods, the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat, and sprinkles it four times on the four horns of the golden altar in the temple, and seven times on the middle of this altar.

[1] Here there is some confusion. *Vid. Lechem Mischneh* on this passage, and *Thosaphoth Jom-tob* on *Joma*, § 5, Mischn. 4.

Halacha 6. In all these forty-three sprinklings he dips his finger in the blood for each sprinkling separately: one dipping is not sufficient for two sprinklings. The remainder of the blood he pours out on the ground to the west of the outer altar.

Halacha 7. He then delivers over the living goat into the hands of a man who stands by ready to lead it into the wilderness. In a legal point of view, any one is fitted for leading it away; but the high priests have made a rule, not to allow any Israelite [1] to lead it away. And tents were set up from Jerusalem to the edge of the wilderness, in which one or several men abode over the day, so as to be able to accompany the man conducting the goat from one tent to another. At each tent it was said to him, "Here is food, and here is water!" And if he was exhausted, and it was necessary for him to eat, he might do so; yet this was never the case. The people at the last tent remained standing at the end of the Sabbath-limit, and surveyed his action from afar. And what did he do? He divided into two the scarlet stripes on the horns of the goat: one-half of the band was placed on the rock, and the other half between the two horns of the goat, which he then pushed backwards, so that tumbling over it rolled down, and all its limbs were smashed to pieces ere it reached a point half-way down the hill. He that led the goat now goes and sits down in the last tent until it is night. Watch-towers were set up, and signals displayed, in order that it should be known when the goat had reached the wilderness.

After he (the high priest) has delivered over the goat into the hands of him who was to lead him away, he turns to the bull and the goat whose blood he had sprinkled within; and cutting them up, and taking therefrom the sacrificial portions, which he places in a vessel in order to take them to the fire on the altar, he cuts up the rest of the flesh [2] into great pieces, all connected with one another, without severing them, and delivers them up into the hands of others to take them

[1] That is, no one who was not of the tribe of Levi.

[2] Rashi quite otherwise.

away to the place of burning, where they were cut in pieces still in the skin.[1] . . .

Halacha 8. As soon as the goat had reached the wilderness, the priest went out into the woman's division of the fore-court in order to read from the Thorah; and whilst he was reading, the bull and the goat were burnt in the place of ashes. Whoever, then, saw the high priest whilst he was reading, could not witness the burning of the bull and the goat. The latter operation could be performed by any common man.

Halacha 9. This reading is not a performance of divine worship; so he can read either in his own ordinary white garments or in the high-priestly white robes, just as he pleases: for he is allowed to make use of the priestly robes at other times than those of service.

Halacha 10. And what were the circumstances attending the reading? He sits in the woman's division of the fore-court, and all the people stand in front of him. The minister of the synagogue takes the book of the Thorah, and gives it to the ruler of the synagogue, who gives it to the consecrating priest: the consecrating priest gives it to the high priest, who receives it standing up; and standing up he reads *Achare moth* (Lev. xvi.) and *ach be'asor* (Lev. xxiii. 27) in the Parashah of the feast up to the end of the division referring to it. He then rolls up the Thorah, and, placing it in his lap, says, "More is here written than that which I have read to you," and recites to them from memory the section *ube'asor* in Numbers up to the end of the division. And why is this done? Because the book of the Thorah is not to be unrolled in a public assembly. And why does he not read the latter portion out of another roll? Because the same man must not read out of two rolls (one after the other), lest he should cast suspicion on the first.

Halacha 11. Before and after the reading he pronounces the benediction in the way in which it is done in the synagogue, but adding the following seven benedictions: "Be

[1] There are here some references made by Maimuni to other sections of his work, which we omit to translate.

well pleased, Jehovah, our God," etc.; "We confess to Thee," etc.; "Forgive us, our Father, for we have sinned," etc. With these he pronounces the concluding formula: "Thou art praised, Jehovah, Thou that pardonest with mercy the sins of Thy people Israel."

These three benedictions are the normal ones. He then pronounces a benediction for the sanctuary separately, with the purport that the sanctuary might continue, and that God would abide therein, with the concluding formula: "Praised art Thou, Jehovah, Thou that art enthroned on Zion." Also a separate benediction for Israel, with the purport that the Lord would help Israel, and that the royalty might not depart from it, with the concluding formula: "Praised art Thou, Jehovah, that Thou choosest Israel." Then for the priests a separate benediction, with the purport that God would accept their actions and ministry graciously, and would bless them, with the concluding formula: "Praised art Thou, Jehovah, Thou that sanctifiest the priests." Finally, he offers prayer, devotion, singing, and supplications, according as he is practised therein, and concludes: "Help, O Jehovah, Thy people Israel, for Thy people needs Thy help. Praised art Thou, Jehovah, Thou that hearest prayer."

Fourth Section.

Halacha 1. The successive order of all the actions of this day was as follows:—About midnight they cast lots for the carrying away of the ashes, duly prepared the altar-fire, and took the ashes from the altar, following entirely the usual mode of procedure in the order we have already described, until they came to slaying the daily sacrifice. When they were about to slay the daily sacrifice, a cloth of linen was spread between the high priest and the people. And why of linen? In order that he may perceive that the service of the day is to be performed in linen robes. He now takes off his ordinary clothes, bathes himself, and puts on the golden robes. After consecrating his hands and feet, he cuts through the greatest part of the two neck-pipes of the daily offering; and

leaving to another the completion of the act of slaying, catches the blood, and sprinkles it upon the altar according to precept. After this, he goes into the temple and looks to the early fumigation with frankincense, cleanses the lamps, and places on the altar-fire the pieces of the daily offering, and also the meat-offering and drink-offering, in the same order as in the daily sacrifice of any other day, as already described. After the daily sacrifice he offers the bull and the seven lambs as the feast-offerings of the day, and consecrating his hands and feet, takes off the golden robes; then having bathed himself, he puts on the white robes, and, consecrating his hands and his feet, approaches his own bull. The latter is placed between the porch and the altar, the head towards the south and the face towards the west; the priest stands on the east of it with his face turned towards the west, and laying both hands on the head of the bull, pronounces the confession of sins. And thus he speaks: "O Jehovah, I have sinned, committed transgressions and wickedness before Thee, I and my house. O Jehovah, let atonement be made for the sins, transgressions, and wickedness in which I have sinned, transgressed, and done wickedly before Thee, I and my house; as it is thus written in the law of Moses Thy servant: 'He shall make atonement for you to cleanse you, that ye may be cleansed from all your sins before Jehovah!'"

Then he casts lots over the two goats, fastens a scarlet stripe on the head of the goat which was to be sent away, and places it before the door at which it was to go out. On the head of the goat which was to be slain (he fastened a band) in the region of the neck; and approaching his own bull a second time, lays his hands upon his head, and pronounces a second confession of sins. And thus he spake: "O Jehovah, I have sinned, transgressed, and committed wickedness before Thee, I and my house, and the sons of Aaron, the people of Thy sacred things. O Jehovah, let atonement be made for the sins, transgressions, and wickedness whereby I have sinned, transgressed, and done wickedly before Thee, I and my house, and the sons of Aaron, the people of Thy holy things; as it is written in the law of

Moses Thy servant: 'For on this day,'" etc. Hereupon he slays the bull, and catching the blood, gives it to some one, who shakes it, lest it should coagulate; then, placing it on the fourth row of pavement outwards from the temple, he takes the incense-pan (הַמַּחְתָּה) and shovels into it the fiery embers from the altar, those indeed which lie to the western side; as it is written, "from the altar of Jehovah." He then descends and places them on the pavement in the fore-court; and there is brought to him out of the utensil-chamber the ladle (הַקֻּפָּה), and a vessel full of the very finest frankincense: of this he takes two handfuls, neither levelled nor heaped up, but just handfuls, whether he be large or small in his bodily proportions, and places them in the ladle.

We have already explained elsewhere, that, as regarded the blood of the sanctuary and the rest of the ministerial actions, the use of the left hand caused a legal invalidity; therefore, in conformity with this, he would have carried the incense-pan in his left hand, and the ladle with the frankincense in his right hand. But nevertheless, on account of the heavy burden of the incense-pan, and because, moreover, it was hot, he could not carry it in his left hand as far as the ark: he therefore took the incense-pan in his right hand, and the ladle with the frankincense in his left, and passed through the temple till he reached the holy of holies. If he found the veil fastened up, he entered the holy of holies, until he came to the ark. When he reached the ark he placed the incense-pan between the two poles—in the second temple, where there was no ark, he placed it on the "foundation stone"—and, taking the ladle by its edge either in the tips of his fingers or his teeth, he empties the frankincense with his thumb into his hands until they are as full of it as they were before;[1] and this is one of the severest ministerial duties in the sanctuary: he then with his hand pours the frankincense in heaps upon the charcoal on the inner

[1] Maimuni appears to have had before him here a reading which differs from our statements in the Talmud (*Joma* 49*b*). *Vid. Lechem Mishneh* on the passage.

side of the pan,[1] so that the fumigation may be closest to the ark, and removed away from his face, lest he might be burnt. He now waits there until the temple is full of the incense, and then goes out, walking backwards step by step, his face turned to the sanctuary, and his back to the temple, until he came outside the veil. After coming out he prays there but a brief prayer, lest he might make the people anxious whether he had not met with his death in the temple. And thus he prayed: "Jehovah, our God, let it be Thy will, if this year should be a hot year, that it may be blessed with rain; may the sceptre not depart from the house of Judah; may Thy people, the house of Israel, never be wanting in support, and let not the prayer of those journeying come before thee."[2]

Halacha 2. During the time of the incense-burning in the holiest of holies, the whole of the people kept away from the temple only: they had not to avoid the interval between the porch and the altar. For the latter is done only in the daily fumigation in the temple, and during the blood-sprinkling there. Then he takes the blood of the bull from him who is shaking it, and going with it into the holiest of holies, sprinkles it there eight times between the poles of the ark; he then goes out and places it in the temple, on the golden pedestal which stands there. In the next place, going out of the temple, he slays the goat, and, catching its blood, carries it into the holiest of holies; there he sprinkles it eight times between the poles of the ark, and going out, places it on the second golden pedestal standing in the temple. Then he takes the blood of the bull down from the pedestal, and sprinkles it eight times on the veil opposite the ark; and putting down the blood of the bull, he takes down the blood of the goat, and sprinkles it eight times on the veil opposite the ark. After that he pours the blood of the bull amongst that of the goat, and empties it all into the basin in which the blood of the bull had been, so that they are well

[1] That is, on the side farthest from him.

[2] Who pray for dry weather whilst the land is in need of rain. *Vid.* my *Geschichte der Jüd. Poesie*, p. 188.

mixed; and standing within the golden altar, between the altar and the candlesticks, he begins to sprinkle the mixed blood on the horns of the golden altar, going round the same outside the horns, commencing with the north-eastern horn, then going to the north-western, then to the south-western, and then to the south-eastern. All the sprinklings are made in an upward direction, the last excepted, which is made freely, and in a downward direction, so that his robes may not be soiled; then he shovels aside the charcoal and ashes on the golden altar, until the gold of it is visible, and sprinkles the mixed blood on the altar now laid bare seven times on the southern side, on the spot where the horns of the altar end; he now goes out and pours the rest of the blood on the ground to the west of the outer altar.

Then he approaches the goat which is to be given away, and, placing both hands on its head, pronounces a confession of sins. And he speaks thus: "O Jehovah, Thy people the house of Israel hath sinned, transgressed, and committed wickedness before Thee. O Jehovah, let atonement be made for the sins, transgressions, and the wickedness whereby Thy people the house of Israel hath sinned, transgressed, and committed wickedness before Thee; as it is written in the law of Moses Thy servant: 'For on this day He will make atonement,'" etc.

After this he sends the goat away into the wilderness; and taking out the sacrificial portions of the bull and the goat, the blood of which he had sprinkled inside, and placing them in a vessel, he sends the remainder of them to the place of ashes to be burnt, and goes out into the woman's division of the fore-court, and there reads, after the goat had reached the wilderness. Then he performs a consecrating washing, and having taken off the golden robes, bathes himself, puts on the white robes, and consecrates his hands and his feet; next he sacrifices the goat, the blood of which is sprinkled without, and forms a part of the regular feast-offering of the day, and offers his own ram and the ram of the people, as it is written: "And he shall go out and offer his burnt-offering and the burnt-offering of the people." And having brought

to the altar-fire the sacrificial portions of the bull and goat which are to be burnt, he offers the daily evening sacrifice. Then he consecrates his hands and feet, takes off the golden robes, bathes himself, puts on the white robes, performs the consecrating washing, and, entering the holiest of holies, brings out the spoon and the pan. After this he performs the consecrating washing, takes off the white robes, bathes himself, puts on the golden robes, performs the consecrating washing, fumigates with the evening incense, and gives his attention to the evening lights, just as on other days. Then he consecrates his hands and his feet, takes off the golden robes, and, putting on his ordinary clothes, withdraws to his own house. All the people accompany him to his house, and he holds a festival to celebrate his having come successfully out of the sanctuary.

This is the liturgy of the day of atonement (סדר עבודת יה כ), according to Maimuni's sketch of it. There is also another classical sketch by Rabinu Asher, which concludes with the words: "Afterwards he consecrates his hands and his feet, and having put on his ordinary clothes, is accompanied to his own house by the chiefs of the people and the distinguished men. And he gives a day of festival to all his friends to celebrate his having come safe out of the matter." I remember that I have given elsewhere this sketch, which is adopted into the Lectionaries of the day of atonement. The *'Abôda* of the day of atonement is the best commentary on that which is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews as to the insufficiency of this Old Testament institution, which fell so very far short of the inward need of man. If we consider, in addition, how deeply degraded the high-priesthood had become at the time of the composition of the epistle, the language which the apostolic author uses will seem even to be mild.

SECOND APPENDIX.

ON THE SACRIFICIAL CHARACTER OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

FOURTEEN THESES TO HEB. XIII. 10.

1. The reality of the sacramental gifts in the Lord's Supper follows of necessity (apart from other grounds) from the antitypical relation of that sacrament to its Old Testament types, especially to the passover (Ex. xii., xiii.) and the covenant blood-sprinkling (Ex. xxiv.).

2. From this antitypical relation follows at once that the Lord's Supper is a sacrificial feast, the Old Testament passover (especially the post-Egyptian) having been such [*i.e.* a feast on sacred food which had been offered to God in sacrifice]; and, moreover, the covenant blood-sprinkling, recorded in Ex. xxiv., was not a mere consecration [or dedication of the people of Israel to their God], but specifically a consecration consisting in the application of an atonement just accomplished [by the blood-sprinkling on the altar] (Ex. xxiv. 6).

3. The Lord's Supper is a sacrificial feast, not merely from the fact that the congregation therein offers earthly gifts [of bread and wine] in order to receiving them back replenished with gifts from heaven; and not merely in so far as the church therein, announcing or showing forth the Lord's death, offers with her lips the sacrifice of praise. Neither of these facts or statements, nor both together, can be rightly said to express, and much less to exhaust, the true sacrificial character of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

4. Neither, then, is the sacrament of the Holy Communion a sacrificial feast in such sense as that the church can properly be said to offer there anything in sacrifice [in order to partake of it. Rather, she partakes of that which has once been offered for her]. She offers nothing herself, but only obtains a share in the sacrifice of Christ; though, inasmuch as He, when made man, did in His high-priestly character offer up Himself vicariously for all mankind, the sacrifice may be said in some sense to be the church's sacrifice as well as His. In this sense the sacrifice of Christ once offered, and the oft-repeated sacramental feast upon that sacrifice of which His church partakes, may be regarded as one great sacrificial action, consisting on the one hand in an objective atonement, and on the other in the application and appropriation of its fruits.

5. And so neither is the Lord's Supper a sacrificial feast in the sense of the Roman Mass. 'The church [properly speaking] offers nothing of herself, least of all does she offer Christ. Neither does Christ in the sacrament offer Himself, by means of His representative the priest (which is properly the view of the Greek and Roman Churches). The self-oblation of Christ, in its earthly form, was made once for all on the altar of the cross; and in its heavenly form (corresponding to the entrance of the Jewish high priest into the holy of holies) it has also been made once for all, and now continues as an ever-present fact, admitting of no interruption, and therefore of no repetition either here on earth or above in heaven.

6. That which was foreshadowed in the three constituent acts of the typical sacrifice, the slaying of the victim, the presentation of the blood in the holy place, and the oblation of the flesh upon the altar, has been accomplished once for all by the divine antitype in acts of eternal validity. Of these acts the first and third were performed on the cross, the second when the God-man entered for our sakes in His risen humanity into the inner life and presence of God. Two other sacrificial actions—the eating of the flesh by priests and offerers (which took place more or less in almost all the

typical sacrifices but that of the burnt-offering), and the sprinkling of the sacrificial blood on the congregation of Israel (which took place only once at the inauguration of the covenant)—are both antitypically fulfilled in the Lord's Supper, where we partake not only of the flesh of the divine victim, by whose προσφορά we have been sanctified, but also of the atoning blood, by whose ἔκχυσις we were redeemed.

7. What we receive in the Lord's Supper is the body, which hung for us upon the cross, and the blood which was shed for us upon the cross. That on which Scripture lays stress is not that it is the Lord's glorified body and blood which we receive, but the identity of what we receive with His body and blood in the act of being offered. In this identity consists the essence and the efficacy of the heavenly *oblatio*. The appearance of Christ before God with His blood once shed for us, His high-priestly introduction of that blood into the heavenly sanctuary, is the eternal conclusive act of His atonement and of our reconciliation.

8. That which is given in the Lord's Supper is one and the same, since the day of Pentecost, as that which was given at the first institution. The divine words and will then constituted the sacrament to be what it is, and gave it its fundamental norm and character for all time.

9. The only difference is, that *then* the Lord's body and blood were *ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΟΝ* and *ΕΚΧΥΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ*, and that *now* they are *ΔΟΘΕΝ* and *ΕΚΧΥΘΕΝ*. This difference is as good as none at all.

10. Another distinction, that the Lord's body is now glorified, and was not so at the first institution, is, so far as the substance of the sacrament is concerned, as defined by the Lord's own words, a merely accidental distinction or difference.

11. What the Lord gives us in the sacrament is that unchangeable essence or form of His humanity which constitutes the substratum under both states or conditions of glorification and non-glorification.

12. This form or essence of the Lord's humanity has the

power of self-impartation and divine spiritual efficacy, not only from the fact that it is the humanity of the God-man, but also from the fact that it was miraculously conceived by the Holy Ghost, and born of the blessed Virgin Mary, and that so our blessed Lord, while partaking in full reality of our Adamite nature, is yet at the same time, in virtue of the supernatural and divine origination of His sinless humanity, the Son of man who is come down from heaven.

13. Christ gives us His body and blood apart from one another in the sacrament, because it is His death which we there show forth, and which in living power is present with us; a death which, in order to be the true antitype of the death of the typical sacrificial victim, consisted in the violent separation of His blood from His body.

14. The distinct operations of the two sacramental gifts may be divined from the different purposes held in view by the presentation on the altar of the flesh of the typical victim, and the affusion or sprinkling of the typical blood.

[The words within brackets are added by the Translator.—T. L. K.]

NOTES.

NOTE A, p. 3.—*On the adjectives ὅσιος, ἅγιος, and ἄκακος.*

Ὅσιος is used in classical writers in reference to persons, ἅγιος very rarely, if ever. The Etymol. Magn. derives ὅσιος from ἄζεσθαι, the Homeric synonym for σέβεσθαι. See Hahn, *Theologie des N. T.* § 36. Of ἄκακος Ammonius says correctly: κακὸς πονηροῦ διαφέρει, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄκακος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Κακὸς μὲν γὰρ ὁ πανοῦργος, πονηρὸς δὲ ὁ δραστικὸς κακοῦ,—the one being an evil-disposed person, the other an evil-doer.

NOTE B, p. 5.

A MS. copy of the *Liturgy of St. Chrysostom* now lying before me has the following noteworthy various readings of Heb. vii. 26-28:—Ver. 26, καὶ χωρισμένος for κεχωρισμένος; ver. 27, θυσίας and προσενέγκας; ver. 28, τελειόμενον,—this last evidently a blunder from ignorance. The Hebrew verb הַעֲלָה combines the notions of causing to ascend by means of fire, and of bringing up upon the altar, without one being able to say which is most prominent.

NOTE C, p. 8.

Bähr takes no notice of this sacerdotal Minchah; but on the other hand the reader may consult with advantage Thalhofer, *Die unblutigen Opfer des Mosaischen Cultus*, pp. 139-156, and Einhorn, *Princip des Mosaismus*, i. 144-146.

NOTE D, p. 9.

Comp. Philo i. 534. 6. This ἐνδελεχὴς θυσία of the priests is more closely described at the end of his book *de Victimis*, ii. 250.

Throughout he calls this Minchah θυσία, and in fact θύειν is etymologically by no means equivalent to σφάττειν.

Note E, p. 15.

The fathers failed to apprehend this truth: *e.g.* Cyril opposes to the ἠσθένησε μὲν σαρκικῶς σταυρὸν ὑπομείνας the abrupt exception, ἐστι γε μὴν ὡς Θεὸς τοῦ ἀσθενεῖν ἐπέκεινα. He loses sight of the ὁ ὑψωθείς in the contemplation of the ὁ Θεός.

Note F, p. 18.

The word λειτουργεῖν, according to Ulpian (on *Demosth. Leptin.* p. 162 C.), is equivalent to εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι. Instead of δημόσιον (the commonweal), the ancients used the term λῆϊτον (λάϊτον) or λεῖτον. Philo calls the priest θεραπευτὴς καὶ λειτουργὸς τῶν ἁγίων (i. 114. 4).

Note G, p. 20.

Steinhofer alone among the older commentators developes this notion in a manner truly original and profound. "The tabernacle," according to him, "is the body of the Lord Jesus, His sacred humanity, which was in truth infinitely more precious than all the vessels of the first tabernacle, than all the gold and silver, and jewelry wherewith the temple was adorned, even though it bore the likeness of our sinful flesh and partook of its infirmity. It was through this outer tabernacle that the Mediator went into the holy of holies. But He thus entered in not for His own sake, but for ours: otherwise it would have been an easy thing for Him to have changed at once that most sacred tabernacle into a holy of holies without any rending of the veil. But it was His blessed will to make His entrance by means of the taking down and destruction of the first tabernacle, that through the rending of the veil *we* might be enabled to see into the inner sanctuary. By His justification through the Spirit the dissolved and ruined tabernacle became the glorious and eternal sanctuary" (*Tägliche Nahrung des Glaubens*, etc., ii. p. 164). These are profound thoughts indeed, but the view thus indicated is not that of the writer of our epistle.

Note H, p. 22.

Not Philo and Josephus (who regard the tabernacle as a symbol of the Cosmos, the sanctuary as that of heaven) are the genuine representatives of this view; but the Zohar, Midrash, and even Talmud and Pijut (religious poetry of the Synagogue), are full of it. See their interpretations of Ps. cxxii., cxi., Isa. xlix. 16, etc., in Schöttgen's *Diss. de Hierosolyma Cœlesti*, among the appendices to his *Horæ*, where, however, what is truly ancient and what is comparatively modern are confounded in a very uncritical manner.

Note I, p. 27.

For this use of the aorist compare Xen. *Œcon.* vii. 20, δεῖ τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἀνθρώποις ἔξειν ὅ τι εἰσφέρωσιν εἰς τὸ στεγνὸν ἔχειν τοὺς ἐργαζομένους τὰς ἐν τῷ ὑπαίθρῳ ἐργασίας, and, on the other hand, such sentences as the following: οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε ἐρέσθαι, in Plato,—ἔχω καλὰ φράσαι in Pindar, and indeed everywhere; *e.g.*, in Irenæus, *Præfat.* ἔχοντες ἐπιδείξαι, *habentes quod ostendant. Vid.* Frotscher's *Glossary to Xen.* under ἔχειν, and comp. Philo's habitual use of ἀνάγκη ("it is necessary"), sometimes with present infinitive, sometimes with aorist, sometimes with both together (*e.g.* ii. 638).

Note K, p. 29.

Among moderns, the writer whose view on this point most nearly resembles mine is undoubtedly v. Gerlach on Heb. v. 7; among older writers, Steinhofer. "Christ's blood was not merely shed for us here on earth, but belongs also to the heavenly sanctuary, where it is sprinkled on the throne of God, and whence it is sprinkled likewise on our hearts." Among the ancients, Cyril of Alexandria interprets the σκηνή, as we do, to be ἡ ἄνω καλλίπολις τουτ' ἐστιν ὁ οὐρανός; but the sacrifice there offered by the glorified Jesus is for him the company of the redeemed. The same appears to have been the view taken by Theodore and by St. Chrysostom. Comp. Cramer's *Catena in loc.* Another but related view is that of Clemens Romanus, c. xxxvi., where he speaks of Christ as τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν προσφορῶν ἡμῶν. St. Gregory's conception expressed in his comment on Job i. 5 ("*sine intermissione pro nobis holocaustum Redemptor immolet, qui sine cessatione*

Patri suam pro nobis incarnationem demonstrat") is not that of our epistle, which regards the heavenly προσφορά of Christ as the antitype of the high priest's action on the day of atonement.

Note L, p. 32.

In the *usus loquendi* it is possible that with ὑποδείγματα the sense of ἀμυδρὰ · δείγματα (indistinct sketches) may have been combined. The assumption made by interpreters, that ὑπόδειγμα has *properly* the meaning of a sketch or outline, is incorrect.

Note M, p. 33.

The reading δειχθέναν in D (without correction) is the accusative form which is now common in modern Greek. This form is frequently found in the Cod. Alex. (*e.g.* Ex. x. 4, Num. xv. 27, Ezek. xxviii. 13), in inscriptions, and is adopted by Lachmann in one or two places of the Apocalypse. Comp. Franz, *Epigraphices Græcæ Elementa*, p. 248, and Mullach, *Gramm. der griechischen Vulgärsprache*, p. 162.

Note N, p. 36.

[It seems worth observing that this wide signification of the Greek word νόμος in the New Testament, on which Professor Delitzsch is here remarking, is derived from its relation to the Hebrew word Thorah, of which it is the rendering in the Septuagint. *Thorah* (תורה), whether designating the Old Testament in general or the Pentateuch in particular, or the revelation or constitution contained in them, signifies more than a collection of commands and precepts, or a code of positive laws. "Thorah" is properly and primarily "instruction," and in the scriptural use of the term, as denoting *divine* instruction, it is in the first place equivalent to "revelation," or a complex of records concerning revelations made by God to His people; and only in the second place, as denoting *ethical* instruction (*i.e.* a revelation of the divine will concerning life and conduct), is Thorah equivalent to "law," *i.e.* a complex of precepts and commandments, with promises and penalties attached to them. The very decalogue itself (the "ten words," δέκα λόγοι, of Deut. x. 4) is a brief summary of the whole Thorah (divine teaching) of the Old Testament under both these

aspects. It contains both the creed and the law of Israel. St. Paul finds both "law" and "gospel" within the *Thorah* itself. Comp. Rom. x. 5-10, Gal. iii. 8, 9, 12. Νόμος is accordingly used sometimes (as Delitzsch observes) in the same comprehensive sense.—Tr.]

Note O, p. 42.

It is in reference to such passages as Isa. liv. 13, Jer. xxxi. 33 sq., Joel iii. 1, etc., that our Lord speaks of all believers as "taught of God" (John vi. 45). The "knowing all things" of 1 John ii. 20, 27, is a potential knowledge, not a divine absolute, but a human and relative intelligence.

Note P, p. 84.

The view taken by many of the fathers, that in the work of atonement the λύτρον was paid by the Redeemer not to God but to the Evil One, is thus expressed by Origen: ἔδωκεν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν, οὐ τῷ Θεῷ, τῷ πονηρῷ οὖν. Οὗτος γὰρ ἐκράτει ἡμῶν ἕως δοθῇ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῷ λύτρον ἡ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ψυχὴ ἀπατηθέντι ὡς δυναμένῳ αὐτῆς κυριεῦσαι. *In Matt.* t. xvi. p. 726. And again by Basil: ὁ διάβολος ὑποχειρίους ἡμᾶς λαβὼν οὐ πρότερον τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τυραννίδος ἀφίησι, πρὶν ἄν τινι λύτρῳ ἀξιολόγῳ πεισθεὶς ἀνταλλάξασθαι ἡμᾶς ἕληται· δεῖ οὖν τὸ λύτρον μὴ ὁμογενὲς εἶναι τοῖς κατεχομένοις ἀλλὰ πολλῷ διαφέρειν τῷ μετρῷ. *Hom. in Ps.* xlviii. One sees at how low a point stood the insight of these fathers into the scheme of redemption. Origen by his ἀπατηθέντι ὡς δυναμένῳ exhibits the self-contradiction of his own theory; and St. Basil, making our redemption depend on the arbitrary will of the Evil One, introduces a perfectly monstrous thought, as Greg. of Nyssa himself felt, *Or.* 42, substituting however one false conception for another: εἰ τὸ λύτρον οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ τοῦ κατέχοντος γίνεται, ζητῶ, τίνι τοῦτο εἰσηνέχθη; εἰ μὲν τῷ πονηρῷ φεῦ τῆς ὕβρεως, εἰ τὸν Θεὸν αὐτὸν λύτρον ὁ λῃστὴς λαμβάνει. Εἰ δὲ τῷ πατρί, δῆλον, ὅτι λαμβάνει μὲν ὁ πατὴρ οὐκ αἰτήσας οὐδὲ δεηθείς, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ χρῆναι ἁγιασθῆναι τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Neither does the author of the Epistle to Diognetus give the true conception when he says that God in the fulness of time appointed by His own mercy αὐτὸς τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ἀπέδοτο λύτρον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν (c. ix.). The Scriptures nowhere so express it. The Father indeed wills our redemption, but it is the Son who gives Himself a λύτρον for us.

It seems strange that the fathers should have never laid hold of the reconciling thought that a satisfaction was due from us to the divine justice. But now that this has been made clear to the consciousness of the later church, and she has embraced the truth of which the λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν of Matt. xx. 28 has become the anagram, it is the more incumbent on us to hold it fast, in adoration of a mystery into which the angels desire to look.

The close relationship between the two notions, כֹּפֶר (ransom, λύτρον) and כִּפּוּרִים (atonement), is strikingly shown in Ex. xxx. 12-16, where the census-money is called at ver. 12 "the ransom" (כֹּפֶר) "of his soul," and at ver. 16 "the money of atonement" (כִּפּוּרִים). The money paid at the census is called כֹּפֶר because it covers or protects the man from the danger supposed to be incurred by the census-taking (comp. 2 Sam. xxiv.), and כִּפּוּרִים for a similar reason, because it covers or hides from the divine wrath (such covering or hiding being the Hebrew mode of conceiving the idea of atonement). Yet so different were the notions connected with the two words in ordinary usage, that while כֹּפֶר is regularly rendered in the LXX. by λύτρον or λύτρωσις, כִּפּוּרִים never is so, but by ἱλασμὸς, καθαρισμὸς, ἐξίλασις, or ἐξιλασμός. Both terms are applied in the New Testament to the work of redemption, and in either case it is the divine punitive justice to which the λύτρον is applied as "satisfaction," or the ἱλασμός as "expiation." The work of redemption is, in fact, a self-wrought reconciliation between the divine justice and the divine mercy. Love is the Alpha and Omega of the whole, between which the death of the cross stands in the midst. In short, the atonement of the cross is the solution of the enigma how God can be at once the δίκαιος and the δικαιῶν of the sinner, how without impeachment of His holiness and justice He can love and save the guilty. "*Vicarious satisfaction*" is the grand *Eureka* of holy love.

Note Q, p. 93.

"A Gentile once came to Rabbi Johanan Ben Saccai, and said to him: Is not this a sort of magic? You take a red cow, burn it, collect the ashes in a vessel of water, and sprinkle therewith a man defiled by contact with a dead body, and then say to him, Thou art clean! He answered him thus: Hast thou never seen a man into whom the spirit of a foul disease has entered, and observed the manner in which they went about his cure? The Gentile said he had done so. And canst thou, continued Rabbi

Johanan, comprehend how any kind of medicine effects the cure of human disease? Both the one and the other are equally incomprehensible, and yet each in its own way effectual. The Gentile was silent, and went his way. Whereupon the Rabbi's own disciples said to him: My lord, it was easy for thee to subdue that Gentile with a straw and reduce him to silence, but what hast thou, O master, satisfactory to say to us on this point? To whom he replied: A dead body defileth not, and water cleanseth not, but such is the ordinance of the Holy One, blessed be He! I have settled an ordinance, I have made a decree, it is not lawful for thee to overstep them!"—*Be-midbar Rabba*, c. xix. The Jewish doctor then discerned no natural or rational connection between means and end, the only reason for the proceeding being the divine ordinance.

END OF VOL. II.

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